M.K. Subbachariar and others vs State of Madras, by the Secretary to Government, Revenue Department, Fort St. George, Madras and others

Natesan, J.—In this batch of writs under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, the constitutional validity of three Acts of the State Legislature

are under challenge. These three Acts, the Madras Inam Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act (XXVI of 1963) the Madras

Minor Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, (XXX of 1963) and the Madras Leaseholds (Abolition and Conversion into

Ryotwari) Act (XXVII of 1963), hereinafter referred to for convenience as Inam Estates Act, Minor Inams Act and Leaseholds Act respectively,

are steps in the final phase of the series of legislation in carrying forward the country''s policy of agrarian reforms, the first effective step having been

taken so early as in 1948 when the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari Act (XXVI of 1948) was passed. Under Act XXVI

of 1948, the intermediaries in the Zamindari and under-tenure estates and whole inam villages in which the grant consisted of Melvaram alone were

abolished and the ryotwari settlement introduced. The objective of the three present enactments is the introduction of ryotwari settlement in respect

of lands held under certain inam and leasehold tenures under the Government, left out in the Estates Abolition Act. The pattern of legislation in the

matter of abolition and conversion and providing for ryotwari settlement is more or less in the line of Madras Act XXVI of 1948, a departure from

the Act being made wherever necessitated by reason of difference in tenures. Though the petitions now before us fall under three groups, as the

main plank of attack as to the constitutional validity is common, they all have been heard together. The principal grievance of the petitioners is that

the provisions relating to the payment of compensation are so framed as to make the compensation illusory. The provisions regarding the grant of

ryotwari pattas are termed arbitrary and discriminatory and as having no relation to the tenures under which lands have been held. Particular attack

is made in regard to the provision in the Acts, for wiping of arrears of rent. The petitioners charge the Legislature with committing a fraud on power

to deprive the absolute proprietors of lands of their rights in property and the rents in arrears under the guise of agrarian reforms for the abolition of

intermediaries and settling the lands on the actual cultivators. Some of the petitioners are religions and charitable endowments and some of them

are mutts ; and it is contended for these religious institutions that the effect of the Acts would result in the violation of Arts. 25 and 26 of the

Constitution. It is urged that Art. 31-A of the Constitution cannot protect the Acts in question ; nor Art. 31 (2) stand in the way of judicial scrutiny

of the provisions relating to compensation. The State seeks to sustain the validity of the Acts by reference to Entry 18 and Entry 45 in List II and

Entry 42 in List III of Sch. VII to the Constitution and relies for protection from attacks based on Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution, on Art.

31-A, while at the same time contending on the merits that the provisions in the Acts on all aspects are unimpeachable, fair and reasonable. It will

be convenient to take up for consideration first, the Inam Estates Act (XXVI of 1963). Writ Petition Nos. 1457 and 1552 of 1956 are typical of

the inams covered by the Act and a brief reference to the facts therein would be sufficient for our present purpose. Writ Petition No. 2586 of 1965

is one of a group of writs relating to what the Act defines as Pudukkotta Inam Estates. The petitioner in Writ Petition No. 1457 of 1965 is a

religious institution Abisheka Kattalai, Sri Thyagarajaswami Devasthanam, Tiruvarur, represented by Sri La Sri Ajapa Nateswara Pandara

Sannadhi and the Executive Officer of the Devasthanam. The petitioner is the inamdar of the inam villages Elandavancheri, Palavoy,

Thyagajapuram Kamalalayam Kattalai, Chandrasekaranpettai, Karimbiyur, Thottam, Ammakottalai and Vellapillaiyar Kattalai in Thanjavur

District. These villages were made estates under the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act XVIII of 1936). In some of these

villages�for instance in Thiagarajapuram�the entire lands are private lands. The villages were held on service tenures for Abishekam service to

the presiding deity Lord Thiagarajaswami and other deities. With reference to the lands situated in Thiagarajapuram and Palavoy, as to their private

character, there was a litigation which ended ultimately in compromise in the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal Nos. 141 to 143 of 1955. Under the

compromise it was recognised that the lands were private and not ryotwari and that the tenants had no occupancy rights in them. The Devasthanam

had to grant a lease of the suit wet and dry lands to the respondent in the said appeals for a period of 25 years beginning from 1st July, 1950, with

an option for renewal in favour of the tenants for a further period of 25 years. Now these villages are notified as ''existing Inam Estates'' under the

aforesaid Act XXVI of 1963 on 15th March, 1965.

Writ Petition No. 1552 of 1965 relates to the Inam village Maniya Adur in Chidambaram Taluk, South Arcot District. In this case the grant was

not of a whole village or a named village, and a portion of the village about 26 acres and odd have been retained by the grantor at the time of the

original grant and subsequently granted to a mosque. The village did not become an estate under the provisions of the Estates Land Act (Third

Amendment) Act XVIII of 1936. When the Government wanted to apply the provisions of the Madras Estates Land (Reduction of Rent) Act

(XXX of 1947) to the suit village, the inamdar instituted a suit, O. S. No. 59 of 1954 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Cuddalore, impleading

the State as a party defendant, and therein a declaration was obtained that the village was not an estate as defined under S. 3(2)(d) of the Madras

Land Act and that the Rent Reduction Act was not applicable to the village in question. There was an appeal by the State to this Court in A. S.

No. 566 of 1955, and this Court on 5th January, 1959, confirmed the decision of the trial Court and held that the inam in question was not an

estate. Now this village has also been included in the notification issued under S. 1(4) of the Inam Estates Abolition Act on 15th March, 1965. This

village comes under the Act as a new inam estate'', though it is only part of a village granted in inam and therefore not an ""estate"" as defined under

the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908. Inam Nilayappatti, a Pudukkottai Inam estate, the subject of Writ Petition No. 2586 of 1965 had its origin in

the grant of the village by a sovereign prince of Pudukkotti and the inam was subsequently settled in 1912 under the Pudukkottai Inam Settlement

Rules of 1888. On the merger of the Pudukkottai State with the Indian Union, Madras Act XXIII of 1955, the Pudukkottai Settlement of loams

Act, was passed providing for the recognition of inams granted, confirmed or recognised by the Pudukkottai Administration and Settlement of the

Inams. The Special Officer, Inam settlement, Pudukkottai, found that Inam Nilayappatti and 81 other villages are whole inam iruwaram grants of

villages. We may state that no special point was made with reference to Pudukkottai inams, as such.

The Inam Estates Act received the assent of the President on the 11th day of December, 1963, and was first published in the Fort St. George

Gazette on the 1st of January, 1964. It extends to the whole of the State of Madras except the Shencottah taluk of the Tirunelveli District, the

Kanyakumari District and the territories specified in the Second Schedule to the Andhra Pradesh and Madras (Alteration of Boundaries) Act,

1959. Under Sub-S. (4) of S. 1 of the Act certain provisions of the Act come into force immediately. The rest of the provisions were by

notification published on 15th March, 1965, brought into force with effect from the 15th day of April, 1965, in respect of the Inam estates

specified in the notification. The Act is made applicable to all inam estates and an inam estate is defined in S. 2(7) as meaning an ''existing inam

estate or a new inam estate. An ''existing inam estate'' is defined by S. 2(4) to mean an inam village which became an estate by virtue of the

Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1036 (XVIII of 1936). A ''new inam estate'' is defined to mean a ''part village inam estate'' or a

''Pudukkottai Inam estate''. A part village inam estate is defined by S. 2(11) as a part of a village including a part of a village in the merged territory

of Pudukkottai the grant of which has been made, confirmed or recognised by the Government notwithstanding that subsequent to the grant, such

part has been partitioned among the grantees or the successors-in-title of the grantee or grantees. Explanation 1 to the definition is of importance.

Under Explanation 1(a) where the grant of a part of a village as an inam it expressed to be a specified fraction of, or a specified number of shares

in, a village, such part shall be deemed to be a part village inam estate notwithstanding that such grant refers also to the extent of such part in terms

of acreage or cawnies, or of other local equivalent. Explanation 1(b) excludes from the definition of a part village inam estate, the area which forms

the subject-matter of a great, where the grant as an inam is expressed to be only in terms of acreage or cawnies. Pudukkottai Inam estates are

inam villages in the merged territory of Pudukkottai and set out in schedule to the Act. The consequence of a notification under the Act is set out in

Chapter II. By S. 3(b) the entire inam estate (including all communal lands and porambokes, other non-ryoti lands, waste lands, pasture lands,

forests, mines and minerals, quarries, rivers and streams, tank and irrigation works, fisheries and ferries) shall stand transferred to the Government

and vest in them, free of all encumbrances, and the Madras Revenue Recovery Act, 1864, the Madras Cess Act, 1965 and all other enactments

applicable to ryotwari areas are made applicable to the inam estates. There are provisions in the Act for survey and settlement operations and

introduction of Ryotwari Settlement. S. 9 specifies the class of lands in respect of which the landholder would be entitled to ryotwari patta. S. 10

specifies the lands in respect of which a ryot is entitled to ryotwari patta. S. 11 provides for a case where no person is entitled to a ryotwari patta

under S. 9 or S. 10. A ryotwari patta is granted under this section on the basis of personal cultivation as detailed in the section. The provision

relating to the payment of compensation is found under Chapter VI and by S. 23 compensation shall be determined for an inam estate as a whole

and not separately for such of the interests therein. S. 24 provides for the determination of a basic annual sum and the compensation payable in

respect of an inam estate except inam estate belonging to religious, educational and charitable institutions is by S. 31 made up of multiples of the

basic annual sum, in a descending scale the multiplier going down with the increase in quantum of the basic annual sum. The basic annual sum by S.

25 is the aggregate of two sums, less certain deductions provided in S. 28; (1) the whole of the gross annual ryotwari demand in respect of all

lands in the inam estate, in respect of which any person other than the landholder is entitled to a ryotwari patta as ascertained under S. 26 less the

deduction specified therein, and (2) the whole of the average net annual miscellaneous revenue derived from all other sources in the inam estate

specified in clause (b) of S. 3 but not including lands in respect of which the land bolder is entitled to a ryotwari patta as ascertained under S. 27.

S. 27 provides that the net annual miscellaneous revenue shall be the average of the net annual income derived by the Government from such

sources during the fasli year commencing on the notified date, if such date was the 1st day of July, or on the 1st July, immediately succeeding the

notified date, if such date was not the 1st day of July and the next fasli year in case ryotwari settlement is effected in that year or the next two fasli

years in other cases. S. 30(1) excludes from the computation of the basic annual sum, the ryotwari assessment imposed on all lands in an inam in

respect of which any person including a landholder is entitled to ryotwari patta under S. 11 of the Act. Religious, educational and charitable

institutions are under S. 32 to be paid compensation by an annual allowance called tasdik allowance. There are special provisions relating to inam

estates held on condition of rendering service to religious institutions. S. 56 makes provision for collection of rents in arrears accrued prior to the

notification and it entitles the tenant to secure a discharge of the balance of rents due on making certain payments even in cases where decrees of

the Courts have been obtained. It is unnecessary for our present purpose to go into greater details of the enactment. As stated at the outset, the

previsions in the Act generally follow those in the Estates Abolition Act (Madras Act XXVI of 1948) relating to Zamindari and Melwaram inam

estates. The important deviation is in regard to compensation. While under Madras Act XXVI of 1948 basic annual sum in respect of a melwaram

inam estate is arrived at by deducting from the aggregate of the gross annual ryotwari demand and the net annual miscellaneous revenue, the jodi,

quit rent, kattubadi, etc., payable by the landholder to the Government or to the landholder of another estate, under the present Act, besides the

jodi, quit rents or other amounts payable annually, the whole of the assessment levied on any land in an inam estate under the Madras Inams

(Assessment) Act (XL of 1956) in respect of which the landholder is entitled to a ryotwari patta, is also deducted.

Learned Counsel examined elaborately the various provisions of the Act with a view to show that the compensation which is purported to be

provided by the Act has been by various shifts and devices reduced to an illusory figure. The attempt of learned Counsel has been to make out that

the principles laid down in the Act for computation of the compensation operated in reality to cut down the compensation and the provisions

relating to compensation are in truth a fraud on the Constitution being a colourable legislative expedient to acquire property without payment of

compensation. The gravamen of the complaint is as to the provisions for compensation. There is no dispute that the acquisition and the vesting of

the property in the State is in the process of land reforms, a public purpose. Now since the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution in 1955 no law

for acquisition by the State of property for a public purpose can be questioned on the ground that the compensation provided for is inadequate. So

long as the law provides for compensation, either fixing the amount or laying down the principles for determination of the compensation, even if the

compensation is inadequate, Art. 31(2) precludes challenge. Of course compensation even under the amended Arts. 31(2) has to be the ''Just

equivalent'' of what the owner is deprived of and the principles should be provided for ascertaining the compensation. It is pointed out by the

Supreme Court in P. Vajravelu Mudaliar Vs. Special Deputy Collector, Madras and Another,

Under amended article, the law fixing the amount of compensation or laying down the principles governing the said fixation cannot be questioned in

any Court on the ground that the compensation provided by that law was inadequate. If the definition of ''compensation'' and the question of

justifiability are kept distinct, much of the cloud raised will be dispelled.

The argument that the word ''compensation'' means a just equivalent for the property acquired and, therefore, the Court can ascertain whether it is

a ''just equivalent'' or not, makes the amendment of the Constitution nugatory. It will be arguing in a circle. Therefore, a more reasonable

interpretation is that neither the principles prescribing the just equivalent nor the just equivalent can be questioned by the Court on the ground of

inadequacy of the compensation fixed or arrived at by the working of the principles.

On the other hand, if a law lays down principles which at or about the time it is acquired, it may be said that they are not principles contemplated

by Art. 31 (2) of the Constitution. If the compensation is illusory or if the principles prescribed are irrelevant to the value of the property at or

about the time of its acquisition, it can be said that the Legislature committed a fraud on power and therefore the law is bad. It is a use of the

protection of Art. 31 in a manner which the Article hardly intended.

The arguments for the inamdars proceeded on the premises that the protective mantle of Art. 31-A of the Constitution does not shield the Act

from judicial scrutiny as to its validity from the standpoint of Arts. 14 and 31(2) of the Constitution. The State would take its stand, however

vulnerable the Act may be, behind the bar which, it is stated it has been able to secure under Art. 31A as insurmountable. For the State it is also

said that none of the provisions of the Act are discriminatory or violative of any of the guaranteed fundamental rights. Adverting to the provisions

relating to the grant of ryotwari pattas and the requirement as to personal cultivation, it is submitted that the inamdars of the estate dealt with under

the Act form a separate and independent class by themselves and cannot claim equal treatment with inamdars who can claim only melwaram rights.

The inamdars in question are either grantees of both the warams or grantees of melwaram while already owning the kudiwaram. It is pointed out by

the State that the requirement as to personal cultivation could not be held unreasonable even in respect of religious and charitable institutions, as the

personal cultivation required is cultivation by the landholder himself by his own servants or by hired labour with his own servants or hired stock in

the course of husbandry. The very object of agrarian reforms is to assure the land to the actual cultivator that he may put forth his best efforts on

the land and secure the maximum yield therefrom. The provisions regarding grant of ryotwari patta are not aimed at depriving the holder of his

lands but at securing better return from the lands. Courts, however, are not concerned with the wisdom or discreetness of the policy embodied in

legislation, but only with its constitutional validity. Courts have to see that constitutional limitations are not evaded by resort to colourable devices ;

but once the legislation is in its true nature and character within the competence of the Legislature, there is no question thereafter of any fraud on

legislative power. If in pith and substance the legislation is within the ambit of the Legislature''s competency, the motive behind the legislation is

totally irrelevant. The doctrine of fraud on the Constitution or colourable legislation, we may state, does not refer to any question, of bona fides or

mala fides on the part of the Legislature. The whole doctrine resolves itself into the question of competency of the Legislature to enact the particular

law. If the Legislature is competent to pass a particular law, the motive which impelled it to act are really irrelevant [see K.C. Gajapati Narayan

Deo and Others Vs. The State of Orissa, Legislative power in relation to any subject-matter is capable of abuse ; but it is not to be assumed that

there has been an abuse or that it has been improperly used. If the legislation is oppressive while within the competence of the Legislature the

remedy is appeal before a different forum, to the representatives in the Legislature and if their conscience is not scared, to the electorate, and not

striking down of the legislation by Courts. The power of the Legislature, it needs no emphasis, is only to make laws within its legislative

competence may be circumscribed by specific legislative entries under Sch. VII of the Constitution or limited by the fundamental rights guaranteed

under the Constitution. The Legislature cannot transgress the field of its competency either directly or indirectly and the Courts can scrutinise the

law to ascertain whether the Legislature by any device purports to make a law which is ostensibly within its field and competence, yet in effect and

substance goes beyond it. In Ladore v. Bennet L.R. (1939) A.C. 468 at 482 Lord Atkin made the dicta:

It is unnecessary to repeat what has been said many time by the Courts in Canada and by the Board that the Courts will be careful to detect and

invalidate any actual violation of constitutional restrictions under pretence of keeping within the statutory field. A colourable device will not avail.

In P. Vajravelu Mudaliar Vs. Special Deputy Collector, Madras and Another, , Subba Rao, J. speaking for the Court observes:

When a Court says that a particular legislation is a colourable one, it means that the Legislature has transgressed its legislative powers in a covert or

indirect manner ; it adopts a device to outstep the limits of its power. Applying the doctrine to the instant case, the Legislature cannot make a law in

derogation of Art. 31(2) of the Constitution. It can, therefore, only make a law of acquisition or requisition by providing for ''compensation'' in the

manner prescribed in Art. 31(2) of the Constitution. If the Legislature, though ex facie purports to provide for compensation or indicates the

principles for ascertaining the same, but in effect and substance takes away a property without paying compensation it will be exercising power it

does not possess. If the Legislature makes an illusory compensation or by indicating the principle for ascertaining the compensation which do not

relate to the property acquired or to the value of property at or within a reasonable proximity of the date of acquisition or the principles are so

designed and so arbitrary that they do not provide for compensation at all, one can easily hold that the Legislature made the law in fraud of its

powers. Briefly stated the legal position is as follows. If the question pertains to the adequacy of compensation, if is not justiciable ; if the

compensation fixed or the principles evolved for fixing it disclose that the Legislature made the law in fraud of powers in the sense we have

explained, the question is within the jurisdiction of the Court.

But the limitation on legislative powers in the matter of acquisition and requisitioning under Art. 31(2) are lifted where Art. 31-A applies. An Act

protected by Art. 31-A, even if it violates the requirements of Art. 31(2) and provided only illusory compensation of principles for ascertaining

compensation so wholly unrelated to the matter and arbitrary as to make it impossible for the expropriated owner to secure any compensation, will

not be open to challenge as a piece of colourable legislation or a legislation in fraud of powers.

Mr. Vedantachari, learned Counsel who led the attack for the inam holders attempted a three pronged drive to take Act out of its cover under

Art. 31-A and expose it for invalidation under Arts. 14 and 31(2). Though several of the provisions of the Act were characterised as

unreasonable, no specific mention was made of Art. 19 evidently in view of the continuance of the proclamation of emergency. The challenge to the

availability of Art. 31-A for the State with reference to Inam Estates Act may be briefly summarised thus : (1) the first is a direct attack on the

validity of the assent of the President aided by a flanking movement. When securing the assent of the President to the Bill as provided under Art.

31-A, the President was apprised of and the attention of the President drawn to the true effect of the pro-provisions of the Bill relating to

compensation which are illusory making the Act really confiscatory and a fraud on the Constitution.

Hence the assent is a nullity. The flanker is that a law violative of fundamental rights is void at its inception and so a still-born law. To such still-

born law there can be no assent as the first proviso to Art. 31-A(1) contemplates only a law made by the Legislature of a State being reserved for

the consideration and assent of the President ; (2) Neither the property defined as ''existing inam estate'' or the property defined as ''new in am

estate ''are estates as required under Art. 31-A of the Constitution. Still less are minor inam estates. As regards an existing inam estate, though it

comes under the definition of the estate under the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, as the Amending Act, Madras Act XVIII of 1936 under which

it was made an estate, was ultra vires of the then Legislature and therefore void. The definition cannot therefore, be availed of. (3) Thirdly, it is

contended that it is implicit in the very concept of the expression acquisition in Entry 42 of the Concurrent List that there should be compensation

and the compensation should be the just equivalent of what the owner has been deprived of. It is stated that provision of compensation is a

restriction on the power for acquisition and that the competency of a Legislature to make a law for acquisition is conditional on its providing the just

equivalent of the property acquired as compensation. There could be no law for acquisition without compensation, and where there is no true

compensation the law is void for lack of competency of the Legislature and the assent of the President would not cure such law. For the assent to

give validity it must be within the competence of the State Legislature, outside the protection given by Art. 31-A.

The Inam Estates Act, as stated, received the assent of the President on the 11th day of December, 1963 and was first published in the Fort

St. George Gazette, on the 1st of January, 1964, The provisions of the Act, ex facie fall under Entries 18 and 45 of the State List II of Sch. VII to

the Constitution.

Entry 18.- Land that is to say rights in or over land, land-tenures, including the relation of landlord and tenant, and the collection of rents transfer

and alienation of agricultural land, land improvement and agricultural loans; colonisation.

Entry 45.- Land revenue, including the assessment and collection of revenue, the maintenance of land records, survey for revenue purposes and

records of rights, and alienation or revenues.

As an Act for acquisition it falls under Entry 42 of the Concurrent List, List III of Schedule VII, which is:

Acquisition and requisitioning of property.

A Bill No. L of 1961 was originally introduced in the Legislative Assembly on the 29th September, 1961, and was referred to a Select Committee.

It took in only inam villages which became estates under the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act of 1936. The Select Committee was

not able to make its recommendation before the Assembly was dissolved and accordingly the Bill lapsed. It is the subsequent Bill No. II of the

1962, introduced on 27th April, 1962, that became the Act. After the Select Committee''s report on the Bill ''new inam estates'' were also brought

under the Act. In the counter-affidavit on behalf of the Government it is stated that the Bill had been discussed threadbare by the Joint Select

Committee and when referring the Bill for the assent of the President specific attention was drawn to the provision of Article 31 of the Constitution.

The relevant papers relating to the securing assent of the President to the Bill including the original Bill were produced in Court and we find from

the record that the entire Bill which ultimately became law had been reserved and submitted to the President was specifically drawn to the fact that

assent was sought under Article 31-A of the Constitution. In the reply affidavit in Writ Petition No. 1457 it is averred thus on the question of the

President''s assent:

At the time when the Bill was passed, it was made to appear that the compensation was being provided under the Act to the dispossessed

landholder, It is that assurance that must have enabled the obtaining of the assent of the President. The obtaining of the assent in such a context

cannot preclude this Honourable Court in examining whether the statute is not a fraud on the Constitution. Neither the fact that the Bill was referred

to a Joint Select Committee nor the fact that the attention of President was drawn to Article 31-A of the Constitution can render the statute valid

which is otherwise a fraud on the Constitution.

We are unable to appreciate the import of these averments. As already stated, it is the Bill that was ultimately pasted by the Legislature with its

provisions as to compensation which has since become law that was submitted to the President for his assent. Counsel for the petitioners does not

contend that it is otherwise.

The relevant proviso to Article 31-A reads:

Provided that where such law is a law made by the Legislature of a State, the provisions of this Article shall not apply thereto unless such law,

having been reserved for the consideration of the President, has received his assent.

The provision for assent in respect of State Bills is found in Articles 200 and 201 which run thus.

Article 200: When a Bill has been passed by the Legislative Assembly of a State or, in the case of a State having a Legislative Council, has been

passed by both Houses of the Legislature of the State, it shall be presented to the Governor and the Governor shall declare either that he assents to

the Bill or that he withholds assent therefrom or that he reserves the Bill for the consideration of the President:

Provided that the Governor may, as soon as possible after the presentation to him of the Bill for assent, return the Bill if it is not a money Bill

together with a message requesting that the House or Houses will reconsider the Bill or any specified provisions thereof and in particular, will

consider the desirability of introducing any such amendments as he may recommend in his message and, when a Bill is no returned, the House or

Houses shall reconsider the Bill accordingly and if the Bill is passed again by the House or Houses with or without amendment and presented to the

Governor for assent, the Governor shall not withhold assent therefrom;

Provided further that the Governor shall not assent to, but shall reserve for the consideration of the President, any Bill which in the opinion of the

Governor would, if it became law, so derogate from the powers of the High Court as to endanger the position which that Court is by this

Constitution designed to fill.

Article 201: When a Bill is reserved by a Governor for the consideration of the President, the President shall declare either that he Assents to the

Bill or that he withholds assent therefrom:

Provided that where the Bill is not a money Bill, the President may direct the Governor to return the Bill to the House or as the cute may be the

Houses of the Legislature of the State together with such a message as is mentioned in the first Proviso to Article 200 and when a Bill is so

returned the House or Houses shall reconsider it accordingly within a period of six months from the date of receipt of such message and if it is

again passed by the House or Houses with or without amendment it shall be presented again to the President for his consideration.

Article 31(3) - and Article 31-A provide for reservation of the law for the President assent. Article 31(3) may also be set out:

No such law as is referred to in clause (2) made by the Legislature of a State shall have effect unless such law, having been reserved for the

consideration of the President has received his assent.

It is not disputed that this Court has power to determine when challenged whether everything has been done which the law prescribes as

necessary for the emergence of a valid statute. What is now said is, that constitutional rights of the subject have been infringed with reference to the

statute by the failure in its formation, of a component part of the law making body. Examining the question whether such an enquiry would

necessarily lead to a breach of Parliamentary privilege, it is observed by A.G. Gueat in Oxford Essays In Jurisprudence, 1961 at page 215:

Ever since the memorable judgment of Holt. C.J. in Ashby v. White (1703) 14 St. Tr. 695, it has been settled that privilege is part of the common

law and cannot affect rights to be exercised outside or independently of the house Regularity of internal proceedings is one thing, the constitutional

rights of the subject are another and it is latter which are in issue in such a case.

Article 212 of the Constitution only preludes Courts from enquiring into the validity of any proceedings in the Legislature on the ground only of

any alleged irregularity of procedure. The contention of Counsel as we understand is that the impact of the Bill in the full force would have been

obvious to the President from its language and that the possible repercussions of the Bill in regard to compensation and other features must have

been brought specifically to the notice of the President. New apart from the terms of the Bill there could have been no assurance as to

compensation and the Bill in its final form was before the President. Learned Counsel said that as the provision of the Bill was confiscatory in

character the assent should have been given. But the argument overlooks that the very purpose of reserving the Bill under Article 31-A for the

President''s assent is to cure its invalidity. It must be in the consciousness that the Bill would be attacked as void being in contravention of Articles

14, 19 and 31 that the Bill is submitted to the President for his assent under Article 31-A. Assent under Article 31(3) gives sanction for some

limited inroads on property rights. Assent under Article 31-A gives greater even practically full cover, Articles 14, 19 and 31 being taken out of the

way. This protective Article proceeds on the basis that the law may be void as inconsistent with or taking away or abridging the rights conferred

under Articles 14, 19 and 31. The President, of course, is expected to consider the law and assent, and it has to be presumed that the President

has done so. The President may declare cither that he assents to the Bill in which case the Bill becomes law or that he withholds assent therefrom in

which case the Bill falls through, unless the procedure indicated in the proviso to Article 201 is followed. It most be noticed that Article 31-A was

first inserted by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act of 1951 and has undergone two amendments, first in 1955 under the Fourth Amendment

and again in 1964 under the Seventeenth Amendment. The amendments have purposely been given retrospective effect to save legislation effecting

agrarian reforms. The Article with its amendments has come into the Constitution to save such legislation from attacks on the ground of

constitutional transgressions based on Articles 14, 19 and 31. The contention in the circumstances that the law being violative of the constitutional

guarantees the President should not have given his assent is meaningless and unsound. Equally the submission that as the law impinges Articles 14,

19 and 31(2), it is a fraud on the Constitution, devoid of substance. Once the absence of legislative Competency from violations of Articles 14, 19

and 31(2) is cured by the President''s assent, that Act cannot be challenged as a fraud on powers for transgression of rights guaranteed under

those Articles.

It is submitted that in the camouflage of language and definition and pretentious provision for payment of compensation, the true effect of the

Act, Its evasion and invasion of the guaranteed rights have been kept masked and veiled from the President. In our view this is a hopelessly puerile

submission. Learned Counsel submits that the President has been constituted the sole Judge for deciding whether the State law should have effect.

It is, therefore, incumbent it is stated, that while the Bill in form is not confiscatory but in reality the compensation provided for will be illusory, the

Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying the Bill and sent to the President must be complete and there must be full disclosure of the

possible repercussions of the several provisions of the Bill. We agree with learned Counsel that reservation of a Bill for consideration and assent by

the President is not a mere matter of form. As we see it, it is an essential and important part of the machinery of law making set up by the

Constitution. Bearing in mind the practice that had been obtaining in Constitutions of the Colonies and Dominions of the British Commonwealth

including the Constitution under the Government of India Act, 1935, we think it may be safely assumed that when a Bill is reserved by a Governor

of a State for consideration of the President, the Bill will be examined by the Law Advisers of the President. Under the Constitution as now

amended, the Legislative power for acquisition and requisition of property has been brought into the Concurrent List and Article 44 of Part IV

containing Directive Principles of State policy provided for securing for citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India. The President

maybe expected to consider any State Bill submitted to him from the angle of securing uniformity of legislation. The President may be expected to

examine with all the facilities at his disposal the effect and extent of transgression of the constitutional rights guaranteed, when protection is sought

for such transgression. Learned Counsel points out that as laid down in Vajravelu v. Special Deputy Collector (1964) 2 S.C.J 703 : (1964)2

M.L.J. (S.C.) 173 : (1964) 2 An. W.R. (S.C.) 173, a Legislature in making a law of acquisition or requisition shall provide for a just equivalent of

what the owner has been deprived of or specify the principles for the purpose of ascertaining the just equivalent of what the owner has been

deprived of. Here is a right in a citizen to have the just equivalent of what he has been deprived of by State acquisition; but the right is not

justiciable when the question raised is as to the adequacy of compensation and the only safety is in the consideration of the law by the President.

Now while a law under Article 31(2) could be challenged where the compensation fixed is illusory or the principles prescribed are irrelevant to the

value of the property at or about the time of the acquisition as a fraud on powers, even this limited scope for challenge is unavailable if the Act falls

under Article 31-A. Hence, learned Counsel contends that a heavy responsibility rests on the President as the ultimate authority against wholly

unjust and expropriatory laws in such cases.

In this connection elaborating the argument, learned Counsel drew our attention to certain passages in the classic treatise, Spenser Bower on

Actionable Nondisclosure. We are unable to appreciate the relevancy of the principles found in these passages in the context of law making

according to constitutional provisions. At page 517 of the treatise, in para. 581 it is stated:

Whenever the Crown, or an officer or department of the State is induced by suppression, or perversion, of material facts within the actual or

presumptive knowledge of the grantee, to confer any privilege on a subject, whereby the rights and interests of any other subject, or of the King''s

other subjects in general, are proportionately curtailed, such grant, on the proper proceedings being taken by the proper parties will be repealed,

revoked, withdrawn or avoided, or (without being formally avoided) treated as void.

For one thing there has not been a plea in the present case of any suppression or perversion of material facts in securing the assent and we do

not see any case made out, that information was deliberately withheld from the President when securing his assent; nor was there anything to

prevent the representatives of the inam holders submitting their case on the Bill to the President. The President must be presumed to have fully

acquainted himself with the whole scope of the Bill and its full implications. Law has not prescribed any procedure to be observed before the

President gives his assent to a bill reserved for his consideration. And there is a presumption of regularity attached to all official business; omnia

praesumuntur rite et solemniter esse acta. In the same treatisie on actionable nondisclosure at page 519 it is observed:

The burden of proof on the party claiming relief is, mutatis mutandis substantially the same as that which rests on a party complaining of the non-

disclosure to him of material facts in the course of a negotiation with a view to a contract or transaction uberrimae fidei. That is to say, the

Attorney-General, or the aggrieved subject, as the case may be, must allege and establish circumstances raising the duty of disclosure as between

the grantee and the Crown, and must show that it was material for the Crown to be informed of the particular undisclosed fact. Secondly, he must

show if challenged the existence or occurrence, in point of fact, of that which he alleges to have been withheld from the King''s notice; fourthly it

must be shown that the subject to whom the impeached grant was made had either actual or presumptive knowledge of the undisclosed fact.

Lastly, it must be established that King had no knowledge aliunde of the undisclosed fact.

There is nothing in the light of the said principles to suggest that the reservation of the Bill for the President''s assent and the securing of the

president''s assent to the bill is in any manner vitiated, even assuming that Courts could go behind the assent once given by the President. But as

pointed out by Mahajan, J. (as he then was), in Raja Suriya Pal Singh Vs. The State of U.P. and Another, it is the subjective opinion of the

President that leads to the assent and it is not justiciable. The learned Judge observes:

The difference is that persons whose properties fall within the definition of the expression ''estate'' in Article 31-A are deprived of their remedy

under Art. 32 of the Constitution and the President has been constituted the sole Judge of deciding whether a State law acquiring estates under

compulsory power has or has not complied with the provisions of Art. 31(2). The validity of the law in those cases depend on the subjective

opinion of the President and is not justiciable. Once the assent is given, the law is taken to have complied with the previsions of Article 31(2).

In our view, though the bread principles on which the assent is intended to be given or withheld from a reserved Bill may be deducible, they are

not specifically laid down in the Constitution. That being so, it will set be open to the Courts to question the propriety of the President''s action. We

may in this connection refer to Section 13 (2) of the Government of India Act, 1935, whereby it is provided that the validity of anything done by

the Governor-General shall not be called in question on the ground that it was done otherwise than in accordance with any Instrument of

Instructions issued to him. Under the Constitution Act of 1935, it may be remembered, the Governor-General was bound by the Instrument of

Instructions to withhold his assent from certain Bills, in certain cases.

We shall next take up the cognate contention that as a law which transgresses the fundamental rights must be deemed to be void from its

inception; the President''s assent cannot give it life and make it effective. It is argued that the Act in question is a post-Constitution Act which

infringes guaranteed fundamental rights and is therefore a stillborn law dead from the beginning. The contention is that the law under Article 31-A

which is reserved for consideration of the President can only mean a valid taw and there can be no valid law when it contravenes the provisions of

the Constitution. In other words, it is said that the Act which is sent to the President is an unconstitutional Act and therefore not a law under Article

13(2). This is arguing in a circle. The law is reserved for the President''s assent to give it life, to make it valid and effective. Constitutionally it is yet

to become a law. A Bill pending assent is in the legislative process of becoming law. The question of voidness can arise only in relation to a law

and not to a Bill. If the contention put forward is accepted, it will render Article 31-A nugatory. A reading of Articles 31 and 31-A shows that in

the context, the word ''law'' in the first proviso to Article 31-A cannot be understood in its strict sense. Article 31-A assumes that the legislation in

question is open to attack under Article 14, 19 or 31. The very language ""no law......... shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is

inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Article 14, Article 19 or Article 31"" assumes that the law may be void

but for the non-obstante provision. In our view, the word ''law'' appears to have been used in a compendious way describing also a legislation that

nag been passed through the Legislature of a State and not yet received the assent of the President. In Part VI of the Constitution where the

legislative procedure is given, there is no provision for reservation of a law for the president''s consideration. Articles 200 and 201 speak only of a

Bill. In our view the word ''law'' used in Article 31-A means just a Bill passed by the Legislature of a State-Similar arguments had been attempted

with reference to Article 31 (3) in the The State of Bihar Vs. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga and Others, the (Darbanga

Case), where Patanjali Sastri, C.J. observes:

The Constitution would thus seem to contemplate only Bills passed by House or Houses of Legislature being reserved for the consideration of the

President and not laws to which the Governor has already given his assent. Nor is the phrase ''law so assented to'' strictly accurate, as the previous

portion of the clause makes it clear that what is reserved for the President''s assent and what he assents to is a Bill and not a law. The phrase

obviously refers to what has become a law after receiving the assent of the President. Similarly, Article 31(3) must, in my Judgment, be understood

as having reference to what, in historical sequence, having been passed by the House or Houses of the State Legislature and reserved by the

Governor for the consideration of the President and assented to by the latter, has thus become a law.

In Visveshwar Rao v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (1952) S.C.J. 427 at 443, Das, J. (as he then was) with reference to Article 31 (3)

observes:

The whole argument is built on the word ''law''. I do not think that what is referred to as law in Article 31(3) is necessarily what had already

become a law before receiving the assent of the President. If that were the meaning, the clause would have said unless such law, having been

reserved for the consideration of the President, receives his assent. The words ''has received his assent'' clearly imply and point to an accomplished

fact that the clause read as a whole does not grammatically exclude a law that eventually become a law by having received the assent of the

President. The question whether the requirements of Article 31 (3) have been complied with will arise only when the State purports to acquire the

property of any person under a law and that person denies that the asserted law has any effect. It if at that point of time that the Court has to ask

itself..... ''Is it a law which, having been reserved for the consideration of the President, has received his assent? I think it is in this sense that the

word ''law'' has been used. In other words the word ''law'' has been used to mean what at the time of dispute purports to be or is asserted to be a

law.

These observation would apply with equal force to the word ''law'' in Article 31-A.

We shall now proceed to the consideration of the submission that the inams which the impugned Act seeks to cover are not estates whose

acquisition is protected under Article 31-A of the Constitution. The impugned Act acquires, for the purpose of completing the agrarian reforms that

the Government has in view, inam estates as defined in the Act. Inam estates are either existing inam estates or new inam estates. The definition of

these inam estates has already been set out. Article 31-A, clause (2), as it now stands amended by the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment)

Act, 1964 with retrospective effect, defines an estate thus:

(a) the expression ''estate'' shall, in relation to any local area, have the same meaning as that expression or its local equivalent has in the existing law

relating to land tenures in force in that area and shall also include--

(i) any jagir, inam or muafi or other similar grant and in the States of Madras and Kerala, any janman right ;

(ii) any land held under ryotwari settlement ;

(iii) any land held or let for purposes of agriculture or for purposes ancillary thereto, including wait land, forest land, land for pasture or sites of

buildings and other structures occupied by cultivators of land, agricultural labourers and village artisans.

If the property, the subject of acquisition under the impugned Act, falls within the definition of estate under Article 31-A (2) as above set out, the

validity of the Act cannot be impugned on the ground that it contravenes Article 14, 19 and 31. The question, therefore, for consideration is

whether the inams defined under the Inam Estates Act fall under the expression ''estate'' in Article 31-A(2)(a). Where the property sought to be

covered by the Act is in the terminology of the existing law relating to land tenures in force in the State described as estate, there can be no

difficulty. Existing law is defined under Article 366 (10) as meaning any law, ordinance, order, bye-law, rule or regulation passed or made before

the commencement of the Constitution by any Legislature, authority or a person having power to make such a law, ordinance, order, bye-law, rule

or regulation. Difficulties can arise only where the relevant local law does not describe any particular agricultural property as estate. It is not of

course disputed that even though no agricultural property is expressly or specifically described as an estate in a local law, there may be agricultural

properties in the area which will constitute an estate under clause (2) (a). In such cases, it will become necessary to examine its attributes and

essential features and enquire whether it satisfies the tests for an estate under clause (2) (a). Of the two tenures which fall under the concept inam

estate in the impugned Act, prima facie there can be no difficulty in holding that the existing inam estate is an estate under Article 31-A. The very

definition of existing inam estate conveys that it is an estate under the existing law. It is a whole inam village which was brought under the Estates

Land Act under S. 3(2)(d) of the said Act by the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act XVIII of 1936. These estates were excluded

from the estates taken over under the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act XXVI of 1948. These estates are otherwise

known as Iruvaram Inam Estates.

On behalf of the owners of these iruwaram estates, the contention now made is that the Third Amendment Act of 1930 itself is not a valid law and

was beyond the competence of the Provincial Legislature. It is contended that it contravened S. 299(2) of the Government of India Act of 1935 in

not providing the just equivalent of what the proprietor was deprived of by bringing in the inams under the Estates Land Act. It may be stated that

when legislation to bring the iruvaram inams under the provisions of the Estates Land Act was on the anvil in 1934 there was considerable agitation

by these inamdars. The Governor-General in the first instance withheld his assent to the Bill and learned Counsel drew out attention to the following

statement of the Governor-General for withholding his assent to the Bill.

In accordance with the provisions of Sub-S. (4) of S. 81 of the Government of India Act (1912) I hereby signify to you that my reason for

withholding my assent from the Madras Estates Land (Second Amendment) Act, 1934, is that after the most anxious consideration, in the course

of which representations submitted in support of the Act, have received no less attention than representation submitted in opposition thereto. I have

reached the conclusion that the Act is expropriatory in that it involves the loss of kudiwaram lands included in their inams by those inamdars who

under the existing law would be in opposition to establish their ownership of the kudiwaram and that a measure producing this result within the

provision for the compensation of persons adversely affected should not be allowed to become law. I desire at the same time to make it

abundantly plain that this conclusion is in no way based on opposition and implies no opposition, to the proposition that the tenants of inamdars

should be placed in a position enabling them to acquire occupancy rights and that I have been constrained to withhold my assent from the present

measure by reason only of the fact that it fails to provide equitable compensation for the inamdars whose rights are affected thereby.

We may in passing observe that learned Counsel sought to press home his contention just now considered the question of the President''s

assent by referring to the regard the Governor-General has shown in the matter of amendment. But they were spacious days of the laissez-faire

doctrine, when the alien Government did not mind being very solicitous of property rights, may be in the view that they contributed to the stability

of the Empire The then Madras Government subsequently sought and obtained sanction for a Bill with provisions for some compensation, by the

addition of clauses providing that if an inamdar proved that he had kudiwaran right in the land which did not come within the definition of private

lands, the tenant of such land could acquire occupancy rights on payment of compensation to the inamdar. The quantum of compensation which

ultimately Game to be provided when the Bill became law was an amount equivalent to the annual rent payable in respect of the land together with

costs of preparing any instrument required to confer occupancy right. It is the case of the petitioners that this compensation was wholly inadequate

and nominal and the legislation was confiscatory in character, but that no action was taken by the inamdar immediately, as comprehensive tenancy

legislation was awaited. In the report of the Estates Land Act Committee, Part I (Prakasam Committee, 1937) in their conclusion it is remarked

with reference to the quantum of compensation that had been provided to the inamdars under Act XVIII of 1936 that it was like granting one pie

nominal damages in an action for tort. The Committee observed that if Courts declared that the kudiwaram right was in the inamdar he must be

given a reasonable compensation for parting with such rights and that he will be entitled to compensation on the same basis in which a vendor or

owner would be entitled to get in return for parting with his rights, from a purchaser. Learned Counsel relied on Section 299 of the Government of

India Act which in express terms said that the Legislature had no power to make any law authorising compulsory acquisition for public purpose of

any land unless the law provided for the payment of compensation for the property acquired. Reference is made to the decision of the Supreme

Court in N.B. Jeejeebhoy Vs. Assistant Collector, Thana Prant, Thana, , where it has been held that it cannot be said that the expression

''compensation'' in S. 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935, should be given a meaning more restricted than that given to the said expression

in Art. 31(2) of the Constitution. The expression ''compensation'' in S. 299 of the Government of India Act will also mean a just equivalent of what

the owner has been deprived of. But this contention elaborately developed has to fall to the ground for the simple reason that the Government of

India Act, 1935, became effective only from 1st April, 1937, and the Third Amendment Act had long prior to that date became law.

There is another formidable obstacle in the way of the petitioners relying on Section 299 of the Government of India Act. Under the Third

Amendment Act there is no question of any compulsory acquisition of property for public purpose to take in the obligation of providing for

payment of compensation. The Third Amendment Act is one intended to regulate the relation between the landlord and tenant and diminish the

rights till then enjoyed by the landlord in connection with his land. In this view, the fact that further amendment of Section 3(2)(d) of the Estates

Land Act was deemed necessary to bring in all iruvaram inam villages and the necessary amendment was made only in 1945 by the Madras

Estates Land (Amendment) Act II of 1945 in not of any consequence. It follows that as existing inam estate would fall under the expression

''estate'' in Article 31-A(2)(1) of the Constitution and legislation in reaped of the same could claim protection under the first proviso to Article 31-

A(1).

The next question for consideration will be whether the property falling under the definition of new inam estate under the impugned In am

Estates Abolition Act would be covered by the expression ''estate'' under the Constitution. A new inam estate as per the definition includes a part

village inam estate which in fact is a minor inam, and what is referred to as a Pudukkottai Inam estate. The contention that these inams are not

estates under Article 31-A, applies also to minor inams, the subject of legislation under the impugned Act XXX of 1963. Briefly put the argument

runs thus; Once there is a definition of the expression ''estate'' in any existing local law relating to land tenure, Article 31-A would apply only to

such estate, and by a mere post-Constitution definition a property which was not an estate previously cannot be brought under the expression

''estate''. Minor inams were never deemed to be estates. Though the scope of the expression ''estate'' in Article 31-A has by the Seventeenth

Amendment been considerably widened, the two impugned Acts proceed only on the basis that all inams are also estates under Article 31-A.

Under the Constitution First Amendment whereby Article 31-A was added to the Constitution, ''estate'' was defined thus:

The expression ''estate'' shall in relation to any local area have the same meaning as the expression ''or its local equivalent'' has in the existing law

relating to land tenures in force in that area, and shall also include any jagir, inam or muafi or other similar grants.

The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution added at the end of the definition ""and in the States of Madras and Kerala any Jenmam rights.

Now the scope of the expression ''estate'' has further been widened by the Seventeenth Amendment, as set out before. Learned Counsel for the

petitioners contends that the word ''inam'' found in Clause (2)(a)(i) of Article 31-A as it now stands should be construed in ejusdem generis sense

as to include only an inam that was an estate on the date of the Constitution. It is submitted that only those inams which under the existing law were

estates would be covered by the expression ''estate'' under Clause (2)(a) that is to say, inams which became estates under the Third Amendment

to the Madras Estates Land Act could alone be considered to be estates for Article 31-A. The argument is that the original intention in the

introduction of Article 31-A was to cover only cases of Zamindars and other intermediaries who stood between the State and cultivators and who

were generally alienees of land revenue it is urged that it is only what may be broadly described as landlord tenures that fall within the scope of the

expression ''estate''. According to learned Counsel where there is an existing law in which the word ''estate'' as such is defined, the word should

have that meaning and the expressions following in Article 31-A(2) like jagir, inam and muafi are just illustrative of the kinds of estates that could

come under the central concept of the word ''estate'' so defined. But as we see it, neither by the language of Article 31-A nor by the setting of the

relevant expressions are we compelled to adopt the narrow construction suggested for the petitioners. The scope of the expression has been

deliberately expanded by the two Amendments and the inclusion of jagir, inam and muafi is preceded by the phrase ""and shall also include"". The

significance of this phrase, in our view, is that otherwise these tenures would not be estates. The use of the word ''also'' must have its proper

import. The word ''any'' before jagir, inam and muafi is significant. When the expression is ''any'' inam, we cannot limit inams to any particular

category, to inams which were estates under the local law prior to the 26th of January, 1950 only. There is no restriction on the content of the

word ''inam'' as to require it to satisfy the definition of estate in the local area. In Dilworth v. Commissioner of Stamps L.R. (1899) A.C. 99 at 105,

106, Lord Watson stated:

''Include'' is very generally used in interpretation clauses to enlarge the meaning of the words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute, and

when it is so used those words and phrases must be construed as comprehending not only such things as they signify according to their natural

import but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include.

If the connecting word used had been only ''inclusive'' and not the expression ''and also include'', a contention is plausible that the word has been

used in the restrictive sent. Occasionally no doubt in some instances the word ''include'' may be used as illustrative of what has been said before.

But in the context of the present user, it is clear that the word has been used in an expansive sense. We do not think it necessary to labour further

on this contention, as the question is concluded by the decision of the Supreme Court in Mahant Sankarshan Ramanuja Das Goswami etc., etc.

Vs. The State Of Orissa and Another, which, confirms the decision of the Orissa High Court in Sankarsana Ramanuja Das Vs. State of Orissa and

Another, The Orissa High Court rejected a contention similar to the one now put forward before us seeking to confine the word ''inam'' in Article

31-A(2)(a) to whole inam villages which were estates under the Madras Estates Land Act and as not including minor inams. The inams in question

which came up for consideration before the Orissa High Court were grants of lands which comprised both melwaram and kudivaram rights and

were just minor inams. Upholding the decision of the Orissa High Court, Hidayatullah, J., speaking for the Court observed.

Learned Counsel for the appellants also urged, though somewhat faintly, that the ejusdem generis rule should be applied to the definition of ''estate''

in Article 31-A(2)(a) as also the corresponding new definition in the Abolition Act. This argument proceeds upon an assumption for which there is

no foundation. The ejusdem generis rule is applicable where wide or general term has to be cut down with reference to the genus of the particular

terms which precede the general words. This rule has hardly any application where certain specific categories are ''included'' in the definition. The

ejusdem generis may be applicable to the general words ''other similar grant'' which would take their colour from the particular categories, ''jagir,

inam and muafi'', which precede them, but the word ''inam'' is not subject to the same rule. Once it is held that inams of any kind were included, it

makes little difference if the inams were of lands and not of whole villages. So also the fact that the holders of such inams cannot be described as

intermediaries, or that they comprised both the melwaram and the kudiwaram rights.

In view of this decision of the Supreme Court before us, the contention is not even open to the petitioners that Art. 31-A will not apply to the

inams which are the subject of the impugned Acts, Madras Acts XXVI and XXX of 1963.

We shall next take up for consideration the final ground of attack to dislodge the Inam Estates Act from its position of vantage under the cover

provided by Art. 31-A. By the proviso to Art. 31-A(1) once the Bill has been reserved for consideration of the President and his assent secured,

the law gets protection from being assailed for transgressions of Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution. But Art. 31-A of the Constitution cannot

stand in the way of judicial scrutiny on the competency of the Legislature over the subject of legislation. The contention that requires examination, is

that the field of legislation under Entry 42 of List III providing for compensation is conditioned from the very connotation of the word ''acquisition''

that the law providing for acquisition should also provide for compensation, and compensation, has been declared by the Supreme Court, to mean

the just equivalent of what the owner is deprived of. The argument is that by history and legislative practice the word ''acquisition'' has a special

meaning and has always been understood as acquisition subject to payment of just compensation: the power of acquisition can be exercised only

subject to the payment of proper compensation. Acquisition and compensation in its true scope go together and are inspirable so much so that

there could be no law for acquisition without provision for compensation. The provision for compensation under Art. 31 (2), it is stated, only gives

a further safeguard lifting the requirement to the status of a fundamental right. Learned Counsel submits that it is a double safeguard and the non-

availability of one, namely, compensation as a fundamental right, will not preclude agitation for fair compensation as an inherent and well

understood concomitant of any acquisition. We are constrained to say that this argument is wholly devoid of substance and we mean no

disparagement to learned Counsel for the petitioners to whom we are indebted for interesting arguments on several questions that arose for

consideration in these cases, when we say that this is the weakest and most fragile argument that could be laid hold of, similar arguments having

been attempted and turned down in the Supreme Court in cases impugning Zamindari Abolition Acts. The only excuse which we can see for

resurrecting this argument before us without reference to the prior decisions is that the inamdars find themselves in extremis and hope to find some

foothold in the bastion from some of the amendments that have since been made to the Constitution.

Now let us examine this position. Prior to the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution in 1956, that is, prior to 1st November, 1956, the

legislative power relating to acquisition and requisitioning was divide between the Union and States Acquisition for the purpose of the Union was

Entry 33 in List I, Seventh Schedule:

Acquisition or requisitioning of property for the purpose of the Union.

The State''s power was found in Entry 36 of List II:

Acquisition or requisitioning of property except for the purpose of the Union, subject to the provisions of Entry 42 of List III.

The power in matters relating to compensation was found in the Concurrent List:

Entry 42 : Principles on which compensation for property acquired or requisitioned for the purpose of the Union or of a State or for any other

public purpose is to be determined, and the form and the manner in which such compensation is to be given.

By the Seventh Amendment, Entry 33 in List I and Entry 36 in List II were dropped and for the original Entry 42 in List III was Substituted as

Entry 42:

Acquisition and requisitioning of property.

The provision relating to the principles on which and the manner in which compensation for property acquired or requisitioned is to be

determined and given is now found only in Art. 31(2). Art. 31(2) since the Fourth Amendment in 1955 reads:

No property shall be compulsorily acquired or requisitioned save for a public purpose and save by authority of a law which provides for

compensation for the property so acquired or requisitioned and either fixes the amount of the compensation or specifies the principles on which,

and the manner in which the compensation is to be determined and given ; and so such law shall be called in question is any Court on the ground

that the compensation provided by that law is not adequate.

Article 31(2) before its amendment in 1955 ran thus:

No property, moveable or immoveable, including any interest in, or in any company owning any commercial or industrial undertaking, shall be

taken possession of or acquired for public purposed under any law authorising the taking of such possession or such acquisition, unless the Law

provides for compensation for the property taken possession of or acquired and either fixes the amount of the compensation, or specifies the

principles on which and the manner in which, the compensation it to be determined and given.

Prior to the amendment of Cl. (2) by the Fourth Amendment, the language of the clause was not quite clear only in respect of public purposes

and it seemed that only by implication one could infer from the principles of ""eminent domain"" that the existence of public purpose was a condition

precedent to compulsory acquisition of property and that accordingly the question as to the existence of public purpose was justiciable

notwithstanding Arts. 31(4) and 31-A. There was strong cleavage of judicial opinion as will be seen in the The State of Bihar Vs. Maharajadhiraja

Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga and Others, , three of the leaned Judges Patanjali Sastri, C.J., and Mukerjee and Dass, JJ., holding that the

existence of public purpose as a pre-requisite to the exercise of the power of compulsory acquisition is an essential and integral part of the

provisions of Art. 31(2) and an infringement of such a provision cannot be put forward as a ground for questioning the validity of an Act providing

for compulsory acquisition, while the other two learned Judges Mahajan, J., (as he then was) and Chandrasekhara Iyer, J., held that the scope of

Art. 31 (4) is limited to the express provisions of Art. 31 (2) and though the Courts cannot examine the extent or adequacy of the provisions of the

compensation contained in any law dealing with the acquisition of property compulsorily, yet the provisions of Art. 31 (4) do not in anyway debar

the Court from considering whether the acquisition is for a public purpose. By the amendment introducing the words ''save for a public purpose'',

public purpose has been made an express condition for compulsory acquisition or requisitioning, and further Cls. (1) and (2) of Art. 31 have been

made mutually exclusive, Cl. (2) besides being attracted only when there is compulsory acquisition or requisitioning. We fail to see how these

amendments to the Constitution provide any room for arguments for the petitioners. Far from it they point the other way. In fact, we heard nothing

tangible. The provisions as to payment of compensation is an essential requisite even originally under Art. 31(2) and it was never in doubt that we

relevant legislative entries by themselves did not make provision for compensation a valid requirement of legislative competence. Compensation

having been provided for under Art. 31(2), it cannot at the same time be regarded as inherent and involved as a matter of common law in the

legislative entry providing for acquisition-expressum facit cessare taciturn. In the The State of Bihar Vs. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of

Darbhanga and Others, Patanjali Sastri, C.J., remarks at page 904:

It is true that under the common law of eminent domain as recognised in the jurisprudence of all civilised countries the State cannot take the

property of its subject unless such property is required for a public purpose.

Proceeding the learned Chief Justice observes at page 906:

The fact is that the law-making power of both Parliament and State Legislature can be exercised only subject to the aforesaid two restrictions, not

by reason of anything contained in the entries themselves but by reason of the positive provisions of Art. 31(2) and as laws falling under Art. 31(4)

or under Arts. 31-A and 31-B cannot be called in question in a Court of law for non-compliance with these provisions, such laws cannot be struck

down as unconditional and void.

At page 929, Mahajan, J. (as he then was) who differed as regards public purpose stated:

The question for consideration is whether this obligation to pay compensation for compulsory acquisition of property has been impliedly laid down

by the Constitution makers in our Constitution under legislative head in Entry 36 of List II and Entry 33 of List I, or whether this all important

obligation which follows compulsory acquisition as a shadow has been put in express and clear terms somewhere else in the Constitution. To my

mind, oar Constitution has raised this obligation to pay compensation for the compulsory acquisition of property to the status of a fundamental right

and it has declared that a law that does not make provision for payment of compensation shall be void. It did not leave the matter to be discovered

and spelt out by learned arguments at the Bar from out of the contents of Entry 36; they explicitly provided for it in Art. 31(2) of the Constitution.

As the obligation to pay has been made a compulsory part of a statute that purports to legislate under Entry 33 of List I and Entry 36 of List II, it is

not possible to accede to the contention of Mr. P.R. Das that the duty to pay compensation is a thing inherent in the language of Entry 36. I agree

with the learned Attorney-General that the concept of acquisition and that of compensation are two different notions having their origin in different

sources. One is founded on the sovereign powers of the State to take, the other is based on the natural right of the person who is deprived of

property to be compensated for his loss. One is the power to take, the other, is the condition for the exercise of that power. Power to take was

mentioned in Entry 36, while the condition for the exercise of that power was embodied in Art. 31(2) and there was no duty to pay compensation

implicit in the content of the entry itself.

The learned Judge rejected the attempt to link up Entry 36 in List II with Entry 42 in the Concurrent List as based on an unsound contention.

Das. J., at page 979 stated:

In my judgment, for the reasons stated above, the major premise in the arguments advanced by Mr. P.R. Das under the first head, namely, that the

obligation to pay compensation is implicit in Entry 36 in List II by itself or read with Entry 42 in List III is unsound. The obligation to provide for

compensation being as I hold, a provision of Art. 31 (2) and not being implicit in or a part and parcel of the legislative power itself under Entry 36

in List II read by itself or in conjunction with Entry 42 in List III, the impugned Act cannot, by virtue of Arts. 31(4), 31-A and 31-B be called in

question on the ground that it contravenes or is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by the provisions of Cl. (2)

of Art. 31, that is to say, that it does not provide for compensation.

The aforesaid decision is clear and binding authority for the position that the obligation to pay compensation for property acquired by the State is

not an obligation imposed by Entry 36 of List II read by itself or in conjunction with Entry 42 of List III. There is nothing in the Fourth Amendment

that could in the least affect the decision, and by the Seventh Amendment all scope for such arguments, is removed. It is surprising that in spite of

these explicit and weighty pronouncements, if we may say so with respect, as to the content of the legislative lists the matter should have been

resurrected once again. The effect of the Fourth Amendment, if at all, has been to make the requirement as to public purpose explicit or express in

Art. 31(2). That the effect of the Fourth Amendment is to make Cl. (1) and (2) of Art. 31 mutually exclusive, does not affect the proportion now

under consideration. The following observation of tat Supreme Court in State of Bihar Vs. Rameshwar Pratap Narain Singh and Others, , on the

effect of the Fourth Amendment is significant in the context of the present contention:

The question whether the validity of a law for compulsory acquisition of property by the State can be challenged on the ground that the

''acquisition'' is not for a public purpose had to be considered by this Court even before the amendment of Art. 31(2) as mentioned above in The

State of Bihar Vs. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga and Others, Art. 31(2) as it then stood did not in so many words provide

that no acquisition can be made save for a public purpose; but it was argued on behalf of the State that such a provision was implicit in the words

of Art. 31(2). This argument was rejected by Mahajan and Chandrasekhara Aiyar, JJ., but it was accepted by Patanjali Sastri, C.J., and Das, J.,

both of whom held that the requirement of public purpose being a condition for compulsory acquisition laid down by Art. 31(2), the law was saved

in spite of the violation of such condition by Art. 31(4) and also Art. 31-A. Mukherjee, J., also said that the requirement of public purpose was a

condition implied in the provision of Art. 31(2). His Lordship then stated:

For my part I would be prepared to assume that Cl. (4) of Art. 31 relates to everything that is provided for in Cl. (2) either in express terms or

impliedly and consequently the question of the existence of a public purpose does not come within the purview of an inquiry in the present case. It

was in this State of judicial opinion that Art. 31(2) was amended by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act as mentioned above and the

requirement of public purpose was expressly made a condition for compulsory acquisition by the State. The basis for the argument that the

question whether there was a public purpose or not is open to judicial review in spite of Art. 31-A has therefore disappeared.

It is worth noticing in this connection that in The State of Bihar Vs. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga and Others, , the

argument that quite apart from anything in Art. 31(2) as it then stood no law of acquisition could be made except for a public purpose was sought

to be reinforced by the words is Item 36 of the State List and Item 42 of the Concurrent List........

The argument on the basis of these entries was that the State Legislatures had no power to make a Law for acquisition of property without fulfilling

the condition of public purpose. The Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act which came into force on 1st day of November, 1956 deleted Entry

36 of the State List and substituted for the former phraseology in Item 42 of the Concurrent List the words ''acquisition and requisition of

property''. It is quite clear that after its amendment the legislative list permits the State Legislature in enact a law of acquisition even without a public

purpose ; and that the only obstacle to such a law being enacted without a public purpose is the provisions of Art. 31(2). That obstacle also

disappears if the law in question is one within Art. 31-A.

The effect of the Fourth Amendment is to bring in the requirement as to public purpose in line with the requirement as to compensation. Since, the

Fourth Amendment, the only obstacle to a law of acquisition being enacted without a public purpose or compensation, is Art. 31 (2). In the words

of Das Gupta, J., in the above case even that obstacle disappears if the law in question is within Art. 31-A.

Reference was made by learned Counsel to Attorney-General v. De Keyser''s Royal Hotel, Ltd. L.R. (1920) A.C. 508 and Central Control

Board v. Gannon Brewery L.R. (1919) A.C. 744, for his contention that there could be no acquisition without providing for just compensation and

that the distinction between acquisition and confiscation is that for the latter there is no compensation and when power is conferred for acquisition,

it implies that the law providing for acquisition should provide for compensation. We find little support in them for these propositions which have to

be considered under the provisions of our Constitution. These decisions do not go against the rule, a rule as much of logic as of commonsense, that

when specific provision has been made in respect of compensation the implied power if any should be held to have disappeared. In Attorney-

General v. De Keyser''s Royal Hotel, Ltd. L.R. (1920) A.C. 508, relied on by learned Counsel, Lord Atkinson observed:

I should prefer to say that when such a statute, expressed the will and intention of the King and of the three estates of the realm, is passed, it

abridges the Royal prerogative while it is in force to, this extent ; that the Crown can only do the particular thing under and in accordance with the

statutory provisions, and that its prerogative power to do that thing is in abeyance. Whichever mode of expression be used, the result intended to

be indicated is, I think, the same, namely, that after the statute has been passed and while it is in force, the thing it empowers the Crown to do can

thenceforth only be done by and under the statute, and subject to all the limitations, restrictions and conditions by it imposed, however unrestricted

the Royal prerogative may therefore have been.

In Legislative, Executive and Judicial Powers in Australia by W. Anstey Wynei, 3rd Edition, it is stated at page 454:

The express grant in Par. (xxxi)--(under the Australian Constitution under Par. (xxxi) of S. 51 is found the Legislative power of Parliament with

respect to acquisition of property on just terms)--both widens and limits the conditions of exercise of the gower which would otherwise come

within the incidental power-enlarges it to cover cases of direct acquisition simpliciter without the necessity of mere acquisition as part of a scheme,

and limits the conditions of exercise to taking ''on just terms,''....... If the property is taken without compensation the question which arises is a

political one merely, since a statute is equally good whether it confiscates, or merely compulsorily purchases ; such is the position in England and

the right flows from the sovereignty of Parliament and does not depend for its defence upon the doctrine called ''eminent domain''. The learned

Justice (Barton, J.) questioned whether the Commonwealth had a right of ''eminent domain'' in addition to the legislative power granted by the

Constitution. It is submitted that the Commonwealth has no such power in view of the grant contained in S. 51 (xxxi) : expressio unius exclusio

alterius.

It may be relevant also in this connection to refer to the corresponding provisions in the Government of India Act, 1935. While the guarantee

for payment of compensation was found under the Constitution of 1935 in S. 299 , Cl. (2) in terms similar to Art. 31(2), the legislative power was

found in Entry 9 of List II which spoke merely of ''compulsory acquisition of land''. Referring to the scope of the BUY in Zamindar of Ettayapuram

v. State of Madras AIR 1954 S.C. 257 to 259, it is observed by the Supreme Court:

....there was no entry in any of the lists attached to the Act of 1935 corresponding to Entry 42 in List III of the Indian Constitution. The only entry

relevant to this point in the Act of 1935, was Entry 9 of List II which spoke merely of ''compulsory acquisition of land'' ; and it is clear that a duty

to pay compensation or of laying down any principle regarding it was not inherent, in the language of the entry. The guarantee for payment of

compensation, so far as the Constitution Act of 1935, is concerned, was contained in S. 299 Cl. (2) .....

We have, therefore, no hesitancy in rejecting the contention that provision for compensation is inherent in Entry 42 of List III, and could affect,

the exercise of legislative powers under the entry. The obligation to provide compensation as in the case of public purpose since the Fourth

Amendment is found only in Article 31 (2), and when an Act in shielded from that Article, it is immune from all attacks based on the requirements

as to compensation, even if the compensation provided is illusory or no compensation is provided. It follows that the Madras Act XXVI of 1963 in

general is not void for legislative competency and there is no room for assailing the Act with the picturesque and epigrammatic expressions that the

enactment is a ""fraud on the Constitution"" or a ""fraud on power.

The other two Acts, the Leasehold Act (XXVII of 1963) and the Minor Inams Act (XXX of 1963) are not much different in form, effect or

content and the above conclusion of ours apply to them as well. The Leaseholds Act seeks to abolish the intermediaries, namely, the lessees of

leasehold villages. It is stated that there are about 11 leasehold villages in the State, two of them leased for 99 years and nine others leased

permanently. Writ Petitions Nos. 1812 of 1965 and 195S of 1965 are about the two villages under the 99 years lease which we are considering

separately on their merits. The provisions of the Act follow mutatis mutandis the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act

(XXVI of 1948) except in regard to compensation, while the basis for calculating the basic annual sum adopted under the Estates Abolition Act

has generally been followed, the amount of compensation is arrived at differently. In the case of lease granted in perpetuity the compensation is 10

times the basic annual sum and in other cases it is five times the basic annual sum. This, Act received the assent of the President on the 12th of

December, 1963 and was first published in the Fort St. George Gazette on the 1st January, 1964, the Act to come into force on such date as the

Government may by notification appoint.

There was no serious argument before us that leasehold villages will not come under the expression ""estate"" is Article 31-A of the Constitution

as it now stands since the Seventeenth Amendment. Under Art. 31-A(2)(a)(iii) any lands held or let for purposes of agriculture or for purposes

ancillary thereto including waste land, forest land, land for pasture or sites of buildings and other structures occupied by cultivators of land,

agricultural labourers and village artisans is included in the expression ''estate''. The legislation in question (Act XXVII of 1963) is, therefore,

legislation relating to acquisition by the State of estate or rights therein of extinguishment or modification of any such rights therein. The Minor

Inams Act (Madras Act XXX of 1963) received the assent of the President on the 28th of January, 1964 and was first published in the Fort St.

George Gazette on the 5th of February, 1964. This Act is for the introduction of ryotwari settlement in minor inams, that is, inam grants of isolated

fields or blocks left out of the Inam Estates Act of 1963. Except as regards the provision for compensation this Act also mutatis mutandis follows

the Estates Abolition Act (Madras Act XXVI of 1948). In the case of inams granted to an individual without any condition of rendering service to

any institution, the compensation is provided only for the loss of income from all sources in the inam excluding the land in respect of which any

person is entitled to ryotwari patta u/s 8 of the Act. Section 20 deals with payment of tasdik allowance to religious, educational and charitable

institutions and section 21 deals with service inams. In the case of inam granted to an institution or to an individual on condition of rendering service

to any institution there is provision for giving an annual tasdik allowance to compensate for the loss of miscellaneous revenue derived from the Inam

if any at a sum equal to the average net annual miscellaneous revenue. u/s 8 of the Act every person who is lawfully entitled the kudiwaram in an

inam land immediately before the appointed day, whether such person is an inamdar or not, is as and from the appointed day entitled to ryotwari

patta in respect of the land. A distinction it made in the cases of lands granted as iruvaram minor inam for the support or maintenance of religious

institutions or for the purpose of charity or service connected with the religious institutions or other religious charities. In the view we are taking it is

unnecessary to go into greater details.

We shall now take up the detention that at any rate the sections in the three impugned Acts providing for a tenant securing extinguishment and

discharge of arrears of rent at his option by depositing a fraction of the rent in arrears even in cases where the arrears have merged in decrees, are

void as lacking legislative competency and violative of constitutional guarantees. The provision assailed is found in section 56 of Madras Act XXVI

of 1963 (Inam Estates Abolition Act) section 43 of Madras Act XXVII of 1963 (Leasehold, Estates Abolition Act) and section 41 of Madras Act

XXX of 1963 (Minor Iname Abolition Act). It may be remembered that the Inam Estates Abolition Act covers not only the whole inam village

grants which were made estates under Madras Act XVIII of 1936 and what are called Explanation estates, that is, estates which were deemed to

be covered by the 1936 Amendment by the 1945 amendment of the Estates Land Act, but also part village inams and Pudukkottai inams. The

''existing inam estates'' had been subjected to rent reduction under the Madras Estates Land (Reduction of Rent) Act, 1947 (XXX of 1947). The

impugned provision in the Inam Estates Abolition Act is the second proviso to section 56(1) in respect of ''existing inam estates'' which runs thus:

Provided further that where the ryot--

(a) has paid before the notified date or pays within two years of that date, or

(b) where the rate of rent for the land has not been fixed under the Madras Estates Land (Reduction of Rent) Act, 1947 (Madras Act XXX of

1947) before the notified date pays within two years of the dade on which such rates of rent are fixed under this Act, the rent due for the fasli years

1356 and 1357 and any interest payable thereon together with any costs, which may have been decreed then, all arrears of rent due from such ryot

in respect at all prior fasli years, including interest and costs, if any, shall be deemed to have been completely discharged;

Explanation--Any amount collected by the Government on behalf of the landholder as rent from the ryots in excess of the rent determined under

the Madras Estates Land (Reduction of Rent) Art. 1947 (Madras Act XXX of 1947) and paid to the landholder shall, for the purposes of this

sub-section, be deemed to be an amount collected by the landholder.

Section 56(3) provides for discharge of arrears of rent in certain cases in regard to ''new inam estates'', that is, Pudukkottai inams and part village

inam estates, and is given effect at once. Section 56 (3) reads:

(i) Notwithstanding anything con stained in this Act, in the care of a new inam estate, all areas of rent any able by a ryot to a landholder in respect

of any land in such estate and outstanding on the date of publication of this Act in Fort St. George Gazette shall, to the extent to which such arrears

are in excess of the rent due for three fasli years in respect of that land, be deemed to be discharged whether or net a decree has bean obtained

therefor, if the ryot pays to the landholder the arrears of rent due for a period of any three fasli years;

(ii) In any suit or proceeding for the recovery of any arrears of rent referred to in clause (i) the Court or authority concerned shall, upon deposit in

the Court or before the authority or upon proof by the ryot of the payment, of arrears of such rent for three fasli years, dismiss the suit or

proceeding;

(iii) If before the date of publication of this Act in the Fort St. George Gazette any decree or order has been passed in any suit or proceeding for

the recovery of any arrears of rent due from a ryot; which is inconsistent with the provisions of this sub-section, the Court or authority concerned

shall upon deposit in the Court or before the authority or upon proof of the payment, of the arrears of rent due from the ryot for three fasli years

and on the application of any person affected by such decree or order, whether or not he was a party thereto, vacate the decree or order:

Provided that nothing contained in this subsection shall apply to any suit or proceeding in which the decree or order has been satisfied in fell, before

the date of publication of this Act in the Fort St. George Gazette,

(vi)......

Explanation.-For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that the payment or deposit, of arrears of rent for three fasli years referred to in this

sub-section shall be payment or deposit made after the date of publication of the Act in the Fort St. George Gazette.

The corresponding provision extinguishing arrears under the Miner Inams Act, section 41, runs thus:-

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in the case of a minor inam all arrears of rent payable by a person to an inamdar in respect of

any land in such inam and outstanding on the appointed day shall, to the extent to which such arrears are in excess of the rent due for three fasli

years in respect of that land, be deemed to be discharged whether or not a decree has been obtained therefor if such person pays to the inamdar

the arrears of rent due for a period of any three fasli years.

(2) In any suit or proceeding for the recovery of any arrears of rent referred to in Sub-S. (1) the Court or authority concerned shall, upon the

deposit in the Court or before the authority or upon proof by the ryot of the payment, of arrears of such rent for three fasli years, dismiss the suit or

proceeding.

(3) If before the appointed day any decree or order has been passed in any suit or proceeding for the recovery of any arrears of rent due from a

ryot, which is inconsistent wite the provisions of this section, the Court or authority concerned shall, upon deposit in the Court or before the

authority, or upon proof of the payment, of the arrears of rent due from the ryot for any three fasli years and on the application of any person

affected by such decree or order whether or not he was a party thereto, vacate the decree or order;

Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply to any suit or proceeding in which the decree or order has been satisfied in full, before

the appointed day.

(4)......

Explanation : For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that the payment, or deposit of arrears of rent for three fasli years referred to in this

section shall be payment or deposit made after the appointed day.

The appointed day under the Minor Inams Act is the date which the Government appoints by notification as the one on which the Act shall

come into force. The provisions in the Leaseholds Abolition Act, S. 43 it identical with the provisions in the Minor Inams Act.

It is contended for the petitioners that the prevision for extinguishing the arrears is on to face of it a deprivation of property and has no place in

any scheme of agrarian worms. The provision is challenged as beyond the legislative competence of the State and as one wholly unrelated to the

scheme of the Act in question. It is pointed out that With reference to several of the ''new inam estates'' the ryots had deliberately withheld the rents

contending that the properties were estates coming under the Rent Reduction Act and the landlords had to institute proceedings and secure

declarations that they were not estates at all under the Estate Land Act. In Writ Petition No. 1552 of 1965, the present first petitioner had

instituted a suit for declaration that the property was not an estate within the meaning of the Rent Reduction Act, and the proceedings initiated by

the State under the said Act were ultra vires. The State supported by several tenants opposed the claim and on the present petitioner succeeding in

securing a declaration in the suit that the suit village was not an estate to which the Rent Reduction Act applied, the State came up in appeal to this

Court in A.S. No. 566 of 1955. The Court on the 5th of January, 1959 upheld the decision of the trial Court, accepting the contention of the

present petitioner that it was not an estate at all under the Estates Land Act even after the Amendment Acts 1936 and 1945. The petitioners

subsequently instituted about 34 suits and obtained decrees for amounts totalling Rs. 62,471-75 P. There are suits pending for arrears totalling

about Rs. 4,188 and the arrears in respect of which suits have not been filed exceed Rs. 23,000. Many of the decrees obtained, it is stated, are

pending execution. It is stated that there are several other inamdars in similar position. The Argument is that the provision for wiping of arrears

cannot fall under Entry 43 of List III and it is a case of deprivation of money, without compensation.

Considerable reliance was placed by learned Counsel for invalidating provision, on the decision of the Supreme Court in The State of Bihar

Vs. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga and Others, . In that case the Supreme Court has Struck down two of the provisions of

the Bihar Land Reforms Act and one of the provisions, S. 4(6), related to arrears, of rent. By that provision all arrears of rent including royalties

aid all cesses together with interfere, if any, due thereon for any period prior to the Vesting of the estate in the State which were recoverable in

respect of the estates or tenures of the proprietors or tenure-holders and the recovery of which was not barred by any law of limitation, vested in

the State and were made recoverable by the State. Fifty per cant of the arrears of rent was made re-payable to the proprietor along with

compensation, that is, the State took over all the arrears and decided to refund 50 per cent, of the arrears and forfeit the rest to itself. It is the

invalidity of this provision that was in question in The State of Bihar Vs. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga and Others, and this

question was considered independently of the validity of the acquisition of estates. Mahajan, J., (as he then was) held that the provisions stood on

the same footing as other debts due to Zamindars or other movable properties of the Zamindars which it was not the object of the Act to acquire

observing that the only purpose of acquisition of the arrears was to raise revenues to pay compensation to some of the Zamindars whoso estates

were taken, but that purpose did not fall within any definition however wide of the phrase ''public purpose''. The law to that extent was therefore

unconstitutional. Mukherjee, J. (as he then was), invalidating the prevision observed at page 960:

On the face of it the legislative provision purports to have been made in exercise of the powers conferred on the State Legislature under Entry 36

of List II and Entry 42 of List III of the Sch. VII of the Constitution. In my opinion, this is a mere device or pretence and the real object which the

legislation intended to accomplish is to deprive a msn of his money which is not ordinarily a subject-matter of acquisition, In exercise of what are

known as power of eminent domain by the State without giving him anything in exchange and under the guise of acting under Entry 42 of List III,

the Legislature has in truth and substance evaded and nullified its provisions altogether.

At page 962, the learned Judge further observed:

Stripped of all disguise, the not result of the impugned provision is that it would be open to the State Government to appropriate to itself half the

arrears of rent due to the landlord prior to the date of the acquisition without giving him any compensation, whatsoever.

When it was contended on behalf of the State that the provision was incidental to the primary object of the Act and could be maintained as

essential in legislation for land tenure coming under Entry 18 in List II. Das, J. (as he then was) observed at page 972:

Further, the impugned Act purports to acquire all arrears of rent and a law for acquisition of the arrears of rent cannot possibly be said to be a law

with respect to matters specified in Entry 18 in List II for it cannot be Supposed to be a law relating to the collection of rent within the meaning of

that entry.

Dealing with the argument of the Attorney-General that legislation under Entry 42 can also lay down principles that would lead to the non-

payment of any compensation and the reliance by the Attorney-General on The State of Bihar Vs. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of

Darbhanga and Others, Chandrasekhara Aiyar, J., observed at page 1010 :

There is nothing in AIR 1941 16 (Federal Court) that supports the argument. It was there held that under the head ''payment of rent'' there could

be legislation providing for remission of rent. Payment of rent is not a legal obligation of every tenure and the Legislature can enact that under

certain circumstances or conditions there shall be remission of rent. But as regards compensation for State acquisition, its payment is a primary

requisite universally recognised by law. This is the essential distinction to remember when we seek to apply the case quoted.

Proceeding the learned Judge observed with reference to the vesting of arrears of rent:

any public purpose in taking them over it conspicuous by its absence. It is fairly obvious that resort was had to the arrears either for augmenting the

financial resources of the State or for paying compensation to the smaller proprietors out of this particular Item of acquisition. (Page 1014).

But there is vital distinction between the provision in the Bihar Land Reforms Act which was struck down by the Supreme Court is

unconstitutional and the provision relating to arrears of rent in the impugned Acts. Here the arrears of rent do not vest in the State. There is no

question here of acquisition of arrears of rents by the State whether they have merged in decrees or not as In the Bihar Act.

Apart from the fact that after the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution even the question of public purpose which was considered by some of

the learned Judges in the AIR 1941 16 (Federal Court) to be justiciable is no longer open to judicial scrutiny where Art. 31-A applies, this is not a

case, of the State to any extent benefiting by the arrears. Two of the learned Judges who formed the majority in the AIR 1941 16 (Federal Court)

, base their decision regarding the invalidity of the provisions in respect of arrears of rent mainly on the ground that there was no public purpose

behind that acquisition. In this connection we have to refer to Art. 31-A(2-A) introduced by the Fourth Amendment:

Where a law does not provide for the transfer of the ownership or right to possession of any property to the State or to a corporation owned or

controlled by the State, it shall not be deemed to provide for the compulsory acquisition or requisitioning of property, notwithstanding that it

deprives any person of his property.

It follows that there is no question of acquisition of the arrears of rents for the impugned Section in the Acts to come under Art. 31(2).

Now the field of legislation under Entry 18 of List II, covers relation of landlord and tenant and the collection of rents. There is no reason to

limit the content of the Entry, particularly the words ""the collection of rents"". It can well include remission of rents. It was observed by Gwyer, C.J.,

in the Federal Court in The State of Bihar Vs. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga and Others, , with reference to Entry 21 of the

Provincial List corresponding to the present Entry 18:

The general descriptive words in Item No. 21, include ''the collection of rents'' ; and if a Provincial Legislature can legislate with respect to the

collection of rent, it must also have power to legislate with respect to any limitation on the power of a landlord to collect rents, that is to say, with

respect to the remission of rents as well as to their collection.

Clearly the impugned provision is within the legislative competence of the State and no question of colourable legislation can arise. Though the

provision may be severable, it cannot be said to be unrelated to the object or the scheme of the legislation. The provision provides ameliorative

relief to the agrarian population in the villages. It must be noted that the tenants do not get automatic discharge of all arrears due by them. An

option is given to them and if they want to claim the benefits of the measure, they are bound to pay a portion of the rent in arrears. A period is fixed

for the payment and the exercise of the option. May be that the inamdars had obtained decrees ; but the tenants have to an extent to pay the costs

incurred by the inamdars, if they seek to avail themselves of the provision for scaling down the arrears of rent. It is in one sense beneficial to the

parties concerned ; the burden of the previous arrears having been discharged, one may expect the cultivator to apply himself to the land without

further worry. The bulk of the tenants are generally tardy in the payment of rents and when once the rents fall into arrears the tenants find it difficult

to pay the current rent in full while liquidating the arrears even in part. So while a part of the arrears is cleared the current rant falls into arrear. And

as for the landlord it is common knowledge that his difficulties start with securing a decree Endless execution proceedings have to be taken by the

landlord before he is able to realise his dues and he saves the costs and tribulation of execution proceedings and uncertainties of realisation of the

full amounts by providing for partial discharge on ready payment of a portion. It may be that in many cases the provision gives a shattering blow to

the landlord''s economy.

But there can be no doubt that any scheme of agrarian reforms and bettering of the conditions of the agriculturists who work on the land can

properly envisage lightening the burden on them of accumulated arrears of rent. Provisions in this regard are legitimately ancillary to land reforms

and get integrated with the core of necessary agrarian legislation. Also Art. 31-A covers not only legislation for the acquisition by the State of any

estate or of any right therein, but also legislation for the extinguishment or modification of any rights in estates. In Gangadharrao Narayanrao

Majumdar Vs. The State of Bombay and Another, , a case arising under the Bombay Personal Inams Abolition Act, 1953, when it Was

contended that the right of the inamdar to appropriate to himself a part of the full assessment which was left over after he had paid the quit rent to

the Government is not a right in an estate, Wanchoo, J., speaking for the Court observed:

This contention also has no force. Inams being estates, the right of the inamdar to retain part of the full assessment over and above the quit rent

payable to the Government arises because he holds the inam estate. The right therefore can be nothing more than a right in an estate.

Similarly, here the arrears arise and are due to the inamdars in relation to the inam estates which they hold. In Ranjit Singh and Others Vs. State of

Punjab and Others, the question was, whether the provisions of a law for the transfer of the village common land owned by the proprietors, to

Village Panchayat for the purpose of management in the manner provided and the conferring of proprietary rights on non-proprietors in respect of

lands included within the boundaries of the village site was ultra vires Art. 31 as no compensation was payable and whether the law was protected

by Art. 31-A. After stating that the view of the Supreme Court was in favour of giving large and liberal meaning to the term ''estate, rights in an

estate,'' and ""extinguishment and modification of such rights"" in Art. 31-A, it is observed by Hidayatullah, J., speaking for the Court:

The scheme of rural development today envisages not only equitable distribution of land so that there is no undue imbalance in society resulting in a

landless class on the one hand and a concentration of land in the hands of a few, on the other, but envisages also the raising of economic standards

and bettering rural health and social conditions......

Reference may be made, while emphasising that legislation relating to collection of rents can be integrally connected with any scheme of agrarian

reforms and may be necessary for affecting agrarian reforms, to the observations of Gajendragadkar, C.J., in Sajjan Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan,

Thus, it would be seen that the genesis of the amendments made by Parliament in 1951 by adding Arts. 31-A and 31-B to the Constitution, clearly

is to assist the State Legislatures in the country to give effect to the economic policy in which the party in power passionately believe to bring about

such needed reform. It is with the same object the second amendment was made by Parliament in 1955, and as we have just indicated, the object

underlying the amendment made by the impugned Act (Seventeenth Amendment) Act is also the same. Parliament desires that agrarian reform in a

broad and comprehensive sense must be introduced in the interests of a very large Section of Indian citizens who live in villages and whose financial

prospects are integrally connected with the pursuit of progressive agrarian policy.

In our view, it is needless to labour on this aspect of the matter further for upholding the validity of the provisions for writing off arrears, as the

unreported decision of this Court in Raja Rao Suguna Kumaran v. State of Madras C.M.P. Nos. 7812, 11820 of 1950, etc., referred to by

learned Counsel for the petitioners in another context is a direct decision on the point with reference to similar provision found in the Madras

Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948. As stated at the beginning, the three impugned Acts follow the pattern of the Estates

Abolition Act (XXVI of 1948). The second proviso to S. 55(1) of the Act (XXVI of 1948) runs thus:

Provided further that where the ryot-

(a) has paid before the notified date or pays within two years of that date, or

(b) where the rate of rent for the land has not been fixed under the Madras Estates land (Reduction of Rent) Act, 1947, before the notified date,

pays within two years of the date on which such rates of rent are fixed under that Act, the rent due for the fasli years 1356 and 1357 and any

interest payable thereon together with any costs which may have been decreed, then, all arrears of rent due from such ryot in respect of all prior

fasli years, including interest and costs, if any, shall be deemed to have been completely discharged.

In the case cited, taking inspiration from the decision of the Supreme Court in the The State of Bihar Vs. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of

Darbhanga and Others, , it was argued before Rajamannar, C.J., andVenkatarama Ayyar, J. that the above provision in S. 55 under which on

payment of rent due for fasli 1356 and 1357 and the interest due thereon and costs if any decreed all prior arrears stood discharged, was

unconstitutional. Overruling the argument the learned Chief Justice observed:

Obviously he (Counsel for the petitioners) could not say that the arrears so wiped away were being acquired by the Government. So far as I

understand him, his contention evidently was that the Legislature was not competent to enact such a provision. This ground is not open to the

learned Counsel in view of the decision of the Federal Court in United Provinces v. Atiqua Begum (1940) F.C.R. 110 : 53 L.W. 397, in which a

similar provision was held to fall within the scope of Entry 21 in List II of Schedule VII of the Government of India Act which included ""land, that is

to say, rights in or over land, land tenures, including the relation of landlord and tenant, and the collection of rent."" In that case the United Provinces

Government directed a remission of the rents payable by tenants to their landlords in view of an unprecedented fall in the prices of agricultural

produce. This remission was declared by the High Court unauthorised and inoperative. So in 1938 the Legislature passed an Act called the

Regularisation of Remission Act which precluded any question as to the validity of the orders of remission being raised in Courts. This Act was

attacked as ultra vires of the Legislature and that it was not within the competence of the Provincial Legislature. It was held by the Federal Court

that the impugned Act was legislation with respect to the ""collection of rents"" within the meaning of Entry 21 of List II ...... I have no doubt that

legislation with respect to the remission of rents is legislation with respect to a matter included in Item 21.

This decision in our view is a complete answer to the contention of Counsel as to want of legislative competence for the impugned provisions.

We have already indicated that the legislation fulfils the requirement of Article 31-A(1)(a). We have held that Act XXVI of 1963, Act XXVII

of 1963 and Act XXX of 1963 fall under the expression ''estate'' in Article 31-A. We, therefore, conclude that the three impugned Acts are fully

covered by Article 31-A of the Constitution and are protected from attack against their constitutionality on the score of any of the provisions of the

Acts being violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution. In Gangadharrao Narayanrao

Majumdar Vs. The State of Bombay and Another, , it to stated:

It is true that by sub-section (5) of section 17 no compensation is to be paid for the loss to the inamdar of what he used to get because of the

difference between the quit-rent and the full assessment. It is however clear that Article 31-A saves the Act from any attack under Article 31

which is the only Article providing for compensation.

It follows that the validity of the Acts cannot be questioned even on the ground that no compensation whatsoever has been provided for the

acquisition of certain specific interests.

On this conclusion strictly speaking it is unnecessary to have any elaborate survey of the provisions of the Acts and examine whether and, if so

to what extent they are violative of Articles 14 and 31 of the Constitution. However, having regard to the learned arguments, and the scathing

criticisms of the Acts from Counsel for the inamdars we shall briefly refer to the more impressive of them, with reference to the Inam Estates

Abolition Act. The same would cover the corresponding provisions in the other Act except as regards the determination of the total amount of the

compensation. Our attention is drawn in particular to section 30(1) of the Act by which the ryotwari assessment imposed on all lands in an inam

estate in respect of which any person is entitled to ryotwari patta u/s 11, is excluded in determining the basic annual sum. It is contended that

private lands are indisputably properties in which the full proprietorship is vested in the inamdar and by defining private lands in a manner totally

unrelated to the inam tenure as has obtained in these parts and the normal mode of enjoyment of the land, securing of ryotwari pattas under the Act

by the landholder is made extremely difficult. The conditions requisite for securing a ryotwari patta, it is pointed, cannot ordinarily be expected to

be complied with, as there have been statutes operating during the relevant period which would make it impossible for the inamdar to comply with

the requirement as to personal cultivation for securing ryotwari patta. Under the Act, even when it is established that certain lands are private lands

of the landholder, he will not be entitled to a ryotwari patta, unless it is proved that the lands have been cultivated by the landholder himself with his

own servants or hired labour in the ordinary course of husbandry for a continuous period of three years within a period of 12 years immediately

before the first day of April, 1960. The practice of a landholder generally has been to grant short term lease of private lands for fixed payments of

grain or cash. Occasionally the rent may be a share of the produce. In regard to religious, educational and charitable institutions, short term leases

is the normal method of enjoying the income from private land. Where the inamdar happens to be a woman, the only convenient mode of

enjoyment is to grant short term lease. The Madras Tenants and Ryots Protection Act (XXIV of 1949), the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection

Act (XXV of 1955) and similar tenancy legislations have during the relevant period made it impossible for the proprietor to secure possession of

his private lands for personal cultivation as now required under the Act. Counsel pointed out that if by reason of the stringent provision of section 9

and the requirements of section 11, a landholder is unable to secure ryotwari patta, he will not only be losing the land but also by reason of section

30(1) have no compensation for the land in question, the assessment of the land getting deducted from the basic annual sum. This it is submitted, is

nothing but naked confiscation by the device of definition. But the argument in the ultimate goes to the question of adequacy of compensation. One

of the elements that should properly be considered and provided for in fixing the compensation is omitted, resulting in inadequacy of the

compensation.

It is further urged that the basis of compensation, the ryotwari demand on ryotwari assessment after settlement to be carried out hereafter, is

not a principle on which an estate yielding present income can be valued for the purpose of compensation. It is submitted that the ryotwari demand

is the opposite of income being an outgoing and cannot therefore be taken as the basis for ascertaining the basic amount for capitalisation. We are

unable to appreciate why the ryotwari assessment cannot form the basis for determining the basic annual sum. It may be that the ryotwari

assessment is in the nature of tax. But the assessment under the ryotwari settlement is fixed with reference to the quality of the soil and on the

principle that the land revenue should represent a fixed proportion of the net and not of the gross produce. The settlement procedure is an

elaborate one and the calculation of the produce and the assessment once made continues in force for a number of years. Ultimately, no doubt, the

ryotwari demand is an outgoing, but essentially it is a fraction of the income, may be an insignificant portion of the gross produce. Taking the

ryotwari demand as a basis may adversely affect the quantum of compensation, but certainly the process of ascertaining the basic annual sum by

reference to the ryotwari demand is not so unrelated to the subject that it cannot be regarded as a relevant principle on which compensation may

be determined.

Attack is then made on the manner of computation of net miscellaneous revenue which is a component of the basic annual sum. By section 27

the net annual miscellaneous revenue is the average of the net annual income derived by the Government from the miscellaneous sources during the

fasli year commencing on the notified date, if it was notified on the 1st of July, or on 1st of July immediately succeeding the notified date, if such

date was not the 1st day of July and the next fasli year in case the ryotwari settlement is effected in that year or the next two fasli years in other

cases. Learned Counsel submits that unmasked here is a provision which excludes altogether the actual income which has been derived from the

property by the inamdar and introduces artificial standards for determining the income or profits. It is submitted that the Government may or may

not exploit the available resources and derive the normal miscellaneous income that can be had. If on account of mismanagement or for other

reasons the Government does not derive income from these sources, the proprietor would not have any compensation under this head. The

submission is that these masked provisions aimed at confiscation of private property, and it is said that the relevant provisions neither lay down nor

are based on any principle of compensation. It is contended that there is no principle for the ascertainment of compensation which the law can

recognise as such. But, here again, it is not a question of principle that is being challenged in reality. The sum and substance of the charge is in the

apprehension that the quantum of compensation that will be ultimately assessed on the principle may be too low.

This feature in the provision relating to compensation, it is stated, affects seriously and to a considerable degree, cases where the miscellaneous

income in the main source as in the case of the petitioners in Writ Petitions Nos. 1790 and 2130 of 1965. Writ Petition No. 1790 of 1965 relates

to Inam Chetty Chevadi Jaghir in Salem Taluk, Salem District. This is claimed to be a part inam village and the Government have issued a

memorandum 28th February, 1950 that the lands in the village are not ryoti lands, and that no action under the Rent Reduction Act is called for.

There are rich magnesite mines in the inam and the inam was purchased by the Magnesite Corporation of India for a sum of Rs. 10 lakhs in view of

the mineral wealth. Under the scheme sanctioned by the High Court in Company petition No. 46 of 1962 the entire property is vested in the

petitioner, Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Limited and the mining operations are being carried on under two agreements. Besides the mines, it is stated

that there is only a mango those but there are large extent of waste lands and house sites capable of fetching lakhs of rupees. In Writ Petition No.

2130 of 1965 the inam involved is one of the five hill estates situated in the Kalroyan Hills. The inams are Jagirs granted to reward the Jagirdars for

service rendered to the former Government and the income of the Jagirs is noted as having been derived by the imposition of tax on ploughs at Rs.

1-4-0 per plough, and poll tax. The forests are rich in timber and other forest produce. Besides, considerable income is derived from sandalwood.

The petitioner would question whether at all the property could be considered to be an income.

In our view, the method by which the miscellaneous income from the inam has to be ascertained cannot be said to be so artificial and divorced

from reality as to be termed not a principle for ascertainment of compensation. Here again the attack ultimately resolved in self into a question of

adequacy of compensation. Besides in our view the apprehensions that the available resources of miscellaneous revenue may not be exploited by

the State during the relevant period to the detriment of the landholder are groundless. Under S. 34 of the Act there is provision for notice to the

landholder and reasonable opportunity for making his representation in writing or orally at the time of determination of the basic annual sum and the

total of compensation payable. The net annual miscellaneous revenue under S. 27 of the Act shall be the average of the net annual income derived

by the Government during the prescribed period. The legislature does not contemplate the Government to stop earning income from the

miscellaneous sources immediately after taking over, even though income was being derived prior to the notified date by the landholder and was

derivable even after the date in the normal course. The estate is vested in the Government with all its resources and the exercise of the power in the

matter of exploiting the available resources which had been yielding income will benefit the landholder by the provisions of the statute. In such

circumstances, it may properly be contended that the word ''derive'' should be construed at imposing a duty on the Government to derive an

income from the sources which have been yielding income to the landholder prior to the vesting of the estate in the Government. The landholder

that been conferred a right by the Act to have the net income included in the basic annual sum for the computation of compensation payable to him.

Reference in this connection may be made to the observations of Lord Cairns in Federic Guilder Julius v. The Lord Bishop of Oxford (1880) L.R.

5 A.C. 214 at 222 and 223 in discussing the words ""it shall be lawful.

....But there may be something in the nature of the thing empowered to be done, something in the object for which it is to be done, something in the

conditions under which it is to be done, something in the title of the persons for whose benefit the power is to be exercised which may couple the

power with a duty, and make it the duty of the person in whom the power is reposed, to exercise that power when called upon to do so.

Lord Blackburn remarks in the same case at page 241:

If the object for which the power is conferred is for the purpose of enforcing a right, there may be a duty cast on the donee of the power to

exercise it for the benefit of those who have that right, when required on their behalf. Where there is such a duty, it is not inaccurate to say that the

words conferring the power are equivalent to saying that the donee must exercise it.

In the writ petitions filed by religious institutions, temples and mutts, churches and educational and charitable institutions, the provision for

payment of tasdik allowance under S. 32 annually instead of payment of compensation in a lump sum is questioned as a denial of compensation, it

is further pointed that S. 32(2) ignores the average income derived by the institution immediately before the notified date for the purpose of fixing

the allowance and making up deficiencies. The average annual net income derived by the institution during the five completed fasli years

immediately preceding fasli years 1357 or during that portion of those fasli years in which the inam estate or part was held by the institution, is

adopted. It is stated that during the period the prices of grain and agricultural produce were comparatively low. On behalf of these institutions, it is

stated that the annual allowance provided by the Act can hardly meet their requirements. The value of paddy at the current rates, it is stated, is

about Rs. 23 per kalam while the value of paddy in the years immediately preceding fasli 1357 was about Rs. 7 per kalam. The crushing blow

suffered by religious and charitable institutions is ill nitrated by reference to Writ Petitions Nos. 2081 and 3923 of 1965. Writ Petition No. 2081 of

1965 relates to the village of Mangal belonging to the Mantrapureeswaraswami Temple, Kovilur, Thanjavour District, the tenure as to which was

the subject of consideration by the Judicial Committee in Naina Pillai Marakayar v. Ramanathan Chettiar ILR 47 Mad. 337 : 19 L.W. 259 (P.C.).

The judicial Committee held in that case that the grant was of all the lands in the village of Mangal including melwaram and kudiwaram and the

occupancy rights over the lands vested in the temple. The Judicial Committee has noticed that the temple must have derived from the village under

its original Sannad an income sufficient for the maintenance of pooja worship at the temple, and that it must have obtained that income from the

cultivation of the village lands either by its servant or by its tenants. It is submitted that the Madras Rent Reduction Act (XXX of 1947) was not

applied to the village, as all the lands in the village were recognised as the private lands of the institution. Writ Petition No. 3929 of 1965 relates to

the Inam village of Sellur belonging to Sri Navaneetheswaraswami temple, Sikkil. The temple was the ekabogam mirasdar of the village and

entitled to full occupancy and cultivation rights in the whole of the village lands. From about the year 1917, the temple was able to take possession

of all the lands and carry on personal cultivation with pannai servants and hired labour till departmental instructions were issued by the Hindu

Religious Endowments Board that the lands should be leased out. In 1945-46, about 40 velies in extent of cultivable lands were leased out for a

period of three years annually, the lease expiring in April, 1948 or April, 1949. The lessees on the expiry of the lease period claimed occupancy

rights under S. 8(5) of the Madras Estates Land Act as amended by the Madras Act XVIII of 1936 and the question came up for consideration

before the Full Bench in Sri Navaneethaswaraswami Devasthanam Vs. P.Swaminatha Pillai, . The Full Bench held that where before 31st

October, 1946, a landholder has granted a lease of land situated in a village referred to in S. 8(5) of the Madras Estates Land Act for a term which

runs beyond 31st October, 1948, the terms of the lease remain in force even after 31st October, 1948, and the lease does not stand determined

by reason of S. 8(5) and the lessee does not become a ryot and get occupancy rights. It is pointed out that while some of the lessees had

surrendered possession others held on and had to be evicted by process of Court and that for reasons beyond its control, the Devasthanam which

had right to get back possession of all the lands in 1948-49 could not recover actual possession of all the lands on or before 1st July, 1950. It is

contended that the provisions regarding the grant of patta to the inamdars in the impugned Act are such that for no laches on the part of the

Devasthanam it may in the circumstances be deprived of valuable proprietary rights over its lands to the detriment of the Devasthanam''s income.

Here again the question ultimately resolves itself into one of adequacy of compensation. Under S. 3(b) of the Act, the entire inam vests in the

Government and the landholder or any other person whose rights stand transferred under Cl. (b) of S. 3 and are ceased and determined under Cl.

(c) of the Section, is entitled only to such rights and privileges as are recognised or conferred on him by or under the Act. After the land has vested

in the State, the State as the owner has got a right to deal with the property in any proper manner carrying out its professed policy of land reforms

and settling of the land on the cultivator. The provisions of the Act, may fall on the inamdars very harshly in particular cases, and there may be

drastic cut in their income. But the question for consideration eventually by the Court is one of competency of the Legislature to enact the particular

statute.

It is said that the reduction in the income of the religious institutions and Mutts under the provisions of a statute relating to land reforms affects

the fundamental rights of these institutions guaranteed under Arts. 25 and 26 of the Constitution. It is urged that the institutions will not have

sufficient income to maintain themselves and to perform their religious obligations. In our view, it may be an indirect effect, not a necessary

consequence ; certainly it is not the object of the Act even remotely to interfere with religious practices. The guarantee under our Constitution

protects the freedom of religious opinion and also acts done in pursuance of a religion. While the State cannot regulate the religious practices, the

freedom of which is guaranteed by the Constitution except when they run counter to public order, health and morality there is no bar against

statutes which may affect the activities of religious bodies which are economic or commercial in character for the reason that the statutes may affect

the income of the religious bodies. It has been observed by the Supreme Court in The The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras

Vs. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt., , that in certain circumstances the scale of expenses to be incurred in connection with

religious observations would be a matter of administration of property belonging to a religious denomination and can be controlled by secular

authorities in accordance with any law laid down by a competent Legislature. Art. 26 guarantees to religious denominations only rights to acquire

and own property and administer the property in accordance with law, but does not prevent properties belonging to a religious body being

acquired by authority of law.

Learned Counsel contends that the compensation when paid as tasdick allowance is reduced to a mere pension and cannot be considered to

be the just equivalent to the property taken away in which the institutions had absolute proprietary rights. In this connection Maharayal

Mohansinghji Jayasinghji v. The Government of Bombay L.R. 8 I. A. 77 where it was held that the Pensions Act of 1871 applied to grants of

money in respect of or in substitution for some right, privilege, perquisite, or office, was referred to. The Judicial Committee in that case held that

an allowance of money by the Government under an arrangement with plaintiff''s ancestors in lieu of a bulk payment theretofore received by them

fell within the Pensions Act and the Civil Courts could not take cognisance of a suit relating thereto. We do not see how that case has any

relevance to the question at present in issue. Here the statute has provided an annual allowance, a permanent annuity, as compensation for the

acquisition. Considering the nature and character of the property acquired, the purpose of the acquisition and the persons holding the property,

instead of a lump sum payment, provision has been made for yearly allowance. Under S. 32 payment to the institution shall be made so long as the

institution exists. Art. 31 (2) of the Constitution provides that the law providing for acquisition should specify also the manner in which the

compensation is to be given. It may be that the method of payment is open to some objection, we are not pronouncing on its tenability, but we

think it unnecessary to go at any length into the question. The drastic deprivation of the just equivalent by the operation of S. 30(1) of the Act is

illustrated by learned Counsel by reference to Writ Petitions Nos. 2081 and 3929 of 1965 where neither the temple nor the cultivator in

possession may be able to secure pattas under Ss. 9 and 10 of the Act for the private lands leased out and coming under S. 8 (5) of the Madras

Estates Land Act. Pattas in such cases may be granted only under S. 11 of the Act and then by reason of S. 30(1) of the Act the ryotwari

assessment imposed on the lands in question gets excluded in determination of the basic annual sum. The result, it is submitted, is that for large

extents of lands the temple neither secures patta nor compensation for the loss. It may be that particular institutions or individuals are hit hard by the

Act. But that cannot invalidate the Act itself. In the The State of Bihar Vs. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga and Others, ,

Mahajan, J., as he then was remarked:

From the premises that the estates of half a dozen zamindars may be expropriated without payment of compensation, one cannot jump to the

conclusion that the whole of the enactment is a fraud on the Constitution or that all the provisions as to payment of compensation are illusory. At

best they are only illusory in the case of some only of the large body of persons affected by it.

The arguments on behalf of the State is that compensation is determined for the inam estate as a whole and not separately for each of the

interests therein. This is the answer also to the charge, that far vacant house sites in these foams which of late have become very valuable no

compensation is provided. The Act specifies the principles on which and the manner in which compensation should be determined and given for the

inam estate. This is all that is required of a law relating to acquisition of property under Art. 31(2) of the Constitution. In Messrs, Burrakur Coal

Co., Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1961 S.C. 957 at 963, examining the provisions of Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957

(Central) and meeting the argument that though there was provision for payment of compensation, the relevant Section,--S. 13--did not contain

any provision for payment of compensation for mineral rights, while the Explanation to Cl. (a) of Sub-S. (5) of the Act laid down that in computing

compensation for the land the value of the minerals shall not be taken into account, and therefore, the acquisition of mineral right would be

impermissible under Art. 31 (2), Mudholkar, J., observed :

Here compensation is specifically provided for the land which is to be acquired under the Act. The land includes all that lies beneath the surface as

Mr. Das put it all that is ''locked up'' in the land. Parliament has laid down in Sub-S. (5) of S. 13 how the value of this land is to be calculated. The

contention that the provisions made by Parliament for computing the amount of compensation for the land do not take into account the value of the

minerals is in effect a challenge to the adequacy of the compensation payable under the Act. The concluding words of Art. 31(2) preclude such a

challenge being made.

It is remarked:

The learned Attorney-General quite rightly pointed out that S. 13 deals with the whole subject of payment of compensation to the owner or lessee

of the mine for his entire interest in the land including the rights to minerals and even though that Section specially says that the value of the minerals

cannot be taken into account in determining the amount of compensation, the concluding words of Art. 31(2) preclude the petitioners from

challenging the law.

Learned Counsel for the inamdars is no doubt on firm ground where the attack is on S.31 of the Act providing for the determination of the total

compensation in cases not governed by S. 32. Under the impugned Act by S. 31 the total compensation is kept down at certain levels ; it is

determined by multiples of the basic annual sum, slabs are provided for the basic annual sum, the multiplier of the basic annual sum that makes up

the total compensation getting lower and lower as the basic annual sum goes up. Where the basic annual sum does not exceed Rs. 1,000 the total

compensation is 30 times the basic annual sum. Where the annual sum exceeds Rs. 1,000 but does not exceed Rs. 3,000 the multiplier which gives

the total compensation is 25 or the compensation is Rs. 30,000 whichever is greater. The next slab provides for basic annual sums between Rs.

3,000 and Rs. 20,000 and the multiplier is 20 or the compensation is Rs. 75,000 whichever is greater and so on the compensation gets scaled

down. When the basic annual sum exceeds one lakh, the multiplier is 12� or the compensation is Rs. 15 lakhs whichever is greater. This method

of providing for compensation with progressive cuts with the increase in the basic annual sum is clearly discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of

the Constitution where that protection is available. Similar provisions fixing the compensation has been struck down by the Supreme Court

Karimbil Kunhikoman Vs. State of Kerala, and A.P. Krishnasami Naidu etc. Vs. State of Madras, But as the Act is covered by the President''s

assent under Article 31-A the petitioners can have no relief on that ground.

But this conclusion of ours does not preclude the contention that particular properties sought to be covered by Acts XXVI and XXX of 1963

are not inams at all. An argument is developed that though the properties might have been inams on the 26th January, 1950, when the Constitution

came into force, they ceased to be inams even before the impugned Acts came into force. It is submitted that the essential requisite for a property

to be an inam is that with reference to the property there must be a remission of the whole or part of the revenue and that as under the Madras

Inams (Assessment) Act (XL of 1956) full assessment has been levied on inam lands, there was no inam for the Acts to operate upon. It is one

thing to say that the Acts are constitutionally valid with reference to properties which were inams on the 26th of January, 1950; it is quite a different

thing to contend that though the Acts may be constitutionally valid, the properties which are sought to be acquired by the Government as inams are

not inams when the acquisition is made. There can be no doubt that when any property had ceased to be an inam when the relevant Act same into

force, it could not vest in the Government as an inam estate or minor inam as the case may be. But the question cannot be decided in the abstract;

it is a question for consideration in each case whether the particular property has ceased to be an inam by the operation of the Madras Inams

(Assessment) Act. In Bachharam Datta Patil v. Viswanath Pundhik Patil (1956) S.C.J. 721 at 723, the Supreme Court stated:

But it has been argued on behalf of the appellant that it is common ground that the Sanadhi inam lands were once watan property and that once the

property is impressed with the character of the inam lands, they continue to bear that character because the Government have not been authorised

by any law to change their character. No precedent or statutory provisions directly supporting this wide proposition have been brought to our

notice. But our attention was called to the provisions of S. 15 which make it permissible for the Collector to commute the service and relieve the

holder of Watan and his heirs and successors in perpetuity of their liability to perform the service on such conditions as may be agreed upon. If we

have been able correctly to appreciate the argument based upon S. 15, it was sought to be made out that the service in respect of the Watan lands

in question may have been commuted, but even after the commutation of the service the Watan remained and the lands continued to retain the

character of Watan lands. This argument assumes that even upon the service being entirely dispensed with in prepetuity the Watan character of the

land continued. That is begging the question. Further more, clause (1) of S. 15 contemplates commutation ''upon such conditions, whether

consistent with the provisions of this Act or not, as may be agreed upon by the Collector and such holder.'' Thus the conditions to be agreed upon

between the holder of land which was once part of a watan and the Government at the time of the commutation may be of so many varieties that in

some cases the Watan character of the land may be maintained, whereas in others the conditions agreed between the parties may them selves

contemplate the cessation of that character....... It is possible to conceive of a case where the conditions agreed upon provide for the continuance

of the Watan tenure in spite of the fact that the holders have been excused the performance of the customary service. On the other hand, it may be

that there were no conditions agreed between the parties continuing the Watan character of the land after dispensing with the service.

Learned Counsel for the petitioners drew our attention also to a decision of a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court In Vasudevan v. State of

Kerala AIR 1964 Ker. 171. (F.B.), where the Jenmikaran Payment (Abolition) Act, 1960 was held not entitled to the protection afforded by

Article 31-A of the Constitution, as the Travancore Jenmi and Kudiyan (Amendment) Act, 1108 had transferred the ownership of the land from

the jenmi to his kudiyan and had the effect of termination of the jenmikaran''s Janmam right which is included in the expression Restate in Article

31-A.

The consideration of the question raised involves an examination of the nature and character of inam tenure in this part of India inams are or

very remote antiquity and variety in character and it is no easy task to trace their history with anything like precision. Inams fall into two broad

classes, major and minor inams. When the grant is of the whole village it is called a major inam. When the grant is not of a village, but of isolated

fields or blocks of land in a village, or share or shares in a village, that is grant of something less than a village it is known as a minor inam. The

major inams, that is whole inam villages, where the grant was of the melwaram to a person not owning the kudiwaram, were brought into the

definition of ''estate'' even in 1908, under the Estate Land Act, iruwaram grants of whole villages were included under the category of estates.

There was an amendment of the Act in 1945 clarifying the effect of the 1936 amendment, with retrospective effect and since, to be an estate, the

grant must be of a named village or a whole village and if it is of a named village or of a whole village, it does not affect the character of the village

being an estate, if certain lands in the village are reserved for communal or other purposes, such as minor inams. Under the Madras Estates

Abolition Act (XXVI of 1948) is already pointed out inams which were estates prior to the 1936 amendment alone were taken over by the State

in the process of agrarian reforms. The Inams Estates Abolition Act (XXVI of 1963) now impugned covers the the whole inam villages which are

left out of the Estates Abolition Act of 1948, that is what are known as post 1936 estates, and besides, takes in under the definition ''part village

inam estates'' some minor inams. From the category of part village inam villages are excluded grants in inam expressed to be only in terms of

acreage or cawnis or of other local equivalent. Minor inams left out by Madras Act XXVI of 1963 are taken over by the State for effectuating its

policy of agrarian reform under the Minor Inams Abolition Act (XXX of 1963).

In the Law Lexicon by Ramanatha Iyer, ''inam'' is thus defined at page 569:

A gift, a benefaction in general, a gift by a superior to an inferior. In India, and especially in the south, and amongst the Marathas, the term was

especially applied to grants of land hold rent-free, and in hereditary and perpetual occupation, the tenure came in time to be qualified by the

reservation of a portion of the assessable revenue, or by exaction of all proceeds exceeding the intended value of the original assignment; the term

was also vaguely applied to grants of rent-free land, without reference to perpetuity or any specified conditions. The grants are also distinguishable

by their orgin from the ruling authorities, or from the village communities and are again distinguishable by peculiar reservations, or by their being

applicable to different objects.

In Maclean''s Manual of the Administration of the Madras Presidency, Volume III, Glossary, at page 352 inam is explained thus:

Generally a gift from a superior to an inferior. So a grant of land for religions or charitable purposes made by Government sometimes given free,

sometimes with light quit rent or jody. Same as Manyam. Technically a major inam is a whole village or more than one village and a minor inam is

something less than a village.

The word ''inam'' by itself is an Arabic word introduced in India after the Muhammad am conquest, the term used before that being Manyam.

The Hindu Sovereigns were ambitious of distinguishing their reign by the extent add value of the lands alienated by them in inams to the religious

classes and inam grants were made in solemn and impressive manner. In latter days inams came to be granted for numerous miscellaneous

purposes to individuals, particular families or even communities, and the power to make such grants were assumed by petty chiefs, officers of

Government and others. It is found in Blair''s Report on the Operations of the Inam Commission that considerable revenues were thus alienated,

and of such origin are many inams granted by the zamindars, various Faujdars and renters in the Nothern Circars and by numerous Poligars of the

Ceded Districts and in the southern provinces of the Madras Presidency. The Muhammadan rulers continued the practice and added to the inams

and the East India Company also in the earlier years followed the practice. Later when the British administration in a way got settled, their attention

fell on the large sacrifice of the State revenue involved by the inams. There was recognition by the administration of the importance of a general

enquiry into the titles to rent-free lands and enactment of certain laws followed and several orders were issued on the subject. Steps were taken to

prevent diversion of inam from the purpose of which it was granted. Maclean''s Manual of Administration of the Madras Presidency, Volume I, at

page 166, refers to inams, thus:

In the south of India it is applied to the grant by the State (either originally or taking up a grant made by a village community) of the permanent right

in one case to occupy land without paying rent to the State and in another case to collect Government assessment on land. The tenure rent-free

came in time in many cases to be qualified by the reservation of a portion of the assessable revenue, or by the exaction of all proceeds exceeding

the intended value of the original assignments. Such charge was called ''jody'', that is to say, favourable rent or quit rent.

In Baden Powel Land Systems of British India (1822 Edition), Volume 1, it is observed at pages 98 and 99:

Yet another class of tenures arises in connection with the State Revenue administration; and that is when the ruler either excuses an existing

landholder from paying his revenue either wholly or in part or ''alienates'' or assigns the revenue of a certain estate or tract of a country in favour of

some chief, or other person of importance, or to provide funds for some special objects, or to serve as a recompense for services to be rendered.

At first such grants are carefully regulated, are for life only, and strictly kept to their purpose and to the amount fixed. But as matters go on, and the

ruler is a bad or unscrupulous one, his treasury is empty, and he makes such grants to avoid the difficulty of finding a cash salary. The grants

become permanent and hereditary ; they are also issued by officials who have no right to make them; and not only do they then result in landlord

tenures and other curious rights, but are burden to after times, and have furnished a most troublesome legacy to our Government when it found the

revenues eaten up by grantees whose titles were invalid and whose pretensions, though grown old in times of disorder, were inadmissible.

Such grant may have begun with no title to the land but only a right to the Revenue but want of supervision and control has resulted in the grantee

seizing the landed right also.

(Italics are ours).

The Judicial Committee in Lakshmana v. Venkateswarlu ILR 1950 Mad. 567 at 572 : 62 L.W. 684 (P.C.) observe:

Inams in the Presidency of Madras are of two kinds: first, those where the proprietary right in the soil and the right to the Government share of the

revenue derivable from land coalesce in the same individual, and secondly, those where the proprietary or occupancy right is vested in one or more

individuals, whilst the Government share of the revenue has been granted to another (para. 71, Mr. W.T. Blair''s Report on the Operations of the

Inam Commission, dated 30th October, 1869).

An inam holding may be of a field only, or village, or a tract of several villages (Land Systems of British India, by Baden Powell. Vol, III, page

140).

Grants consisting of whole village or more than one village are technically called major inams to distinguish them from minor inams which are grants

of something less than a village.

The first step taken by the British Administration was to exclude inams from the Permanent Settlement Regulation XXV of 1802, and provide

for recognition of the title of the inamdars on actual possession by Regulation XXXI of 1802. The title of the Regulation which is instructive is as

follows:

A regulation for trying the validity of titles of persons holding, or claiming to hold, lands exempted from the payment of revenue under grants not

being Badshahi or Royal grants; and for determination of the amount of the annual assessment to be imposed on lands so held which may be

adjudged to be, or may become liable to the payment of public revenue in the British Territories subject to the Presidency of Fort St. George....

It is unnecessary for our present purpose to refer to the Regulations and Orders that followed. It is sufficient to state that in spite of Regulation

XXXI of 1802, only in 1858 the Inam Commission was established to examine the title to the possession of the inams and to enfranchise them for

a quit rent in lieu of the Government''s right to resume. The Inam Commissioner proceeding in right earnest, made elaborate investigation and

enfranchised and confirmed the grant, that were proved and title deeds were issued in favour of the holders. Act IV of 1862 was passed to

confirm and validate the title deeds given by the Inam Commissioner. Then came the Madras Enfranchised Inams Act IV of 1866 and to clear the

doubts raised by these two Acts and the language of the title deeds issued, Madras Inams Act VIII of 1869 was passed. The Preamble to the Act

and the single Section of the Act set out hereunder have a value in the context of the present discussion.

An Act to prevent doubts as to the true intent and meaning of certain words used in the title-deeds of inams heretofore furnished to inam holders

by the Inam Commissioner of the Madras Presidency and to declare the true intent and meaning of Madras Act IV of 1862 and IV of 1866.

Whereas, under the rules sanctioned by the Local Government in the year 1859, and in the Fort St. George Gazette, 1859, for the adjudication

and settlement of inam lands in the Madras Presidency the Inam Commissioner of the said Presidency is required to furnish inams holders with title

deeds in respect of their inams prepared according to certain forms prescribed by the said Government, and whereas the terms of the title deeds

so prepared appear in many cases to convey a more extensive right than was intended to be given or than could be legally given and whereas it is

apprehended that the terms of the title deeds may be so construed as to affect the rights and interests which other persons may have in lands from

which the inams are derived or drawn, in cases where inam holders do not possess the proprietary right in the soil, but only the right of receiving

the rent or tax payable to Government in respect of the inam lands as transferee of the Government, and it is therefore expedient to remove all

doubts as to the true intent and meaning of the words used in the said title deed : and whereas the Words ''land'' and ''lands'' are used in Madras

Act IV of 1862 and IV of 1866 in connection with inams in a sense not applicable to inams, and it is expedient to explain the true intent and

meaning of such words in the said Acts ; it is enacted as follows:--

Nothing contained in any title deed heretofore issued to any inam holder shall be deemed to define, limit, infringe or destroy the rights of any

description of holders or occupiers of the lands from which any inam is derived or drawn or to affect the interests of any person other than the inam

holder named in the title deed ; and nothing contained in Madras Act IV of 1862 or in Madras Act IV of 1866, shall be deemed to confer on any

inam holder any right to land which he would not otherwise possess.

We may here refer to the two expressions commonly found in regard to land tenures in this State, ''melwaram'' and ''kudiwaram''. Strictly, the

Sovereign''s right to collect a share of the produce from the cultivated land is known by the name melwaram and the share of the ryot or cultivator

is known by the name kudiwaram. Under the ancient land system, the kudiwaram right or cultivator''s right arose from first occupation of land. The

grant of an inam may not and could not touch the cultivator''s right in the land, namely, kudiwaram, except in cases where the grantor was also

holding the cultivator''s interest at the time of the grant. The cultivator will, therefore, be owner of the land and will also be the owner of the revenue

of the land if it was assigned by the Government of the day. While the revenue is not assigned to the owner of the soil himself and the revenue is

granted to somebody other than the owner of the soil, the two interests in the land recognised will be held by two persons ; the person who

receives rents and profits who is the owner of the land and the person who had received assignment of the revenue from the Government. Inam in

such a case is of the revenue only. The Inam Settlement did not settle the question as to whether the inamdar was himself the owner of the land,

and whether the inam comprised both the melwaram and kudiwaram or was only of the melwaram and this feature is brought out in Act VIII of

1869 set out above. The distinct interests in the land are set out thus in Venkatanarasimha Naidu v. Dendamudi Kotayya ILR 20 Mad. 299, 302

The interest in the land is divided into the two main heads of the kudiwaram interest and the melwaram interest, and the holder of the kudiwaram

right, is really a co-owner with him. The kudiwaram right originated in priority of effective occupation and beneficial use of the soil, and the claim of

the Government and the Assignees of Government was always in these parts, to a share in the produce raised by the ryots.

Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Lakshmana v. Venkateswarlu ILR 1950 Mad. 567 : 62 L.W. 682 (P.C.), cite the above passage

with approval and they further remarked that there it no presumption in law that the grant of an inam conveyed only the melwaram, that when the

question of the respective rights of the parties in the land arises for decision, each case should be decided on its own merits without reference to

any presumption in law regarding the existence of those rights in either of the parties, and that this principle will apply also to cases of minor inams.

In Aluru Kondayya and Others Vs. Singaraju Rama Rao and Others, it is observed by the Supreme Court:

Kudiwaram is a Tamil word, which signifies the cultivator''s share in the produce of land as distinguished from the landlord''s share received by him

as rent, which is called ''melwaram''. ''Kudiwarani'' has acquired a secondary meaning ; it means the cultivator''s interest in the land, and

''melwaram'' the landlords interest in the land.

The relationship between melwaramdar and kudiwaramdar has generally been equated to co-ownership. In Diwan Bahadur Srinivasaraghava

Ayyangar''s book ''Progress of the Madras Presidency During the Last Forty Years of British Administration'', it is stated at page 218;

Ancient Hindu Law recognised only two beneficial interests in land viz., (1) that of the Sovereign or his representatives and (2) that of the

cultivators holding the land either individually or as member of a joint family or joint village community neither the Sovereign nor the cultivators had

unlimited proprietary right or full ownership in the modern sense. The Sovereign''s right consisted in his power to collect a share of the produce of

the cultivated lands known by the name of melwaram in the southern districts of the Presidency ; and this melwaram is not rent in the strict

signification of the term. The share of the ryots or cultivators is known by the name kudiwaram ; and by ryots is to be understood cultivators who

occupy, superintend and assist the labour, and who are every where the farmers of the country the creators and payers of the land revenue. The

ryot''s right to land arises from mere occupation, and is not derived from the Sovereign in the manner in which the right of the English tenant under

the Modern English law, derived from his landlord. The relation between the Government and the ryot may perhaps be described as one of co-

partnership. But is certainly not that of a landlord and tenant. The ancient Hindu Law books clearly establish this position.

It is for this reason obviously quit rent is not regarded as burden. In Secretary of State for India v. Raja Sobhonadri Appa Rao ILR (1937)

Mad. 862, 876 : 46 L.W. 7 (P.C.) it is stated:

Now, in the first place, in their Lordships'' opinion it is fallacy to speak of the imposition quit rent in this case a burden. The karnam in lieu of wages

is granted the land, together with an assignment by State of the land revenue of the land subject to the payment of a quit rent, that is to say, he is

not granted a total but only a partial exemption from the land revenue on the land. Far from being a burden tens assignment so limited is part of his

remuneration.

It is apparent from the above discussion that the essence of an inam is that there should be a grant or gift, a favour by the grantor of land of

melwaram also, or gift or giving up of melwaram in favour of the holder of the land, that is the kudiwaramdar. Or it may be an assignment of

melwarm to a person not in occupation of the lands. The grant or assignment of melwaram may be of the entirety of melwaram or, a share or

fraction therein. As observed in Zamindar of Ettayapuram v. Collector of Tirunelveli (1962) M.L.J. 20 at 31 : 75 L.W. 97.

there is no doubt that in order to constitute a giant an inam, the mere use of the expression ''inam'' or ''gift'' is wholly inconclusive, unless along with

that expression, we can find an indication that the grantee was to enjoy the land either totally free of rent or to have partial remission of the

Government share of the revenue.

This imperative requirement of an inam has been affirmed recently by a Division Bench of this Court in Vedaranyeswaraswami Devasthanam v.

State of Madras (1964) 1 Mad. 212, 217 : 76 L.W. 548 where the constitutionality of the Madras Inam (Assessment) Act, 1956, came up for

consideration and was upheld. Ramachandra Iyer, C.J., who delivered the judgment after a detailed consideration of the law relating to inams

observed:

The inam grants were of various extents. Sometimes they comprised of whole villages. Sometimes they were only of parts of villages. The inams

themselves were of different species. Some comprised both of kudiwaram as well as the melwaram interest in the land; others of the melwaram

due to the State alone. But the distinguishing feature of an inam is that it is always accompanied by the grant or remission of the whole or part of the

revenue. Indeed there will be no inam if there is no remission of revenue either in whole or in part, and a mere grant of land subject to payment of

full assessment has never been regarded as an inam. Thus, an inam grant may consist of one or the other of the following; (i) of the melwaram alone

of an entire village; (ii) of both the melwaram and the kudiwaram in an entire village; (iii) of the melwaram alone in a part of a village where such

village is part of a zamindari or a larger inam or a ryotwari area; and (iv) of the melwaram and kudiwaram in part of a village where such village is

part of a zamindari, larger inam or of a ryotwari area. The last two categories of inams are known as minor inams.

The Madras Inams (Assessment) Act, 1956, the effect of which it is said, is to extinguish the inams, purports to be an Act for the levy of full

assessment on certain inam lands in the State of Madras. It received the assent of the President on the 19th February, 1957, and was gazetted on

the 27th of February, 1957. The Act defines ''inam'' as ''inam land'' and as including an assignment of land revenue on inam land, inam land is

defined as meaning any land the grant of which in inam had been made, confirmed or recognised by the Government and including any inam

constituting an estate under the Estates Lands Act. But the definition of Inam lands excludes (i) any estate to which the provisions of the Madras

Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 (Madras Act XXVI of 1948), apply or applied; (ii) any ryoti land, that is to say, any

cultivable land in an estate held by a person other than the landholder ; and (iii) any land granted by a landholder on service tenure either free of

rent or on favourable rates of rent if granted before the passing of the Estate Land Act or free of rent if granted after that date, so long as the

service tenure subsists and communal lands, waste lands and forests etc, as set out in Cls. (iv), (v) and (vi) of S. 2 (d) of the Act. S. 3(1) of the

Act provides for the levy of full assessment on any inam land in a ryotwari village at the rate of assessment set out in the settlement notification for

lands of a similar description and with similar advantage in the same village, and if there are no such lands, in the nearest ryotwari village where

such similar lands exist. On any other inam land it made lawful for the State Government to levy full assessment at the rate of assessment set out in

the settlement notification for the lands of similar description and with similar advantages in the nearest ryotwari village where conditions are

generally similar to those obtaining in the village in which the inam land is situated. There is a proviso to S. 3(1) that in the case of an inam granted

on service tenure which is proved to consist of an assignment of land revenue only no assessment under the sub-section shall be leviable, and the

inamdar shall be liable to pay only the quit rent, jodi, kattubadi or other amounts of a like nature, if any, which he has been paying before the

commencement of that Act. In the case of whole inam villages which became estates under the 1936 amendment the levy of full assessment is in

addition to any quit rent, jodi, etc., payable to the State by the landholder. In the case of other inams, the quit rent, jodi, etc., will be deducted from

the full assessment contemplated under the Act. The Act makes one thing clear that it empowers the State Government to levy full assessment on

certain inam lands. The question for considerations is what is the effect of such levy and whether in such cases the inam gets extinguished and the

property ceases to be an inam. Prima facie it may be said that where the inam grant is only of the assessment, whether whole or partial, if full

assessment is levied, the inam gets extinguished ; it could no more be said to retain its essential inam character. It would tantamount in effect to

resumption of inam. In Idubily Siyyadi Garu v. Visweswara Nissanka 30 I.C. 416, 417 Spencer and Coutts-Trotter, JJ., observed:

Resumption means no more than a taking back of that which was once given, and, therefore, the plaintiffs cannot succeed in evicting the defendants

unless they are able to show that what was originally granted was not merely a slice of the melwaram or landlord''s share of the produce but the

land itself.

The effect of levy of full assessment on inams under Madras Act XL of 1956 also was discussed by this Court in Vedaranyeswaraswami

Devasthanam v. State of Madras ILR 1964 1 Mad. 212 : 76 L.W. 548. Extreme contentions were put forward in the said case. On behalf of the

State it was contended that grantee of an inam, whether it be of melwaram or of melwaram and kudwaram, is the owner of the land, and that an

inam was a grant of the land, and the imposition of assessment a tax. For the inamdars it was contended that the State has no ownership of the soil

of the land, its only right being to receive Rajahbogam from the occupier, that is, the owner of the kudiwaram. On a consideration of the case-law

and a review of the history of inams, it is observed by the learned Chief Justice at page 223:

It follows that an inam by Sovereign authority need not necessarily consist merely of a transfer of its right to revenue but it may also include the

grant of the soil, the extent of the grant depending in each case on the construction of the terms thereof.

Adverting to the incidence of assessment under the Inam Assessment Act, it is stated:

(i) Where the grant is of the entire village whether such grant is of the melwaram alone or of the melwaram and Kudiwaram in such a case the

inamdar will, in addition to his right to collect the melwaram from the ryots, be the owner of all uncultivated and waste lands comprised within the

ambit of the grant. The levy of ryotwari assessment, while it may diminish his net income from the estates, might not affect his ownership of the

uncultivated areas in the village or of mines, etc., if included in the grant.

(ii) Where, the arant is of both the warams in a part of a village, the provisions of the Madras Estates Land Act would not apply in such a case but

the right of the inamdar to collect rents from his tenant will be subject to the tenancy legislations existing for the time being, like the Cultivating

Tenants Protection Act, (XXV of 1955) and the Fair Rent Act XXIV of 1956. It may be that in, such a case the imposition of ryotwari assessment

does not take away all the income that the minor inamdar might get from the tenants but there can be no doubt that a substantial part of the income

must be lost to him by reason of the imposition of the assessment under the impugned legislation.

(iii) Where the grant consists of land revenue alone over a part of a village ; what the grantee obtains is nothing more than his assignor''s right to

collect the assessment ; in such a case the incidence of the tax will practically take away all or most of what the inamdar gets from his ryots.

The minor inam contemplated above under the third head obviously refers to a grantee of land revenue over specified parcels of land not his

own as there is reference to other ryots on the land and it is further observed in the judgment:

In regard to ryotwari lands and the lands in the abolished estates, the assessee owns the land. This can also be said in the case of a minor inamdar

who has got both the melwaram and kudiwaram interest in the land. But a minor inamdar who is only an assessee of the land revenue is not in

possession of the land. His case cannot, therefore, be treated as similar to that of the other owners of land ; the imposition of full ryotwari

assessment in his case would practically take away all that has been granted to him. In their case there was need for a special and less harsh

treatment at the hands of the Legislature. But unfortunately no provision has been made in the statute to treat them differently from others.

For the matter now under consideration we have to make a further categorisation. In the case of grant of part of a village, the part may be a

specified fraction of the village, or a specified number of shares in a village, or it may be defined specified parcels of land or a block of land in a

village. That is the grant may be what is defined as ''part village inam estate'' in the Inam Estates Act, or a grant covered by the Minor Inams Act.

The dichotomy in the concept of beneficial interest in the land between kudiwaram and melwaram can necessarily be the reference to the cultivated

lands in a village and the grantee''s right in the land itself may be open to challenge in the absence of ownership of the land in the grantor only in

respect of cultivated lands. The characteristic of an Indian village is described thus in Sundararaja Iyengar''s Land Tenures, 2nd Edition at page 32:

The central site consisting of the houses of the community, surrounded first by the arable mark consisting of cultivated lands, and then by the

common marks consisting of uncultivated lands, is particularly true of the South Indian Village of the plains. While the village communities of the

west refrained from increasing the arable mark and valued the common mark chiefly for pasture, the common mark in India was always treated as

being liable to be merged in the arable mark. Thus waste lands and virgin forests within the boundaries of a village, though not coming under the

arable mark had a tendency to develop into it at some time or other. The Hindu system of assessment with its share of the produce was not likely

to impede such development, and an extended cultivation increased the revenue to the State.

Whether the grant is of the melwaram or melwaram and kudiwaram, the grantee of a fractional share of a whole village would be the owner of

a share also in all uncultivated and waste lands comprised within the ambit of the grant. Even as in the case of grantee of a whole village, the levy of

ryotwari assessment, while it may diminish the net income of the holder of a share in the village, it might not affect his share of the uncultivated areas

in the village, mines, forests, etc., if they are included in the giant. The incidence of the assessment with reference to the first category, in

Vedaranyeswaraswami Devasthanam case ILR (1964) 1 Mad. 212 : 76 L.W. 548 that is, where the grant is of the entire village, whether such

grant is of the melwaram alone or melwaram and kudiwaram noticed by the learned Chief Justice, will equally apply to the case of the grantee of a

fractional share in the whole village, that is a ''part village inam estate'' holder as defined in the Inam Estates Act. But the third classification for the

purpose of the incidence of the assessment made by the learned Chief Justice will apply to other minor inams under the Minors inams Act, where

the grant is of the melwaram alone even where the grantee is already the owner of the kudiwaram. If the grant is of both the melwaram and

kudiwaram, then though the effect of the Inam Assessment Act may be substantially to affect the grantee''s income, it cannot be said that there is an

extinguishment or taking away all that has been granted. There will still be some part of the favour left, in the kudiwaram. Equally even if, the grant

be of melwaram alone in a village, whether it be a whole village or a part village inam estate it cannot be said at least a general proposition that the

grantee get nothing more than his assignor''s right to collect assessment. The miscellaneous sources of income either in whole or in shares or a

fraction will be there the possibility of having extended cultivation is there, and a vestige of the inam will still be left after full assessment. The

Legislature in defining a ''part village inam estate'' obviously had in mind cases where the villages were held in shares by several grantees. Cases

have come up in Courts where originally then entire village might have been granted as inam but subsequently the grantor might have resumed a half

or 1/3rd or some such fraction of the village and the inam grant was confirmed in respect of the remaining share. One of the several grantees of the

village might have abandoned his share in the village granted as inam and his share resumed by the grantor, There may be a fresh grant of the share

thus resumed and ultimately the village got confirmed on several grantees in shares. There can, however be little doubt that when the grant is, of the

land revenue only over specific revenue fields or parcels of land in a village that is of a grant that would fall under Madras Act XXX of 1963 as a

minor inams, then, whether the grantee is already owner of the kudiwaram or not, the effect of full assessment as provided under the Madras Inams

(Assessment) Act would be to extinguish the grant.

In Vedaranyeswaraswami Devasthanam v. State of Madras ILR (1964) 1 Mad. 212, 231, 232 : 76 L.W. 548 it is observed:

Mr. Vedantachari then contended that at any rate in regard to the minor inams which consist of the melwaram alone, the levy of full ryotwari

assessment, under S. 3 of the Act (The Madras Inams (Assessment) Act) should be regarded as an unreasonable restriction on the inamdars'' right

to enjoy his property and that the legislation should struck down as contravening Art. 19(1)(f). We have already indicated our view that while it

cannot be said that the assessment levied on inams which consist of whole villages or of both the warams in the land is unreasonable the same

cannot be said with respect to an inam of the melwaram alone in part of a village. What it granted in such a case is the Government''s share of the

revenue and what is sought to be levied under S. 3 is practically the same. There is therefore considerable force in the contention advanced by the

learned Counsel. The pith and substance rule referred to above may not apply in such a case as the substance itself will be acquisition of property.

With respect we are in entire agreement with the view thus expressed that in the case of Minor Inams where the grant is of the melwaram alone

the effect of levy under the Inam Assessment Act would be practically to take away the same. In our view, with reference to any particular grant, if

a result of the assessment under the Inam Assessment Act there is nothing of the gift, benefit or favour left, there will be no Inam for the Minor

Inams Act to act upon. It can be said that there is no Inam to vest in the State under S. 3(b) of the Act. The inam is of the land revenue only and

the grant had been taken away by the levy of full assessment. In the decision referred to above up relief could be granted to the Inamdars sinking

down the Act even so far as the Minor Inams were concerned, as that Act was protected by the assent of the President under Art. 31-A and it

was the validity of the assessment under the Act that was then in question. Now we are concerned with the effect of the assessment validly made,

on the subsequent character of the property.

On behalf of the State reliance was placed on the aforesaid decision V. Sesha Sarma Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Another, Andh. Pra.

461 at 464 and the decision in Sesha Sarma v. State of A.P. The former decision far from being of any help to the State as pointed out above in

fact supports the petitioners. The latter case wherein the validity of the Andhra Inams (Assessment) Act came up for consideration cannot also be

of any assistance to the State as in that case grants which were of land revenue alone were excluded from the operation of the Act. Satyanarayana

Raju, J., (as he then was) delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed:

It is then argued that the effect of levying full assessment is to convert the petitioner''s Inamland to ryotwari and has the effect of resumption of the

Inam. We cannot accede to this contention. Where the grant is of land revenue alone, resumption has no effect on land and interference therewith

is not at all intended. The only effect of resumption is to impose full assessment on land which was till then revenue free, either wholly or partially,

and classify it under the head of ryotwari.

The Act does not infringe any right to property and there has been no cancellation of the grant. There is no putting an end to the grant and the Act

specifically excludes cases where the grant was of the land revenue alone. The second proviso to section 3 saves all grant of land revenues and

makes the Act applicable only to cases where the grant was of the land.

But the applicability of the impugned Acts to the Inams in question cannot be conveniently investigated in the present writ proceedings. The

question will have to be determined with reference to the terms of the grants; the extent of the grant has to be ascertained by reference to the

relevant materials. Section 5 of Madras Act XXXI of 1963 makes special provision for determination of the question whether any non-ryotwari

area is or is not an ''existing inam estate'' or ''part village inam estate'' or a minor inam or whole inam village in Pudukkottai. It is stated at the Bar

that in most of the cases now before us the parties have applied under the provisions of the said Act for determination of the character of the inams

respectively held by them. It is needless to point out that the Tribunal constituted under the Act will be entitled to decide that a particular property

is neither an ''existing inam estate'' nor a ''part village inam estate'' nor, a ''minor inam'', nor a whole inam village in Pudukkottai and so completely

out of the coverage of Acts XXVI and XXX of 1963. We also make it clear that the disposal of these Writ Petitions now does not preclude the

inamdars from agitating the question that a particular property is not an inam at all and does not fall under any of the aforesaid four categories or

falls under one or other of the categories as may be urged for the inamdars.

An argument was faintly put forward that the impugned enactments are contrary to the Crown (Government) Grants Act of 1895. We fail to

see how that Act can affect the validity of these enactments. The provisions of the Crown (Government) Grants Act are intended only to give

validity to conditions imposed by the Government in respect of Crown lands even though the conditions might not be in conformity with the law of

the land like the rule against perpetuity, accumulation etc. The Act does not preclude the Government from altering, modifying or from extinguishing

the grants made whose validity could be sustained under the Act. In the result, all the Writ Petitions except Writ Petitions Nos. 1958 and 1812 of

1965 separately dealt with on merits, are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.