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Judgment
Krishnaswami Nayudu, J.—These two applications are taken out by the petitioners who are the sons of the respondent for certain directions
in C.M.A. No. 123 of 1955 on the file of this Court, that being an appeal against an order of the Subordinate Judge of Tirunelveli in I.A. No. 124
of 1955 in O.S. No. 25 of 1956 appointing a receiver. C.M.P. No. 5439 of 1955 is for an order to the effect that the respondent is liable to have
his C.M.A. dismissed for want of prosecution until he purges himself of the contempt of Court which he is alleged to have committed under the
following circumstances. The other application C.M.P. No. 5440 of 1955, is for the removal of the respondent from the receivership of one of the
properties of which he was appointed receiver by this Court. The result of these applications would depend upon the petitioners establishing the
charge which they have laid against the respondent that he has committed contempt of Court.
O.S. No. 25 of 1955 is a suit for partition institued by the petitioners against the respondent in respect of joint family properties and for setting
aside a deed of settlement of partition executed by the respondent without the consent and concurrence of the petitioners. During the mid-vacation
of 1955, C.M.A No. 123 of 1955 was filed against the order appointing an independent receiver in respect of some of the suit properties, and the
application came up before one of us (Krishnaswami Nayudu, J.). An interim order was made confirming the appointment in respect of some
properties but varying the order in respect of a property known as the Dalavoi Lodging House in Courtallam by appointing the respondent himself
as the receiver of that property instead of an independent receiver. Mr. S.V. Gopalakrishna Ayyar, Advocate Tirunelveli, was throughout acting
for the petitioners in the proceedings between them and their father, and the said Gopalakrishna Ayyar came to Madras when the said order was
passed on the 25th May, 1955, by the High Court. It is seen from Sri Gopalakiishna Ayyar''s affidavit that on the 26th May, 1955, when he left
Madras for Tirunelveli, he travelled in the same train as the respondent by the Tirunelveli Express which leaves Egmore. When the train reached
Chingleput, Gopalakrishna Ayyar got down from the compartment and walked up the platform for a cup of water and while he was returning to his
compartment, he and the respondent having occupied different first class compartments, the compartment occupied by the respondent being nearer
the engine, the respondent shouted at Gopalakrishna Ayyar in Tamil from his compartment saying ""What worse things do you intend doing to me
and hurled obscene and unprintably vulgar abuse at him and threatened to beat him with shoes on reaching Tirunelveli, and three times he used the
Tamil word which would mean ""mother ravisher"". This unexpected exhibition of temper on the part of the respondent upset Gopalakrishna Ayyar
and troubled his mind and as soon as he got into his compartment, he narrated the incident to his fellow passengers, one, Joseph, P.W. 2 of the
Ministry of Education, Central Government, and another Mr. Subramania Thevar of Vannarpet, Tirunelveli, who was not examined. At Madurai
railway station Gopalakrishna Ayyar happened to meet Sri R. Desikachari, P.W. 3, and he narrated the incident to him and requested him to send
a telephonic message to his son and son-in-law asking; them to meet him at the Tirunelveli Junction as he apprehended further trouble. But as the
telephone system was out of order, P.W. 3 sent a telegram. At Koilpatti, Gopalakrishna Ayyar met Sri Byravan, P.W. 4, the Sub-Magistrate of
the place, and asked him to intimate his son and son-in-law by telephone and at his instance also a telegram was sent to Tiruneveli (Exhibit P. 2).
When the train reached Maniyachi at 10-30 A.M. Gopalakrishna Ayyar got down from the compartment and as soon as the respondent saw
Gopalakrishna Ayyar on the platform, he again indulged in foul and outrageous abuse against him in-Tamil and threatened to shoot and kill him at
Tirunelveli. As the respondent held a license for a revolver Gopalakrishna Ayyar felt that the threats of the respondent may not be idle ones. After
reaching Tirunelveli, Gopalakrishna Ayyar met the District Superintendent of Police at 1-30 P.M. by appointment and narrated to him the incidents
and also gave him a written complaint.
The respondent has filed a counter-affidavit completely denying the allegations made in the affidavit of Gopalakrishna Ayyar as to what
happened at Chingleput and Maniyachi and alleging that Gopalakrishna Ayyar set up this false story and has manufactured evidence and that it is
the result of his having initiated proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act in I.A. No. 128 of 1954 in O.P. No. 16 of 1954 on the file of the
District Court Tirunelveli, in respect of certain allegations made by the first petitioner''s maternal grandfather and Gopalakrishna Ayyar with a view
to influence the decision of the District Judge and which application was then pending. He further contended that even assuming that the incidents
alleged in the affidavit took place, they would not amount to contempt of Court.
The petitioners examined Gopalakrishna Ayyar as P.W. 1 and also three other witnesses, R.P. Joseph, R. Desikachari and Byravan, in support
of their allegations and the respondent examined himself and denied the allegations.
After hearing the evidence in this case, we are not prepared to accept that the incidents referred to by the petitioners did not at all take place
and that the entire thing was a myth. Gopalakrishna Ayyar, P.W. 1 in his oral evidence narrated as to what happened at Chingleput, Koilpatti,
Madurai, and Maniachi P.W. 2, who was a stranger and for the first time met Gopalakrishna Ayyar, having been a co-passenger in the first class
compartment, said that at Chingleput railway station Gopalakrishna Ayyar got down from the compartment and came back after some time and
told him that somebody in the next compartment abused him and threatened him to beat with shoes. He added that Gopalakrishna Ayyar had told
him that he had appeared against the person who had abused him and that he was very much upset by the incident. Desikachari, P.W. 3, is an
advocate practising at Madurai, and he speaks to meeting Gopalakrishna Ayyar in the first class compartment at the Madurai railway station, and
to his being told by Gopalakrishna Ayyar that the respondent had threatened him at Chingleput to beat him with shoes or do some such thing on
reaching Tirunelveli, and to Gopalakrishna Ayyar requesting him to send a telegram to his son or son-in-law asking them to meet him at the
Tirunelveli Junction. He adds that as the telephone system was not in order he directed his clerk to send a telegram asking his son-in-law to meet
him and that it was to be treated as urgent. P.W. 4, Byravan, who was Sub-Magistrate at Koilpatti says that he came to the station to receive his
father and that he knew Gopalakrishna Ayyar as he was an apprentice under him for some time. He adds that Gopalakrishna Ayyar told him that
the respondent threatened him at Chingleput and that he might inform his son-in-law about this and ask some one to meet him at the station, but
being a Sub-Magistrate he did not send a telegram but instructed one Raja Vaidyalingam to send the telegram.
The respondent says in his evidence that he was sitting in his compartment on a6th May, 1955, keeping the glass shutters closed and that there
was none else in his compartment except a child of his friend whom he was taking to Tirunelveli and that he did not see Gopalakrishna Ayyar at all
that day either at Chingleput or at Maniyachi though he saw him at Egmore railway station on the platform. He totally denied the o her incidents.
It is suggested that if, in fact, the respondent did abuse Gopalakrishna Ayyar at Chingleput or at Maniyachi, one would have naturally expected
him to make a complaint to the police instead of telling his co-passengers and informing P.Ws. 3 and 4 about it, and, therefore, it is unlikely that the
incidents did really happen. Though we are not prepared to disbelieve Gopalakrishna Ayyar and find that nothing happened at Chingleput as also
at Maniyachi which created an impression in Gopalakrishna Ayyar that he was being abused and threatened it is difficult to find as to what exactly
were the abusive words that were hurled against Gopalakrishna Ayyar. But the fact remains that the respondent abused and insulted his
opponent''s counsel after the proceedings in the High Court were closed and when both of them left Madras and were on their way to their
respective places.
The contempt proceedings which were started by the respondent against the first petitioner''s maternal grandfather and against Gopalakrishna
Ayyar ultimately came up to the High Court. The charges against them by the respondent were that in connection with the guardianship of his minor
daughter under a proposed marriage, Gopalakrishna Ayyar sent a private communication to the then District Judge, Mr. Koragappa, with the
intention of influencing him and prejudicing him against the respondent and that such conduct amounted to contempt of Court. The application was
disposed of eventually by the High Court by an order passed by the learned Chief Justice and Panchapakesa Ayyar, J., disapproving of the
conduct of Gopalakrishna Ayyar and observing that the action of the advocate and the other respondent was, in the highest degree improper,
which conduct a Court certainly would not countenance and much less encourage.
But the more important point that requires examination is as to whether, assuming that the respondent abused and threatened Gopalakrishna
Ayyar in the terms spoken to by him at Chingleput and Maniyachi, such conduct on the part of the respondent would amount to contempt of
Court; in other words, whether an insult to a counsel in the circumstances of this case would amount to contempt and whether such contempt could
be punished.
In considering the question the following passage from Oswald on Contempt of Committal and Attachment, Page 91, may be relevant:
An insult to counsel may be punished as a contempt. All publications which offend against the dignity of the Court, or are calculated to prejudice
the course of justice, will constitute contempts. Offences of this nature are of three kinds, namely, those which (1) scandalise the Court, or (2)
abuse the parties concerned in causes there, or (3) prejudice mankind against persons before the cause is heard. Under the first head fall libels on
the integrity of the Court, its Judges, officers or proceedings; under the second and third heads anything which tends to excite prejudice against the
parties, or their litigation, while it is pending; for example, attacks on or abuse of a party, not amounting to an interference with the course of
justice, does not, the party being left to his remedy by action.
The decision relied on by Oswald is French v. French (1824) 1 Hog. 138, which appears to be a case of an insult to a counsel while he was
attending in the Master''s office, the insult therefore having been offered within the precincts of the Court. Advocates who appear for the parties
being officers of Court, any abuse or insult or aspersions cast on them, which would interfere with the com se of administration of justice, must
necessarily be held to amount to contempt of Court. A learned Judge of the Nagpur High Court in Telhara Cotton Ginning Co. Ltd. v. Kasinath
Gangadhar Namjoshi I.L.R.(1930) Cal. 884, has observed:
The real end of a judicial proceeding, civil or criminal, is to ascertain the true facts and dispense justice. Various persons have their respective
contributions to make in the proper fulfilment of that task. They are necessarily the Judges or the Magistrates, the parties to the proceedings, or
their agents or pleaders or advocates, the witnesses and the ministerial or menial staff of the Court. All these persons can well be described as the
limbs of the judicial proceedings. For proper administration of justice, it is essential that all these persons are, in the performance of their respective
duties, ensured such fullness of freedom as is fair and legitimate. Anything that tends to curtail or impair the freedom of the limbs of the judicial
proceedings must by necessity result in hampering the due administration of law in interfering with the course of justice. It must, therefore, be held
to constitute contempt of Court.
The learned Judge took the view that all those including clerks and ministerial and menial staff of the Court are necessary limbs of the judicial
proceeding and that any act or conduct which affects the free and unhampered discharge of their respective duties would amount to a hampering of
the due administration of law and interfering with the course of justice and would, therefore, amount to contempt of Court. Whether protection
should be extended to each and every one who is employed in a Court, including the members of the staff, is a matter, however, on which we do
not want to express any opinion; but counsel do form an integral part of the machinery for the administration of justice and any abuse, insult or
aspersions cast on them in the course of the discharge of their duties and which might tend to hamper or interfere with the administration of justice
by deterring them from doing their duty can reasonably be held as amounting to contempt of Court. In Anantalal Singha v. Alfred Henry Watson
I.L.R.(1930) Cal. 884, Rankin, C.J., while holding that comment upon an advocate which has reference to the conduct of his cases may amount to
contempt of Court on exactly the same principle that, while criticism of a judge or even of a judge''s judgment in Court is permissible, criticism is
not permissible if it is made at a time and in such circumstances or is of such a character that it tends to interfere with the due course of justice,
however, on the facts of that case which related to publication in a news paper about an advocate defending a libel action, observed that a Court''s
jurisdiction in contempt is not to be invoked unless there is I real prejudice which can be regarded as a substantial interference with the due course
of justice and that it is not every theoretical tendency that will attract the action of the Court in its very special jurisdiction. He added that the
purpose of the Court''s action is a practical purpose and that it is reasonably clear on the authorities that the Court will not exercise its jurisdiction
upon a mere question of propriety where the tendency of the article to do harm is slight and the character and circumstances of the comment is
otherwise such that it can properly be ignored.
The abuse in the present case was made outside the Court a day after the termination of the proceedings for which the parties had come down
to Madras and whether such abuse made outside the Court would be contempt has also to be decided. In AIR 1945 134 (Privy Council) there
was a remark by the appellant appearing in person, when the counsel for the opposite party suggested that he was misleading the Court and that he
should read out a paragraph in the plaint, that he did not keep back anything at all and that his fault was that he disclosed everything unlike
members of the Bar, who were in the habit of not doing so and misleading the Court. This incident happened at the trial and Lord Goddard in his
judgment observed:
Their Lordships would indeed go further and say that it would have been more consonant with the dignity of the Bar to have ignored a foolish
remark which has been made over and over again not only by the ignorant, but by people who ought to know better, and no doubt will continue to
be made so long as there is a profession of advocacy. To treat such words as requiring the exercise by the Court of its summary powers of
punishment is not only to make a mountain out of a mole hill but to give a wholly undeserved advertisement to what had far better have been
treated as unworthy of either answer or even notice.
The following observations of the learned Law Lord may also be extracted:
It must be rare indeed for words used in the course of argument, however, irrelevant, to amount to a contempt when they relate to an opponent,
whether counsel or litigant. If in the course of a case a person persists in a line of conduct or use of language in spite of the ruling of the presiding
Judge he may very properly be adjudged guilty of contempt of Court, but then the offence is the disregard of the ruling and setting the Court at
defiance. So also, if a litigant or an advocate threatened or attempted violence of the opponent, or conceivably if he used language so outrageous
and provocative as to be likely to lead to a brawl in Court, the offence could be said to have been committed. An insult to counsel or to the
opposing litigant is very, different from an insult to the Court itself or to members of a jury who form part of the tribunal.
It may be observed that the power to punish for contempt being a summary power, its usefulness depends on the wisdom and restraint with
which it is exercised and to use it to suppress methods of advocacy which are merely offensive is to use it for a purpose for which it was never
intended and the Bar can surely maintain its dignity and prestige without having to invoke that jurisdiction. In In re Abdul-Hasan Jauhar I.L.R.
(1926) All. 709 , a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court has held that any conduct that tends to bring the authority of a Court into disrespect or
which amounts to a false and scandalous attack upon the administration of justice or an insult offered to the Judge or the dignity of the Court, even
though it may be after the termination of a pending case, amounts to a contempt of Court and that contempt is not confined to cases which directly
interfere with the administration if justice in a pending case. In that case a pamphlet issued by an unsuccessful litigant referred to a judgment of the
High Court casting aspersions on its impartiality, while observing that the pamphlet in question contained the most scurrilous attack on the whole
administration of justice in the provinces and in particular on the Subordinate Judge, which was calculated to bring the authority and administration
of the law into disrespect and disrepute. Sulaiman, J., with reference to the attack on the plaintiff''s advocate, observed as follows:
I leave aside the attack on the plaintiff''s advocate in this Court, for that in my opinion does not, properly speaking, amount to a contempt of Court.
No authority has been cited in support of the contention that it does, and I think it undesirable to extend the scope of the definition of a contempt of
Court without authority. The insult offered to an advocate not during the trial of a case, but after its termination, cannot be a condemnation of the
system of administration of justice but would amount to a calumny upon an individual. The position of advocates cannot be that of officers of the
Court like Registrars who are appointed by the Court itself. Defamatory statements made against advocates after the termination of a case stand
on quite a different footing from insults offered to such advocates while actually conducting cases. I am, therefore, not prepared to hold that the
libel on the plaintiff''s advocate in this case amounted to a contempt of the High Court.
It does not appear that the Irish decision in French v. French (1824) 1 Hog. 138, was cited before the learned Judges in that case, and even if
that decision was before the learned Judges, we do not think that the view of Sulaiman, J., would have been different in respect of calumny or
abuse made against an advocate outside the Court, since the decision in the Irish case referred to an insult offered in the Master''s Office. In In re
Johnson (1887) 20 Q.B.D. 68, a solicitor, who had attended the hearing of an application before a judge at Chambers in the Royal Court of
Justice, immediately after such hearing and while the parties were on their way from the judge''s room to the entrance gate of the building, made
use of grossly abusive expressions and threatening gestures to the solicitor on the other side in relation to such application, and it was held that such
conduct in relation to proceedings before a judge at chambers was a contempt of Court punishable by attachment. Bowen, L.J., in enunciating the
principle of law which has armed the High Court of Justice with the power and imposed on it the duty of preventing brevi manu and by summary
proceedings any attempt to interfere with the administration of justice, observed:
It is on that ground and not on any exaggerated notion of the dignity of individuals that insults to Judges are not allowed. It is on the same ground
that insults to witnesses or to jurymen are not allowed. The principle is that those who have duties to discharge in a Court of justice are protected
by the law, and shielded on their way to the discharge of such duties, while discharging them, and on their return therefrom, in order that such
persons may safely have resort to Courts of justice.
On the question whether the conduct of the appellant in that case was an infringement of that principle, the learned Judge, stating the facts as to
how the incident occurred immediately after the case was over arid when the parties and the counsel were coming out of the gates of the Court
building, observed that the protection afforded by the law extends to the other officers besides judges acting under the authority of the Court as
representing the Court and that that case could not be urged to be beyond the reach of the Court''s jurisdiction to commit for contempt, so long as
it was interference with the administration of justice.
The facts similar to the present one have arisen in many of the reported cases referred to in which either the abuse or insult or the casting of
aspersions on counsel having happened during the course of a trial, or immediately after the close of the proceedings either in the precincts of the
Court buildings, or allegations and calumny against a counsel having been published in a pamphlet long after the proceedings. It appears to us that
while counsel who are officers of Court and must be considered to be essential limbs in the administration of justice require protection of Courts
from unjustifiable attacks by parties or opposing counsel by the Court''s jurisdiction in punishing for contempt being invoked, it is doubtful whether
such protection and consequent exercise of this summary jurisdiction of Court would become necessary in a case like the present one where the
opponent''s counsel is abused and threatened two days after the termination of the proceedings and the words used or the action taken not having
any special reference to the proceedings which concluded on the 25th May, 1955. While we are prepared to uphold and maintain the dignity of the
Bar and its protection from attacks by way of abuse and insults from pat ties and others which might have the effect of deterring them from
continuing to discharge their duties while Such abuse or insults and casting of aspersions occur during or in relation to a trial of the case itself,
considering that the nature of the jurisdiction vested in the Courts in the matter of punishment for contempt is summary, and has to be used with the
greatest caution and care and only when the ordinary process of law could not be sufficient to give such protection, we consider that to invoke and
exercise this jurisdiction in a case like the present one would be extending it to a case which does not legitimately come within its compass. Sir
George Jessel, Master of the Rolls, in In re : Clements, Republic of Costa Rica v. Erlanger (1876) 46 L.J. Ch. 375 , observed:
It seems to me that this jurisdiction of committing for contempt, being practically arbitrary and unlimited, should be most jealously and carefully
watched, and exercised, if I may say so, with the greatest reluctance and the greatest anxiety on the part of Judges, to see whether there is no other
mode which can be brought to bear upon the subject. I say that a Judge should be most careful to see that the cause cannot be fairly prosecuted to
a hearing unless this extreme mode of dealing with persons brought before him on accusations of contempt should be adopted. I have myself had
on many occasions to consider this jurisdiction, and I have always thought that, necessary though it be, it is necessary only in the sense in which
extreme measures are sometimes necessary to preserve men''s rights, that is, if no other pertinent remedy can be found.
Attacks on an Advocate made outside the Court after the termination of the proceedings and having no bearing or relation to the proceedings that
terminated, though might be urged to be as a result of the Advocate having taken part in the proceedings against the opponent who has attacked
him, cannot be considered to be scandalizing the Court or the administration of justice, though Advocates cannot be dissociated from the
machinery constituted, for the administration of justice. From the authoritative pronouncements on the subject of contempt of Court, a distinction is
sought to be made in invoking the jurisdiction of the Court for punishment for its contempt between attacks made or aspersions cast on judges, the
jurors or the officers of Court, like the Registrars and Masters, and Advocates and witnesses who take part in the conduct of cases. Emphasis is
laid on the protection that is required to be afforded to the Court itself or the members of the Jury who form part of the tribunal. Then the
protection that is required to be afforded to the Advocates, counsel or witnesses, and Courts do not ordinarily take cognizance of any abuse or
insult or attack against witnesses and counsel, if such incidents occur outside the Courts and do not arise during the trial or within the precincts of
the Court buildings or soon after the proceedings are over, when alone such incidents can be directly traced to the proceedings that were
conducted in the Court.
In the present case, it cannot be said that the respondent had any immediate provocation consequent on the result of the orders passed by the
Vacation Judge on C.M.P. No. 3726 of 1955 in C.M.A. No. 123 of 1955. As the orders passed varying the orders of the learned Subordinate
Judge appointing an independent receiver were in favour of the respondent, since the independent receiver was removed in respect of an important
item of property and the respondent himself appointed receiver, that order cannot be said to be an adverse order against the respondent, and, in
our view that order was more in favour of the respondent than against him. The abuse and the threatening language used by the respondent against
Gopalakrishna Ayyar on the Chingleput platform and at Maniyachi railway station cannot be, therefore, in any way connected to the proceeding
that terminated in the High Court a day or two before. Golpalakrishna Ayyar says that at Chingleput the respondent should at him and saying ""what
worse thing do you intend doing to me"" hurled obscene and unprintably vulgar abuse at him and threatened him. That is indicative of the feelings
that existed between the respondent and Gopalakrishna Ayyar and ordinarily a counsel should not incur such ill feelings from his opponent if he
was merely discharging his duty by his client whose interest he is bound to safeguard. But if the past history of this litigation is examined, the part
which Gopalakrishna Ayyar took on behalf of the respondent''s wife and children, especially his writing a letter to the District Judge, his interview
on a holiday and complaining about the respondent with reference to the marriage of his daughter, cannot be considered to be legitimately within
the province of an Advocate who has been engaged to appear in certain: proceedings pending between the respondent and his wife and children in
Tirunelveli and elsewhere, and it might have created an impression in the respondent that but for the interference of Gopalakrishna Ayyar, who is a
leading Advocate in Tirunelveli, and his taking a personal interest in the family affairs against him, there would not have been any cause for the
disruption in the respondent''s family, and ill feelings would not have reached such a stage as to result in a continued litigation in the family.
Professional duty and etiquette does not require that kind of personal interest to be bestowed on their clients and their cases. They are expected to
take such interest and bestow such attention as is absolutely necessary to do justice to the case entrusted to them. The impression formed in the
respondent about the personal interest taken by Gopalakrishna Ayyar in the affairs of his family against him might be responsible for the outburst of
temper which he exhibited at Chingleput and Maniyachi. While we do not in the least approve of-the conduct of the respondent in abusing his
opponent''s counsel but on the other hand express our extreme displeasure at it whatever justification there might have been for the arousing of
feelings in him, for the purpose of the present proceedings however it is difficult to hold that the conduct of the respondent amounts strictly to
contempt of Court.
It is argued that the respondent is a very powerful and wealthy man in Tirunelveli and has also been in possession of a revolver and that
Gopalakrishna Ayyar might reasonably apprehend that the threats which the respondent gave might not be empty ones but might be carried into
effect and that might have the effect of deterring him from doing his duty by his clients. The fact, however, cannot be ignored that both
Gopalakrishna Ayyar and the respondent belong to Tirunelveli and they must be expected to have known their respective positions in the society
and it is not as if Gopalakrishna Ayyar could not have had knowledge of the influential position which the respondent occupies in the district and
since with full knowledge he accepted an engagement to appear against him, we do not think that this vulgar abuse by the respondent in any way
could deter him from doing his strict duty. It is needless to emphasise and reiterate that the jurisdiction of the Court for committing for contempt
being a weapon in its hands which should be sparingly used, it is not without much anxiety and deep consideration that a Court should come to the
conclusion as to whether a particular conduct amounts to contempt of Court. In the circumstances in which the incidents took place in the present
case, it cannot be suggested that there is no other suitable or appropriate remedy available to Gopalakrishna Ayyar and that the only way of
securing justice between the parties is to invoke this extraordinary power which the Court possesses in regard to the punishment for contempt of
Court.
In the result, while we view with utter disapproval and condemn the conduct of the respondent in relation to Gopalakrishna Ayyar, we do not
consider that the facts of this case warrant any action, and we, therefore, dismiss the applications.