M.K. Chengalva Roya Chetti vs The State of Madras

Panchapakesa Ayyar, J.—This batch of appeals has been filed against the judgment of the Chief Judge of the Court of Small Causes in Land

Case Nos. 133, 106, 112, 111, 107, 116, 113, 100 and 102 of 1952, valuing the lands acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, as modified by

the Town Planning Act (with No. 15% solarium), as on 14th August, 1934, the date of the notification under S. 12 of the Town Planning Act,

instead of on the date of the last extension by Government of that notification, namely, 24th October, 1946. The acquisition was for the laying of

scheme roads under the My lapore western section area Town Planning Scheme. We have perused the records and heard the learned Counsel for

the appellants, and the learned Government Pleader, contra The main contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants was that the

Government had no power to extend the time fixed under S. 12 of the Town Planning Act and that if the Government is to be held by an

indulgence, to have the power to extend the time fixed under S. 12, as has been held by Ramesam, Offg. C. J. in the Bench ruling in Secretary of

State for India v. Narayanaswami Chettiar 55 Mad. 391 =35 L.W. 831 (the other learned Judge was Cornish, J.), it could only be because they

had the power to issue a fresh notification and took the short cut of doing it by a mere order of extension, taking all the legal consequences of a

fresh notification under S. 12, including the liability to pay the market value as on the date of the last extension for the purpose of S. 35(2) of the

Town; Planning Act, and as per the view taken by Rajagopala Aiyangar J. in G. Radhakrishna Chettiar and Others Vs. The State of Madras and

Others, and as directly held by a Bench of this Court consisting of Subba Rao and Ramaswami JJ. in A. S. No. 757 of 1950, after the delivery of

the judgment now appealed against It was urged that the learned Judge below erred in not waiting for a law days for the Bench judgment, though

requested and took a wrong view. We may add here that the learned Counsel for the appellants conceded that the judgment of Ramesam, Offg.

C.J. and of Rajagopala Aiyangar J. would amount only to obiter and that Cornish J. dissented from the view of Ramesam, Offg. C.J. and held that

only the market value on the original date of the notification under S. 12 could be claimed. He submitted the Bench decision was a direct decision

on the point. It was contended by the learned Counsel for the appellants that the prices were a oddity rising from 1934 onwards and that the prices

on 24th October 1946 were four or five times higher than the prices on 14th August 1934. Of course possession has not been taken, as the

acquisition is only under the Town Planning Act, and not under the Land Acquisition Act.

Learned Government Pleader would not concede that prices had risen to any extent by 24th October 1946. He said that the 1934 prices

continued. We need not decide that question, in these appeals, as if we come to the conclusion that the market value has to be fixed under S.

35(2) of the Town Planning Act as on 24th October 1946 as per the decision of the Bench and the observations of Ramesam Offg. C.J. and

Rajagopala Aiyangar J. the matter will have to be remanded to the lower Court for hearing the evidence and determining the point, which has not

been done, as the lower Court took it for granted that. only the market value as on 14th August 1934 would be payable. So too, the claims

regarding the damages for erection, dismantling, severance etc., will have to be decided afresh.

The learned Government pleader relied upon two rulings of single Judges namely of Satyanarayana Rao, J., in A. S. No. 552 of 1949 and

Krishnaswami Nayudu, J., in A. S. No. 351 of 1949 dated respectively 14th February 1952 and 7th August 1952. No doubt in those cases the

notification under S. 12 was in 1934 as here and the acquisition was only in 1947, and the learned Judges took the view that the market value

should be fixed only as on the date of the original notification in 1934 under S. 12 of the Town Planning Act while pointing out the injustice to the

claimants as the price had gone up by leaps and bounds. But the point now raised was not raised before them, namely, that the Government had

no power to extend the period of the notification under S. 12 and that if they must be deemed to have had such power by extending an indulgence,

it could only be on the reasoning of Ramesam Offg. C.J., and the learned Judges in the Bench decision, namely, that they must be deemed to have

issued fresh notification under S. 12 by those extensions, as they had an undoubted power to do, and to have used the extensions as a mere short

cut, but taking the full consequences of fresh notification including the liability to pay the market value as on the date of the last order of extension.

In other words it is alike the relief against forfeiture, granted as an indulgence by Courts in suitable cases under the Town Planning Act of course,

the Bench decision was much later than the decisions of the two learned single Judges. We may add that the decisions of the two learned single

Judges were not brought to the notice of the learned Judges who decided the Bench case, though we do not think that the Bench decision would

have been in any way different even if cited. Nor was even the observation of Ramesam Offg C.J., brought to the notice of the two learned single

Judges and the point discussed We consider that the decisions of the single Judges might have been different in that case. We may also add that the

Judge below did not discuss any of the above decisions relating to this point, but assumed as a matter of course and without even waiting for the

Bench decision, though requested to do so, that only the market value as on the date of the original notification under S. 12 can be given.

We are, therefore of opinion that the Bench decision holds the field, and we are bound by it, especially as we agree with the principle and

reasoning therein. We see no point in the learned Government Pleader''s attack on it as incorrect, and see no reason to refer the matter to a Full

Bench, as requested by the learned Government Pleader. We follow the decision of the Bench, which we hold to be the only possible correct view

and we adopt the observations of Ramesam. Offg. C.J., and Cornish, J., and Rajagopala Aiyangar, J., in the above cases and hold that the

extension of the S. 12 notification by Government on 24th October 1946 was not illegal or null and void but that the market value has to be paid

as on the date of the last order of extension, namely, 24th October 1946, in all these cases. To hold otherwise would be to hold the extensions

themselves to be illegal and to make all the acquisitions sought to be covered by extensions to be null and void, too drastic and unthinkable a

course for us to pursue in public interested, especially as the interests of private parties also do not require such an extreme step. They have

interest only in being given the market value as on the date of last order of extension It is obvious that even if the extensions are held to be illegal,

that will not prevent the Government from issuing a fresh notification under S. 12 and acquiring these lands under the Town Planning Act. In our

opinion, the middle course followed by Ramesam Offg. C.J., and Rajagopala Ayyanger, J., and by the learned judges who delivered the Bench

judgments meets all the exigencies of justice, equity and good conscience, and should be adopted as just. The contention of the appellants to treat

the acquisitions in these cases as acquisitions under the Land Acquisition Act is wholly untenable and is rejected.

It follows from all these that the judgment and decrees of the Court below must be set aside, and the references in these land cases must be

remanded to the Court below, now the City Civil Court for being taken again on file and disposed of afresh after considering all relevant oral and

documentary evidence let in by all the parties regarding the market value of these lands damages, etc. as on 24th October 1946. Of course all

other questions of values and valuation and damages covered by the land cases will also stand remanded for fresh decision. In the circumstances,

we direct all the parties to these appeals to bear their own costs, but direct the Court fees paid on the appeal memos to be refunded to the

respective parties eats all the exigencies of justice, equity and good conscience, and should be adopted as just. The contention of the appellants to

treat the acquisitions in these cases as acquisitions under the Land Acquisition Act is wholly untenable and is rejected. It follows from all these that

the judgment and decrees of the Court below must be set aside, and the references in these land cases must be remanded to the Court below, now

the City Civil Court for being taken again on file and disposed of afresh after considering all relevant oral and documentary evidence let in by all the

parties regarding the market value of these lands damages, etc. as on 24th October 1946. Of course all other questions of values and valuation and

damages covered by the land cases will also stand remanded for fresh decision. In the circumstances, we direct all the parties to these appeals to

bear their own costs, but direct the Court fees paid on the appeal memos to be refunded to the respective parties.