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Judgment
V.S. Sirpurkar, J.—Petitioner is a company, registered under the Companies Act. It took advantage of the scheme framed by the
Government of India, known as ""Export Promotion Capital Good Scheme"" under which, the capital goods for manufacturing purposes were
allowed to be imported with a concessional rate of duty. There was an export obligation attached to the said concession to the effect that the
importer would be liable to export goods worth three times the value of the machinery within four years from the date of first clearance of the
machinery.
A licence was obtained by the petitioner for import of some machinery, the details of which are given in paragraph 3 of the affidavit filed in
support of the petition. The value of the said machinery was DM.5,12,126 whereas the export obligation attached to the said licence was
US$906262 which was to be fulfilled within four years of the first date of clearance of the consignment which was on 2-12-1991. For the purpose
of this, the company also had to furnish a bank guarantee to the Director General of Foreign Trade, Udyog Bhavan, New Delhi (3rd respondent
herein) and in this case, the bank guarantee was of Rs.63,00,000/-. This guarantee was given for a period of five years from 9-11-1991.
The petitioner pleaded that for various reasons such as non-availability of the contract licence in time; non-availability of World Health
Organisation Good Manufacturing Practice certificate, etc., the export obligation undertaken by the petitioner could not be honoured in the sense
that by 1995, the company was able to make the export only of the goods worth US$9000, which was almost about one-tenth of its export
obligation. The company, therefore, made an application on 25-8-1995 to the 2nd respondent for extension of time to honour its export obligation.
In this application, the company expressed its inability on account of the various reasons which have been indicated earlier in this order such as
non-availability of contract licence, etc.
The petitioner company thereafter complains that in spite of the extension application having been filed originally on 26-3-1995 and thereafter in
proper proforma on 25-8-1995, there was no response from the 2nd respondent on this extension application at all. The 2nd respondent,
however, invoked the bank guarantee given in favour of it by the petitioner company through the 3rd respondent bank by letter dated 29-9-1995.
The petitioner company pleads that though the period of export obligation was to come to an end by 1-12-1995, it had made an application well in
advance, i.e. on 26-3-1995 to begin with and thereafter in proper proforma on 25-8-1995 yet the 2nd respondent remained under coma for the
reasons best known to it without deciding the extension application one way or the other. In that view, the company filed this writ petition whereby
it sought the quashing of the order dated 29-9-1995 by which the 2nd respondent had sought the invoking the bank guarantee.
The writ petition was entertained and the invocation of the bank guarantee was also stayed. It is now after seven years that the petition comes
before me for decision.
Learned senior counsel, Mr. R. Thiagaranan, appearing for the petitioner says that even till today the said application for extension of time has
not been decided by the 2nd respondent one way or the other. With the result, that even till today it is not known as to whether the authority was
in a position to allow the extension of time to honour the export obligation. He points out that because of that the petitioner could not export its
goods as there would be no clearance for the goods in the absence of such extension.
Unfortunately, at the time of hearing, there was no representation on behalf of the respondents 1 and 2. Learned counsel appearing for the 3rd
respondent pointed out that the bank was bound by the stay order granted by the Court as back as on 19-10-1995 and, therefore, the bank has
guarantee not been able to be invoked by the 2nd respondent. In that view, learned counsel says that there should at least be a direction to the 2nd
respondent to decide the application for extension of time one way or the other.
There can be no doubt that in this case, the 2nd respondent as also the 1st respondent has shown the utter apathy so much so that in these
seven years even the counter has not been filed refuting the allegations made in the petition. Very interestingly, though the invocation of the bank
guarantee came to be stayed by an interim order in the writ petition, even no petition for vacating the said interim order has been made on behalf of
the respondents 1 and 2, who were the only persons to suffer.
Be that as it may, it is obvious that right from 26-3-1995 or as the case may be 25-8-1995, there is no action on the part of the 2nd respondent
in deciding upon the petitioner''s application for extension of time one way or the other. There is no explanation before me as to why the said
application remains undecided or if it is already decided, what is the fate thereof. It is obvious that the said application has not been decided so far
because no such intimation has been given to the petitioner. Therefore, it would be in the fitness of the things to direct the 2nd respondent to decide
that application, after hearing the petitioner or its representative as the case may be, within two months from the date of receipt of this order.
However, before parting with the judgment, it must be said that there could not have been any stay of the invocation of the bank guarantee
because there was no question of fraud involved in all these matters for obtaining the bank guarantee at least none is pleaded in the writ petition.
The apathy on the part of the particular authority could not be spelt out as a fraud so that the said authority could not have invoked the bank
guarantee. Therefore, even if the writ petition succeeds partly, the interim order would stand vacated. However, the petitioner may take such steps
to persuade the 2nd respondent to take any other view of the matter.
With these observations, the writ petition is disposed of. No costs. W.M.P. No.22817 of 1995 is closed.