Mewar Anchalik Gramin Bank and Others vs Mewar Anchalik Gramin Bank Officers Association

Heard learned counsel for the parties.

This appeal is arising out of the judgment and decree, dated September 7, 2000, passed by the learned single Judge in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4347 of 1998, which reads as under:

"The case is fully covered by the judgment of this Court in the case of Rajnesh Pareak v. Bhilwarar Ajmer Kshetriya Gramin Bank and Ors. reportedin R.L. W 1998 (1) 74.

The petition succeeds and is allowed. The petitioner is entitled for all the consequential benefits as remained in that case."

This takes us to the facts of the case and the declaration of principle in Rajneesh Pareak''s case.

The petitioner, which is an association of officers, has challenged the validity of Annexure 6, the seniority list of confirmed officers, as on April 1, 1995 published by the respondent No. 1. The seniority list was prepared in accordance with the terms of Rules 13(2) and 13(3) of the Mewar Anchalik Gramin Bank Staff Service Regulations, 1983, and the clarifications received from GOI/NABARD/ sponsor bank in this respect from time to time.

The principal objection of the petitioner is preparation of assigning seniority by giving effect to Clause 3 of Rule 13 of the aforesaid rules which reads as under:

"In the case of officer or an employee whose probation has been extended, his seniority shall be reckoned just below all the officers or employees, if any, recruited or promoted in the same batch along with him."

By operation of this rule, the seniority of officers or employees of the bank appointed on probation as per their merit in the select list is altered on the basis of their performance during the probation period. Those who successfully completed their period of probation without requiring any extension, their seniority remains unaltered as is assigned to them amongst the batch of which they are members. But out of such group if any person has not completed his probation satisfactorily and probation period is extended instead of terminating services, such a person on probation loses his seniority and is placed at the bottom of the batch of which he is the member.

The validity of this rule was challenged before this Court and a learned single Judge of this Court in the case referred to above has held the provisions to be ultra vires being unreasonable with reference to principle enunciated (sic) by the Supreme Court in the case of S.B. Patwardhan and Another Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, where the Apex Court found the principle of assigning seniority on the basis of confirmation alone to be ultra vires. According to it, confirmation is glorious uncertainty of the service. Seniority depending on confirmation alone is ultra vires, having no nexus to the object sought to be achieved, where an employee has no control over the matter of confirmation to be made timely, as and when it becomes due, and the seniority depends on the fortuitous circumstances when the authority decides to undertake the process of confirmation.

It is, on the aforesaid premise, the present writ petition was allowed and Annexure 6 was quashed.

We have heard learned counsel for the appellant as well as learned counsel for the respondent. Perusal of the rule goes to show that rule does not relate the seniority to the date of confirmation at all. Therefore, in our opinion application of rule as to assigning seniority with effect from the date of confirmation without anything more was not at all applicable to the construction of the rule in question.

The rule does not detract from the principle that seniority has to be assigned with effect from the date of initial appointment after completion of probation. Clause 3 merely makes a differentiation between those who had successfully completed initial period of probation by rendering satisfactory service during the period of probation on the one hand and those who did not work satisfactorily during the period of initial probation. For their continuance of service they had to depend on the extension of probation. The latter, who are not working satisfactorily during the period of probation thus, lose their place in merit initially determined before appointment in the matter of assigning inter se seniority of the members of very same select list. The rule operates only among the members of same batch who have been appointed simultaneously for determining their inter se seniority finally, assigning of inter se seniority of the probationers on the basis of satisfactory completion of probation period. Person who completes initial period of probation satisfactorily retains his inter se seniority in the order of merit as per select list. Those who do not complete the initial period of service satisfactorily and period of probation in their case is required to be extended, lose their inter se seniority on the basis of their place in merit in select list. Such incumbent is placed at the bottom amongst the members recruited in the same batch in seniority.

The rule obviously is founded on satisfactory functioning of the new employee and has nothing to do with date of confirmation. If that were so, a person selected in later batch, if confirmed earlier would become Senior to a person selected and appointed earlier. This is not the consequence of Rule 13(3).

As the rule has direct nexus to objective of achieving efficiency in service by rendition of satisfactory service from the initial stage, the rule cannot be held to be unreasonable, arbitrary and ultra vires on the ground of providing a vague and uncertain criterion for determining seniority depending on a fortuitous circumstance like uncertainty of confirmation. Such rule neither attracts from the principle nor makes the determination of seniority on the basis of confirmation.

Any precedent declaring the provisions of rules for reckoning the seniority with effect from the date of confirmation without anything more as ultra vires had no relevance to the question raised about the validity of Rule 13(3).

As we have come to the conclusion that the impugned rule which provides for determining the seniority of the persons appointed simultaneously out of the same batch on the basis of their performance appraisal during the probation period does not suffer from vice of making classification having no nexus with the object sought to be achieved and therefore any challenge to validity of such rule has to be repelled.

Accordingly, we hold that Clause (3) of Rule 13 is not suffering from vice of discrimination or unreasonableness, and uphold the rule as valid. Once this conclusion is reached, then further conclusion follows that the seniority list which has been prepared in accordance with the existing rules does not suffer from any illegality and is valid.

As a result, this appeal is allowed. The judgment under appeal is set aside and the writ petition is dismissed with no order as to costs.