AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
Raju J.
The above Second Appeal has been filed by the plaintiffs in O.S. No. 824/81 on the file of the District Munsif Court. Salem, who succeeded
before the trial court, but have lost in the first appellate court, against the judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge. Salem dated
30.6.1982 in A.S. No. 94/81 reversing the judgment and decree of the District Munsif. Salem, dated 31.8.1981 in O.S. No. 824/81. The case of
the plaintiffs before the courts below was that the plaintiffs are the owners of Mohannad Peak Estate. Yercaud, that there was an earlier litigation
between the plaintiffs on the one hand and the defendants and the family members on the other hand in respect of various estates owned by them in
common and suits were filed for partition and thereafter in O.S. No. 501/75. on the file of the Sub Court. Salem, a compromise final decree was
passed in I.A. No. 399/77 on 23.3 1977 and that thereafter the plaintiffs were enjoying the whole of Mohannad Peak Estate without am let or
hindrance and the defendants were enjoying likewise Carrara Estate as owners. The case of the plaintiffs was that both parties arc bound by the
various terms of the compromise embodied in the final decree, that there is a tank in Carrara Estate, the water from which could be and was being
utilised for spraying and other purposes for the benefit of Mohannad Peak Estate also and to enable the plaint ills to do so. a specific provision was
made with reference to this right in clause 12 of the memorandum of compromise (clause 14 of the compromise decree) permitting the plaintiffs to
continue to draw water through the existing 3"" pipeline for spraying and other purposes from Carrara Tank which lies below the Carrara Estate
Pump House. The further claim of the plaintiff was that they have been exercising these rights of the user of the tank water for the purpose of
spraying etc., through the regular 3"" pipes connected from the lank, that the defendants had no right to interfere with the said exercise of the right
by the plaintiffs, but however the defendants were giving much trouble to the plaintiffs in enjoying the said right of the plaintiffs by the defendants''
men coming to the border of Mohannad Peak Estate on 2.1.1978 to meddle with the pipeline so that the water cannot flow into Mohannad Peak
Estate Such attempts were said to have been thwarted and therefore the present suit came to be filed and numbered originally before the Sub
Court. Salem as 1071/76 and thereafter due to the revision in the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Courts in the District level, the suit was transferred
to the Court of the District Munsif at Salem and numbered as O.S. No. 824/81 and the relief of permanent injunction subsequently came to be
amended as relief of mandatory injunction by virtue of the amendment ordered on 20 8 1979 in I.A. No. 245/79. The first defendant who
represents the other defendant by means of Power of Attorney filed a written statement as also an additional written statement contending that
clause 12 in the compromise memo and 14 in the compromise decree was brought about by fraud and misrepresentation as far as the right of
drawing water in Mohannad Peak Estate was concerned and therefore was not binding on the defendants, that there was no pipeline existing
between the Carrara Tank and the Mohannad Peak Estate at the time of compromise and even before or after the compromise also, that on a
misrepresentation by the plaintiffs that such a pipeline exists, the signature of the defendants were obtained in the compromise, that in view of the
above factual position even subsequent to the compromise no water was taken at any time through the alleged pipelines since there was no such
connecting pipe line between the Carrara tank and Mohannad Peak Estate. It was also contended that the alleged pipelines connecting Carrara
tank and Mohannad Peak Estate were not in existence before the filing of the suit or before or after the Commissioner''s visit and as per the
Commissioner''s plan and report, the pipelines found in existence at the lime of Commissioner''s visit were only to lake water to the Estate of the
defendants themselves and not to the plaintiffs'' estate, and therefore, there was no question of disconnecting the said pipelines by the defendants
since the fact remains that there was no such pipe line in existence at any lime by connecting the Carrara lank to Mohannad Peak Estate. The
defendants also pleaded that the plaintiffs are not entitled to any mandatory injunction as prayed for.
On the above pleadings the suit was tried and on the side of the plaintiffs there was no oral evidence and only the certified copy of the decree in
O.S. No. 501/75 dated 23.3.1977, came to be marked as Ex.A1. On the side of the defendants, the Advocate Commissioner was examined and
no exhibits as such were marked The Commissioner''s report and plan as also the interim report and plan were marked as Exs. Cl. to C.4. On
considering the materials placed before the court, the learned trial judge held that the defendants who are parties to the compromise decree Ex A1.
which has become final arc bound by the same and therefore, they cannot deny the claim of the plaintiff and that the dispute of the nature said to
have been raised by the defendants would amount to approbation and reprobation in the sense of accepting other clauses but denying clause 12 in
the compromise which is really clause 14 in the decree The learned trial judge also held on the basis of the materials disclosed by the report of the
Commissioner that the defendants have meddled with the pipelines in question after the first visit of the Commissioner on 4.9.1978 and that such
meddling with the Carrara Estate would have been done only by the defendants who are the owners of the said Estate. The plea of fraud and
misrepresentation also came to be rejected and finally, the learned trial judge held as hereunder. ""However, in view of the reasons already staled
above that the existence of the pipeline connecting. Carrara tank and the Mohannad Peak Estate had been clearly established as per the clause 1
of Exhibit A1 and also due the pleading put forward, by the defendants that due to the misrepresentation about the existence of the pipelines by the
plaintiffs they have signed the compromise which could not be correct and after that though the defendant the owners of the Carrara Estate and
lank and also fully aware of tire physical features of the same kept quite till date. Hence the pipeline was in existence and it continued to be in
existence even on the date of suit as well on the first visit of the commissioner on 4.9.1978 and the western end of the pipeline was also tampered
even on 4.9.1978 due to the recent mark of the riches as per the report and plan Exhibit C3 and Exhibit C4 it is well established that the said
pipeline was in existence prior to the suit and on the date of the suit and the same had been subsequently meddled tampered with or removed by
the defendants within the Carrara Estate who are owners of the said estate. So the defendants must restore the pipeline So for the reasons staled
above and as per clause 12 of Exhibit A1 which is binding upon the defendants also issue No. 1, is answered that the plaintiff is entitled to take
water from the Carrara bank to them own Mohannad Peak Estate for spraying and other purposes and for Issue No. 2 the plaintiffs are entitled to
permanent and mandatory injunction is prayed for by them. Hence I answer issues 1 and 2 in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants.
Issue No. 3: In view of the findings on issues 1 and 2 and the reasons stated thereon the plaintiffs are entitled to the reliefs asked for in the suit
In the result, the suit is decreed as prayed for with costs.
Aggrieved the defendants filed an appeal originally before the District Court. Salem in A.S. No. 201/81 which subsequently came to be
transferred to the learned Subordinate judge Salem as A.S. No. 94/81 and disposed of by him as such. The learned Subordinate Judge also
concurred with the trial judge to hold that the case of fraud and misrepresentation as vitiating the clause in question pleaded by the defendants was
devoid of merit since the appellants have not chosen to take such a stand seriously in the appeal. As for the claim relating to the existence of the
pipeline in question, the learned first appellate Judge disagreed from the findings of the trial judge and held that as on the dale of suit there was no
pipeline as such in existence connecting. Mohannad Peak Estate with the lank in Carrara estate and water was not taken from Carrara tank to
Mohannad Peak Estate. Learned Subordinate Judge was also of the view that even if the case of the plaintiffs that the defendants have meddled
with the existing pipelines is true the plaintiffs cannot be granted any mandatory injunction since according to the learned judge the cause of action
for the restoration of the tank was said to have arisen after the filing of the suit, and at any rate, even otherwise, the remedy of the plaintiffs is to ask
for a declaration of their right and for restoration of the pipes not only on the basis of the compromise decree, but also by way of grant and in as
much as this course of action has not been adopted by the plaintiffs, they cannot be granted even the relief of mandatory injunction, even though it
is assumed that the defendants were responsible for the disconnection of the pipes. Further, the first appellate judge has held that the plaintiffs have
not adduced any evidence at all to prove the allegations made in the plaint and they have not taken the witness stand to testify to the fact that on the
date of suit viz.. 4.9.1978 the pipe line existed and that they were enjoying the right of taking water from Carrara tank to the Mohannad Peak
Estate. The absence of any oral evidence according to the first appellate judge to prove that only after receipt of the communication the
disconnection was effected disentitled the plaintiffs to get the relief of mandatory injunction. Further infirmity in the judgment and decree of the trial
court according to the first appellate court was that the decree has not been properly drafted and as it stood it was impracticable and unworkable
in that in the absence of any direction to the defendants to restore the pipeline within a stipulated time so that beyond the period within which such
restoration has to be effected consequential action can be taken, and the manner action to be taken in case of default by the defendants, so also
according to the learned first appellate judge the mere mention of pipelines in the compromise decree will not be conclusive proof of the plaintiffs
case and therefore, he also came to the conclusion that the pipelines were not in existence on the date of the suit, and therefore, the plaintiffs were
not entitled to an injunction as prayed for.
The aggrieved plaintiffs have therefore come up before this Court. Mr. K.P. Sivasubramaniam. learned counsel appearing for the
plaintiffs/appellants contended that the lower appellate court committed grave error of law in dismissing the suit and coming to the conclusion that in
the absence of a prayer for relief of declaration, the mandatory injunction could not have been sought for and that the clause 12 in the memo of
compromise in question (clause 14 in the compromise decree) by itself does not either confer the right or prove the existence of the pipeline in
question to lake water from Carrara Estate bank to the Mohannad Peak Estate. Learned counsel also took me at length through the findings of the
trial court as also the manner of consideration made by the first appellate court and the reports of the Commissioner etc.. to contend that there arc
over whelming materials on record to substantiate the existence of the pipeline and their interference by the defendants with the same justifying the
need and necessity for granting the mandatory injunction as sought for. The learned counsel also submitted that the clause in question in the
compromise decree confers valid and substantial rights which can be enforced and the lower appellate court having held that the plea of fraud and
misrepresentation was devoid of merit ought to have only decreed the suit as prayed for and the absence of any oral evidence on the side of the
plaintiffs is no ground to reject the claim of the plaintiffs in the teeth of the materials already available on record. Learned counsel also relied upon
certain judicial pronouncements to highlight the efficacy and binding force of a compromise decree and a reference will be made to those
judgements hereinafter.
Percontra Thiru S. Gopalaralhnam learned senior counsel contended that the clause in question does not refer to either the estate of the plaintiffs
or any land to which the water has to be taken for use and that there was absolutely no evidence whatsoever to prove the actual user of the water
through the alleged pipelines in question prior to the suit. The learned senior counsel also submitted that the word ""Permitted"" used in the clause in
question is indicative of only the grant in the nature of a licence and not a conferment of am right as such of either property or right connected with
the use of any property and therefore, it was always open to the defendants to revoke or bring to an end such licence and there is no form or
specific prescribed procedure to bring to an cud the licence and consequently the plaintiffs cannot claim any relief as prayed for in the nature of
mandatory injunction. While inviting my attention to the plan submitted by the Commissioner along with his final report dated 16.12.1978 in I.A.
No. 1332/78 in O.S. No. 1071/88 the learned counsel pointed out that three pipelines emanated from the tank in question and the conspicuous
omission in the clause in question on which rights arc claimed by the plaintiffs to even specify which of the three pipelines was used or permitted to
be used for taking the water from the tank in question to the plaintiffs'' estate would itself show that the claim of the plaintiffs about the existence of
the so called pipelines has no merit or substance and that the lower appellate court was right in interfering with the judgment and decree of the
learned trial judge. According to the learned senior counsel for the respondents, every one of the reasons assigned by the learned first appellate
judge arc sound in law and would justify his conclusion to reverse the judgment and decree of the trial court. To substantiate the claim on the
nature and character of the right envisaged in the clause in question, reference has also been made to Sections 4and 52of the Indian Easements
Act. 1882.
Before adverting to a consideration of the respective submissions of the learned council appearing on cither side, a reference to the judgments
placed for may consideration may be usefully made. In Shankar Sitaram Sontakke and Another Vs. Balkrishna Sitaram Sontakke and Others, .
the Court was concerned with the efficacy and binding ford of a consent decree in a partition suit Learned judges of the Supreme Court while
repelling the claim of the appellant before them held as follows :-
We hold therefore, that the compromise closed once for all the controversy about taking any account of the joint family businesses including the
motor business after the 31st March, 1946 and the plaintiff is bound by the terms of the compromise and the consent decree following upon it.
The obvious effect of this finding is that the plaintiff is barred by the principle of ''res judicata'' from reanimating the question in the present suit. It
is well settled that a consent decree is as binding upon the parties thereto as a decree passed two invitum. The compromise having been found not
to be vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation misunderstanding or mistake the decree passes thereon has the binding force of ''res judicata''.
In Raja Sri Sailendra Narayan Bhanja Deo Vs. The State of Orissa, . a Constitution Bench of the learned Judges of the Supreme Court had
once again an occasion to consider the effaces the binding nature of a consent decree and it held as hereunder:
the plea of estoppel is sought to be founded on the compromise decide. Ex. ""O."" passed by the Patna High Court on 2.5.1945 in F.A. No. 15 of
1941. The compromise decree is utilised in the first place as creating an estoppel by Judgment. In-In re South American and Mexican Co., Ex.
parte v. Bank of England. "" (1895) I Ch 37 (C). It has been held that a judgement by consent or default is effective as estoppel between the
parties judgment whereby the court exercises its mind by a contested case. Upholding the judgment of Vaughan Williams, J. Lord Herschell said a
page 50:-
The truth is. a Judgment by a consent intended to put a stop to litigation between the parties just as much as is a judgment which results from the
decision of the Court after the matter has been fought out to the end.
And I think it would be very mischievous if one were not to give a fair and reasonable interpretation to such judgments, and were to allow
questions that were really involved in the action to be fought over again in a subsequent action.
To the like effect are the following observations of the Judicial Committee in- ''Kinch v. Watcott 1929 AC 482 at p. 493 (D) First of all their
Lordships are clear that in relation to this plea of estoppels it is of no advantage to the appellant that the order in the libel action which is said to
raise it was a consent order. For such a purpose an order by consent, not discharged by mutual agreement, and remaining unreduced, is as
effective as an order of the Court made otherwise than by consent and not discharged on appeal.
The same principle has been followed by the High Courts in India in a number of reported decisions.
Reference need only be made to the case of -""Secy. of State v. Attendranath Das "", 63 Cal 550 at P.558 (E): ''Bhaishankar v. Moraji''. 36. Bom
283 (F) and - ''Raja Kumara Venkata Perumal Raja Bahadur v. Thatha Ramasamy Chetty"". 35 Mad 75 (G) In the Calcutta case after referring to
the English decisions the High Court observed as follows: ""On this authority it becomes absolutely'' clear that the consent order is as effective as an
order passed on contest, not only with reference to the conclusions arrived at in the previous suit but also with regard to every step in the process
of reasoning on which the said conclusion is founded.
When we say ""every step in the reasoning"" we mean the findings on the essential facts on which the judgment or the ultimate conclusion was
founded. In other words the finding which it was necessary to arrive at for the purpose of sustaining the judgment in the particular case will operate
as estoppels by judgment. "" The correctness of these principles laid down in these decisions is not disputed by Mr. P.R. Das. Proceeding on the
basis that there is such a principle of estoppels by judgment, he contends that the lest laid down in the decisions referred to above is whether the
judgment in the previous case could have been passed without the determination of the question which was put in issue in the subsequent case,
where the plea of estoppels by the previous judgment is raised. This leads us to a consideration of the facts, which are material to this question.
In Govind Waman Shanbhag v. Muralidhar Shriniv as Shanbhag (ILR 1953 Bombay 948) a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court had an
occasion to consider the question in the context of a challenge to a clause in compromise decree restraining alienation being opposed to the
provisions of Section 10of the Transfer of Property Act. 1882. Mr. Justice Gajendragadkar as he then was speaking for the Bench, on elaborate
consideration of the case law held as here under:-
We think that a consent decree passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction cannot be treated on the same footing as a contract between the
parties. It is true that before a court passes a consent decree, it can and should examine the lawfulness and validity of the terms of the proposed
compromise. But once that stage is passed and a decree follows, different considerations arise. Indeed. Mr. Murdeshwar has not cited before us
any decision of this Court which actually decided that a compromise decree which contains a term contrary to law is for that reason a nullity On the
contrary, as we have just pointed out. a large number of reported judgments of this court have taken a contrary view. Therefore, in our opinion, the
lower appellate court was right in coming to the conclusion that despite the fact that one of the terms of the compromise decree is opposed to the
provisions of S. 10of the Transfer of Property Act, the decree is still binding between the parties and cannot be said to be a nullity. If it is not a
nullity its terms must be enforced and the plaintiff would be entitled to claim possession of the property.
In Pasutdeva Prabhu v. Madhava Prabhu (AIR 1993 Kerala 68) a learned single judge of the Kerala High Court while dealing with the
circumstance under which the justification for the grant of a mandators'' injunction has been made out, held as hereunder :-
On behalf of the defendants it is contended that no decree for mandatory injunction can be granted in view of the delay in moving the Court.
According to them the gale on the compound wall had been closed about five to eight years back. The case of the plaintiffs is that in the first week
of December 1981 the defendants had removed two gates on the boundary wall and also closed the pathway. The notice was issued on
12.12.1981 and the same suit was filed on 28.2.1981, In Ext.A.2 notice it was pointed out that a masonary wall was constructed in the place
where from gates were removed. The obstruction was created on different dales according to the plaintiffs. As pointed out by the lower appellate
court Ext.C.1 report did not give any assistance in this regard Therefore there was no evidence for delay in moving the Court seeking mandatory
injunction. Apart from that, if any co-owner creates any obstruction for the convenient enjoyment of the pathway by other sharers, such acts shall
be invalid automatically as per clause (7). That means the section of defendants by way of removing two gates on the compound wall and closing
of the pathway had always been invalid. Therefore, the date of obstruction will not assume much importance. A decree cannot therefore be denied
to the plaintiffs on this ground.
I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel appearing on either side. In my view the learned first appellate judge
committed a grave error of law in coming to the conclusion that in the absence of a specific prayer for the relief of declaration of title, the clause in
question alone would not suffice either to confer such right or substantiate the existence of the pipelines or the user of the right to warrant grant of
relief of mandatory injunction. The consent decree is as effective as one passed on contest and binding on all parties as a decree passed by invitum
and the parties to the decree would be precluded from reanimating the matter or driving one or the others parties to the decree to the necessity of
seeking for or securing a fresh declaration once-over again decree passed on consent also operates by mete and bounds to carry out certain
obligations from either revolting against the mandate concluding the decree or attempting to wriggle out of the obligations both by the principles of
estoppels by judgement and by the principles res judicata Consequently, the view taken by the learned first appellate judge that in the absence of
fresh declaration obtained by the plaintiffs, no rights flow from the clause in question to the appellant: so as to entitle them to straightway seek for
the relief of mandatory injunction constitutes a total negation the decree itself cannot be said to be either a proper approach or the correct decision
to made in law. The conclusions of the learned Subordinate Judge therefore cannot be sustained
It becomes now necessary to consider the nature and character of the rights conferred under the clause in question in the teeth of a claim
having been made by the learned senior counsel for the respondents/defendants that the grant in the clause in question partakes the character of
licence revocable at the will and option of the defendant by a mere denial or assertion in derogation of the grant in the clause in question at any
point of time Clause 14 in the agreement which is the saute a clause 12 in the memo of compromise is as follows
That (he defendants 3, 4, 6 and 8 be and are permitted to continue the drawl of water though the existing 3"" pipeline for spraying and other
purposes from the Carrara tank which lies blow the Carrara Estate Pulp house.
A proper understanding of the nature and character of the grant requires also an appreciation of the attendant circumstances and the nature of
disputes involved in the light of which the stipulation of the nature referred to above came to be made by way of a term of compromise which got
engrafted into a final decree binding between the parties to the proceedings. The suit was for partition and at a point of time when civil disputes and
litigations arose between various sharers who were parties to the proceedings culminating into a compromise decree made in 1 A. No. 399/79 in
O.S. No. 501/75 on the file of the learned Subordinate Judge of Salem. Till disputes arose between parties and their shares got divided, the entire
properties have been held and used by all the sharers for several years past as co-owners. In view of the misunderstandings or disputes the need
for division came to be felt and the properties for the first time came to be divided among the various sharers. It is in that process, as could be seen
from the various clauses contained therein that the Mohannad Peak Estate have come to be allotted to the share of 3, 4, 6 & 8 therein of course
with certain liabilities attached there to and similarly the Carrara Estate and other properties fell to the share of the defendants. While reconciling
and readjusting the rights of various parties by separation once and for all several rights and obligations have been created and conferred mutually
among the various sharers as part of the scheme of division effected to make the division and the subsequent possession and enjoyment of proper
tics divided more perfect and effective. Clause 14 in the decree (Clause 12 in the memo of compromise) is therefore one such granting a right in
favour of the defendants 3, 4, 6 & 8 and the use of the word ''protected/permitted'' has thus to be construed in the context and cannot be given
undue emphasis to whittle down the nature of the grant and to make it a mere license, revocable at will and whim of one party. That it should be
the only and proper method of construction or appreciation of the character of the stipulation is fortified by the fact that even defendants 3, 4, 6 &
8 were the co-owners of the Carrara Estate and the lank till it was allocated to the share of others including the defendants in the compromise to
divide the entire properties in the manner provided by the various terms and conditions contained therein would go to show that it cannot be
equated to a grant envisaged u/s 14of the Indian Easements Act, which comprehends in my view such of the grants as are made by one person to
another who did not own or possess such rights earlier or dehors such specific grant. On the other hand, the compromise decree had the effect of
crystallizing into individual rights what were till then in the form of common rights enjoyed by all the owners and in such circumstances the
stipulation by way of a specific condition of the compromise decree has to be in my view construed only as a right reserved to one or more of the
co-owners and not as a grant revocable at the sweet wilt of one and at any time of his choice. To such a case, in my view, the definition of
licence"" in Section 52of the Indian Easements Act. 1982 has also no application. Even if it is to be viewed as an casement, it would be not only an
easement of necessity as well as by grant, but in view of my conclusion that the clause confers, rather reserve, a right in defendants 3, 4, 6 & 8. It
is unnecessary to elaborate further on the issue as to whether it may be construed to be an easement or otherwise. In view of the above
conclusions of mine, it becomes wholly unnecessary for the plaintiffs in this suit to independently prove their rights or entitlement once over again in
a fresh suit or in the suit under consideration itself. As noticed earlier, both the courts below have negatived the plea on behalf of the defendants in
the present suit that the clause in question has been fraudulently and by way of misrepresentation introduced in the compromise decree. The
rejection of such a plea by the courts below would, in my view, lead to the inevitable conclusion that the plaintiffs/appellants would become entitled
to the use of the water from the Carrara tank to the Mohannad Peak Estate allotted exclusively to the share of defendants 3, 4, 6 & 8. The
absence of any mention specifically of the name of the Mohannad Peak Estate or the identity of the lands of the estate to which the water has to be
taken even in the clause in question itself does not in any manner undermine the efficacy of the clause or throw or cast any doubts in this regard if
the compromise decree and the various clauses contained therein are considered as a whole, as they ought to be without construing clause 14 in
the compromise decree alone in isolation and in the abstract.
The question next to be considered is as to whether the plaintiffs in this case have made out a case for the grant of mandatory injunction. In my
view, in the light of my conclusions as above in the nature of the right and binding force of the clause in question on the defendants and the materials
disclosed from the report of the Commissioner itself sufficient case has been made out to justify the grant of the mandatory injunction. The absence
of any specific stipulation in the clause itself as to out of which of the three pipelines the plaintiffs have to avail of the supply of water from the
Carrara tank docs not in any manner help the defendants to deny the existing user of the water in a particular manner which has been conserved for
the benefit of the plaintiffs under the compromise decree particularly under the clause in question. Except denying the right of the plaintiffs, it is not
the case of the defendants that there was any other scope for ensuring supply of water for the purposes envisaged in the clause in question
otherwise than from the Carrara tank and that the particular need envisaged in the clause in question was hitherto satisfied by any alternate or other
mode of supply of water. The learned first appellate judge in my view was also wrong in concluding that the defect, if any. in the omission to make
necessary stipulation regarding the mode and manner of execution of the decree itself, and vitiates the judgment, and nothing precluded the learned
6Subordinate Judge who also could and ought to have equally proceeded to rectify the lapses noticed as the first appellate court with powers co-
extensive with that of the trial court and in respect of the time limit make suitable provision for compliance with the manner of executing the
mandatory order of injunction even in case of default of compliance by the defendants themselves and these lapses cannot be assigned as reasons
for denying the very relief of mandatory injunction itself.
For all the reasons stated above the judgement and decree passed by the first appellate Court on 30.6.1982 in A.S. No. 94/81 is set aside
and the judgement and decree of the learned trial judges restored. The plaintiffs/appellants shall be at liberty to move the trial court for further
direction with reference to the identification of the pipeline to have them restored, to stipulate the time within which such restoration shall be
effected and the manner in which the restoration has to be ensured through court on default of compliance be the defendants. The Second Appeal
is allowed with the above further directions. No cost.