High CourtsSingle Bench(1997) 05 J&K CK 0018

Mohan Lal & Ors vs Mahmood-ur-Rehman, Chief Secretary Home Department, J&K Civil Secretariat & Ors

Jammu And Kashmir High Court · Decided on 16 May 1997 · Citation: (1997) KashLJ 362

HON’BLE JUDGES
B.A.Nazki, J
CASE NUMBER
147COA(W)/1993 & 400/1994 (C.C)

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Judgment

150 paragraphs · 3,434 words
1.

Both these contempt petitions arise from same set of facts and raise identical questions of law, therefore, both of them are decided together.

2.

Before the real controversy is taken up, it will be pertinent to mention certain facts hereinbelow:

3.

Some riots took place on 13.1.1989 in Jammu city, which resulted in burning and causing of damages to certain shops. Some of the persons

whose property got destroyed during the said riots, filedvarious writ petitions in this court. One of such writ petitions was entitled: Mohan Lai and

others V/s Union of India and others (being OWP No. 263/1991). Second petition came to be filed under the title: Pawan Cloth House V/s Union

of India and others (being OWP No. 271/1991). Another writ petition came to be filed under the title: M/s Inder Puri Gneral Store and others V/s

Union of India and others. This writ petition was decided by a learned Single Judge of this Court, and is reported in AIR 1992 J&K page 11. This

was the first petition to have been decided out of all the petitions which were filed. Another writ petition filed under the title: M/s Geet General

Stores V/s Union of India and others (being WP No. 273/1991) was also decided by the learned Single Judge on the analogy of the judgement

delivered in Inder Puri's case. While deciding the writ petition titled: Mohan Lai and others V/s Union of India and others (being WP No.

263/1991) this court also decided a batch of four other writ petitions bearing Nos. WP No. 975, 977 and 978 of 1989. The writ petition titled:

M/s Pawan Cloth House Vs. Union of India and others was decided separately. All these writ petitions were disposed of by the learned Single

Judge on the strength of judgement delivered in M/s Inder Puri's case. An LPA was preferred by the State against the judgement delivered in M/s

Geet General Store and others, in which there were ten respondents. This appeal was taken up by the Division Bench and was decided vide

judgement dated 2881995. Appeals were also filed by the State in the cases of Pawan Cloth House and Mohan Lai and others. They were

dismissed by the Division Bench for non prosecution, and applications for their restoration are pending disposal.

4.

The Division Bench reversed the basic judgement given by the learned Single Judge in Inder Puri's case. In Inder Puri's case, the learned Single

Judge had given a detailed judgement and mentioned the grounds taken in the writ petition reply submitted therein and considered the law on the

subject and issued the writ. This was not done either in Mohan Lai's case or in case of Pawan Cloth House. Only a reference was made to Inder

Puri's case and the cases were decided on the strength of judgement given in Inder Puri's case. Since the judgement of the learned Single Judge

given in Inder Puri's case has been reversed by the Division Bench of this Court, the question which arises is whether the judgement given in Pawan

Cloth House and Mohan Lai's case is still enforceable. These Contempt Petitions have been filed by the petitioners alleging therein that the

judgement were not complied with by the respondents, therefore, contempt proceedings be initiated against them, and orders be passed for

enforcing the judgements.

5.

Objections have been filed by the respondents.

Heard learned counsel for the parties.

6.

The only question that has to be decided is whether the judgement delivered in the instant cases by the learned Single Judge still remain

enforceable after the Division Bench passed a judgement in M/s Geet General Store's case in appeal. Mr. H.L. Bhagotra learned counsel for the

petitioners in one of the contempt petitions submits that the decisions given by the High Court are the only precedent for the subordinate Courts

and do not assume the colour of LAW as it assumed by the judgements of the Supreme Court. He also submits that there is a provision in this

regard in the Constitution of India (under Article 141). He further submits that the law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on all the Courts

within the territory of India, but there is no such identical power vested with the High Court. The judgments of the High Court are only the

interpretation of the provisions of law and facts of a particular controversy before the Court and become precedent for its subordinate Courts, but

do not become law. Therefore, even if the Division Bench has allowed the appeal and set aside the judgement of the learned Single Judge given in

M/s Geet General Store's case, it will have no bearing whatsoever on the cases of present petitioners, whose cases have been decided by the

learned Single Judge. Since, no appeals were preferred against the petitioners herein, therefore, the judgments of the learned Single Judge in their

cases have assumed finality, and therefore, there is no option left with the respondentstate but to enforce the same. He further submits that the state

cannot be heard to say that since the basic judgment has been set aside by the Division Bench, therefore, there is no judgment which needs to be

enforced. He also contended that his clients were not party to the LPA No. 109/1992, therefore, the rights which had accured to the present

petitioners could not be taken away, even without hearing them. In order to appreciate the arguments of learned counsel for the parties, I

reproduce one of the judgments passed by the learned Single Judge in OWP No. 263/1991:

Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the pleadings. Petitioners are the victims, who suffered losses in the unfortunate communal riots

which took place in the holy city of Jammu on 13.1.1989. It has been prayed that appropriate directions be issued to the respondents to pay to the

petitioners the compensation to the extent of losses actually suffered by thm as detailed in these petitions. It is submitted that the property of the

petitioners was damaged in the riots as the respondents authorities failed to provide them protection as was the mandate of law adopted and

followed in this democratic socialist that the District Magistrate is alleged to have committed summary inquiry to assess the loss and damages which

are shown in the statements attached with the petitions. It has been agreed by the learned counsel for the parties that under similar circumstances,

this court has already passed appropriate directions in case M/s Inder Puri General Store and others V/s Union of India and another (AIR 1992

J&K 11). It was held in that case:

The constitutional set up in this country envisages that all communities have a right to life and practice their religion according to their conscience.

All citizens of the country have a right to carry on any profession or trade within the limits of law and the State is under an obligatiion to protect

their life and property ensuring them all the benefits of fundamental rights enshrined under the Part III of the Constitution. As and when life and

property, as discussed hereinabove, is taken away by any indivdual or organisation, a duty is cast upon the State representing the will of people to.

compensate the victim by granting adequate compensation. The monarchia! rule has to be distinguished from democratic set up and the State

cannot shrink in its responsibitlity to protect the life, liberty and property of the citizens. On, their failure to protect the life, liberty and property of

the citizens, State is under a constitutional obligations to compensate the victims adequately. The argument of the learned Advocate General that

the State was under no obligation to compensate the victims of communal riots, is without any basis and contradictory in terms in view of the

actions already taken in that behalf. If it was not the responsibility of the State to provide compensation, what was the necessity of passing orders

for providing exgratia grant and lumpsum amounts as compensation for the lossess suffered. The State represents the will of the lapses of the

Rulers, a right accrues to them for award of compensation. As and when the life and liberty of any person is taken away, a presumption arises of

the failure of the State machinery to protect the life and property of the individual involved.

7.

As the facts of these cases and the points of law involved are identical as were considered in Inder Puri General Store and others (supra), these

petitions are also disposed of in terms of that judgement with the directions to the respondents to pay to the petitioners the compensation to the

extent of losses suffered by them as assessed by the Committee consituted by the Deputy Commissioner, Jammu within a period of three months.

Parties to bear their own costs.

Jammu August 20, 1992

8.

From the perusal of the said order, it appears that the learned Single Judge has found that the controversy in question was squarely covered by

the judgement given in Inder Puri's case. The facts narrated in both the writ petitioners were same and the question of law involved were also

identical. Therefore, there is no doubt that the facts of the writ petitions which have given rise to these Contempt proceedgins were identical to the

writ petition titled: Geet General Store. The question of law involved in both the matters were also identical. The judgement passed in the cases

which have given rise to these contempt proceedings are infact based upon the judgement delivered in Geet General Store's case. We are working

under the scheme created by the Consitution itself; where at the State level the High Court is the Apex Court, and at the Central level the Supreme

Court of India is the Apex Court. It is true, that there is no provision in the Constitution of India or the State Constitution, which is similar to Article

141 of the Consitution of India, but that does not mean that once the High Court decides a matter, it does not lay down law for the State. The

interpretations given to the laws or usages by the High Court are a final word on the subject, in so far as such a State is concerned. High Court

draws strength from the fact that Article 226 of the Constitution of India give power to the High Court to issue writs, and Article 227 (in our case

Section 104 of the Constitution of the State) gives it the power of superintendence over the subordinate Courts and Tribunals. There is, therefore,

inherent power in the High Court to interpret law. Besides, the High Court is the Court of record and has the power to punish for contempt. The

Supreme Court in a case titled: Bishnu Ram Borah V/s Parag Saikia and others reported in AIR 1984 page 898, while dealing with the question as

to whether Board of Revenue could refuse implementation of order of the High Court, made the following observations:

It is regrettable that the Board of Revenue failed to realise that like any other subordinate tribunal, it was subject to the writ jurisdiction of the High

Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Just as the judgments and orders of the Supreme Court have to be faithfully obeyed and carried out

throughout the territory of India under Article 142 of the Constitution, so should the judgments and orders of the High Court by all inferior courts

and Tribunal subject to their supervisory jurisidiction, within the State under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution. We cannot butdepracate the

action of the Board of Revenue in refusing to carry out the directions of the High Court

In Bhopal Sugar Industries Limites Vs. Income Tax Officer, Bhopal, (1961) 1 SCR 4474; (AIR 1961 SC 182), the Income Tax Officer had

virtually refused to carry out the clear and unambiguous directions which a superior tribunal like the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal had given to

him by its final order in exercise of its appellate powers in respect of an order of assessment made by him. The Court held that such refusal was in

effect a denial of justice and is furthermore destructive to one of the basic principles in the administration of justice based as it is in this country on

the hierarchy of courts. The facts of the present case are more or less similar and we would have allowed the matter to rest at that but unfortunately

the judgement of the High Court directing the issue of a writ of mandamus for the grant of a liquor licence to respondents Nos. 1 and 2 cannot be

sustained.

9.

The Supreme Court has laid down the parameters regarding precedent of the High Court in East India Commercial Company Limited Vs The

Collector of Customs Calcutta reported in AIR 1962 SC 1093. Views of justice Subba Rao J. as His Lordships then was, were again referred to

with approval in Shri Baradkanata Mishra Versus Shri Bhimsen Dixit reported in AIR 1972 SC page 2466. The following observations of Justice

Subha Rao J. has clinched the matter:

The Division Bench of the High Court held that a contravention of a condition imposed by a licence issued under the Act is not an offence under

S.5 of the Act. This raised the question whether an administrative tribunal can ignore the law declared by the highest Court in the State and initiate

proceedings in direction violation of the law so declared. Under Article 215, every High Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the

powers to punish for contempt of itself. Under Article 226, it has a plenary powers to issue orders or writs for the enforcement of the fundamental

rights and for any other purpose to any person or authroity including in appropriate cases any Government, within its territorial jurisdiction. Under

Article 227 it has jurisdiction over all Courts and tribunals throughout the terrotories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. It would be

anomalous to suggest that a tribunal over which the High Court has superintendence can ignore the law declared by that Court and start

proceedings in direct violation of it. If a tribunal can do so, all the subordinate courts can equally do sc, for there is no specific provision, just like in

the case of Supreme Court, making the law declared by the High Court binding on subordinate courts. It is implicit in the power of supervision

conferred on a superior tribunal that all the tribunal subject to its supervision should confrom to the law laid down by it. Such obedience would also

be conducive to their smooth working; otherwise there would be confusion in the administration of law and respect for law would irretrievably

suffer.

10.

Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in case Shri Baradkanta Mishra V/s Shri Bhimsen Dixit reported in AIR 1972 SC 2466, held as under:

1516. The conduct of the appellant in not following the previous decision of the High Court is calculated to create confusion in the administration

of law. It will undermine respect for law laid down by the High Court and impair the constitutional authority of the High Court. His conduct is

therefore comprehended by the principles underlying the law of contempt. The analogy of the inferior Court's disobedience to the specific order of

a superior Court also suggests that his conduct falls within the purview of the law of contempt. Just as the disobedience to a specific order of the

court undermines the authority and dignity of the court in a particular case, similarly any deliberate and mala fide conduct of not following the law

laid down in the previous decision undermines the constitutional authority and respect of the High Court. Indeed, while the former conduct has

repercussions on an individual case and on a limited number of persons, the latter conduct has a much wider and more disastrous impact. It is

calculated not only to undermines constitutional authority and respect of the High Court generally but is also likely to subvert the Rule of Law and

endager harassing uncertainty and confusion in the administration of law.

11.

It follows from the judgement (supra) that whatever powers the Supreme Court has under Article 142, same powers have to be enjoyed by

the High Courts. If the judgments of the High Court are binding on subordinate Courts and Tribunals, so are they binding on each and every

person in the State. Besides, the High Court is working under syatem and under the constitutional provisions, the High Court has the power to

make the Rules. In Jammu and Kashmir High Court Rules, 1975, a hierarchy has been created within the High Court. Even, the Letters Patent

Rules of the High Court, permit such a hierarchy within the High Court. A judgement of a learned Single Judge passed in exercise of original

jurisdiction is appellable before a Division Bench. The Lord Chief Justice has the powers to constitute Full Benches also, and in terms of the

relevant Rules, a judgment/decision of the full Bench is binding on all Division and Single Benches, and a judgement of the Division Bench is binding

on all the single Benches on law and usages, having the force of law. The judgement delivered by the Division Bench in Geet General Store's case

is, as such, binding on this Court, as against the judgement passed by the learned Single Judge. Before issuing any rule in these contempt

proceedings, this Court has to first satisfy itself as to whether the judgement delivered by a Single Bench of this Court, of which disobedince is

alleged, are still enforceable, and can this court enforce them, I am afraid it cannot be done for two simple reasons; i) That this Court is bound by

the judgement of the Division Bench, which has impliedly set aside the judgment of the single Judges, the disobedince whereof is alleged; ii) The

High Court Rules made me bound to follow the judgment of the division Bench.

12.

There are other reasons for adopting the said course, which I am entertaining in these proceedings. The reason being that we are placed in the

system of tiers, where the Judiciary works under different tiers in the State. It starts at the Munsiffs level and ends at the High Court level, and at

the Apex level we have the Supreme Court. If there is no judicial discipline in implementing and getting the judgments implemented, there shall be

judicial anarchy, which will not be in the interest of anybody.

13.

Let me give an example, that there are two shopkeepers adjacent to each other, who suffered losses in one and the same incident. Both of

them filed writ petitions and succeeded. In one of the cases, appeal was filed, which was accepted and judgment of the single Judge was set aside.

In another case, no appeal was preferred. One of the shopkeepers who suffered losses as a result of same incident, gets compensation another

shopkeeper adjacent to his shop who also suffered losses in the same incident, will not get any compensation. This will erode confidence of the

people in the Courts. There must be some standards for identical situations. Therefore, I am of the view that the judgement delivered by the

learned Single Judge in Geet General Store must be taken to have been set aside; even if not taken to have ben set aside impliedly, but even then,

they are rendered unenforeceable. The position of Division Bench in the scheme of our constitution and the laws, is not a kin to Supreme Court,

but at the same time, by fiction of Rules and Letters Patent, we have tried to create a Court within a Court. Therefore, a full Bench of this Court is

at the highest level; whereas Division Bench is at the next higher level and the Single Bench is at the lowest level.

14.

In view of the discussion made hereinabove, I find that the judgments delivered by the learned Single Judge, disobedince where of has been

complained, have become unenforceable in view of the judgment delivered by the Division Bench in Geet General Store. I think, the appropriate

remedy for the petitioner was to challenge the judgement of the Division Bench before an appropriate Court; as they decidedly were the persons

who were aggrieved of the judgement of the Division Bench (supra).

15.

For the aforesaid reasons, I find no merit in these contempt petitions, which are dismissed accordingly, and the rule issued against the

respondents is discharged.