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Judgment
K. Chandru, J.—The petitioner was working as a Police Constable at Maduravoyal Police Station. Subsequently, he was transferred to
Cuddalore District. A charge memo was framed against the petitioner in P.R. 182/92 under Rule 3(b) of the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate
Service (D & A) Rules. After enquiry, the petitioner was imposed with the punishment of reduction in time scale of pay by two stages for one year
without cumulative effect by the first respondent dated 07.12.1993.
The petitioner preferred a statutory appeal to the second respondent raising several grounds. A copy of the appeal memo was found in pages
19 to 24 of the additional typed set of papers. However, the second respondent by the impugned order dated 05.07.1994 dismissed the appeal
and recorded as follows:
I have looked diligently for evidence in favour of the representation of the appellant PC, but we have not come across it in his appeal. I therefore
feel illegitimate to disturb the order passed by the Superintendent of Police, The appeal is rejected.
The petitioner filed O.A. No. 6528 of 1998 before the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal, challenging the original order as well as the order of
the appellate authority.
On notice from the Tribunal, the first respondent has filed a reply affidavit dated 17.05.1999. In response to the allegation made in para 6(b)
that the appellate authority did not apply his mind, in paragraph 5 of the reply affidavit, it was averred as follows:
It is submitted that the punishing authority while passing orders in the P.R. has clearly stated in para 4 of the order that the delinquency
committed by the applicant was held proves beyond all reasonable doubt through statements of PW1 to 3 and the prosecution exhibits. It is
therefore denied that the order was a non speaking order. Similarly the appellate authority has rejected the appeal only after carefully going through
the appeal petition, the minute and other relevant records. So it is incorrect to say that the appellate has not considered whether the punishment
was adequate or otherwise. If the punishment was considered excessive, the appellate authority would have minimized the gravity and on the other
hand it. It was felt inadequate a show cause notice would have been issued to him calling for his explanation as to why the punishment should not
be enhanced. In the absence of such things, it is crystal clear that the appellate authority felt that the punishment awarded to the applicant was
adequate. The applicant should in fact thank his stars that he has been let off with a minor punishment. Hence the order of punishment is not liable
to be quashed.
In view of the abolition of the Tribunal, the matter stood transferred to this Court and was re-numbered as W.P. No. 39009 of 2006.
Mr. K. Venkatramani, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that justification of the order of the appellate authority by
the first respondent is wholly erroneous and contrary to the statutory rules made in Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service (D & A) Rules. The
relevant rule relating to appeal reads as follows:
Rule 6- (1) In the case of an appeal against an order imposing any penalty specified in Rule 2, the appellate authority shall consider:
(a) Whether the facts on which the order was based have been established;
(b) Whether the facts established afford sufficient ground for taking action; and
(c) Whether the penalty is excessive, adequate or inadequate and after such consideration, shall pass orders
If the impugned order is seen in the above context, certainly it will show that the second respondent, being the appellate authority failed to
discharge his appellate powers and he has not followed the Rules in this regard. The Supreme Court vide its judgment in Chairman, Disciplinary
Authority, Rani Lakshmi Bai Kshetriya Gramin Bank Vs. Jagdish Sharan Varshney and Others, has held that if an appellate authority even if he
agrees with the disciplinary authority, he must give reasons for agreeing with the same.
Therefore, in the light of the above, the order passed by the second respondent dated 05.07.1994 is set aside and the matter is remitted back to
the second respondent. The second respondent is directed to pass appropriate orders in accordance with the Rules and after giving notice to the
petitioner. The said exercise shall be made within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
The writ petition will stand allowed to the extent indicated above. No costs.