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Judgment
By way of the present Revision Application, the Applicant, who is arraigned as Accused No.5 in Sessions Case No.95/2023 pending on the file of Additional Session Judge-2, Mapusa, has questioned the order dated 25.07.2025, whereby it is directed to frame charges against the Applicant and the other Accused under Sections 120-B, 395, 427 and 452 of the IPC.
The essential facts leading to the filing of the present Revision Application can be summarised as under:
On 07.01.2019, one Mani Chander Tyagi, the Complainant, files a complaint before the Calangute Police Station stating that he is a businessman by profession and runs a hotel, namely Ocean Ride Beach Resort at Khobrowado, Calangute, on a Lease Agreement. The premises belong to one Alnoor Shamsuddin Lakhoo @Alibaba, native of Hubli, Karnataka. He states that the said Alnoor Lakhoo @ Alibaba had warned him that the Lease Agreement was getting over and he had to pay the arrears of rent, failing which Lakhoo would forcefully evict him from the hotel. The Complainant further mentions about a Civil Suit, which he had filed against owner Lakhoo for a temporary injunction, which was disposed of in the month of December 2018 with a direction to the Complainant to pay the rent.
He states that on 07.01.2019, at about 6.00 p.m., around 15 people came to his hotel and entered the reception area. The receptionist one Mohit was on duty at the reception. He made a phone call to the Complainant and upon reaching the hotel, the Complainant was accosted by around 15 people. They asked him if his name is Jony and when the Complainant replied in the affirmative, they started assaulting him and the receptionist Mohit with fist blows, speaker rods, etc., causing them injuries. He states that the assailants took away his gold chain costing approximately Rs.90,000/- along with cash of Rs.5,00,000/- from the reception counter. They disconnected CCTV cameras, forcefully took out the guests from the rooms of the hotel and also told the waiters to go away from the hotel. He states that there were two lady bouncers among the 15 persons, who were present at the spot. He states that he was informed by these persons who accosted him and assaulted him that they have been sent by Mr Alnoor Shamsuddin Lakhoo to take possession of the hotel. He identifies two persons from the said group as Manish Prakash Mishra and Rupam Kumar Dey. He files written complaint against the aforesaid two persons and Mr Alnoor Shamsuddin Lakhoo dated 07.01.2019.
On the basis of the said written complaint, Calangute Police Station lodges an FIR bearing no.07/2019 against Alnoor Shamsuddin Lakhoo, owner of Ocean Ride Beach Resort, Manish Prakash Mishra and Roopam Kumar Dey along with 13 other unknown persons including two ladies for offences punishable under Sections 143, 147, 148, 452, 427, 323, 506, 356, 380 r/w 149 IPC. The FIR narrates the incident in terms of the aforesaid complaint and alleges offences of unlawful assembly, criminal trespass, criminal intimidation, assault and theft amongst other offences against the accused persons.
On 08.01.2019, Section 395 IPC is added to the aforesaid array of offences. Section 395 provides for punishment for dacoity. One of the essential requirements of attracting Section 395 IPC is that the offence of robbery must have been committed or attempted to be committed by five or more persons conjointly. It is pertinent to note that the FIR refers to around 15 persons, known and unknown.
After registration of FIR, the Police commence investigation, record the statement of Mohit on 08.01.2019. In his statement, Mohit, the receptionist, corroborates the allegations of the Complainant.
From around January 2019 to January 2020, the Police record the statements of waiters and other witnesses, who were present at the scene of offence. The Police also obtain Medical Certificates, draw panchanamas, crime scene inspection reports, collect documents, call detail records, FSL reports, etc. They arrest Rupam Kumar Dey, who is subsequently released on bail. Manish Mishra is granted anticipatory bail by the Sessions Judge, Panaji.
On 29.01.2020, the Police record supplementary statement of the Complainant, which reads as under:
څI Shri Manichander s/o Virendra Tyagi, age 34 years Occ:-Business r/o H. No. B-202, Mathura Enclave, Porvorim Bardez Goa, do hereby state as under.
In continuation to my complaint dated 07.01.2019 which is registered vide Calangute Police Station Crime No. 07/2019 u/s 143, 147, 148, 452, 427, 323, 506, 356, 380, 395 r/w 149 IPC and in continuation to my letter dated 09.01.2019, I would like to state that I have viewed the Facebook page of one Mr. Domnic Nazareth and ongoing through his Facebook friends list, I noticed one person by name Selvin Crasto, who is the same who had accompanied with the accused person mentioned in the above crime to my Hotel namely Ocean Ride Beach Resort at Khobrowado Calangute and I identified the said person to be same person.
My statement is recorded in English, read and explained to me and ƯouǏd ƙoǥǥeƙtl̎ ǥeƙoǥded as peǥ ǎ̎ sa̎.چ
On the very next day, i.e. on 30.01.2020, one more supplementary statement of the Complainant was recorded, since this statement forms the fulcrum of the allegations against the Applicant, it would be necessary to reproduce the same. It reads thus:
څI Shǥi MaǏiƙhaǏdeǥ s/o ViǥeǏdǥa (̎aưi, aưe ֵֶ ̎ eaǥs Oƙƙك -Business r/o H. No. B-202, Mathura Enclave, Porvorim Bardez Goa, do hereby state as under.
In continuation to my complaint dated 07.01.2019 which is registered vide Calangute Police Station Crime No. 07/2019 u/s 143, 147, 148, 452, 427, 323, 506, 356, 380, 395 r/w 149 IPC and in continuation to my letter dated 09.01.2019, I would like to state that today ie. on 30.01.2020 I had come to Calangute Police Station for investigation purpose in my above case as I had learnt from my reliable sources that one person who had introduced himself as Alnoor @ Ali Baba on the date of incident i.e. on 07.01.2019 is seen near Lavie Woods Hotel at Khobrowado Calangute. Accordingly, as per the directions of P.I. Calangute P.S. I along with PSI Laxi Amonkar left to Khobrowado Calangute and I noticed the said was standing outside the main entrance of Hotel Lavie Woods. Upon asking him he disclosed his name as Mohammad Hussain s/o Ahmed, age 68 years r/o c/o Lavie Woods Hotel, Khobrowado Calangute Bardez Goa n/o Flat. No. B/3801 30th floor Orchid Enclave, Belasis road, Mumbai Central, Maharashtra. Accordingly he was brought at Calangute Police Station for further legal formalities. My statement is recorded in English, read and explained to me and found correctly recorded as per my say.”
On 31.01.2020, the next day, Police filed the chargesheet, bearing no.8/2020 for offences punishable under Sections 395, 427, 452 r/w 120-B of IPC against Rupam Kumar Dey (Accused No.1), Manish Mishra (Accused No.2), Selwin Crasto (Accused No.3), Alnoor Shamsuddin Lakhoo (Accused No.4) and the Applicant i.e. Mohammed Hussain Ahmed (Accused No.5).
The JMFC, Mapusa, committed the chargesheet to the Sessions Court on 06.12.2023. The Applicant – Accused No.5 was arrayed as Accused without arrest.
The Sessions Court vide its order dated 25.07.2025 (impugned order) framed charges against the Accused Nos.2,3 and 5 under Sections 395, 427, 452 r/w 120-B of IPC.
Heard Mr Nitin Sardessai, learned Senior Counsel along with Mr S. Nunes and T. Rebello, learned Counsel for the Applicant and Mr S.G. Bhobe, learned Public Prosecutor for the Respondents. Perused the record and the judgments relied upon by rival parties.
The principal submission of learned Senior Advocate Mr Sardessai is that the Complainant, in his complaint to the Police and the statement recorded by the Police forming the basis of the FIR has stated about the incident dated 07.01.2019 wherein 15 persons accosted him and the receptionist Mohit, assaulted them and took away cash from the reception counter and gold chain of the Complainant. He states in his complaint that these persons were sent by Alnoor Shamsuddin Lakhoo, the owner of the hotel, since he wanted to evict the Complainant forcibly. The Complainant does not state that Alnoor Shamsuddin Lakhoo was present at the scene of offence or that he participated in the assault or subsequent theft. It was further urged by Mr Sardessai that the only role attributed to Alnoor Shamsuddin Lakhoo is that the offence was committed at his behest and hence his name finds reference in the FIR. In the chargesheet, which was filed by the Police on 31.01.2020, the name of Alnoor Shamsuddin Lakhoo is reflected as Accused No.4.
He then invites attention to the supplementary statements of the Complainant recorded on 29.01.2020 and 30.01.2020. He submits that the statement recorded on 30.01.2020 is germane to the present application. In this statement, the complainant states that on 30.01.2020, he had come to Calangute Police Station for investigation because he learnt from his reliable sources that one person, who had introduced himself as Alnoor @ Alibaba on the date of the incident, i.e. on 07.01.2019, is seen near Lavie Woods Hotel at Khobrowado, Calangute. The Complainant further states that when he reached the said location along with PSI Amonkar, the concerned person was standing outside the main entrance of Hotel Lavie Woods. Upon asking him, he disclosed his name as Mohamed Hussain, S/o. Ahmed, age 68 years, R/o. C/o. Lavie Woods Hotel, Khobrowado, Calangute, Bardez, Goa and Flat No.B/3801, 30th Floor. Orchid Enclave, Belasis Road, Mumbai Central Maharashtra (the Applicant herein). He was apprehended by the Police and brought to the Calangute Police Station for further legal formalities. The Police filed chargesheet the very next day, i.e. on 31.01.2020 arraigning him as Accused No.5. The learned Senior Advocate has strenuously urged that taking the chargesheet and the documents submitted therewith by the Police, there is no material to even prima facie implicate the Applicant, Accused No.5. He submits that the prosecution case taken at its face value is that one Alnoor Shamsuddin Lakhoo, the owner of Ocean Ride Hotel had a dispute with the Complainant Mani Chander Tyagi and at his instance some persons assaulted the Complainant and the receptionist on 07.01.2019. The name of Alnoor Shamsuddin Lakhoo is mentioned in the FIR and the chargesheet as Accused No.4.
He further submits that the supplementary statement of the Complainant dated 30.01.2020 is the only material that is sought to be used to implicate the present Applicant (Accused No.5). However, taking the supplementary statement as gospel truth the name referred to in the said statement is Alnoor @ Alibaba. It is pertinent to note that the Complainant refers to Alnoor Shamsuddin Lakhoo @ Alibaba in his complaint dated 07.01.2019 as the owner of the said hotel with whom he has a dispute. In fact, the said Alnoor Shamsuddin Lakhoo @ Alibaba is already arraigned in the case as Accused No.4. Interestingly, the supplementary statement dated 30.01.2020 states that when the person who was apprehended outside the main entrance of Hotel Lavie Woods was asked his name, he disclosed it as Mohamed Hussain, S/o. Ahmed.
The learned Senior Advocate strenuously submits that by no stretch of imagination there is any similarity between Alnoor Shamsuddin Lakhoo @ Alibaba and Mohamed Hussain, S/o. Ahmed. These are two separate persons, even going by the supplementary statement of the Complainant. It is not the case of the Complainant that he has identified Alnoor Shamsuddin Lakhoo @ Alibaba since he is already an Accused in the said proceedings. It is also not his case that the person who was apprehended introduced himself or is identified as Alnoor Shamsuddin Lakhoo @ Alibaba. Hence, there is no possibility of any mistaken identity. Quite simply put, the Police apprehended the Applicant on 30.01.2020, who, despite identifying himself as Mohamed Hussain, S/o. Ahmed was still arraigned as Accused without the Complainant identifying him as the person who had participated in the offence allegedly committed on 07.01.2019. In fact, the name of the Applicant does not figure in the complaint or even the subsequent supplementary statement of the Complainant.
The learned Senior Advocate would then point out that without carrying out any investigation or confirming whether the Applicant had any role to play in the alleged offence, the Police incorporated him as an accused and filed a chargesheet on the very next day. This speaks volumes about what kind of investigation the Police has done in the matter. Lastly, it was submitted that the Applicant, an innocent person, is being falsely implicated in the offence, without there being a shred of material against him, taking the record of the case and the documents submitted by the Police at face value.
Countering these arguments, the learned Public Prosecutor would fairly concede that the Applicant is not named in the FIR, nor is any person matching his description mentioned in the FIR. However, he would urge that at the stage of framing of charge, it may not be appropriate to examine the question of identification of the Applicant as it is a triable issue.
Thus, the question that arises before me is whether the Additional Sessions Judge, Mapusa, was justified in directing a charge to be framed against Accused No.5 vide her impugned order dated 25.07.2025?
Revisiting the facts of the case, it is crystal clear that the Complainant has named Alnoor Shamsuddin Lakhoo @ Alibaba as an Accused in the FIR, and the chargesheet, as he has attributed a role to him. In fact, it is the case of the Complainant that the assault was orchestrated by Alnoor Shamsuddin Lakhoo @ Alibaba. On the other hand, the name of the present Applicant is Mohamed Hussain, S/o. Ahmed. There is no ambiguity about the name of the present Applicant, who is styled as Accused No.5 in the chargesheet. There is admittedly no similarity between the name of Accused No.4, i.e. Alnoor Shamsuddin Lakhoo and the present Applicant, i.e. Mohamed Hussain, S/o. Ahmed. It is the positive case of the Prosecution that the Complainant on 30.01.2020 learnt from his reliable sources that the person who had introduced himself as Alnoor @ Alibaba is seen near Lavie Woods Hotel. The Complainant does not speak of Mohammad Hussain S/o Ahmed. However, the inexplicable part of the Prosecution case is that when the person who is seen near Lavie Woods Hotel is apprehended and is asked his name, he discloses his name as Mohamed Hussain, S/o. Ahmed and not as Alnoor @ Alibaba. It is strange that the investigating agency has proceeded to implicate Mohamed Hussain, S/o. Ahmed as an Accused despite the fact that the Complainant does not say anything about his involvement in the offence, nor is there any independent material to indicate his complicity in the offence. It is not the case of the Complainant that Mohamed Hussain, S/o. Ahmed is actually Alnoor @ Alibaba. Even the prosecution does not say so. In fact, both Alnoor Shamsuddin Lakhoo and Mohamed Hussain, S/o. Ahmed are arraigned as Accused, separately, in the same proceedings. If it was a case of mistaken identity, that the present Applicant and Alnoor @ Alibaba are one and the same person, then only one of them could have been made as an Accused by the prosecution. However, it does not stand to reason that both the Applicant and Alnoor Shamsuddin Lakhoo are made as Accused in the same proceedings. This means that the Prosecution proceeds on the basis that these two persons are separate and distinct. This makes the prosecution case completely untenable. This is because the prosecution has no incriminating material of whatsoever nature against the Applicant, i.e. Mohamed Hussain, S/o. Ahmed, taking the prosecution case as the gospel truth.
Dealing with the reasoning of the learned Additional Sessions Judge in the impugned order, it proceeds on the basis that there was no identification parade in respect of Accused No.5 and hence the Additional Sessions Judge observes that the evidentiary value of the identification will have to be decided at the time of trial. However, the learned Trial Judge has clearly erred in not appreciating the fundamental aspect of the case that the Complainant has not identified the Applicant and there is no role attributed to the Applicant insofar as the commission of the offence is concerned. In the absence of this factual foundation, there is no ground for proceeding against Accused No.5. The learned Sessions Judge in the impugned order observes that the Complainant has identified one Alnoor @ Alibaba, who, upon asking his name, disclosed it as Mohamed Hussain, S/o. Ahmed. He also furnished his address as the address which is mentioned in the cause title of the Application. This observation is factually incorrect. The Complainant, in his supplementary statement dated 30.01.2020, does not say that Alnoor @ Alibaba is the same person as Mohamed Hussain, S/o. Ahmed. In fact, the entire prosecution case proceeds on the premise that Alnoor @ Alibaba (Alnoor Shamsuddin Lakhoo – Accused No.4) is a different person from Mohamed Hussain, S/o. Ahmed (Accused No.5). Therefore, to say that the Complainant has identified Alnoor @ Alibaba as Mohamed Hussain, S/o. Ahmed is completely erroneous.
Before dealing with the law on this issue, it would not be out of place to examine the scheme of Chapter XVIII of CrPC, which deals with the trial before the Court of Sessions. The Chapter opens with Section 225, which designates a Public Prosecutor, who conducts the prosecution in every trial before a Court of Sessions. The next Section, i.e. Section 226 is perhaps the most important Section dealing with the scope of the framing of charge and the parameters of discharge. Section 226 postulates that the Prosecutor shall open his case by describing the charge brought against the Accused and by stating what evidence he proposes to prove the guilt of the Accused. The next Section, i.e. Section 227 deals with discharge of the Accused and stipulates that if, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the Accused and the Prosecution, the Judge considers there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the Accused, he shall discharge the Accused and record his reasons for doing so. This Section is followed by Section 228, whiƝh deals with ܗƳraǒiǓƴ oƳ Ɲharƴeܘ. The Section begins by stating that if the Judge is of the opinion that there is ground for presuming that the Accused has committed an offence he shall frame a charge against the Accused in writing and the charge shall be read and explained to the Accused and the Accused shall be asked whether he is guilty of the offence charges or claims to be tried. Section 228 proceeds on the premise that the earlier Sections, namely Section 226 and 227 have been complied with and in view thereof there is ground for presuming that the Accused has committed the offence. In that sense, Sections 226 and 227 form the filters after going through which the Judge forms an opinion of whether or not, for proceeding against the Accused, there is sufficient ground to frame the charge under Section 228.
The importance of Section 226 has been emphasised time and again by coordinate Benches of this Court. In the case of Ambadas Kashirao Kharad V/s. State of Maharashtra1, the Nagpur Bench of this Court had the occasion to deal with the interplay between Sections 226 and 227 of CrPC. It observes thus:
ֺڅ. A Ƙaǥe peǥusal oƯ the aƘȯe sections makes it clear that in a Sessions Trial the case has to begin with opening of the case by the prosecution followed by arguments on behalf of the prosecution and the accused culminating in passing of an order provided in section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The compliance of sections 226 and 227 is not an empty formality and the Sessions Courts dealing with the sessions cases are bound to comply with the sections 226 and 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in letter and spirit. Section 226 has been enacted so that the accused knows in advance the nature of the evidence which the prosecution proposes to lead to prove the charge brought against him. The object of section 227 is to ensure expeditious disposal of sessions cases so that the accused is discharged if there is no case against him or tried quickly and either acquitted or convicted as the case may be. Section 227 also saves the accused from harassment inasmuch as if the records do not make out any prima facie case against the accused the accused is entitled to be discharged. This is not only with a view to avoid undue harassment of the accused but also waste of public time over the cases which do not disclose even prima facie case. Therefore, at this stage the Judge has to apply his judicial mind to find out as to whether prima facie any offence is made out against the accused having regard to the record relied upon by the prosecution. No doubt exercise undertaken by the Judge at this stage is to find out if there is a prima facie evidence against the accused so that the accused can be tried by the competent Court, that is, Sessions Court or any other Court/Magistrate having jurisdiction to tǥ̎ the oƯƯeǏƙe.چ This judgment was quoted with approval by the same Bench in a subsequent judgment, namely Vikrant Rajkumar Gupta V/s. State of Maharashtra2.
ReƝeǓtlʹ, the HoǓܘƜle Supreǒe Court in the matter of Sudershan Singh Wazir V/s. State (NCT of Delhi) and Ors.3, has had the occasion to deal with the scope of Section 226 CrPC, where the Court was pleased to observe as under:
ֳֳڅ. UǏdeǥ SeƙtioǏ ִִָ oƯ the CǥPC, aƯteǥ the oǥdeǥ oƯ commitment, when the accused appears or is brought before the Court of Sessions, the prosecutor has to open his case by describing the charge levelled against the accused by stating what evidence is proposed to prove the guilt of the accused. At that stage, the Sessions Court has to consider the record of the case. The record of the case will be the charge sheets. The Sessions Court is under an obligation to hear the submissions of the accused and the prosecution as provided in Section 227 of the CrPC. After hearing the parties, if the Sessions Court is of the opinion that there is a ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, it may proceed to frame a charge in writing against the accused. The charge can be framed only after the Court comes to a conclusion that there is a ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence.”
In fact, a prior judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Ghulam Hassan Beigh V/s. Mohammad Maqbool Magrey and Ors.4 has had an occasion to observe at para 20, which reads thus:
ִִָ SeƙtioǏ .ֲִڅ CrPC, over a period of time has gone, in oblivion. Our understanding of the provision of Section 226CrPC is that before the Court proceeds to frame the charge against the accused, the Public Prosecutor owes a duty to give a Ưaiǥ idea to the Couǥt as ǥeưaǥds the ƙase oƯ the pǥoseƙutioǏ.چ
From the aforesaid discussion, it is evident that the compliance of Sections 226 and 227 is not an empty formality and the Sessions Courts are bound to comply with Sections 226 and 227 of CrPC in letter and spirit. Section 226 has been enacted so that the Accused knows in advance the nature of the evidence which the prosecution proposes to lead in order to prove the charge brought against him. At that stage, the Sessions Court has to consider the record of the case. Thereafter, the Sessions Court is obliged to hear the submissions of the Accused and the prosecution as provided for in Section 227 of the CrPC. The object of Section 227 is to ensure expeditious disposal of a sessions case. Since the Section is premised on the compliance of its preceding Section, i.e. Section 226, the Judge is already aware of the evidence that is proposed to be brought against the Accused by the prosecution. Thus, Section 226 filters out that material and evidence which the prosecution may not emphasise/rely on to prove the guilt of the Accused. Section 226 thus narrows the conspectus of the evidence which is required to prove the guilt of the Accused. It is in the light of these facets of Section 226 that the importance of Section 227 comes to the fore. Since only those materials which the Prosecution proposes to rely upon are being considered while dealing with the record of the case, the submissions of the Accused and the Prosecution can be better appreciated and streamlined to expeditiously form the opinion whether or not charge ought to be framed against the Accused. Thus, Section 226 is certainly Ǔot aǓ eǒptʹ Ƴorǒalitʹ aǓd whiƝh is whʹ the HoǓܘƜle Apeͳ Court was constrained to sound a cautionary note that Section 226 over a period of time has gone in oblivion.
It is observed that despite underscoring the need for compliance of Section 226 in its letter and spirit by the HoǓܘƜle Supreǒe Court aǓd other Courts, from time to time, sadly, the situation at the level of the Trial Courts, largely, echoes the sentiments of the Apex Court, i.e. Section 226 has gone in oblivion. In many cases, a hearing conventionally Ɲalled as ܗheariǓƴ oǓ Ɲharƴeܘ, Section 226 is bypassed and Section 227 is approached by the Trial Courts directly. This is one such case. From the record, in the case at hand, it is evident that Section 226 has been bypassed and the Sessions Judge has directly approached Section 227, which is not contemplated as seen from the discussion above.
Coming to the parameters of discharge, the Apex Court has, in a line of judgments, succinctly culled out the basic principles of the scope and parameters of discharge. In the case of Union of India V/s. Prafulla Kumar Samal and Anr.5, the Apex Court was considering the scope of inquiry that the Judge is required to make while addressing the question of framing of charge. After an exhaustive survey of the case law on the point, the Apex Court in paragraph 10 of the judgment sets out the following principles:
٣ֳ٢څ (hat the Judưe ̈ hile ƙoǏsideǥiǏư the ǤuestioǏ oƯ ƯǥaǎiǏư the charges under Section 227 of the Code has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out.
(2)Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.
(3)The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By and large however if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused.
(4)That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Code the Judge which under the present Code is a senior and experienced court cannot act merely as a Post Office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This however does not mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.”
There are several other judgments of the Apex Court delineating the sƝope oƳ the Courtܘs power iǓ respeƝt oƳ ƳraǒiǓƴ oƳ a Ɲharƴe iǓ a criminal case, one of those being Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel V/s. State of Gujarat6, wherein the law relating to the framing of charge and discharge is discussed elaborately in paragraphs 15 and 23 and the same are reproduced as under:
څ15. We may profitably, in this regard, refer to the judgment of this Court in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh7 wherein this Court has laid down the principles relating to framing of charge and discharge as follows:
ֶڅ. … ReadiǏư SeƙtioǏs ִִֹ aǏd ִִֺ toưetheǥ iǏ ju̍tapositioǏ, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that stage the court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the tǥial. … IƯ the sƙales oƯ paǏ as to the ưuilt oǥ iǏǏoƙeǏƙe oƯ the accused are something like even, at the conclusion of the trial, then, on the theory of benefit of doubt the case is to end in his acquittal. But if, on the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of making an order under Section 227 or Section 228, then in such a situation ordinarily and generally the order which will have to be made will be one under Section 228 and not under Section 227.
23.At the stage of framing the charge in accordance with the principles which have been laid down by this Court, what the court is expected to do is, it does not act as a mere post office. The court must indeed sift the material before it. The material to be sifted would be the material which is produced and relied upon by the prosecution. The sifting is not to be meticulous in the sense that the court dons the mantle of the trial Judge hearing arguments after the entire evidence has been adduced after a full-fledged trial and the question is not whether the prosecution has made out the case for the conviction of the accused. All that is required is, the court must be satisfied that with the materials available, a case is made out for the accused to stand trial. A strong suspicion suffices. However, a strong suspicion must be founded on some material. The material must be such as can be translated into evidence at the stage of trial. The strong suspicion cannot be the pure subjective satisfaction based on the moral notions of the Judge that here is a case where it is possible that the accused has committed the offence. Strong suspicion must be the suspicion which is premised on some material which commends itself to the court as sufficient to entertain the prima facie view that the accused has committed the oƯƯeǏƙe.چ
In the case of Asim Shariff V/s National Investigation Agency8, the HoǓܘƜle Supreǒe Court has eͳpressed in paragraph 18 that the Trial Court is not expected or supposed to hold a mini-trial for the purpose of marshalling the evidence on record. Paragraph 18 of the said judgment reads as under:
ֳֺڅ. (akiǏư Ǐote oƯ the e̍positioǏ oƯ lä oǏ the suƘjeƙt laid döǏ by this Court, it is settled that the Judge while considering the question of framing charge under Section 227 CrPC in sessions cases (which is akin to Section 239 CrPC pertaining to warrant cases) has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out; where the material placed before the court discloses grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing the charge; by and large if two views are possible and one of them giving rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion against the accused, the trial Judge will be justified in discharging him. It is thus clear that while examining the discharge application filed under Section 227 CrPC, it is expected from the trial Judge to exercise its judicial mind to determine as to whether a case for trial has been made out or not. It is true that in such proceedings, the court is not supposed to hold a mini trial by marshalling the evidence on record.چ
In the recent case of Ghulam Hassan Beigh (supra), the Apex Court after dealing with the entire case law on the aspect of discharge has observed at paragraphs 27 & 28, which read as under:
ִֹڅ. (hus Ưǥoǎ the aƯoǥesaid, it is ėideǏt that the tǥial ƙouǥt is enjoined with the duty to apply its mind at the time of framing of charge and should not act as a mere post office. The endorsement on the charge-sheet presented by the police as it is without applying its mind and without recording brief reasons in support of its opinion is not countenanced by law. However, the material which is required to be evaluated by the court at the time of framing charge should be the material which is produced and relied upon by the prosecution. The sifting of such material is not to be so meticulous as would render the exercise a mini trial to find out the guilt or otherwise of the accused. All that is required at this stage is that the court must be satisfied that the evidence collected by the prosecution is sufficient to presume that the accused has committed an offence. Even a strong suspicion would suffice. Undoubtedly, apart from the material that is placed before the court by the prosecution in the shape of final report in terms of Section 173CrPC, the court may also rely upon any other evidence or material which is of sterling quality and has direct bearing on the charge laid before it by the prosecution. [See : Bhawna Bai V/s. Ghanshyam9].
28.In Amit Kapoor V/s. Ramesh Chander10, this Court observed in para 30 that the Legislature in its wisdom has used the e̍pǥessioǏ څtheǥe is ưǥouǏd Ưoǥ pǥesuǎiǏư that the aƙƙused has ƙoǎǎitted aǏ oƯƯeǏƙeچ. (heǥe is aǏ iǏƘuilt eleǎeǏt oƯ presumption. It referred to its judgment rendered in State of Maharashtra V/s. Som Nath Thapa11, and to the meaning of the
̈oǥd څpǥesuǎeچ, plaƙiǏư ǥeliaǏƙe upoǏ Blaƙk's Lä DiƙtioǏaǥ̎, where it was defined to mean څto believe or accept upon probable ėideǏƙeڇ لڈto take as tǥue uǏtil ėideǏƙe to the contrary is forthƙoǎiǏưچ. In other words, the truth of the matter has to come out when the prosecution evidence is led, the witnesses are cross-examined by the defence, the incriminating material and evidence is put to the accused in terms of Section 313 of the Code and then the accused is provided an opportunity to lead defence, if any. It is only upon completion of such steps that the trial concludes with the Court forming its final opinion and delivering its judưǎeǏt.چ
Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, it is evident that the Prosecution has not complied with the mandatory provisions of Section 226 of CrPC and it is also crystal clear that there was non-application of mind on the part of the learned Sessions Judge while framing charge against the Applicant. The reasoning of the Sessions Judge as reflected in the impugned order is untenable in the wake of the discussion herein above. From the discussion on facts, it is clear that there was no sufficient ground for proceeding against the Applicant in terms of Section 227 of CrPC and hence the Applicant ought to have been discharged.
Hence, I pass the following order:
In the premises, the Criminal Revision Application is allowed.
The order dated 25.07.2025 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-2, Mapusa in Session Case (ORS) No.95/2023 is quashed and set aside, qua the Applicant only.
The Applicant is discharged of offences punishable under Sections 395, 427, 452 r/w 120-B of IPC.
The Criminal Revision Application No.849/2025(F) stands disposed of.