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Judgment
Heard Mr. Bharat Ji Agrawal and Mr. S.M.K. Chaudhari, Senior Advocates duly assisted by Mr. Piyush Agrawal, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. H.P. Srivastava, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel. The controversy involved in the instant writ petition is that the petitioner has not been granted eligibility certificate u/s 4A of the U.P. Trade Tax Act on the ground that one Member of Secretary Level Committee did not agree with the majority view.
Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner has established a new unit for manufacture of vanaspati in accordance with the scheme announced by the State Government for promoting the industrial development in the State of Uttar Pradesh and for increasing the production of the goods u/s 4A of the U.P. Trade Tax Act. Pursuant to the notification dated December 26, 1985, the General Manager, District Industries Centre, Ghaziabad, namely, the Industries Department, has forwarded the recommendation of the District Level Committee for grant of eligibility certificate since the petitioner is entitled for exemption under the aforesaid notification. Thereafter, vide letter dated January 26, 1991, the Deputy Commissioner (Executive), after making a spot inspection, informed that the petitioner''s unit is a new unit and it has installed all new machinery. It has also been mentioned in the said report that the earlier unit of Modi Vanaspati, which is no longer in existence, was not adjacent to the present new unit inasmuch as in between the two units, another unit, namely, Modi Gas & Chemicals is situated, hence this new unit established by the petitioner cannot be said to be adjacent to the earlier unit. Thereafter, the matter was referred by the State Level Committee to the Secretary Level Committee and it was considered before the said committee on July 11, 1991. In the said meeting, out of three members, two members had agreed to grant the eligibility certificate granting exemption from payment of tax to the unit established by the petitioner for the manufacture of vanaspati. Owing to difference of opinion between the Commissioner of Sales Tax and other two members, the matter was referred to the Secretary Level Committee in accordance with the provisions of notification dated December 26, 1985.
As the eligibility certificate was not granted, under the compelling circumstances, the instant writ petition has been filed and a coordinate Bench of this court passed the following order on March 31, 1992:
In our order dated December 19, 1991 we had indicated that the question of further interim relief shall be considered after the expiry of the above period which we had allowed to the standing counsel to file a counter-affidavit. Counter-affidavit has not been filed.
We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner as also the learned standing counsel. Since the fact that the matter has been disposed of by the State Level Committee and the majority opinion is in favour of the petitioner, we direct that the opposite-parties shall issue provisional eligibility certificate to the petitioner within a week from today subject to the final decision of the writ petition.
Thereafter, the aforesaid order was modified on the application filed by the Department on April 7, 1992, which reads as under :
This is an application for recall of the order dated March 31, 1992 passed by a Bench of this court comprising one of us (S.S. Ahmad, J.) and honourable Mr. Justice H.N. Tilhari and in the alternative to say the operation of that order. Both these prayers can be considered by the Bench concerned which is not available today.
Put up for orders in the first week of May, 1992. At this stage, the standing counsel has stated that this application may be treated as an application for extension of time for grant of provisional eligibility certificate to the petitioner in terms of the order dated March 31, 1992. The prayer appears to be reasonable. The time for grant of provisional eligibility certificate is extended by three weeks from today with the observation that in the meantime it will be open to the opposite-parties to consider and finally dispose of the petitioner''s application u/s 4A of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, as it is stated that on behalf of the opposite-parties in their affidavit filed in support of this application that the averments of the petitioner that the Secretary Level Committee has already taken a decision in his favour by majority opinion is not correct.
In pursuance of the order dated April 7, 1992, the Secretary Level Committee, Lucknow, had passed an order dated April 22, 1992 and the said order was communicated by the Director of Industries. Therefore, the petitioner moved an amendment application, which was allowed by this court.
The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that before passing the impugned order dated April 22, 1992, an opportunity of hearing was not afforded to the petitioner. While elaborating his submissions, he contended that after affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioner on April 11, 1991, the State Level Committee passed an order. Further, he submits that in view of the provisions of notification dated December 26, 1985, the Secretary Level Committee was constituted as statutory committee and was acting for the benefit of grant of eligibility certificate as quasi-judicial authority and in absence of power of review, which has not been conferred to the Secretary Level Committee, it could not review its earlier decision dated May 16, 1991 and July 11, 1991.
On the other hand, Mr. H.P. Srivastava, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel, submits that in compliance of this court''s order dated April 7, 1992, the matter was considered and thereafter, vide order dated April 22, 1992, impugned in the instant writ petition, has been passed. As there is no illegality or infirmity in the said order, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.
Natural justice has a prime role to play in the matter where the justice has to be secured. Natural justice is another name for commonsense justice.
Rules of natural justice are not codified canons. But they are principles ingrained into the conscience of man. Natural justice is the administration of justice in a common sense/liberal way. Justice is based substantially on natural ideals and human values. The administration of justice is to be freed from the narrow and restricted considerations which are usually associated with a formulated law involving linguistic technicalities and grammatical niceties. It is the substance of justice which has to determine its form.
The expressions "natural justice" and "legal justice" do not present a watertight classification. It is the substance of justice, which is to be secured by both, and whenever legal justice fails to achieve this solemn purpose, natural justice is called in aid of legal justice. Natural justice relieves legal justice from unnecessary technicality, grammatical pedantry or logical prevarication. It supplies the omissions of a formulated law. As Lord Buckmaster said, no form or procedure should ever be permitted to exclude the presentation of a litigant''s defence.
The adherence to principles of natural justice as recognized by all civilized States is of supreme importance when a quasi-judicial body embarks on determining disputes between the parties, or any administrative action involving civil consequences is in issue. These principles are well-settled. The first and foremost principle is what is commonly known as audi alteram partem rule. It says that no one should be condemned unheard. Notice is the first limb of this principle. It must be precise and unambiguous. It should apprise the party determinatively of the case he has to meet. Time given for the purpose should be adequate so as to enable him to make his representation. In the absence of a notice of the kind and such reasonable opportunity, the order passed becomes wholly vitiated. Thus, it is but essential that a party should be put on notice of the case before any adverse order is passed against him. This is one of the most important principles of natural justice. After all, it is an approved rule of fair play. The concept has gained significance and shades with time. When the historic document was made at Runnymede in 1215, the first statutory recognition of this principle found its way into the "Magna Carta". The classic exposition of Sir Edward Coke of natural justice requires to "vocate, interrogate and adjudicate". In the celebrated case of Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works [1863] 143 ER 414, the principle was thus stated:
...even God himself did not pass sentence upon Adam before he was called upon to make his defence. ''Adam'' (says God), ''where art thou? Hast thou not eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldest not eat?''
Principles of natural justice are those rules which have been laid down by the courts as being the minimum protection of the rights of the individual against the arbitrary procedure that may be adopted by a judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative authority while making an order affecting those rights. These rules are intended to prevent such authority from doing injustice. Inquiries which were considered administrative at one time are now being considered as quasi-judicial in character. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi-judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far-reaching effect than decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry.
Concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. Rules of natural justice are not rules embodied always expressly in a statute or in rules framed thereunder. They may be implied from the nature of the duty to be performed under a statute. What particular rule of natural justice should be implied and what its context should be in a given case must depend to a great extent on the fact and circumstances of that case, the framework of the statute under which the enquiry is held. The old distinction between a judicial act and an administrative act has withered away. Even an administrative order which involves civil consequences must be consistent with the rules of natural justice. The expression "civil rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations and non-pecuniary damages" in its wide umbrella comes everything that affects a citizen in his civil life.
In D.K. Yadav Vs. J.M.A. Industries Ltd., , the apex court while laying emphasis on affording opportunity by the authority which has the power to take punitive or damaging action held that orders affecting the civil rights or resulting civil consequences would have to answer the requirement of article 14. The honourable apex court concluded as under :
The procedure prescribed for depriving a person of livelihood would be liable to be tested on the anvil of article 14. The procedure prescribed by a statute or statutory rule or rules or orders affecting the civil rights or result in civil consequences would have to answer the requirement of article 14. Article 14 has a pervasive processual potency and versatile quality, equalitarian in its soul and allergic to discriminatory dictates. Equality is the antithesis of arbitrariness. The principles of natural justice are part of article 14 and the procedure prescribed by law must be just, fair and reasonable, and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive.
In National Buildings Construction Corporation Vs. S. Raghunathan and Others, , the apex court in unequivocal words held that a person is entitled to judicial review, if he is able to show that the decision of the public authority affected him of some benefit or advantage which in the past he had been permitted to enjoy and which he legitimately expected to be permitted to continue to enjoy either until he is informed the reasons for withdrawal and the opportunity to comment on such reasons.
In view of above legal proposition, as the petitioner has not been afforded opportunity of hearing before passing the impugned order dated April 22, 1992, it is liable to be quashed. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order dated April 22, 1992, is quashed. The opposite-parties are directed to re-consider the case of the petitioner afresh, after giving personal opportunity of hearing and pass appropriate orders, in accordance with law. As the matter is lingering since 1991, we hope and trust that appropriate orders will be passed expeditiously.