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Judgment
Singaravelu, J.—The tenant in the revision Petitioner. The Respondent-landlady filed the petition for eviction in respect of a non-residential
building u/s 10(3)(a)(iii) on the ground of requirement for the occupation of her husband. The tenant contended that the requirement is not
bonafide, and that in any event, the landlady is not entitled to file a petition before the expiry of the lease period agreed to between the parties. The
rent Controller accepted the case of the tenant and dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Appellate Authority reversed the finding of the Rent
Controller and ordered eviction. Hence the revision by the tenant.
The premises in question in a multistoried building Consisting of ground floor, first floor and second floor situated at North Beach Road near the
Madras Harbour. The tenant is Messrs. Gillanders Arbuthnot and Company Limited. The building in question originally belonged to South India
Flour Mills Limited, Madras through whom the tenant was inducted into possession. The landlady, namely, the revision Petitioner herein,
purchased the building on 6th April 1979 and thereafter called upon the tenant to vacate the premises on the ground of requirement for the purpose
of business of her husband who is a businessman and an exporter at Singapore. These facts are not disputed.
The first point to be considered is, whether the requirement of the premises by the landlady for the purpose of running the business by her
husband is bona fide. It is common ground that the landlady''s husband is a citizen of Singapore doing export and import business at Singapore.
According to the landlady, the demised building at Madras is required for the purpose of using it as a godown as well as office for the business run
and carried on by her husband at Singapore. The landlady''s husband has given evidence as P.W. 1 and has stated that he wants to open up an
office at Madras in the leasehold premises so that it will be convenient for him for the purpose of his business. It was elicited from him that though
he and his father have been doing export and import business at Singapore from 1963 onwards, they have not chosen to set up any office at
Madras till now In short, there is no evidence to show that the landlady''s, husband is carrying on any business at Madras on the date of the
petition. There is also no evidence to show that they have made any preparations for setting up an office or godown at Madras. That apart, it was
elicited from P.W. 1 that the landlady filed eviction petitions against the tenants in the first and second floors, but unceremoniously withdrew the
same after some arrangement with them. The tenant herein is in occupation of the ground floor. It was found by the Rent Controller that the
conduct of the landlady in withdrawing the eviction proceedings against the tenants of the first and Second floors indicates that the requirement is
not bona fide. Further, since the tenants in the first and second floors have agreed to vacate, P.W. 1 can easily be accommodated in these
premises. Placing reliance on this fact, the Rent Controller rejected the case of the landlady and held that the requirement is neither true nor bona
fide. It was also pointed out that in the notice exhibit P-4, the landlady asked the tenant to vacate stating that the ground floor will easily fetch a
monthly rent of Rs. 5,000 at the current market rate, and that if the tenant does not vacate, she will take action and recover damages at the rate of
Rs. 5,000 per month. This is yet another circumstance to show that the eviction petition is motivated and that her only object is to get a fat rent
from the tenant. On this evidence, the finding of the Rent Controller is justified. However, the Appellate Authority has held that there is nothing
artificial in a Singapore merchant engaged in export and import business having an office at Madras near the harbour. In this view, the Appellate
Authority found that the requirement was bonafide. But, the finding of the Appellate Authority is contrary to the evidence on record and also to the
legal requirement u/s 10(3)(a)(iii) Firstly, there is nothing to show that P.W. 1 is actually carrying on any business at Madras. Secondly, the
premises that fell vacant have not been occupied by P.W. 1. Thirdly, there is no evidence at all to show that P.W.I has made any preparations for
starting the business. These vital points have been ignored by the Appellate Authority which has come to an erroneous conclusion that the
requirement must be bona fide. I am unable to sustain the finding of the Appellate Authority that the requirement is bonafide.
There is another formidable impediment to the landlady seeking eviction of the tenant. Exhibit R-8 is a lease deed dated 6th April 1979
executed by the vendor of the landlady under which the lease deed was renewed on an enhanced rent of Rs. 1,400 per month for a period of five
years with an option to knew for a further term of five years from 1st January 1984. Originally, the rent was Rs. 1,100, and under this lease deed
exhibit P-8, the vendor of the landlady had bargained for an enhanced rent and executed a rent deed in favour of the tenant. The learned Counsel
for the tenant relies upon this, registered:, rent deed exhibit R-8 and claim protection u/s 10(3)(d). The Rent Controller accepted this argument of
the tenant. But the Appellate Authority again committed an error and probed into the question whether the renewed lease deed was true or not,
and came to the conclusion that the lease deed was executed by the vendor, namely, the previous owner of the building, without proper authority.
For one thing, the validity of the lease deed need not be (SIC) obed into detail in a proceeding under the Rent Control Act, and it is enough if the
tenant prima facie proves that he is entitled to be protected u/s 10(3)(d) by virtue of a solemnly registered document. For another, the rent deed
under exhibit R-8 also stands scrutiny, and it cannot be rejected in the manner in which the Appellate Authority as done it. It may be recalled that
the previous owner is a Private Limited Company, namely, the South India Flour Mills (Private) Limited, Madras having Board of Directors bound
by the Company Law. In other words, it is not a private individual who has entered into a transaction surreptitiously with profit motive. This lease
deed was executed by one of the Board of Directors of the Limited Company, one Rajendra Shah, who had executed the sale deed in favour of
the present landlady. Exhibit P-l is a copy of the resolution of the South India Flour Mills Private Limited, dated 30th March 1979, under which the
Director Rajendra Shah was authorized to execute necessary documents for the sale. Therefore, it is far fetched to contend that the Director who
had authority to execute a sale deed in favour of the landlady, had no authority to execute a lease deed to the tenant Messrs. Gillanders Arbuthnot
and Company Limited.
Learned Counsel for the landlady strenuously contended that this lease deed is suspicious, in that both the lease deed and the sale deed were
executed on the same day and therefore, this renewal of the lease deed had been brought about behind the back of the landlady. There is
absolutely no basis for this contention, since the sale deed Exhibit P-3 itself clearly recites that the lessee Messrs. Gillanders Arbuthnot and
Company is in possession of the premises as a tenant and that the tenant will atto(SIC)n to the vendee. Again, it is not as if the lease deed under
exhibit R-8 came into existence all of a sudden. There is also documentary evidence in the shape of exhibits R-1 to R-7 which is the
correspondence between the owner and the lessee for the renewal of the lease. This clearly show that the negotiations for the renewal of the lease
started even in September, 1978, whereas the sale deed in favour of the landlady was only on 6th April 1979. Thus, after prolonged negotiations
for over six months, the previous owner, namely a responsible Company, had renewed the lease deed on the same day simultaneously with the sale
deed. That is more, it is clearly (SIC)ecited in the sale deed itself that Messrs. Gillanders Arbuthnot and Company, namely the tenant herein has a
right of renewal of the lease and that the tenant has also prepared a fresh lease deed in respect of the ground floor for a period of five years and
that it is under execution. After this clear recital to which the landlady was a party, it is f(SIC) ivolous to contend that she was not aware of the
fresh lease deed or agreement of renewal or that it is not binding on her. On the other hand, the landlady with eyes wide open has purchased the
property perhaps under the impassion that she will be able to evict the tenant on some ground or other. The Appellate Authority has completely
ignored the recital in the sale deed just now referred and committed a grave error in finding that the lease deed exhibit R-8. is suspicious. Of
course, the lease deed was executed at 3.00 p.m. and the sale dried was registered between 5-00 and 6.00 p.m. on the same day. But, there is
nothing suspicious or fraud went about it especially when the purchaser had teen put on notice about top renewal of lease, The result, is the tenant
is protected u/s 10(3)(d) and the landlady who is a subsequent purchaser cannot go behind it and ask for eviction. Therefore, the finding of the
Appellate Authority is clearly erroneous both on the ground of law and on the question of fact, and therefore it cannot be allowed to stand.
Consequently, the Revision petition is allowed with costs, and the eviction petition stands dismissed.