High CourtsSingle Bench(1973) 10 P&H CK 0009

Mehar Singh vs Vinod Parshad

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 30 October 1973 · Citation: (1974) RCR(Rent) 199

HON’BLE JUDGES
Prem Chand Pandit, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Civil Revision No. 922 of 1973

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Judgment

9 paragraphs · 1,010 words

Prem Chand Pandit, J.—This is a tenant''s revision petition against the decision of the Appellate Authority affirming on appeal the order of the Rent Controller evicting him from the premises in dispute.

2.

On 27th October, 1958, a shop, situate in Patiala, was rented out by Vinod Parshad to Mehar Singh for 11 months at a monthly rent of Rs. 17/-, The tenant was quite regular In the payment of the rent. On 18th January, 1969, a notice u/s 114 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911, was given to the landlord by the Committee for demolishing this shop within seven days as it was in a very bad condition. On 31st January, 1969, the landlord filed an application for the ejectment of the tenant on the ground that the shop had become unsafe and unfit for human habitation, bat after producing his evidence, got the same dismissed as withdrawn on 6th August 1970. Then the present application was filed on 29th August 1970 on two grounds (i) nonpayment of rent, and (ii) that the shop bad become unsafe and unfit for human habitation and the landlord wanted to reconstruct it.

3.

The ground regarding the non-payment of rent become non-available to the landlord, because the arrears of rent were paid on the first date of hearing.

4.

Both the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority have come to the conclusion that the second ground for ejectment relied upon by the landlord bad been fully established. The tenant was, consequently, ordered to vacate these premises. He has come here to challenge that order.

5.

The only point for decision is whether the Authorities below were right in holding that the shop in question had beeome unsafe and unit for human habitation and the landlord desired to reconstruct it.

6.

The Appellate Authority, while giving a finding In favour of the landlord, has relied on the evidence of the witnesses produced by him. He has referred to the statement of A. W. 1 Roop Lal, who had stated that the shop ''was an old conduction of small bricks and its back wall was In a dilapidated condition and the same was still deteriorating. To almost the same effect was the evidence of A- W. 2 Vidya Sagar. Reference was then made to the evidence of the landlord himself, who had deposed that the condition of the shop was bad and he wanted to reconstruct it. He bad also stated that he had got means to do to and in fact he had obtained sanction from the Municipal Committee for reconstructing the shop. The Rent Controller himself also inspected the shop and he too was of the view that it was in a dilapidated condition and was an old construction of small bricks. This inspection was done in the presence of both the parties. The Appellate Authority considered the evidence produced by the tenant also, namely, R.W. 1 Jagan Nath. R.W. 2 Dalip Singh R.W. 3 Sant Ram and the tenant himself. After referring to their evidence, he came to the conclusion that the witnesses produced by the tenant were not reliable. As a matter of fact, he had given reasons regarding each one of them on the basis of which he found that their evidence could not be relied upon. After discussing the entire evidence, he found that the shop was unfit and unsafe for human habitation and it was required by the landlord for reconstruction. This is a finding of fact and no valid reason has been given by the learned counsel for the petitioner to upset the same.

7.

It was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that it was necessary for the Authorities below to give a firm finding that the application made by the landlord for eviction was bona fide and unless that finding was recorded by them, the ejectment application must fail on that ground alone.

8.

After hearing the learned counsel, I find that there is no merit in this contention. In the first place, in the reply which the tenant himself had given, it was nowhere stated specifically that the eviction application was not a bona fide one. Secondly, I find that this contention was never raised either before the Rent Controller or the Appellate Authority. Thirdly, the moment the Authorities below came to the conclusion that the shop in question was unsafe and unfit for human habitation and the landlord had money for reconstructing the same and as a matter of fact, he had got the plan for reconstruction sanctioned by the Municipal Committee, the necessary inference was that the ejectment application made by him was a bona fide one. Fourthly, learned counsel could not bring to my notice any decided case, in which it had been said that in every case, the Rent Controller was bound to give a finding that the eviction application was a bona fide one irrespective of the fact whether the tenant raised that particular objection or not. If the ground of ejectment is valid in law and the Authorities come to the conclusion that the said ground has been established by the landlord, in my opinion, it will be assumed that the eviction application is a bona-fide one, unless, of course, the tenant raises this particular objection and brings some prima facie material on the record to show that the application is not on bona fide one. If that be the case, perhaps, in such a situation, the precise objection may be put in issue and the parties afforded an opportunity to lead evidence thereon. In the circumstances of this case, however, as I have already mentioned above, this argument is not available to the tenant. Besides, as I have said earlier, on the findings given by the Appellate Authority, it has to be assumed that the application made by the landlord was not mala fide.

9.

In view of what I have said above, I would dismiss this petition with costs. The tenant is, however, granted a period of three months to vacate the premises.