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Judgment
Sardar Ali Khan, J.—In the first batch of Writ Petitions, viz., W.P. Nos. 13033/88, 13035/88, 13036/88 and 13038/88 the petitioners seek a writ of certiorari calling for the records relating to the second respondent''s Office Order No Pers/R/7(46), dated 23-7-1988 awarding a punishment or reducing to a lower grade of Cat. V in the pay scale of Rs. 650-27-1055 as Lab. Attendant ''A'' and to set aside the same as illegal, null and void and unconstitutional. In the second batch of writ petitions, viz., W.P. Nos. 19109/88, 19110/88 and 19113/88 to 19118/88 the petitioners seek a writ of certiorari calling for the records relating to the second respondent''s Order No. Ag/Adm/3/(91)/72, dated 22-11-1988 dismissing the petitioners from service and to set aside the same as illegal, void and unconstitutional.
The orders in question have been passed against the petitioners imposing the penalty of reducing to a lower grade or dismissal from service, as ,the case may be, on the ground that the petitioners are guilty of serious misconduct for which charges have been framed against them and an enquiry has been held.
It would be convenient to deal with the facts arising in W.P. No. 19110/88 to indicate the nature of controversy arising in this batch of writ petitions.
In W.P. No. 19110/88 it is alleged that the Superintendent of Mines, Agnigun-dala Lead Project (Hindustan Zinc Limited), Bandalamottu, issued a Memo, dated 16-5-1986 making certain allegations against the petitioner that he forcibly entered the project house premises throwing stones through the mam door and assaulted and caused bodily injury to Shri K.S. Chowdhary, who was then Superintendent of Mines, and Shri P.S. Solanki, the then Manager (Mechanical Maintenance). The said actions constituted misconduct under Clause 39(ix), (xxv) and (xii) of the Company''s Standing Orders. It is further stated that the charges are grave and the petitioner was placed under suspension by the very same Memo.
The main contention raised by the petitioners in all the writ petitions is that as an appellate authority the Superintendent of Mines, Agnigundala Lead Project, Bandalamottu, is not vested with the original disciplinary jurisdiction and, therefore, cannot institute disciplinary proceedings against the petitioners. According to the petitioners, such action has been taken by the Superintendent of Mines on the assumption that clause 50 of the Company''s Standing Orders, which lays down that all powers conferred on any employee of the Company under the Company''s Standing Orders shall also be exercised by any other authority or employee of the company superior to him, invests him with the original disciplinary powers also. It is contended by the petitioners, inter alia, that the powers referred to in Clause 50 do not relate to disciplinary powers which are delegated to specific authorities. Furthermore, the nature of charges reveals that the Superintendent of Mines, the 1st respondent, is himself supposed to be the victim of assault and is, therefore, the complainant in the eye of law and hence a complainant cannot institute a disciplinary action against the petitioners as otherwise he will be infringing the well established principle of "Nemo judex in propria sua causa". The third submission so to say is based upon the question of the alleged bias against the officers of the Enquiry Committee. It seems, the Officers of the Enquiry Committee belong to an Association which is affiliated to INTUC while the petitioners belong to another rival Union AITIJC. And one of the members of the Enquiry Committee has been promoted during the proceedings thereby providing inducement to the said member to record the verdict of guilty against the petitioners.
In the counter-affidavit filed by the respondent-management the first and the fore-most objection raised is with regard to the maintainability of the writ petitions. It is stated in the counter-affidavit that since the Director of Mining Operations initiated a disciplinary action, it was made clear to the petitioners that the Appellate Authority is the Chairman and Managing Director. In the dismissal order, dated 22-11-1988 it is clearly stated as follows:
"It may be stated here that he is entitled to prefer an appeal to the Chairman & Managing Director against the orders passed herein within 30 days from the date of same."
Now, instead of preferring an appeal to the Chairman & Managing Director, the petitioners have filed the writ petitions thereby short-circuiting the appeal procedure provided under the Company''s Standing Orders. It is next contended that in any case the petitioners have an efficacious alternative remedy to raise an Industrial Dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act. It need not be mentioned at any great length here that the other charges of bias against the members of the Enquiry Committee and lack of jurisdiction in the first respondent-Management to exercise original disciplinary powers against the petitioners are denied.
Sri P. Ramachandra Reddi, learned counsel for the petitioners in these writ petitions, has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court reported in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Sree Rama Rao: 1964 (2) Lab LJ 150 wherein it is stated that the power of the High Court is circumscribed to interfere in cases where there has been a violation of procedure to be followed by the enquiring authority or where the proceedings against the delinquent officer have been carried on in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case. There cannot be any quarrel with the principle which has been so well and truly laid in the case under reference. But it is difficult to agree with the learned counsel for the petitioners that this is a case in which an interference can be made in the proceedings which have been held against the petitioners. There is nothing to suggest that there has been a short-circuiting of the procedure to be followed by the authorities or that there has been a gross misappreciation of the evidence available in this matter. In any case the questions of facts arising in these cases are of such a nature that they deserve to be considered either by an Appellate Authority or by an authority under the Industrial Disputes Act.
The learned counsel for the petitioners has also placed reliance upon a decision reported in Rajbir Singh v. State of Haryana 1983 (1) SLR 38, stated that the petitioners cannot be asked to invoke the remedy available to them under the Industrial Disputes Act. Again, it is difficult to agree with the learned counsel for the petitioners in this aspect of the problem. In view of the disputed questions of facts arising in these cases the proper remedy available to the petitioners seems to be to raise an industrial dispute under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is evident at a glance at the record of the case that the whole matter in these writ petitions bristles with questions of fact. For instance, the forcible entry of the petitioners into the house of a Superior Officer and the alleged assault committed by them and the various incidents which followed thereafter are all matters which constitute pure questions of fact which can be decided only by an authority which is in a position to sift through the evidence recorded in the case and the relevant records of the matter. Therefore, the acute questions of fact involved in the matter render it difficult to go into the substantive aspects of the case in these writ petitions. In a somewhat similar matter the Division Bench of this High Court in Appeal No. 53 of 1987, dated 15-2-1988 also took the same view that when there are many questions of fact to be considered in a particular case and when there is a regular remedy provided under the Industrial Disputes Act, the petitioners are not entitled to invoke the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It cannot be overlooked that the petitioners have an efficacious alternative remedy by way of raising an industrial dispute under the relevant provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act in which all questions of fact and law can be gone into on the basis of the evidence that may be adduced by both sides.
Taking an overall view of the situation as it exists, these writ petitions are dismissed but, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.