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Judgment
Markandey Katju, C.J.—This writ appeal has been filed against the impugned order of the learned single Judge dated 25.3.2004 passed in
Writ Petition No. 12356 of 2003.
We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and find no merit in this appeal.
The respondent was an employee of the appellant. By order dated 4.12.2000 he was removed from the service of the appellant as he was
invalidated on medical grounds and found not suitable for the post of Heavy Passenger Vehicle Driver and he was removed from duty with
immediate effect. The disability which he incurred was spinal problem (Disc Prolapse - L4, L5 & L5 S1).
The respondent filed the writ petition which has been allowed by the learned single Judge and hence this appeal. We fully agree with the view
taken by the learned single Judge.
Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the respondent did not incur the injury in the course of his employment. In our opinion this
submission is misconceived. It may be noted that the language of Section 47 of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of
Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as the `1995 Act'' ) is very different from that of Section 3 of the Workmen''s
Compensation Act, 1923.
Section 3(1) of the Workmen''s Compensation Act, 1923 states as follows:
Employer''s liability for compensation:
(1) If personal injury is caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, his employer shall be liable to pay
compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter.
A perusal of Section 3(1) of the Workmen''s Compensation Act, 1923 shows that the words used therein are ""personal injury ... in the course
of his employment "".
On the other hand, the words used in Section 47(1) of the 1995 Act are "" an employee who acquires a disability during his service.
Thus, the language of Section 3(1) of the Workmen''s Compensation Act is very different from that of Section 47(1) of the 1995 Act. We
cannot import notions of the Workmen''s Compensation Act, 1923 into the 1995 Act which is a totally different Act.
It may be mentioned that the 1995 Act is a piece of welfare legislation and hence it has to be liberally construed giving a purposive
interpretation. The object of the Act obviously is to fulfill the mandate of the Directive Principles of State Policy in Part IV of the Constitution.
Hence full effect must be given to this objective. In our opinion, the words ""who acquires a disability during his service"" means that the disability
should be acquired while in employment, and it is not necessary that it should be acquired while performing his work. It is also not necessary that
the employment should be the cause of disability.
Thus, there is no force in this appeal and it is dismissed with a modification that in paragraph 18 (ii) of the impugned order the words ""thirty
days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order"" shall be substituted by the words ""thirty days from today."" No costs. W. A.M.P. No. 1305
of 2005 for stay is dismissed.