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Judgment
Veeraswami, C.J. and Gokulakrishnan, J.
The due place and value of signed statements of witnesses examined by a Police lnspector of the Directorate of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption, in
the course of investigation leading to disciplinary proceeding arises for consideration in this batch of petitions. They were originally before a single
Judge, who have regard to the importance of the question, referred them to a Division Bench. On petitions from certain village officers in
Tirumangalam taluk in Madurai Dist. that specified Revenue Subordinates, Tahsildars and Deputy Tahsildars demanded and obtained illegal
gratification from them in connection with passage of village accounts, the Inspector investigated into the allegations and made a report. The
materials of investigation he sent up contained signed statements from certain witnesses who were mostly village officers, stated to be the victims.
The cases were eventually referred to the Disciplinary Tribunals which, on the basis in the main of such signed statements, framed charges against
the petitioners to the effect that actuated by corrupt motives and abuse of their position and authority as Upper Division Clerks in the Collector''s
Office, at Madurai, they demanded at the specified place and time and received illegal gratification of specified amounts from named village officers
whose accounts were checked during the Jamabandi. The propriety of these charges is questioned by them. This they do on the analogy of the
provisions of Chap. XIV of the Criminal Procedure Code, and of P. Sirajuddin Vs. Government of Madras and Others, and P. Sirajuddin, etc.
Vs. State of Madras, etc., . They go so far as to suggest that Rule 5 (b) of the Madras Civil Services (Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal) Rules
1955, is ultra vires and is violative of Article 311 of the Constitution inasmuch as it permits a decision to be taken by the Government on the
investigation records including such statements, to refer the cases to the Disciplinary Tribunal. On these grounds they pray that the proceedings
before the Tribunal should be quashed.
We think that the question is basically one of fairness to the persons charged, and application to the disciplinary proceedings of the elementary
principles of justice. In Criminal investigations, the Law of this land is embodied in Chap. XIV of the Criminal Procedure Code abundantly ensures
it by safeguards and limitations on the powers of the police. In cognisable cases, the police register a case on First Information and commence
investigation in which they are empowered to examine witnesses and reduces to writing any statement made by them. Lest the power is misused by
employing unfair methods, a signed statement by a person to a police officer in the course of an investigation is forbidden. This is by way of
protection to the accused, for the deponent at the trial may be planed down to his former signed statement. The protection is extended by limiting
the use of such statements for contradiction. Such statements can never be used as substantive evidence. As an instance of ensuring fairness is
enjoined on the police officer not be offer any inducement or make threat or promise as is mentioned in S. 24 of the Indian Evidence Act, to any
person. But at the same time, he shall not prevent any person from making, in the course of the investigation, any statement which he may be
disposed to make of his own freedom. Still further safeguards are to be found in the Code as well as the said Act in respect of confessional
statement made to police officers, and certain other matters during investigation. After investigation the police officer is required to make a report
to the Magistrate having jurisdiction. P. Sirajuddin Vs. Government of Madras and Others, held that statements recorded during an investigation in
violation of the mandatory safeguards provided by Ss. 161 and 162 of the Code, should not be considered at the stage of framing charges under
S. 251-A . That was a remarkable case of an exceptional nature in which the records of investigation brought out a kind of pre-determination on
the part of the the police as to the guilt of the accused, and not only statements signed by witnesses were taken, but they were provided with
certificates of amnesty. The charges based on such statements were quashed. With this conclusion, the Supreme Court in P. Sirajuddin, etc. Vs.
State of Madras, etc., concurred. In doing so, It was pointed out that as the Government has set up a Vigliance and Anti-Corruption Department
and it was entrusted with enquiries of the kind, no exception could be taken to the enquiry by the officers of the department, but any such enquiry
must proceed in a fair and reasonable manner. Then followed the observations:
The enquiring officer must not act under any pre-conceived idea of guilt of the person whose conduct was being enquired into or pursues the
enquiry in such a manner as to lead to an inference that he was beat upon securing the conviction of the said person by adopting measures which
are of doubtful validity or sanction. The means adopted no less than the end to be achieved must be impeccable. In ordinary departmental
proceedings against a Government servant charged with delinquency, the normal practice before the issue of a charge sheet is for some one in
authority to take down statements of persons involved in the matter and to examine documents which have a bearing on the issue involved. It is
only thereafter that a charge-sheet is submitted and a full scale enquire is launched. When the enquiry is to be held for the purpose of finding out
whether criminal proceedings are to be restored to the scope thereof must be limited to the examination of persons who have knowledge of the
affairs of the delinquent officer and documents bearing on the same to find out whether there is prima facie evidence of guilt of the officer.
Thereafter the ordinary law of the land must take its course and further inquiry be proceeded with in terms of the Code of Criminal Procedure by
lodging a first information report"".
The substance of the approach should, in our view, equally apply to investigations leading to disciplinary proceedings which, in certain respects, are
of a quasi-criminal nature. Parallels can be drawn between the two kinds of proceedings. At the same time, we should think that there are many
gaps in the line of disciplinary proceedings, which make it distinct and different from prosecutions for corruption, and this aspect necessarily bears
on the question we have to decide.
The investigation of officers of the Directorate of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption, into allegations of corruption as a prelude to disciplinary
proceedings, is not governed by any Statute, or rule of law. Chap. XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure has no application to it. Such
investigation is only controlled and guided by what is fair and just, and the same principles should guide the authority to decide to refer any matter
to Disciplinary Tribunal on the basis of the materials furnished by the Investigation. We have to bear in mind that the proceedings before the
Disciplinary Tribunal are not under the Code of Criminal Procedure, but governed by the Madras Civil Service (Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal)
Rules, made in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution and other powers. These rules make the Tribunal
but an advisory body, with no power to take the ultimate decision. It is only required to submit its findings and recommendations after an enquiry,
to the Government which decides on the punishment after observing the requisites of Article 311 of the Constitution. To the disciplinary
proceedings, the Evidence Act has no application, though the Tribunal should, as far as possible, observe the basic rules of evidence relating to
evidence, examination of witnesses and the marking of documents, besides following the procedure of framing appropriate charges, communicating
them to the person charged together with a list of witnesses likely to be examined, giving an opportunity to him to file a written statement of his
defence along with a list of witnesses whom he wishes to examine and at the end of the enquiry to submit his arguments. The nature of the
disciplinary proceedings before the Tribunal is not criminal, in the sense that the Tribunal is concerned with a criminal offence. It is primarily
concerned with the conduct of the person charged, which, if found to be against the delinquent, may result in penalties with reference to his service.
Having regard to the essential differences between the two kinds of proceedings, therefore, think that the analogy of Chap. XIV of the Code we
cannot be extended to the investigation into conduct of Government Servants by the Directorate of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption and the
materials collected in the course of it before and for the purpose, of the authority concerned deciding whether there is a prima facie case to initiate
disciplinary proceedings, or for prosecution in a criminal court. It is pressed on us that the very fact that a police officer attached to the Directorate
of Vigilance Investigates, carries with it the notion of fear and compulsion with the consequent unfairness and that there is also the fact that once the
witnesses has given a signed statement he is obliged to stick to it, against his wish and belief at his examination at the enquiry. We are also told
where the Directorate is declared as a police station for a defined area, as in the instant case, the position would be even worse. In our opinion, it
is neither proper nor wise to lay down a rule on such a sweeping generalisation. All that is necessary to say is, in the words of P. Sirajuddin, etc.
Vs. State of Madras, etc., , ""The means adopted no less than the end to be achieved must be impeccable"" and If the officers of the Directorate of
Vigilance and Anti-Corruption should keep this in view in making investigation, there can then be no room for complaint. The courts will only
interfere where signed statements from witnesses during investigation leading to disciplinary proceedings, have been forced or involuntary, or have
been obtained by unfair means. The facts and circumstances in these cases do not establish any such defect.
On our view of the entire matter in question, we are not persuaded to find any invalidity of Rule 5 (b) or any other related rule of the Madras Civil
Service (Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal) Rules, or of the charges framed by the Tribunal against the petitioners. We decline to interfere. The
petitions are dismissed. No costs.