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Judgment
JUDGEMENT PRONOUNCED ON:-
J U D G M E N T : (Per Urmila Joshi Phalke, J.)
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 480 OF 2026
ADMIT.
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 704 OF 2026
Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally both proceedings with the consent of learned counsel for the parties.
The appellants in Criminal Appeal No.480/2026 are the original accused Nos.1 and 2, whereas the petitioner in the Writ Petition is the original accused No.5.
The petitioner as well as the appellants are arrayed as an accused in connection with crime No.299/2026 registered with Bhiwapur Police Station District Nagpur for the offences punishable under Sections 303(2), 318(4), 336(3), 338, 49, 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita read with sections 48(7), 48(8) of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 read with Sections 4 & 21 of the Mines and Minerals (Development & Regulation) Act, 1957, Section 3 of the Prevention of Damage to the Public Properties Act, Section 15 of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 and under Sections 3(1)(ii), 3(2), 3(4) of the Maharashtra Control of Organized Crime Act, 1999 (for short, “MCOC Act).
The petitioner as well as the appellants were arrayed as an accused on an allegation that on 24.04.2026 Crime Branch Officials upon secrete information intercepted a tipper Truck illegally transporting sand at Kargaon Shivar followed by one black Creta Car. The police officials upon inquiry with the driver found that 9 brass of sand in the truck is being transported by the owner as well as driver of the truck illegally and the royalty pass shown by the driver was also forged one. Therefore, offence came to be registered. During investigation, it was revealed that there are other persons involved have also constituted WhatsApp Group by name “Kai Sangu Mama” which consists of more than 500 members used to alert tipper drivers regarding police check post. As per the allegations all the accused persons including the present appellants and the petitioner are the members of an organized crime syndicate engaged in illegal excavation, extraction and transportation of sand. After obtaining prior approval from the Competent Authority offences under Sections 3(1)(ii), 3(2) and 3(4) of the MCOC Act were added.
It is further contention of the petitioner and the appellants that they were came to be arrested. The Investigation was carried out. However, charge-sheet was not filed. The first application for extension of the period for completing investigation and filing charge-sheet was moved by the Additional Public Prosecutor below Exh.108 with affirmation of Investigating Officer on 20.07.2026 under Section 21(2)(b) of the MCOC Act seeking extension of 90 days on the ground that the period of 90 days from the date of arrest of earliest arrested co-accused (24.04.2026) was to expire on 22.07.2026. Prior to the said application being heard, Sub Divisional Police Officer, Umrer addressed a letter dated 21.07.2026 to the learned Special Judge MCOC reporting that the accused Nos.1, 2, 3 and 5 refused to accept the notice of the extension application. The said report was not accompanied by any independent witness or any certification by jail authorities. Learned Special Court by order dated 22.07.2026 granted extension of 30 days as against the 90 days. Thereafter, second application came to be filed vide Exh.151 on 18.08.2026, seeking further extension of 45 days with similar grounds that the period of 120 days i.e. initial 90 days and extended period of 30 days was to expire on 20.08.2026. It is the contention of the petitioner and appellants that in fact second application is replica of first application. Thus, it was a reproduction of the first application without showing any progress in the investigation. In the first application as well as in the second application, the ground of recording confessional statement was mentioned though statement was recorded in May, 2026 itself. The order on the second application Exh.151 was passed by observing that accused Nos.1, 2 and 5 refused to accept the notice. Thus, without hearing the accused persons, the second extension order came to be passed and therefore, the petitioner approaches to this Court.
Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Mardikar and Mr. Chitale, learned counsel appearing in Criminal W.P. and Criminal Appeal respectively, raised three grounds thereby challenging the impugned order:-
Firstly, they claimed that both the extension granted by the Special Judge are without application of mind and without following settled proposition of law as laid down in Section 21(2)
of MCOCA. The proviso therein mandates the Public Prosecutor to submit his independent report by applying mind to the facts and circumstances of the case for extension of time.
Secondly, they claimed that after first extension was granted without following due procedure i.e. without hearing the accused persons is illegal and thirdly, the second sanctioned extension was granted by the learned Special Court on the similar ground without adhering to the facts that there was no progress shown in the investigation. It is contended by the learned Advocate Mr. Chitale that the appellants have filed an application for bail under Section 187(2)(R) of the BNSS (Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure) as charge-sheet was not filed. It was the indefeasible right of the accused to be released on bail when charge-sheet is not filed within stipulated period. Despite the fact that second extension application is reproduction of the earlier application, the Special Court has not considered the same and rejected the bail application and without giving an opportunity to the appellants allowed the extension application and therefore, the orders passed by Special Judge below Exh.108 dated 22.07.2026 and 20.08.2026 are illegal and liable to be quashed and set aside.
Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Mardikar placed reliance on the decision in Criminal Appeal No.23/2025 (Mohsin Nasir Sheikh and ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra) wherein this Court has extensively dealt with the indefeasible right of the petitioner on non-filing of the charge-sheet as well as grant of extension without application of mind. Learned counsel Mr. Chitale also placed reliance on the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Md. Ariz Hasnain allias Ariz Hasnain vs. State of Jharkhand reported in 2026 SCC OnLine SC 808.
8. Per contra learned APP strongly opposed the said contention and submitted that the Sub Divisional Officer with the assistance of Special Prosecutor filed an application for extension of time after application of mind by giving justifying reasons for extension. He submitted that on perusal of first application of extension it reveals that it is specifically mentioned in the said application that there are several offences registered against the accused persons. The said offences are committed by them as a member of organized crime syndicate after application of the provision of MCOCA. Investigation was handed over to Assistant Superintendent of Police, Umred Division on 02.05.2026. Initially Assistant Superintendent of Police Umrer was busy in ‘Bandobast” on account of visit of President of India to the locality, thereafter Gram Panchayat Election and Police Recruitment. Therefore, he could not record the statement of witnesses and the statement of the concerning Police Officer are also to be recorded. The said statements were recorded. Accused persons are arrested. CDR and SDR report are collected. The accused were interrogated. During investigation, Investigation Officer has addressed communication to the Sub Registrar, Nagpur, Municipal Corporation, Income Tax Officer and other authorities to ascertain the details of property in the names of the accused. The said information is yet to be received.
The learned Special Judge, recorded a finding that, under the provisions of MCOCA, it was necessary to obtain further information in respect of the movable and immovable properties, luxury items, and other assets. He also records that there is progress in the investigation and thereby granted extension of 30 days. He further submitted that second extension application was also filed recording the progress in the investigation and therefore, the learned Special Judge recording the detailed reason observing in paragraph No.9 “After perusal of record it indicates that, the ongoing property tracing, telecom data verification and obtaining statutory sanction constitute substantial and concrete grounds demonstrating progress in the investigation. The statutory period permitted under Section 21(2)(b) of MCOCA extend upto a total of 180 days and the requested extension falls well within legal limit.” and granted the extension. Thus, he submitted that considering the progress in the investigation the further extension was granted. Therefore, no inference is called for.
In the light of the submissions the mandate of law as laid down under Section 21(2)(b) of the said Act by the Apex Court in the case of Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors., reported in (1994) 4 SCC 602.
The observations of the Apex Court in the case of Hitendra Thakur (supra) in paragraph 23 are relevant and thus quoted for reference.
“23.We may at this stage, also on a plain reading of clause (bb) of sub-section (4) of Section 20, point out that the Legislature has provided for seeking extension of time for completion of investigation on a report of the public prosecutor. The Legislature did not purposely leave it to an investigating officer to make an application for seeking extension of time from the court. This provision is in tune with the legislative intent to have the investigations completed expeditiously and not to allow an accused to be kept in continued detention during unnecessary prolonged investigation at the whims of the police. The Legislature expects that the investigation must be completed with utmost promptitude but where it becomes necessary to seek some more time for completion of the investigation, the investigating agency must submit itself to the scrutiny of the public prosecutor in the first instance and satisfy him about the progress of the investigation and furnish reasons for seeking further custody of an accused. A public prosecutor is an important officer of the State Government and is appointed by the State under the Code of Criminal Procedure. He is not a part of the investigating agency. He is an independent statutory authority. The public prosecutor is expected to independently apply his mind to the request of the investigating agency before submitting a report to the court for extension of time with a view to enable the investigating agency to complete the investigation. He is not merely a post office or a forwarding agency. A public prosecutor may or may not agree with the reasons given by the investigating officer for seeking extension of time and may find that the investigation had not progressed in the proper manner or that there has been unnecessary, deliberate or avoidable delay in completing the investigation. In that event, he may not submit any report to the court under clause (bb) to seek extension of time. Thus, for seeking extension of time under clause (bb), the public prosecutor after an independent application of his mind to the request of the investigating agency is required to make a report to the Designated Court indicating therein the progress of the investigation and disclosing justification for keeping the accused in further custody to enable the investigating agency to complete the investigation. The public prosecutor may attach the request of the investigating officer along with his request or application and report, but his report, as envisaged under clause (bb), must disclose on the face of it that he has applied his mind and was satisfied with the progress of the investigation and considered grant of further time to complete the investigation necessary. The use of the expression "on the report of the public prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation and the specific reasons for the detention of the accused beyond the said period" as occurring in clause (bb) in sub-section (2) of Section 167 as amended by Section 20(4) are important and indicative of the legislative intent not to keep an accused in custody unreasonably and to grant extension only on the report of the public prosecutor. The report of the public prosecutor, therefore, is not merely a formality but a very vital report, because the consequence of its acceptance affects the liberty of an accused and it must, therefore, strictly comply with the requirements as contained in clause (bb). The request of an investigating officer for extension of time is no substitute for the report of the public prosecutor. Where either no report as is envisaged by clause (bb) is filed or the report filed by the public prosecutor is not accepted by the Designated Court, since the grant of extension of time under clause (bb) is neither a formality nor automatic, the necessary corollary would be that an accused would be entitled to seek bail and the court 'shall' release him on bail if he furnishes bail as required by the Designated Court. It is not merely the question of form in which the request for extension under clause (bb) is made but one of substance. The contents of the report to be submitted by the public prosecutor, after proper application of his mind, are designed to assist the Designated Court to independently decide whether or not extension should be granted in a given case. Keeping in view the consequences of the grant of extension i.e. keeping an accused in further custody, the Designated Court must be satisfied for the Justification, from the report of the public prosecutor, to grant extension of time to complete the investigation. Where the Designated Court declines to grant such an extension, the right to be released on bail on account of the 'default' of the prosecution becomes indefeasible and cannot be defeated by reasons other than those contemplated by sub-section (4) of Section 20 as discussed in the earlier part of this judgment. We are unable to agree with Mr Madhava Reddy or the Additional Solicitor General Mr Tulsi that even if the public prosecutor 'presents' the request of the investigating officer to the court or 'forwards' the request of the investigating officer to the court, it should be construed to be the report of the public prosecutor. There is no scope for such a construction when we are dealing with the liberty of a citizen. The courts are expected to zealously safeguard his liberty. Clause (bb) has to be read and interpreted on its plain language without addition or substitution of any expression in it. We have already dealt with the importance of the report of the public prosecutor and emphasised that he is neither a 'post office' of the investigating agency nor its 'forwarding agency' but is charged with a statutory duty. He must apply his mind to the facts and circumstances of the case and his report must disclose on the face of it that he had applied his mind to the twin conditions contained in clause (bb) of sub-section (4) of Section 20. Since the law requires him to submit the report as envisaged by the section, he must act in the manner as provided by the section and in no other manner. A Designated Court which overlooks and ignores the requirements of a valid report fails in the performance of one of its essential duties and renders its order under clause (bb) vulnerable. Whether the public prosecutor labels his report as a report or as an application for extension, would not be of much consequence so long as it demonstrates on the face of it that he has applied his mind and is satisfied with the progress of the investigation and the genuineness of the reasons for grant of extension to keep an accused in further custody as envisaged by clause (bb) (supra). Even the mere reproduction of the application or request of the investigating officer by the public prosecutor in his report, without demonstration of the application of his mind and recording his own satisfaction, would not render his report as the one envisaged by clause (bb) and it would not be a proper report to seek extension of time. In the absence of an appropriate report the Designated Court would have no jurisdiction to deny to an accused his indefeasible right to be released on bail on account of the default of the prosecution to file the challan within the prescribed time if an accused seeks and is prepared to furnish the bail bonds as directed by the court. Moreover, no extension can be granted to keep an accused in custody beyond the prescribed period except to enable the investigation to be completed and as already stated before any extension is granted under clause (bb), the accused must be put on notice and permitted to have his say so as to be able to object to the grant of extension.”
The law laid down by the Apex Court shows that duty of the Public Prosecutor attached to the Special Court, is something special in which he has to apply his mind independently and satisfy himself as to whether there is actually need for extension of time to file charge sheet. Only then the Public Prosecutor, after verifying the case papers and reasons given by the Investigating Officer may apply by submitting his report to the Special Court for such extension. The Public Prosecutor along with his report may attach the request of Investigating Officer made to him, but he has to apply his mind and demonstrate by giving his reasons as to why he is supporting the contentions raised by the Investigation Officer for extension of time.
The Apex Court very clearly observed in paragraph No.23 that the Public Prosecutor may lebel his report as a report or as an application for extension and it would not be of much consequence, so long as it demonstrates on the face of it, that the Public Prosecutor has applied his mind and he is satisfied with the progress of investigation, the genuineness of the reason for grant of extension thereby keeping accused in further custody. However, mere reproduction of the application or request of Investigating Officer by the Public Prosecutor in his report without demonstrating his application of mind and without recording his own satisfaction would not render his report as the one envisaged in clause (b) provision of Section 21(2)(b) and it would not be proper report to seek extension of time. In absence of appropriate report, the Designating Court would have no jurisdiction to deny to an accused in his indefeasible right to be released on bail on account of default of prosecution to file charge-sheet within the prescribed time, if the accused is ready and wiling to furnish bail bonds. The Court is duty bound to protect the rights of the accused and also to follow the law laid down and no extension can be granted beyond the prescribed period without following such law laid down under Section 21 (2)(b) and by the Apex Court in various decisions.
The provision of Section 21(2)(b) is extensively dealt by this Court in Criminal Appeal No.23/2025 decided on 25.08.2025 wherein it is observed that in order to appreciate the submissions, it is necessary to reproduce Section 21 of MCOCA Act as under:-
“21.Modified application of certain provisions of the Code-(1)
(2)Section 167 of the Code shall apply in relation to a case involving an offence punishable under this Act subject to the modifications that, in sub-section (a) the references to “fifteen days” and “sixty days”. Wherever they occur, shall be construed as references to “thirty days” and “ninety days”, respectively;
(b)after the proviso, the following proviso shall be inserted, namely:-
“provided further that if it is not possible to complete the investigation within the said period of ninety days, the Special Court shall extend the said period upto one hundred and eighty days, on the report of the Public Prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation and the specific reasons for the detention of the accused beyond the said period of ninety days”
Proviso to Section 21(2)(b) carves out exception in respect of grant of extension of period beyond 90 days, the period can be extended upto 180 days subject to satisfying three conditions as laid down in the said proviso. The powers to be exercised under Section 21 of the MCOCA are vested with the Special Court, there is no dispute to that effect. Further, if it is not possible to complete the investigation within 90 days then for extension of further time beyond 90 days, three conditions are to be satisfied which are mandatory i.e. (1) the report of the “Public Prosecutor” is necessary, (2) the said report should indicate that “progress of investigation” and (3) it should also invariably “specify the reasons for the detention” of the accused beyond the period of 90 days. To understand these three ingredients of the proviso, it is necessary to discuss each ingredient.
Here in the present case, the first information report states the prosecution story and application of the provision under the MCOCA Act. As far as grounds for extension are concerned, which are mentioned in paragraph 8. Ground (g) which states that “During investigation and interrogation the accused are not supported to the I.O. in investigation in respect of property obtained by illegal pecuniary gain, therefore, more time required to further investigation. An important investigation is to be made as to whether the accused acquired any movable/immovable property by wrongful means or how. The income source of accused is yet to be investigated. Hence, more time to be required.
That during the course of investigation, Investigation Officer has sent letters to the Sub-Registrars, N.M.C. Income, Tax Officer Grampanchayat, Tahsildar and transport Authority, enquiring about details of property in the names of accused or their relatives and also sent letter to bank/financial institution whether the accused are holding any account in the banks in their names, or in the name of their relatives. The information in that respect has yet to be received from the respective authorities. Hence more time to be required. The Special Judge only observing that under the MCOCA necessary information in respect of movable and immovable property is required to be ascertained and thereby made out a ground for detention and extended the time for completing investigation. The said order came to be passed on 22.07.2026. The application for bail was filed by the appellants in Criminal Appeal No.480/2026 which was pending. Thereafter second extension application was filed on 18.08.2026. On perusal of the second application, it reveals that the first application and second application are same and nothing transpires that any progress of investigation is shown. The second application is complete re-production of first application. This fact itself is sufficient to show that without application of mind, the second application was filed by the Special Public Prosecutor.
The ingredient of “progress of investigation” which has to be spelt out from the report of the Public Prosecutor. The term “investigation” is defined under Section (2)(1) of the BNSS which includes all the proceedings under the said Court for collection of the evidence conducted by the Police Officer or by any person “other than Magistrate” who is authorised by Magistrate in this behalf. Therefore, the term “progress of the investigation” requires to be reflected from the application which is filed by the Special Prosecutor. The other requirement is that report shall be disclosed “specific reasons for detention which means that there should be reasons indicating grounds on which further detention i.e. beyond 90 days is sought. The strict compliance requires and purpose behind such a strict compliance is to safeguard the illegal and unnecessarily detention of the accused. Article 21 of the Constitution of India provides for protection of life and personal liberty. Thus, liberty can be curtailed only by procedure established by the law and therefore, strict compliance is a mandate of the proviso to Section 21(2)(b) of the MCOCA Act. Thus, in a given case extension of time to complete investigation must be justified if the reasons are mentioned therein.
The learned Special Judge without considering the provision committed serious error by accepting both applications for extension though same are not satisfying the requirement of the provision. First extensions was granted of 30 days and second extension was granted of further 30 days. In fact, it was duty of the learned Special Court to find out whether there is any independent report of Public Prosecutor showing application of mind and recording his satisfaction for the purpose of extension and file charge-sheet.
Learned Special Judge has to consider the provisions of Section 21(2)(b) of the MCOCA in its true sense and shall not pass order in routine manner by granting extension of time. It is apparent that learned Special Judge gave a complete go bye to Section 21(2)(b) of the MCOCA and deprived the accused of their indefeasible right of default bail.
Article 21 of the Constitution of India protects personal liberty and Article 22 of the Constitution of India provides safeguard to the accused or the persons detained on similar lines. Taken into consideration proviso to Section 21(2)(b) of the MCOCA the legislature intended to safeguard the interests of the accused who is likely to be detained beyond period of 90 days and therefore, three conditions are laid down. Liberty of person can be curtailed only by procedure established and therefore, so far as the present case is concerned, the duty has been casted upon learned Special Prosecutor and the Special Judge to adhere to the proviso to Section 21(2)(b) of the MCOCA. Thus, considering there is an apparent violation of provision of Section 21(2)(b) of the MCOCA and accused persons are deprived of their right to obtain default bail under Section 187(2)(i) of BNSS, it is needless to mention at this juncture, that the appellants as well as petitioner have filed application for grant of bail which was turned down by the Special Judge on the ground that further period for investigation is already extended. Needless to say that the report of the public prosecutor has to show progress of investigation including relevant material collected. As already observed that Special Judge has ignored this aspect that the application nowhere shows progress of the investigation and identify the reasons for further detention of the appellants and the petitioner.
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sanjay Dutta vs. State through C.B.I. Bombay (II), (994) 5 SCC 410 and M. Ravindran vs. Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, (2021) 2 SCC 485 observed as under:-
“25.Therefore, in conclusion:
25.1Once the accused files an application for bail under the Proviso to Section 167(2) he is deemed to have ‘availed of’ or enforced his right to be released on default bail, accruing after expiry of the stipulated time limit for investigation. Thus, if the accused applies for bail under Section 167(2), CrPC read with Section 36A (4), NDPS Act upon expiry of 180 days or the extended period, as the case may be, the Court must release him on bail forthwith without any unnecessary delay after getting necessary information from the public prosecutor, as mentioned supra. Such prompt action will restrict the prosecution from frustrating the legislative mandate to release the accused on bail in case of default by the investigative agency.
25.2The right to be released on default bail continues to remain enforceable if the accused has applied for such bail, notwithstanding pendency of the bail application; or subsequent filing of the chargesheet or a report seeking extension of time by the prosecution before the Court; or filing of the chargesheet during the interregnum when challenge to the rejection of the bail application is pending before a higher Court.”
22.The meaning of “if not already availed of” in Sanjay Dutt case (supra) is clarified by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and interpreted in the case of Bikramji Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (2020) 10 SCC 616 and M. Ravindran (supra). It would be useful to refer paragraph 29 in Bikramji Singh (supra) as under:-
“29........In the aforesaid premises, we are of the considered opinion that an accused must be held to have availed of his right flowing from the legislative mandate engrafted in the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 167 of the Code if he has filed an application after the expiry of the stipulated period alleging that no challan has been filed and he is prepared to offer the bail that is ordered, and it is found as a fact that no challan has been filed within the period prescribed from the date of the arrest of the accused. In our view, such interpretation would subserve the purpose and the object for which the provision in question was brought on to the statute-book. In such a case, therefore, even if the application for consideration of an order of being released on bail is posted before the court after some length of time, or even if the Magistrate refuses the application erroneously and the accused moves the higher forum for getting a formal order of being released on bail in enforcement of his indefeasible right, then filing of challan at that stage will not take away the right of the accused. Personal liberty is one of the cherished objects of the Indian Constitution and deprivation of the same can only be in accordance with law and in conformity with the provisions thereof, as stipulated under Article 21 of the Constitution. When the law provides that the Magistrate could authorise the detention of the accused in custody up to a maximum period as indicated in the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 167, any further detention beyond the period without filing of a challan by the investigating agency would be a subterfuge and would not be in accordance with law and in conformity with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, and as such, could be violative of Article 21 of the Constitution. There is no provision in the Criminal Procedure Code authorising detention of an accused in custody after the expiry of the period indicated in proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 167 excepting the contingency indicated in Explanation I, namely, if the accused does not furnish the bail…But so long as the accused files an application and indicates in the application to offer bail on being released by appropriate orders of the court then the right of the accused on being released on bail cannot be frustrated on the off chance of the Magistrate not being available and the matter not being moved, or that the Magistrate erroneously refuses to pass an order and the matter is moved to the higher forum and a challan is filed in interregnum. This is the only way how a balance can be struck between the so-called indefeasible right of the accused on failure on the part of the prosecution to file a challan within the specified period and the interest of the society, at large, in lawfully preventing an accused from being released on bail on account of inaction on the part of the prosecuting agency. On the aforesaid premises, we would record our conclusions as follows:
3.On the expiry of the said period of 90 days or 60 days, as the case may be, an indefeasible right accrues in favour of the accused for being released on bail on account of default by the investigating agency in the completion of the investigation within the period prescribed and the accused is entitled to be released on bail, if he is prepared to and furnishes the bail as directed by the Magistrate.
6.The expression “if not already availed of” used by this Court in Sanjay Dutt case must be understood to mean when the accused files an application and is prepared to offer bail on being directed. In other words, on expiry of the period specified in para (a) of the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 167 if the accused files an application for bail and offers also to furnish the bail on being directed, then it has to be held that the accused has availed of his indefeasible right even though the court has not considered the said application and has not indicated the terms and conditions of bail, and the accused has not furnished the same.”
Therefore, in the light of the above, considering that there is gross violation of Section 21(2)(b) of the MCOCA, the orders of the extension are set aside, so also the orders of rejecting the bail application.
In view of that, we proceed to pass following order in Criminal Appeal No.480/2026:-
Criminal Appeal No.480/2026 is allowed.
The order dated 22.07.2026 and 20.08.2026 passed by the learned Special Judge MCOCA, Nagpur in Crime No.299/2026 granting extension of time for completion of investigation and for filing charge sheet is hereby quashed and set aside.
The appellants are released on bail in connection with Crime No.299/2026 registered under Sections 303(2), 318(4), 336(3),338, 49, 3(5) of the BNSS read with section 48(7), 48(8) of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 read with Sections 4 & 21 of the Mines and Minerals (Development & Regulation) Act, 1957, Section 3 of the Prevention of Damage to the Public Properties Act, Section 15 of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 and under Section 3(1)(ii), 3(2), 3(4) of the MCOC Act, 1999 on executing P.R. bond of Rs.50,000/-(Fifty Thousand Only) each with one solvent surety of like amount.
The appellants namely Mohammad Inaajul @ Kallu Tajmul Khan and Kaisar Ali s/o Riyajuddin Ali shall regularly attend the concerned Police Station Bhiwapur District Nagpur twice a month on 1st and 15 between 10.00 a.m. to 1.00 p.m. of every month till filing of the charge sheet.
The appellants shall also regularly attend the trial Court as and when called.
The appellants shall furnish their address of the residents alongwith mobile number and names of two relatives along with their address proof.
The appellants shall not tamper a prosecution evidence in any manner and on finding the same, the bail granted to the appellants deserves to be cancelled.
Criminal Appeal stands disposed of.
We pass the following order in Writ Petition:-
Writ Petition is allowed.
The order dated 22.07.2026 and 20.08.2026 in connection with Crime No.299/2026 registered under Sections 303(2), 318(4), 336(3), 338, 49, 3(5) of the BNSS read with sections 48(7), 48(8) of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 read with Sections 4 & 21 of the Mines and Minerals (Development & Regulation) Act, 1957, Section 3 of the Prevention of Damage to the Public Properties Act, Section 15 of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 and under Section 3(1)(ii), 3(2), 3(4) of the MCOC Act, 1999 is hereby quashed and set aside.
The petitioner-Shailendra @ Jitu s/o Kawaduji Vaidya shall be released on bail on executing PR bond of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand Only) with one surety of like amount.
The petitioner shall attend the concerned Police Station twice in a month on 1st and 15th every month between 10.00 am to 1.00 pm till filing of the charge-sheet.
The petitioner shall also attend trial Court as and when required.
The petitioner shall furnish his detailed address along with mobile number and the names of his two nearest relatives alongwith their address proof before Special Court.
The petitioner shall not tamper a prosecution evidence in any manner and on finding the same, the bail granted to the petitioner deserves to be cancelled.
Rule is made absolute in the above said terms.
Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
(RAJ D. WAKODE, J.) (URMILA JOSHI PHALKE, J.)
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