Mohammad Ashraf Banday vs State Of Jammu And Kashmir & Ors.

……Applicant

JUSTICE RITU TAGORE, MEMBER [JUDL.]

The present Transfer Application has its genesis in SWP No. 1627/2017, originally instituted before the Hon’ble High Court of Jammu and Kashmir at Srinagar. The applicant seeks, primarily, quashing of SRO-177 dated 20.06.2014, whereby the definition of “Family Member” under the Jammu and Kashmir Compassionate Appointment Rules, 1994 (SRO-43 of 1994) was amended to include an adopted son or adopted daughter only in respect of communities in whose case adoption is permissible under law. The applicant also challenges the communication issued by the Principal Accountant General, J&K, whereby the adoption deed relied upon by him was not accepted for the purpose of extending pensionary benefits of the deceased employee. The applicant consequently seeks a direction to the respondents to appoint him on compassionate grounds under SRO-43 of 1994, to extend the pensionary/service benefits of the deceased employee to him and to grant him the same treatment as allegedly extended to similarly situated persons.

The case of the applicant, in brief, is that he was adopted by KalooBanday, resident of Vail Nagbal, Tehsil and Central Administrative Tribunal^{District Anantnag, during his infancy and was brought up} by him as his son. The deceased KalooBanday was serving in the Public Health Engineering Department as a Helper and died in harness on 15.02.2004. According to the applicant, the wife of the deceased had already died and the applicant was the only surviving dependent of Kaloo Banday. The applicant claims that he has no knowledge of his natural parents as he had been brought up by the deceased since infancy.

Following the death of Kaloo Banday, the applicant sought compassionate appointment under SRO-43 of 1994. A dependency/income certificate was issued by the Deputy Commissioner, Anantnag on 29.08.2005, recording the applicant as the adopted son and dependent of the deceased employee. The certificate further records the applicant as the only surviving member in the family of the deceased employee.

The applicant has further relied upon a succession certificate issued by the Court of the Principal District Central Administrative Tribunal^{Judge, Anantnag, in respect of the service benefits of the} deceased, including leave salary, G.P. Fund and SLI. He has also relied upon mutation No. 858 relating to the property of the deceased, which, according to him, was effected in his favor. The applicant further relies upon a Will dated 08.12.2003 executed by Kaloo Banday, wherein the deceased is stated to have specifically referred to the adoption of the applicant and conferred upon him rights in respect of the movable and immovable property as well as the service benefits. Revenue records are also relied upon to contend that the applicant has been recognized as the adopted son and legal representative of the deceased.

The applicant contends that he applied for compassionate appointment within time from the death of the deceased and that his claim was being processed under SRO-43 of 1994. According to him, the concerned authorities had initially processed his case, but the pensionary case of the deceased was subsequently returned by the Accountant Central Administrative Tribunal^{General on the ground that the will relied upon by the} applicant had not been registered and could not be entertained for grant of pensionary benefits. The applicant maintains that the respondents had sufficient material before them to establish his status as the adopted son and dependent of the deceased, but failed to appoint him.

The applicant had earlier approached the Hon’ble High Court by filing SWP No. 897/2010. During the pendency of the said writ petition, SRO-177 dated 20.06.2014 came to be issued amending SRO-43 of 1994. The applicant thereafter withdrew SWP No. 897/2010 on 07.07.2017 with liberty to file a fresh petition so as to enable him to challenge the subsequent amendment and the developments arising therefrom. The present proceedings were thereafter instituted.

The principal challenge of the applicant is that when Kaloo Banday died on 15.02.2004 and when the applicant submitted his claim for compassionate appointment, the unamended SRO-43 of 1994 was in force. Under the then Central Administrative Tribunal^{existing definition of “Family Member”, an adopted son} or adopted daughter was expressly included. It is therefore contended that the applicant acquired a vested right to compassionate appointment under the rules then prevailing and that such right could not subsequently be taken away by SRO-177 issued in the year 2014.

It is further contended that SRO-177 cannot be applied retrospectively to the applicant's case merely because his claim remained pending. According to the applicant, the cause of action arose in the year 2004 upon the death of the deceased employee and his application was admittedly made within the prescribed period. It is argued that a subsequent amendment cannot operate to the prejudice of an accrued right, particularly when the applicant had already approached the Court in the year 2010 and his claim remained pending due to no fault on his part.

Another limb of the applicant's challenge is founded upon Article 14 of the Constitution. It is alleged that several adopted sons and adopted daughters of deceased Central Administrative Tribunal^{Government employees had been granted compassionate} appointment under SRO-43 of 1994 and that the applicant alone has been denied such benefit. The applicant alleges that the respondents have thereby subjected him to hostile discrimination and have adopted an arbitrary and selective approach in dealing with cases of adopted children.

The applicant has also relied upon the definition of “family” contained in the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Service Regulations (CSR) and has contended that the said provisions do not expressly exclude an adopted child. According to him, SRO-43 of 1994 is a special legislation dealing specifically with compassionate appointment and therefore has an overriding effect over the general provisions contained in the Civil Service Regulations. On this basis, it is contended that the subsequent amendment introduced by SRO-177 cannot defeat the applicant's entitlement under the special scheme.

The applicant has further relied upon the Will, mutation, succession certificate and dependency certificate to Central Administrative Tribunal^{contend that he has throughout been recognized as the} son, legal heir and dependent of the deceased. It is argued that no person has challenged his status or the documents relied upon by him and that the respondents themselves had treated him as the adopted son of Kaloo Banday for various administrative purposes. The applicant accordingly submits that the respondents cannot now deny his status merely on the ground that the will was not registered.

The applicant has also questioned the applicability of the Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 2007. It is submitted that the adoption relied upon by him took place during his infancy and the deceased had executed the Will in the year 2003, much before the enactment of the said Act. It is contended that the Shariat Act cannot be invoked retrospectively to invalidate the status which had already been recognized and acted upon by the authorities. It is further submitted that if the intention of the rule-making authority was to Central Administrative Tribunal^{exclude adopted children belonging to communities where} adoption is not recognized under personal law, the same could have been expressly provided in SRO-43 itself, but the amendment came only in 2014.The applicant has relied upon the judgment of this Tribunal in T.A. No. 8596 of 2020, Ubaid Latif v. Director, Civil Secretariat, J&K &Ors., decided on 13.11.2024 , submitting that the present case be decided in the light of observations made in the aforesaid judgement.

Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents has opposed the Transfer Application. It is submitted that compassionate appointment is an exception to the normal rule of recruitment and does not confer any right of inheritance or succession upon the family members of a deceased employee. According to the respondents, a claimant can seek appointment only if he satisfies the eligibility conditions prescribed by the scheme governing compassionate appointment.

The respondents have specifically contended that the Central Administrative Tribunal^{applicant belongs to Muslim community,cannot claim the} status of a legally recognized adopted son for the purposes of compassionate appointment. It is submitted that adoption, in the legal sense of creating a relationship equivalent to that of a natural-born child, is not recognized under Muslim Personal Law. Reliance has also been placed upon the Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 2007 to contend that matters governed by Muslim Personal Law have to be determined in accordance with the Shariat.

The respondents further rely upon SRO-177 dated 20.06.2014. It is contended that the amendment expressly qualifies the inclusion of an adopted son or adopted daughter by providing that such inclusion shall be available only in respect of communities in whose case adoption is permissible under law. It is further submitted that the Explanation appended to the amendment expressly provides that all cases pending on the date of issuance of SRO-177 shall be decided in accordance with Central Administrative Tribunal^{the amended notification, provided the candidate had} applied within one year from the date of death of the deceased employee.

According to the respondents, the applicant admittedly applied for compassionate appointment within the prescribed period from the death of KalooBanday. His case was pending on the date when SRO-177 came into force, therefore, squarely falls within the Explanation appended to the amended rules. It is accordingly submitted that the applicant cannot claim consideration under the unamended SRO-43 merely because the deceased employee died in the year 2004.

The respondents have also questioned the proof and legal effect of the adoption relied upon by the applicant. It is pointed out that the documents relied upon by the applicant do not, according to the respondents, establish a legally recognized relationship for the purposes of compassionate appointment. The respondents have further relied upon the communication of the Accountant Central Administrative Tribunal^{General, whereby the Will relied by the applicant was not} accepted for pensionary benefits on the ground that it had not been registered.

The respondents have also taken the plea that the applicant had earlier filed SWP No. 897/2010 on the same cause of action and that the subsequent writ petition was not maintainable. However, the record shows that SWP No. 897/2010 was withdrawn on 07.07.2017 with liberty granted by the Hon’ble High Court to file a fresh petition so as to enable the applicant to challenge the subsequent developments, including the effect of SRO-177. The said objection, therefore, does not require separate consideration in the present proceedings.

The respondents have placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court in Mohammad RafiqWagay v. State of J&K &Ors., SWP No. 1673/2018, decided on 26.07.2018, wherein the claim of an adopted son belonging to the Muslim community under SRO-43 of 1994 was considered in the light of SRO-177 of 2014. The Central Administrative Tribunal^{Hon’ble High Court held that after the amendment, the} benefit in respect of an adopted son or daughter would be available only where the personal law governing the concerned community permits adoption.

Reliance has also been placed upon the judgment of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Jammu Bench, in Mohammad YousufKhanday v. Department of Power Development, UT of J&K, T.A. No. 5478/2020, decided on 05.05.2021. In that case also, the claim of an adopted son of a Muslim Government employee for compassionate appointment under SRO-43 of 1994 was rejected after considering the legal position relating to adoption under Muslim Personal Law and the Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 2007.

The respondents have further relied upon the judgment of this Tribunal in Abdul Wahid Sheikh v. State of J&K &Ors., T.A. No. 5206/2021, arising out of SWP No. 1587/2017, decided on 04.12.2024, besides other judgments referred to in their written submissions.

Central Administrative Tribunal^{22. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and} carefully perused the pleadings, the documents placed on record and the judgments relied upon by both sides.

From the respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, the following issues arise for consideration before this Tribunal:

The case of the applicantis founded on his claim that he is the adopted son of the deceased employee and, therefore, eligible to be treated as a "family member" of the deceased employee for the purposes of consideration under SRO-43 of 1994 for compassionate appointment as it stood prior to the amendment introduced by SRO-177 of Central Administrative Tribunal^2014.

The applicant contends that the amendment introduced by SRO-177 of 2014 restricts recognition of adopted son oradopted daughter to those communities in which adoption is legally recognized under the applicable personal law. It is urged that such restriction creates an impermissible distinction between otherwise similarly situated dependents and results in denial of consideration for compassionate appointment solely on the basis of religion.

It is, therefore, contended that classification introduced by the amendment, whereby adopted sons and daughters belonging to communities in which adoption is recognized under the applicable personal laws, while those belonging to communities where such recognition is unavailable are excluded has no reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the Scheme of providing succour to the family of a deceased employee facing financial hardship on account of loss of its breadwinner. According to the Central Administrative Tribunal^{applicant, the amendment introduced through SRO-177 of} 2014 defeats the very object underlying the parent Scheme.

As per the applicant, the earlier version of SRO-43 of 1994 expressly defined "family member" in Rule 2(d) to include "adopted son" and "adopted daughter". The Scheme did not make any distinction on the basis of religion and recognized an adopted son or adopted daughter as a member of the family of the deceased employee. According to the applicant, rejection of his claim solely on the ground that he is a Muslim and that adoption is not recognized under Muslim Personal Law is arbitrary, discriminatory and unsustainable in law. It is further contended that amendment has no application to his case and that his claim is required to be considered strictly under the special provisions of SRO-43 of 1994.

The controversy essentially turns upon two questions: first, whether the applicant can claim the status of a legally recognized adopted son for the purpose of Central Administrative Tribunal^{compassionate appointment under SRO-43 of 1994; and} second, whether his pending claim is governed by the unamended SRO-43 or by SRO-177 dated 20.06.2014.

There is no dispute that KalooBanday died in harness on 15.02.2004 and that the applicant thereafter sought compassionate appointment. There is also material on record in the form of the dependency certificate issued by the Deputy Commissioner, the succession certificate issued by the District Judge, the mutation relied upon by the applicant and other official records, which show that the applicant was treated by the authorities as the adopted son and dependent of the deceased. These documents cannot simply be ignored. They demonstrate, at the least, that the deceased treated the applicant as his son and that the applicant was treated as his dependent for certain administrative purposes.

That, however, does not conclude the issue before this Tribunal. The question is not merely whether the applicant was brought up by KalooBanday or whether he was Central Administrative Tribunal^{described as his adopted son in official or private} documents. The question is whether the relationship relied upon by the applicant satisfies the statutory requirement of a “family member” under the scheme governing compassionate appointment under SRO-43 read with SRO -177 dated 20.06.2014.

Compassionate appointment is an exception to the normal rule of recruitment to public employment. It is intended to provide relief to the family of a Government employee who dies in harness and leaves the family in financial distress. It does not constitute a mode of succession to the post held by the deceased employee. Consequently, even where dependency is established, the claimant must satisfy the eligibility requirements prescribed by the scheme. No appointment can be directed dehorsthe governing rules.

The original SRO-43 of 1994 undoubtedly included an ‘adopted son’ and ‘adopted daughter’ within the expression “Family Member”. The position, however, was Central Administrative Tribunal^{subsequently altered by SRO-177 dated 20.06.2014. The} amendment did not remove the expressions “adopted son” and “adopted daughter”; rather, it qualified their inclusion by providing that such relationship would be recognized only in respect of communities in whose case adoption is permissible under law.

The amended provision, therefore, makes the inclusion of an adopted son or adopted daughter as a “Family Member” for purpose of the Scheme dependent upon the legal permissibility of adoption under the law applicable to the concerned communities. The description of a person as an adopted son in a dependency certificate, revenue record, Will or other document may have evidentiary relevance, but cannot, by itself, satisfy the amended statutory requirement where the claimed relationship of adoption is not recognized in law.

It is an admitted position that the applicant is Muslim by religion. Under the Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 2007, Central Administrative Tribunal^{adoption, in the sense in which it is recognized under} certain other personal law systems, is not acknowledged as conferring upon a child the legal status of a natural-born offspring. Islamic law recognizes the concept of guardianship and care of a child; however, such guardianship does not ordinarily create legal filiation or inheritance rights equivalent to those of a biological child. In the absence of any statutory provision expressly overriding the personal law applicable to the parties, an adopted child cannot automatically be presumed to acquire the status of a legally recognized adopted son within the Muslim community.

More importantly, SRO-177 contains an express Explanation dealing with pending cases. It provides that all cases pending on the date of issuance of SRO-177 shall be decided in accordance with the said notification, provided that the candidate had applied within one year from the date of death of the deceased person. The applicant admittedly applied for compassionate Central Administrative Tribunal^{appointment within six months of the death of} KalooBanday. His claim was thus pending on the date of issuance of SRO-177 and falls squarely within the class of cases to which the amended provision was expressly made applicable.

The contention that the applicant's claim must necessarily be decided under the unamended SRO-43 merely because the deceased employee died in 2004 cannot, therefore, be accepted. The death of the employee and the submission of the application undoubtedly furnished the occasion for the claim, but the applicant had not acquired an indefeasible right to appointment merely upon the death of the employee or upon submission of his application. His claim remained subject to consideration under the governing scheme, and the rule-making authority expressly prescribed the manner in which pending cases were to be dealt with after the amendment.

The argument founded upon retrospective operation of SRO-177 also does not advance the applicant's case. No Central Administrative Tribunal^{appointment had been made in favour of the applicant} before SRO-177 came into force; his claim remained pending and was expressly brought within the ambit of the amended provision.The present case, therefore, is not one where a subsequently amendment is sought to be applied retrospectively in the absence of any statutory authority. Rather, the rule-making authority has expressly provided the manner in which pending claims are to be dealt with.

It is relevant to note that, while the earlier version of SRO-43 of 1994 referred to "adopted son" and "adopted daughter" amongst the eligible categories, it did not expressly clarify its applicability to communities in which adoption is not legally recognized. By virtue of SRO-177 dated 20.06.2014, the position was clarified to the effect that adoption must be legally valid under the applicable law governing the parties. Thus the amendment does not create a separate category of beneficiaries but regulates the manner in which the existing category of adopted son or adopted daughter is to be recognized for the purposes Central Administrative Tribunal^{of the Scheme.}

For instance, in the case of a Hindu employee, where adoption is recognized under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, a child lawfully adopted acquires the same legal status as a natural-born child and would fall within the ambit of "family member" under SRO-43 of 1994. Conversely, where a person belongs to a community in which adoption is not recognized under the applicable personal law and no statutory mechanism, such as adoption under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, has been invoked, a mere deed, declaration or private arrangement of adoption would not, by itself, confer the legal status necessary for claiming service benefits under the Scheme.

The applicant's reliance upon the Will dated 08.12.2003 does not alter this position. The Will may have evidentiary relevance concerning the intention of the deceased and testamentary disposition of property. Similarly, the mutation and succession certificate may have relevance Central Administrative Tribunal^{for property or specified service benefits. These} documents, however, cannot by themselves create a legal relationship of adoption for a purpose for which the governing service scheme requires the relationship of adoption to be legally permissible under the applicable law.

The distinction between succession to property and eligibility under a compassionate appointment scheme is fundamental. The fact that the applicant may have succeeded to property or certain debts and securities of the deceased, or that he may have been treated as his dependent for administrative purposes, does not automatically make him eligible for appointment under a statutory scheme. Eligibility for public employment must be determined by reference to the conditions prescribed by the scheme.

The applicant has also sought to place significance upon the fact that the Will dated 08.12.2003 and alleged adoption predates the Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Central Administrative Tribunal^{Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 2007. Even} assuming the factual position as asserted by the applicant, the argument does not answer the effect of SRO-177 upon his pending claim. The relevant issue before this Tribunal is not whether the Will could have testamentary consequences when executed, but whether, when the applicant's pending claim for compassionate appointment was required to be considered, he satisfied the amended definition of “Family Member”.

By the time the applicant's claim was required to be considered under SRO-177, the amended provision expressly made recognition of an adopted son or adopted daughter dependent upon the permissibility of adoption under the law applicable to the concerned community. The applicant admittedly belongs to the Muslim community. The judgments relied upon by the respondents have consistently proceeded on the basis that adoption, in the sense of creating a legal filial relationship equivalent to that of a natural-born child, is not recognized Central Administrative Tribunal^{under the applicable Muslim Personal Law. The applicant} has not been able to demonstrate any statutory mechanism under which the alleged adoption conferred upon him the legal status contemplated by the amended SRO-43.

Further, the applicant has sought to draw support from the definition of “family” contained in Rules 15 of the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Service Rules( CSR). However, the said provision, being a general provision contained in the Service Rules, would not by itself, enlarge or modify the scope of expression “family” as contemplated under these special provisions of SRO-43 of 1994. The applicant, therefore, cannot claim inclusion merely by relying upon the general definition contained in the CSR unless such entitlement is otherwise traceable to the provisions of SRO 40 Of 94 or other applicable laws.

In the present case, the applicant has neither pleaded nor established that adoption is recognized under his personal law, nor has he demonstrated that any statutory mechanism creating a legally valid adoption was resorted Central Administrative Tribunal^{to. There is also no case set up by the applicant that} adoption is recognized as a binding custom having the force of law within his family or community. In the absence of a legally cognizable adoption, the applicant cannot be treated as a "family member" within the meaning of the Scheme. Rather, the case projected by the applicant proceeds on the admitted premise that adoption, as understood in other personal law systems, is not recognized under the personal law applicable to him.

The judgment in Mohammad RafiqWagayis particularly relevant because it considered the very amendment introduced by SRO-177 and held that an adopted son belonging to a community whose personal law does not permit adoption cannot claim the benefit of SRO-43 on the basis of such adoption.

The distinction between the present case and Ubaid Latif Dar, (supra), is decisive. In that case, compassionate appointment had already been made under the unamended SRO-43 before SRO-177 came into force. In the present Central Administrative Tribunal^{case, no appointment was ever made in favour of the} applicant. His claim remained pending and was, therefore, expressly brought within the operation of SRO-177 by the Explanation appended thereto. Furthermore, the judgment as on date been stayed by the Hon’ble High Court, therefore does not furnish a sustainable basis for determination of the issue at hand.

The applicant's contention that he acquired a vested right to appointment in the year 2004 is, therefore, also untenable. At the highest, the applicant acquired a right to have his claim considered under the compassionate appointment scheme. No indefeasible right to appointment arose merely because the deceased employee died while in service or because the applicant submitted his application within the prescribed period. Appointment could follow only upon satisfaction of the eligibility conditions prescribed by the governing rules.

The argument based upon Article 14 of the Constitution also cannot be accepted. The classification introduced by Central Administrative Tribunal^{SRO-177 is not founded simply upon the religion of the} claimant. The amended provision does not prohibit compassionate appointment to a person merely because he belongs to a particular community; rather, it makes the inclusion of an ‘adopted son’ or ‘adopted daughter’ dependent upon whether adoption is permissible under the law applicable to that community. The relevant distinction is, therefore, founded upon the legal status of the claimed relationship.

Article 14 prohibits arbitrary discrimination, but does not require the State to disregard legally relevant distinctions. While framing a scheme for compassionate appointment, the State is entitled to prescribe ascertainable categories of eligible family members and to require the claimed relationship to have legal recognition. Such a requirement provides an objective basis for determining eligibility and ensures certainty and uniformity in the administration of an exceptional mode of appointment. The applicant has not demonstrated that the classification lacks an Central Administrative Tribunal^{intelligible differentia or that the differentia has no} rational nexus with the object of the Scheme.

The allegation that other adopted sons or daughters were granted compassionate appointment also does not assist the applicant. No specific appointment order or other cogent material has been placed before this Tribunal establishing that any person similarly situated to the applicant, governed by the same legal framework and subject to the same amended provision, was granted appointment notwithstanding the absence of legally recognized adoption. Even otherwise, an appointment allegedly made contrary to the governing statutory provisions cannot furnish a legal foundation for claiming repetition of an illegality. Article 14 does not confer a right to negative equality.

There is also no merit in the contention that the respondents were bound by their earlier processing of the applicant’s case. The fact that the departmental authorities initially forwarded the applicant’s case along with the Central Administrative Tribunal^{relevant documents merely shows that the claim was} processed administratively. It does not amount to a final determination that the applicant was legally eligible for appointment. Eligibility was ultimately required to be examined by the competent authority in accordance with the Scheme.

In view of the foregoing discussion, the applicant has failed to establish that he falls within the expression “family member” under SRO-43 of 1994 as amended by SRO-177 dated 20.06.2014. The fact that he was brought up by the deceased, described as his adopted son in various documents, and treated as a dependent for certain administrative or property-related purposes cannot substitute the requirement of a legally recognized relationship of adoption under the applicable law. The Will, dependency certificate and succession certificate, therefore, do not confer or adjudicate upon the applicant eligibility for compassionate appointment under the Scheme. The applicant has, thereof failed to satisfy the Central Administrative Tribunal^{statutory requirement of eligibility for appointment on} compassionate grounds.

It is settled that compassionate appointment is not a hereditary right that accrues automatically upon the death of an employee. It is an exception to the general rule governing public employment and must therefore be strictly regulated by the Scheme in force. In State Bank of India v. Raj Kumar, (2010) 11 SCC 661, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that no aspirant can claim compassionate appointment dehors the governing Scheme. Similar principles were reiterated in Canara Bank v. Mahesh Kumar, (2015) 7 SCC 412. Therefore, the contention that the amended provisions cannot be applied is without merit.The exclusion of an adopted child from the ambit of compassionate appointment in the case of a Muslim employee cannot be said to be unconstitutional merely because Muslim personal law does not recognize adoption. The validity of scheme must be examined within the limited scope of compassionate of equality or perceived hardship.

It is equally well settled that Article 14 forbids class legislation but permits reasonable classification founded upon an intelligible differentia having a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved. Distinct personal law systems recognized by law constitute legally cognizable distinctions unless declared unconstitutional by a competent court. Consequently, legal consequences flowing from such personal law systems cannot automatically be characterized as arbitrary merely because they operate differently in relation to different communities.

While framing a compassionate appointment policy, the State is entitled to identify the category of eligible dependents on the basis of legally recognized familial relationships. Where the personal law governing a particular community does not confer upon an adopted child the legal status of a natural-born child, the State determining eligibility under a service scheme. The classification, therefore, is founded not upon religion per se but upon the existence or absence of a legally recognized filial relationship under the applicable legal framework.

The distinction also bears rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved. Compassionate appointment requires certainty, administrative uniformity, and objective determination of entitlement. Reliance upon legally recognized family relations ensures administratively manageable standards, prevents uncertainty and disputed dependency claims, and avoids potential misuse of an exceptional concession carved out in deviation from ordinary public employment norms. The State is, therefore, justified in restricting eligibility to persons whose status is recognized by applicable law.It may further be contended that Scheme itself does not create the distinction; rather, the distinction already exists recognizes pre-existing legal status for the limited purpose of determining entitlement under a welfare oriented service policy. Such recognition of different legal consequences flowing from the distinct personal law systems does not by itself offend Article 14 so long as classification rest upon intelligible differentia and bears reasonable nexus with the object of the scheme.

Moreover, compassionate appointment being a matter of policy, the scope of judicial review remains limited. Courts have consistently held that compassionate appointment cannot be claimed dehors governing rules nor granted merely on sympathetic considerations. A claimant must strictly satisfy the eligibility conditions prescribed under the scheme. Mere hardship and emotional considerations cannot furnish a ground for judicially expanding the categories of beneficiaries contrary to the express policy framework.

In the absence of any challenge to the validity of the indirectly be nullified through a collateral challenge to a service scheme. So long as the underlying legal framework remains valid and operative, the State cannot be faulted for recognizing distinctions flowing therefrom while determining legally recognized family relationships for administrative purposes.

Further, there also exists a strong presumption of constitutionality in favour of statutory provisions and executive policies. The burden lies upon the person challenging such provisions to establish manifest arbitrariness, hostile discrimination or absence of any rational basis. Merely because another personal law system recognizes adoption differently does not render the impugned classification unconstitutional. Equality under Article 14 does not mandate uniformity of personal laws nor obliteration of distinctions legally arising there from.

Accordingly, where the governing personal law does not recognize adoption in the manner contemplated by the ofcompassionate appointment cannot, by itself, be held unconstitutional, arbitrary or lacking in reasonable classification. SRO-177 of 2014, which recognizes adoption only where it is legally recognized under the applicable law, is founded upon an intelligible differentia having a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved. Consequently, the impugned provisions of SRO-177 of 2014 cannot be held to be arbitrary or unconstitutional.

The claim for pensionary benefits stands on different footing and cannot be rejected merely by reference to the provisions governing compassionate appointment. The entitlement to family pension and other pensionary benefits is required to be examined under the statutory provisions governing pension and gratuity applicable to the deceased government employee.The question whether applicant is legally entitled to be treated as a member of the family for purpose of pensionary benefits and whether establish such status, is required to be determined with reference to the applicable pension rules and the relevant facts and documents. The findings recorded herein with regard to compassionate appointment shall not, therefore, be treated as determinative of the applicant’s independent claim for pensionary benefits.

Consequently, while the claim for the compassionate appointment is rejected, the challenge to the order of Accountant General concerning pensionary benefit is disposed of with direction to the competent authority to reconsider the applicant’s claim independently, strictly in accordance with applicable pension rules and regulations after examining the material placed on record, within a period of 08 weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this Order , by passing a speaking and reasoned order.

Accordingly, the points of determination stand answered in terms of the findings recorded hereinabove. In view of the findings returned, the present Transfer Application is Applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of.

There shall be no order as to costs.

The Registry shall consign the record to the Record Room after due compliance.