Md. Asraful Islam vs The State Of West Bengal & Ors.

Ravi Krishan Kapur, J.:

This is an appeal against an order and judgment dated 26 September 2025 dismissing the writ petition by refusing to interfere with the penalty imposed and only stalling the suspension order against the appellant.

Briefly, the appellant is a license holder for a fair price shop dealer at plot no.1502, JL no.65, Khatian no.44, Mouza-Gopalpur, P.S.-Baishnabnagar, District-Malda. The challenge in this writ petition is directed against a show cause notice dated 12 February 2024 which culminated in the order dated 30 July 2024 passed by the Sub-Divisional Controller Food and Supply (SCFS), Malda and the Appellate order by the District Controller, Food and Supplies (DCFS) dated 17 September 2024 upholding the penalty order and finding the appellant guilty of violating the provisions of the West Bengal Public Distribution System (Maintenance and Control) Order, 2013.

Initially, the SCFS Malda had issued a show cause notice dated 6 September 2022, alleging that the appellant did not perform the Duare Ration and did not issue transaction slips to the rationees. By a response dated 12 September 2022, the appellant refuted the allegations in the show cause notice. Despite such response, the appellant was directed to pay a fine of Rs.20,000/- which the appellant paid. Subsequently, the SCFS issued another show cause notice dated 12 February 2024 alleging that upon an enquiry held on 2 November 2023 and 3 November 2023 respectively, it transpired that most of the family members i.e. the recipients did not recognize in whose favour cards have been issued and many cards had been issued in Form IV. In addition, to the deactivated beneficiaries there were also gross irregularities and fraud in the distribution system followed by the appellant. It was also alleged that there was violation of clause 19A of the West Bengal Public Distribution System (Maintenance and Control) order, 2013. In such circumstances, the appellant was ultimately charged with black marketing, misappropriation and siphoning of huge quantities of food grains. By a response dated 21 February 2024, the appellant duly replied to such show cause notice and disputed all allegations. It was alleged that upon an enquiry being caused on 2 November 2023, the appellant came to learn of the complaint. The appellant had no role in registering the new cards and this was exclusively in the control of the State respondents. The appellant was also unaware of the families of the card holders and had not received any physical cards. All allegations of black marketing and misappropriation were also disputed.

On 20 May 2024, the SCFS gave a personal hearing to the appellant and sought for a reply whether the appellant recognized the 323 card holders or not. The SCFS also made enquiries as to whether the appellant had e-pos slips or cash memos and whether the appellant had copies prior to the implementation of delivery through e-pos machine. In this background, even though the first show cause notice had not been concluded, the SCFS unusually issued a second show cause notice on 22 June 2024 incorporating all the allegations made in the earlier show cause notice and included a charge of shortfall of 4 quintal 37 kgs. 610 grams in the stock of rice as per another enquiry report dated 25 June 2024. By its reply dated 4 July 2024, the appellant denied the allegations made in the show cause notice dated 26 June 2024. It was contended by the appellant that he was not responsible for non receipt of physical cards and had delivered food grains on the basis of Biometric Aadhar Authentication through e-pos machines. All allegations of black marketing and misappropriation were disputed. The SCFS heard to the appellant on 12 July 2024 and passed a final order dated 30 July 2024 imposing a penalty of Rs.7,85,61,044/- on the appellant.

Being aggrieved by the order dated 30 July 2024, the appellant preferred a statutory appeal on 5 August 2024. The DCFS granted a hearing to the appellant on 30 September 2024 and passed an order on 17 September 2024 confirming the order dated 30 July 2024 finding that the petitioner was guilty of violating the Control Order 2013. Strangely, despite the order of the DCFS granting a period of 10 days to the appellant before any further action could be taken, the SCFS on the next day i.e. 18 September 2024 suspended the appellant’s dealership with immediate effect.

By the impugned order dated 25 September 2025, the Learned Single Judge while disposing of the writ petition inter alia stalled the suspension order but did not interfere with the penalty order dated 30 July 2024. Hence, this appeal.

It is contended on behalf of the appellant that the charges levelled in the show cause notice dated 26 June 2024 were vague and based on conjectures. The complaint on the basis of which show cause notice was issued had never been served on the appellant. An enquiry had been conducted in respect of deactivated ration cards behind the back of the appellant and the appellant had no opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. In passing the impugned order, the SCFS travelled beyond the charges alleged in the show cause notice and the appellant did not get a chance to defend the same. This was in violation of the principles of natural justice. No documents nor records which had been relied on by the State authorities were served on the appellant. Neither did the appellant have an opportunity to prepare an effective defence. There were also no reasons in the impugned order. In such circumstances, the impugned order is unsustainable and is liable to be set aside.

It is well settled that judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision has been made. The power of judicial review is meant to ensure that an individual receives fair treatment and not to assail the conclusion arrived at by the authority. The Writ Court while exercising judicial review does not act as an Appellate Authority in re-appreciating the evidence or in arriving at its own independent findings on the evidence. However, one of the grounds for interference by the Writ Court is when the order impugned has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. [B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India (1995) 6 SCC 749].

The impugned order dated 17 September 2024 after merely recording all the facts concludes as “……..Under the above circumstances, it has been established that the dealer has committed an offence of misappropriation and siphoning of huge quantity of food grains meant for public distribution against ration cards issued from 2015 onwards until 2022, which are currently deactivated.”

There are simply no reasons in the impugned order. There is no consideration of the evidence relied on by the authorities which passed the impugned order. There is no discussion as to what were the circumstances which weighed with the Appellate Authority which passed the impugned order. The evidence has neither been discussed nor is there any no basis as to how damages have been arrived at.

The impugned order needed to meet the twin test of “why” and “what”. It is the “why” which sustains the “what”. Reasons are the safeguard against the ipse dixit of the decision making process. They discuss how the mind of the Adjudicator has been applied to the matters in issue and conveys the nexus between the matters which have been considered and the conclusion based thereon. The justification and the reasonableness of a conclusion depend on the reasons given in support thereof. Centuries ago Sir, Edward Coke had remarked “Reason is the life of the law…”. The orders impugned have no element of “why” for the “what” therein to stand on and that is a serious infirmity in the impugned order. (Uniworth Resorts Limited and Ajay Prakash Lohia vs. Ashok Mittal & Ors. (2008) 1 CalLT 1.).

“Cutting, copying and pasting has been repeatedly frowned up by our Courts. A prolific use of the “cut-copy-paste” function is not a substitute for substantive reasoning which, in the ultimate analysis, is the defining feature of the judicial process. Reasons constitute the soul of a judicial decision. Without them one is left with a shell.” (Union Public Service Commission vs. Bibhu Prasad Sarangi, (2021) 4 SCC 516 at Para. 5.).

It is true that an order of affirmation need not contain elaborate reasoning as an order of reversal but that does not mean that the order of affirmation need not contain any reasons at all. Whether there has been any application of mind or not can only be disclosed by reasons, at least in summary, mentioned in the order of the Appellate Authority. The circumstances needed to be explained, discussed or enumerated. The order must contain some reasons, so that one can know whether the Appellate Authority had applied its mind while affirming the order under appeal. (The Disciplinary Authority. [Divisional]. Forest Officer v. Madhusudhan Rao (2008) 3 SCC 469 at para 20, and M.P. Industries Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1966 SC 671, Siemens Engg. & Mfg. Co. of India Ltd. v. Union of India (1976) 2 SCC 981].

In the instant case, the order of the Appellate Authority does not contain any reason and hence does not disclose any application of mind. The purpose of disclosure of reasons is that people must have confidence in the judicial or quasi-judicial authorities. It was obligatory for the Appellate Authority to disclose reasons. Unless reasons are disclosed, how can a person know whether the authority has applied its mind or not? It is the furnishing of reasons which minimises the chance of arbitrariness. Thus, it is an essential requirement of the Rule of Law that some reasons, at least in brief, must be disclosed in a judicial or quasi-judicial order, even if it is an order of affirmation. [S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 594]. In Sailesh Bhansali vs. Alok Dhir and Others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 512 it has been held as follows:

It also well settled that an authority cannot be permitted to improve or supplement an order by additional documents or providing explanations at a later stage. The impugned order must stand on its own. It is impermissible to supplement or supplant reasons in the impugned order in such a circuitous manner. [Mohinder Singh Gill & Anr. vs. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & Ors. (1978) 1 SCC 405 @ Para 8].

Significantly, this aspect of the matter has neither been considered nor addressed in the impugned order and that is a fatal infirmity which vitiates the impugned order.

In view of the above, the order dated 17 September 2024 passed by the Appellate Authority is unsustainable on the ground of non furnishing of reasons and is set aside. The consequential communication dated 18 September 2024 being the suspension notice is also set aside.

To this extent, MAT 1839 of 2025 stands allowed. The impugned order and judgment dated 26 September 2025 is set aside. The matter is remanded to the District Controller, Food and Supplies, Malda to consider the matter afresh and furnish reasons in disposing of the appeal. It is made clear that there has been no finding on the merits and all issues are left open for the District Controller (DCFS) to decide in accordance with law. It is expected that the appeal would be disposed of positively within a month from the date of communication of this order. In default, the appellant shall automatically be entitled to restoration of its license. Both parties are directed to forthwith communicate this order to the DCFS. In view of the above, MAT 1839 of 2025 alongwith the stay application CAN 1 of 2025 stands disposed of.

I agree,