Mathew alias Sunny vs State of Kerala

Hidayatullah, J.—The Appellant, Mathew alias Sunny, has been convicted by the High Court of Kerala u/s 302 of the Indian Penal Code, and sentenced to death. He was previously tried and acquitted by the Additional Sessions Judge, Mavelikkara, and hence this appeal has been brought to this Court under Article 134(1)(a) of the Constitution. The facts of the case are as follows: Sunny was married to Ammal the deceased, in 1951. After their marriage, the couple resided at Melamparambil House with the Appellant's father, Dr. Markose, who was a retired Medical Government servant but who was carrying on some private practice. Three children were born of this marriage, and it appears, that the husband and wife lived happily till a third party appeared on the scene. Sunny was employed as a Lecturer in St. Berchman's College, Changanacherry. Later, he opened a Tutorial College of his own, called Sunny's Tutorial College, which, it appears, brought him a large income. The employers of Sunny natuarally did not like him to divide his attention between his Tutorial College and his employment. They accordingly dispensed with his services. Thereafter, Sunny continued his Tutorial College with some success. In his Tutorial College, there used to attend a student by name Lizzy (P.W. 12), with whom Sunny developed an illicit intimacy. This Lizzy was studying in St. Joseph's College in Alleppey, some 30 miles away from Thiruvalla, where the Tutorial College was situated.Sunny and Lizzy used to meet together, it appears that Sunny took her to various places where the two resided as man and wife. They used to correspond in letters, which were written in simple Code.

In January 1957, Ammal went away to reside with her brother (P.W. 33) and mother. She went for the purpose of preparing for the Intermediate Examination of the Ajmer Board. She also took training in shorthand and typewriting under P.W. 22. Meanwhile, the letters of Sunny and Lizzy were intercepted by the St. Joseph's College authorities. Some of these letters and also a letter written by Sunny to Lizzy which had not been posted, fell into the hands of his wife. Ammal returned to the Melamparambil House sometime in October 1957. Sunny appears to have joined her on her way back to Ernakulam, and both got down from the boat at Vycome. They then went to live again at the Melamparambil House. In November 1957, Dr. Markose, the father of the Appellant, sent a letter, Ext. P. 3, to the Principal of the St. Joseph's College, requesting that Lizzy should be asked to break off her relations with his son. In the same month, on the 27th, Ammal went to the College, and met Lizzy. Though Ammal had promised to the Principal and the Warden that she would behave herself, she apparently lost her temper and slapped Lizzy. Both the Principal and the Warden depose that Ammal soon regained her composure, and apologised to the girl. Later the College authorities persuaded Lizzy to write a letter, Ext. P. 38, in which Lizzy requested Sunny to forget her. That letter was probably not sent. On November 28, 1957, Lizzy however, wrote to a common friend, Ammukutty (P.W. 15), about the slap she had received from Ammal. The scene now takes us to December 22, 1957, when the occurrence took place.

At about 10 a.m. on that day, Sunny started to go out in his car. Ammal, who previously had not allowed Sunny to go out alone anywhere, not even to the Tutorial College, promptly sat in the car, without even caring to change her house clothes into day clothes. They then went over to the house of Ammukutty's husband (P.W. 31), who it appears, surreptitiously handed over a letter of Lizzy to Sunny. Ammal remained seated in the car, and when the couple wanted to start back for the Melamparambil House, it was found that she had pulled out all the ignition wires and rendered the vehicle immovable. A mechanic had to be sent for to put the car in order, and the couple returned to the House at about 4 p.m.

Soon afterwards, Sunny retreated to the privy to read the letter while Ammal had flung herself on a bed to rest. Ammal having sensed something, went to the latrine, and found Sunny reading the letter. She demanded the letter from him, and on his refusal, wanted to get it. It appears and it is not denied that Sunny retreated into one room after another and closed the doors. The prosecution case is that Ammal managed to enter that room, and again asked for that letter. The defence is that Ammal demanded the letter from a window, which Sunny also shut. The prosecution and the defence versions thereafter vary. According to the prosecution version, Sunny ran to the car shed in front of his house, followed by Ammal. From there two shots were heard, and when people arrived on the scene, Ammal was lying wounded in the car shed between the car and the end wall. Ammal is then stated to have said that she had been wounded by Sunny. The defence, on the other hand, is that after Ammal was not given the letter and the window was shut in her face, she went to the car shed and two shots were heard. Sunny says that on his arrival there, he found his wife lying wounded in front of the car inside the shed and he said to his wife "Ammu, why have you done this?".

It is common case that Dr. Markose took away the revolver and locked it in a drawer of his table. The prosecution case, further, is that Dr. Markose also tried to strike Sunny with his stick which he avoided, and the blow fell upon the car. Thereafter, Dr. Markose asked a neighbour to bring a car, and a car not having been brought, Sunny offered to take Ammal in his own car to the hospital. Sunny then with the assistance of P.W. 10, put Ammal in the back seat of the car, and they drove first to the G.K. Hospital about 3/4th of a mile away. There, the doctor was not found, and as the compounder was unable to do anything, they drove to the Government Hospital, but on the way, Ammal died at about 5-30 p.m. They, therefore, returned to the house, and Animal's body was put on a cot, while no further action appears to have been taken either by Sunny or Dr. Markose. At 6-15 p.m. the maternal uncle of the deceased (P.W. 1) reported the matter to the police, and investigation thereafter began.

The two Courts below have differed in their appraisal of the evidence. The Additional Sessions Judge was of the opinion that the circumstances of the case were not incompatible with Ammal having committed suicide, and he, therefore, gave the benefit of the doubt to the Appellant. The High Court, on the other hand, felt that the circumstances of the case excluded the possibility of suicide, and that, therefore, the Appellant was guilty. Before us, the only question argued is whether the High Court was correct in reversing the finding of fact given by the Additional Sessions Judge.

There are no eye-witness to the occurrence. The decision of the case, therefore, rests upon an examination of all the circumstances attending this death. It is apparent, however, that there was a motive for Sunny to shoot his wife, who was becoming a burden to him in his illicit connection with Lizzy, with whom he wished to continue his relations. From the letters which have been produced in this Court and which were de-coded in the Courts below, it is quite clear that the Appellant was infatuated with Lizzy, though at times he evinced feelings for his wife. The Appellant appears to be a man who was somewhat over-sexed, because all his letters to Lizzy, deal not only with the higher aspects of love but quite plainly with its sexual implications. He was in the habit of writing in gross language, expressing his sentiments about love, marriage and sex. To such a person the obstacle of a wife in the successful prosecution of an amour would be a motive sufficient for almost any purpose. On the other hand, the wife, Ammal, appears to have been also a very determined lady. Even with her three children, she was contemplating improving her educational attainments, with a view to carving out an independent carreer. She was also somewhat excitable, as her slapping of Lizzy and the pulling out of the ignition wires clearly show. But it does not appear that she wanted to end her life, or had exhibited any signs of depression and confusion of mind, which precede suicides. She was even preparing to live apart from her husband, because she had undertaken a course of shorthand and typewriting and had even sat for the Intermediate Examination. However it be, the question is still whether she committed suicide, or was murdered.

The prosecution examined a number of witnesses, and we were referred to the evidence of some of them. The household at Melamparambil House consisted of Dr. Markose, his son, the Appellant, and his daughter-in-law, the deceased, and three children. It appears that a boy and a girl were employed as servants in the household. P. Ws. 6 and 7 were those two servants, the former being 15 years of age, and the latter, 12. The evidence consists of these two servants, and there is, in addition, the evidence of another witness, P.W. 3 who was aged 11. These witnesses were not believed by the Additional Sessions Judge, but were relied upon by the High Court. Various arguments were addressed before us to show that we should not accept the testimony of these witnesses.

The evidence also consisted of three experts. They are, the doctor who performed the post-mortem examination, a Professor of Forensic Medicine and a Gunnery Specialist from the Indian Navy. These three persons were examined to show that the nature of the injury on Animal was inconsistent with the theory of suicide, and was compatible only with murder.

When the case was prosecuted, both the Appellant and Dr. Markose were sent for trial, the former on the charge of murder and the latter, for concealing the evidence of the crime, u/s 201 of the Indian Penal Code. Under the orders of the High Court of Kerala, the trial of Dr. Markose was stayed, and Dr. Markose was not either questioned as an accused in the case, or examined as a witness. The investigation was at first carried on by a Circle Inspector, who examined all the witnesses till January 4, 1958. On that day, the Deputy Superintendent of Police (P.W. 36), came on the scene. He examined the witnesses again. The version which P. Ws. 6 and 7 had given to the Circle Inspector was exculpatory of the Appellant. Later, these same witnesses gave versions which supported the prosecution case. The argument has been that the Deputy Superintendent of Police managed to extract false statements from these two witnesses, and, therefore, they should not be believed. In support of this contention, it is pointed out that in spite of the directions contained in Section 160 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, these two witnesses were not examined at their houses but at the Kallisseri Travellers' Bungalow, or at the police station and that their statements in support of their later version should not be accepted. In the course of the cross-examination, numerous passages from their earlier statements to the police were put to these witnesses in an attempt to demonstrate that they had changed their version under the influence of the police and others.

With regard to the expert witnesses, it is stated that their qualifications and experience did not indicate that they had first-hand knowledge of the matters to which they deposed, and that their testimony is therefore unacceptable. It is contended that, from the nature of the wound and the way in which the injury was inflicted, it is reasonable to hold that Ammal committed suicide and therefore, at any rate, the benefit of the doubt ought to have gone to the Appellant, and that the High Court is in error in denying the benefit of the doubt and also in reversing the decision of the Sessions Judge, who had the opportunity of watching the demeanour of the witnesses in the box. No other argument was either advanced or attempted, though, at the end, there was a suggestion that the Appellant did not deserve the extreme penalty of the law, and that The lesser penalty might be imposed.

The first point to consider is whether the oral evidence points to suicide or murder. The first witness who tells us about this occurrence is P.W. 3. He is a student aged 11 years. He was questioned to find out whether he knew the sanctity of the oath, and the Court examined him after satisfying itself that he did so. His evidence is that he lives very close to the Melamparambil House and his father and uncle own a tapioca and sugarcane field. On the day in question, he was present near a cart in which sugarcane was being loaded after bringing it from the field. He was left near the cart to guard it, and he says that at 4 or 4-30 p.m. he saw Sunny and Ammal arriving at the House in the car and going inside the House. The witness goes on to say that he was loitering near the gate of the house, and saw from there that at about 5 p.m. Sunny and Ammal were both running towards the car shed. Thereafter, the witness started going towards the sugarcane field, when he heard a shot. The witness says that he had proceeded 4 or 5 feet when he heard a second shot. Later, the witness met the coolies who were bringing the sugarcane, and he walked to that place where the sugarcane was being loaded in the cart, and he saw a car coming out of the Melamparambil House and going northwards. He saw Sunny and Chakky Kali (P.W. 10) in the car. He does not mention that he had seen Ammal also in the car. Later, he heard that Ammal was shot. He was afraid, and so he went away to his house. It is argued that this boy was a child witness, and that his testimony should not be accepted. The boy was cross-examined at considerable length. We have been taken through the whole of the cross-examination, and we are of opinion, as was the High Court, that he has stood the cross-examination exceedingly well. On a reading of his entire evidence, it does not appear that he has in any way faltered in his replies. He is an intelligent child who gave proper replies even on topics on which it is impossible to think that there could have been any previous coaching.

It is then stated that the house is surrounded by a high wall, that the gate is the only place from where one can look inside the house and that it is most extraordinary that this boy should have been in the line of vision at the crucial moment, to which he deposes. We see nothing extraordinary in this, because the boy has described the place where the cart was stationed, and that place is not at all far from the gate. Children are known not to be still, and it is probable that this boy was moving about and not stationary, and happened to see the incident, to which he deposes. There is no reason suggested why the prosecution should have hit upon such a small boy for the purpose of putting up a false case. It is argued that the Circle Inspector had not examined this witness, and that it was only the Deputy Superintendent of Police, who managed to find him. It is also pointed out that this boy admits that he did not disclose the facts to any one, and it is suggested that there seems to be something unusual in the discovery of this witness. The Deputy Superintendent of Police has explained that he had questioned the labourers who, he understood, were carrying sugarcane from the field to the cart stationed near the Melamparambil House, and had come to know about the presence of this boy at the cart. He, therefore, questioned him and found from him what he had to say. We do not think that this explanation is false, because the existence of witnesses of this type is not known to the investigating authorities at once, but has to be found out from questioning a number of persons.

Now, this witness has only given two facts, which we consider relevant. The first is that he had seen the husband running ahead, chased by his wife towards the car shed, a short time before he heard the first shot. The point on which his testimony is relevant is that the two shots followed within a few seconds of each other. It is contended that the powers of observation of this witness were not great, because when the car went out of the gate northwards, he says he saw only Sunny and Chakky Kali (P.W. 10) in the car, and did not mention Ammal. In our opinion, this does not detract from his testimony, because the car was a small baby Fiat, and Ammal was lying in the Jap of Chakky Kali and was not seated. In fact, if the boy had stated that he had seen Ammal, there would be some reason to doubt his testimony but not when he states, quite frankly, that he saw only two persons. We do not think that this testimony can be rejected either because the witness is of tender age, or because he was not questioned till January 6, 1958. Or even because he was unable to mention the presence of Ammal in the car. He has given a valid reason for his presence at the spot, and though the wall of the house might be high, over which this boy could not see, he says he was right opposite the gate from where, as is admitted by Learned Counsel for the Appellant, the car shed would be visible and was only a short distance away. It is further suggested that the time was near Christmas and many crackers were being let off in celebration or anticipation of Christmas, and that the boy might have heard not these two shots but of some crackers. We are not prepared to accept this suggestion. The boy says that he heard the shots immediately after he had seen the Appellant and his wife entering the car shed, and he has further stated that they came from the side of the car shed. There is no evidence at all to show that at that time any crackers were let off by any person in the neighborhood, and the time at which this witness says he heard these two shots clearly connects the sound with the two shots fired in the car shed.

The time which this witness has given accords with the time given by another witness. Thommi Mathew (P.W. 25) who is a School Master, states that he had gone to the house of Dr. Markose, the father of the Appellant, on December 22, 1957 at 4 p.m. Before he left, one of the children of the Appellant had come and told Dr. Markose that her father and mother were quarrelling. The witness says that he left the Melamparambil House, and had gone half a furlong, when he heard a sound, just like that of crackers. He had taken 5 or 6 steps further, when he heard another sound, just like that of crackers. He went from there to a club and read some papers. Later, he heard that Ammal had been shot and he went over again to the house and saw Ammal lying on a cot. Now, this witness also says that he had taken 4 or 5 steps before the other shot was heard, and he thus corroborates the evidence of the witness, we have just referred to, that the duration between the two shots was not more than 5 seconds.

The testimony of this witness is criticised on various grounds. The first is that he stated that he had seen the car going out of the Melamparambil House and going northwards, but he saw Sunny alone in the car. It is stated before us that this witness's observation was so defective that he did not, see Chakky Kali in the back seat. If he could not see two persons in the car, he could not be relied upon to give the exact time of the sounds and the duration between them. We are not prepared to accept this argument. No doubt the witness did say that he saw Sunny alone in the car; but it appears to us that there was no reason for him to notice the occupants of the car closely. There is nothing to show from what distance he saw the car, and he probably connected the owner of the car with the car, and did not care to see who else was in it. It is next contended that he went to the reading room, and then heard after some considerable time about this incident. It is argued why it was that the witness should have taken so much time to have learnt about the occurrence. We do not think that there is any point in this argument at all. It is unlikely that the information would be conveyed to every person immediately. A person reading a newspaper in a reading room is not likely to hear of the occurrence straightaway. There would be some time lost depending upon who brought the information. We do not, therefore, consider that there is any flaw in the testimony of this witness, and we are satisfied on two points, namely, that before the incident the husband and wife were having some kind of quarrel, news of which was brought by the child to Dr. Markose, and that the two shots took place within a few seconds of each other.

This now takes us to the evidence of P.W. 6, Gopala Panikker Gopinadhan Nair, one of the servants in the household. This witness deposed to the relations between the Appellant and his wife on the one hand, and with Lizzy, on the other. He has stated that ever since the wife came back in October to live at the Melamparambil House, there were incessant quarrels between the two. He has also deposed that his master used to drink always, that on the morning of December 22, 1957 the husband and wife left in the car and came back at about 4 p.m., that thereafter the husband was reading a letter in the latrine, the door of which was not completly closed, and that Ammal came and asked for that letter. He describes how Sunny ran from one room to another and closed the doors, as Ammal went to each door in turn to enter the room where he was, that Ammal managed to get into the room through the attic, and that while he was in the kitchen he heard the sound of a shot from the car shed. After three or four seconds, he heard the sound of another shot. He ran towards the car shed and so did Saraswathy, who was ahead of him. When he reached the dining room, Sunny was seen by him entering the eastern side of the shed with the revolver and going through the northern side of the shed and entering the dining room through the cattle shed. He then went, and entered the car shed, where Dr. Markose also arrived. At that time, Ammal stated, "Chaya (father), Sunny was trying to kill me." The witness next says that Dr. Markose after hearing what Ammal told him, went back to Sunny's room and took the revolver from Sunny's hands and locked it in the table drawer. Dr. Markose then came back to the shed, followed by Sunny and Dr. Markose tried to hit him a blow with the stick in his hand. Sunny evaded the blow, and the stick hit the car. Then, Dr. Markose asked one Ramachandran Pillai to get a car from the neighbourhood; When no car was found, Sunny offered to take Ammal in his car, if his father would not beat him again. He then took Ammal who was placed in the lap of Chakky Kali (P.W. 10). The car returned in 10 or 15 minutes. The witness also states that he had seen the revolver with Sunny, who used to clean it and keep it in the right-hand pocket of the car, and, further, that Ammal was right-handed and did all her work with her right hand.

The witness was cross-examined at length with reference to his previous statement to the Circle Inspector. To him he had given a different version. The cross examination, ex-facie, offends Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in as much as the witness was only questioned what statement he had made to the police and not confronted with the earlier statement, as required by Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act. We do not wish to stress too strongly this legal defect in the case, because it is possible that the earlier statement was, in fact, put to the witness, though no note of it was taken on the deposition sheet. A discussion of the law is also not necessary, because the witness frankly admitted that he had made the previous statements falsely, and that the true statement was the one which he had made on oath in Court. No doubt, the credibility of the witness suffers somewhat from this admission, but it is quite clear to us, on a reading of his statement, that his version in Court was the true one, and further that before the Circle Inspecter, he was trying to shiled his master's son. This conclusion is irresistible, when we examine the circumstances and the total evidence about the incident. It is also argued that he was a boy of tender age and might have been coached; but this cuts either way. There is no reason why this boy should submit to any coaching by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, if the truth was otherwise. The theory of fear of the police cannot be accepted, because, the earlier statement which he had made was also made to the police, and if he was not afraid then, there was no reason to think that he would have been afraid later. In our opinion, the truth was stated by him after he was questioned by the Deputy Superintendent of Police and the influence on his was removed. There is nothing to show that the Deputy Superintendent of Police used any illegal means to make this witness change his version.

The evidence of P.W. 6 is corroborated by P.W. 7 Saraswathy Amma shortly known as Sumathy. Sumathy gave very nearly the same version of the incidents that took place on that afternoon. She also had made a contrary statement before the Circle Inspector which, she admitted, was false for the same reason given by the other witness. The cross-examination of the witness and the criticism of the evidence were along the same lines as in the case of the previous witness. We have already discussed these contentions, and have rejected them, and what we have said before applies also here. It is contended that, at best, P. Ws. 6 and 7 were child witnesses, that they were examined contrary to the provisions of Section 160 of the Code, and that therefore, their testimony should not be accepted. That one of them is a child witness is, no doubt, true; but the boy is aged 15 years and is not exactly a child. They were, no doubt, examined at the Kallisseri Travellers' Bungalow and not at their residence. But it must not be forgotten that they were living at the Melamparambil House, where there was a possibility of their being influenced. Even if there was a breach of the provision of Section 160 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, we do not think that it destroys the evidence given in Court. The provision of law which was breached was introduced more in the interests of the police, against whom allegations of malpractices in respect of women and children of tender age are sometimes made. Even if the provision is for the protection of such witnesses, the fact that the provision was not duly observed does not destroy the testimony in Court completely. We think that, in the circumstances of this case and in view of the fact that P. Ws. 6 and 7 were the servants of the household to which Sunny belonged, even if Section 160 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was not strictly observed, we should regard their testimony with caution, but not with distrust. We have been taken through the evidence of these two witnesses, and we agree with the High Court that it rings true, in spite of the obvious change from one version to another.

The sum total of the oral evidence, therefore, is that the husband and wife were not pulling on well together, that the husband had developed an attachment for Lizzy, and that he was finding it impossible to carry on his intrigue because of the possessiveness of the wife and her close watch on him. It is also apparent that the husband and wife went out in the morning, and that the husband received a letter, presumably from Lizzy. The wife also knew of it, and wanted to possess that letter, which the husband would not allow her to do. There was some manner of quarrel. The revolver was in the car, where the Appellant used to keep it. It is in evidence that he was quite handy with this weapon, which he had once fired in a Bank office through the window to show to his friend, P.K. Mathew (P.W. 16), that it was loaded causing disturbance in the office. It is further clear that Ammal and Sunny were both inside the car shed, and that two shots were fired from that revolver, one of which fatally wounded Ammal. Sunny was also seen emerging from this car shed with the revolver in his hand soon afterwards.

We now proceed to examine the medical evidence. The wound has been described in the inquest report, which was proved by two witnesses as containing an accurate description. The wound was also described by the doctor who has given identical measurements of the wound, its appearance and the marks on the blouse and the bodice of Ammal. The only difference is that while bodice is described as being 11/2 inch in diameter in the other it is described as being 1/2 inch in diameter. We think that this is due to a faulty observation, and that the doctor's observation was probably more accurate. Except for this the descriptions are almost identical. The wound of the entry was situated in the fourth intercostal space and the track of the bullet was downwards across the body to the 12th vertibra. The bullet had traversed through the lung, the liver, the diaphragm, and had lodged itself in the tissues of the back so as to be palpable from the outside. Two significant facts about this injury were that the angle of the track of the bullet was at 45 degrees to the wall of the chest, and that it was situated 1 1/5 inches to the right from the middle line of the chest. The burning on the blouse and the bodice and the scorching of 1/10th inch round the hole of entry were emphasised before us to show that the range was small, and Books on Ballistics. Firearms and Medical Jurisprudence were cited to show that the range could not be beyond 6 inches. It is argued that Dr. Dominic (P.W. 11) was wrong when he stated that the distance between the body and the end of the barrel must have been between 1 to 2 feet. His evidence, we were asked, to reject on this account, and it is also contended that the description of the track by him could not be accepted as decisive, because a bullet was likely to be deflected by coming into contact with skin and even soft tissues. No cross-examination was directed to find out whether the track of the bullet exhibited any deflection which would warrant the assumption that it had been deflected. The bullet in its flight passed through exceedingly soft organs like the lung, the liver and the diaphragm, and does not appear to have touched a bone. The revolver appears to have been fired directly against the body, and it is impossible to think that the bullet would have been deflected in those circumstances. The bullet must either meet with resistence, or hit at an angle to cause deflection. It does not appear that there was any such evidence in the case.

There is also the evidence of Dr. M. Thankavelu, M.D., Professor of Pathology and Forensic Medicine in the Medical College, Trivandrum, who also was of opinion that the situation of the wound, distance etc., were incompatible with suicide. This was supported by Lt. Commander S. Mathews (P.W. 35), Gunnery Specialist of the Indian Navy. He also gave the approximate distance of the barrel from the body as 1 to 2 feet. He stated that he had seen some cases of suicide with firearms, and had specialised training in both the small and big weapons. He was also of the opinion that the angle of the flight of the bullet did not show that it was a case of suicide.

We do not think that we can take the evidence of these witnesses as conclusive of a fact which the Court has to decide for itself. We, therefore, do not accept the evidence of these witnesses, in so far as they deposed that this was a case of murder and not of suicide. If we accepted the opinion as evidence the case would really be taken from the hands of the Court and placed in the hands of witnesses. However, the witnesses have given reasons for reaching this conclusion, and these reasons, in our opinion, are facts, which have been proved by the doctor, who performed the autopsy, and we are, therefore, in a position to decide for ourselves whether the case is one of suicide or murder.

The most important points to bear in mind in this connection are the angle at which the shot was fired and the place where the bullet hit. We have seen that Ammal was a right-handed person, and it would be extraordinary for her to attempt to shoot herself on the right side of her chest with her right hand. Suicides select either the right temple or put barrel in the mouth or shoot themselves in the region of the heart. There might be cases in which a person might commit suicide by shooting himself with a rifle in his right chest, working the trigger with his big toe. But, for a woman to work a double action revolver held within a few inches to the right side of her chest and to shoot down at an angle of 45 degrees would be impossible. The elbow in this position would have to be elevated considerably, and the index finger of the hand would lack the necessary pull to work a double action revolver. This, the, Learned Counsel for the Appellant conceded, though half-heartedly. He, however, stated that it was still possible for a suicide to work the revolver with the thumb of the right hand, holding the revolver in the palm of the left hand. It seems to us that though such a possibility is not entirely excluded, it is impossible to think that this is a reasonable conclusion in the circumstances of this case. Ammal, if she was bent on doing away with herself and was accustomed to the use of fireams (the revolver) would have shot herself in some other way and not in this extraordinary manner. Further, there would have been a scorching of the left hand from the flash, and the barrel of the revolver would have kicked up and the track of the bullet would not have been so steep inside the body. These circumstances do not fit in with the theory of suicide, and lend considerable support to the oral evidence, which we have discussed. The range from which the shot was fired is of no consequence, because though in the case of a suicide a long range might rule suicide out, a short range in a case of murder cannot be so eliminated. A murderer can fire the revolver at his victim at almost any range. Then, there is a very significant circumstance that two very quick shots within a few seconds of each other were fired. It may be pointed out that in spite of a most thorough search extending over 2 or 3 days, the other bullet was not found, and it is obvious that it was fired so as to go outside the car shed. Suicides do not fire a practice shot, if they want to do away with themselves. The first shot must have been an ineffective one, and if the first shot wounded Ammal, situated where it was, it is impossible to think that she could have fired the second. A murderer, on the other hand, might fire the first shot to deter his victim and the second effectively but it is not reasonable to hold that Ammal would fire the first shot ineffectively and within a few seconds, a second shot effectively on her person.

Considering the fact that Sunny was very handy with the revolver and had once fired in the air to demonstrate that it was loaded, we are convinced that when Ammal chased him into the car shed, he first fired through the open portion of the car shed to put her off, and when he found that he had not scared her, he fired the second shot at close range on her person and with fatal effect.

There were compelling reasons in this case for the High Court to interfere. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, in our opinion, overlooked many of the vital circumstances, and rejected the oral testimony of the witnesses merely because they had changed their versions. He also failed to appreciate the evidence of wound, etc. as found on the body of the victim, to which we have referred and the circumstances in which the difference between the husband and wife arose that afternoon. He should have seen that the wife had no reason to commit suicide in this way suddenly, while the husband had motive to fire at the wife, who was very pressing in her demands for the letter. In our opinion the High Court took a correct view of the circumstances of this case, and rightly interfered with the acquittal, which was clearly erroneous.

We accordingly confirm the finding given by the High Court, and hold that the Appellant was rightly convicted u/s 302 of the Indian Penal Code. As regards the sentence, there is hardly any mitigating circumstance. The conduct of Ammal was entirely correct though she was somewhat possessive by nature, which is not blame worthy in a wife with three small children. We see no reason to interfere with the sentence passed by the High Court. The appeal fails, and is dismissed.