Manzoor Ahmad Teeli vs State Of Jammu And Kashmir & Ors.

JUSTICE RITU TAGORE, MEMBER [JUDL.]

The present Transfer Application has its genesis in SWP No. 1814/2017, originally instituted before the Hon’ble High Court of Jammu and Kashmir. The applicant seeks, primarily, quashing of SRO-177 dated 20.06.2014 to the extent it amended the definition of “family member” under the Jammu and Kashmir Compassionate Appointment Rules, 1994 (SRO-43 of 1994), by providing that an adopted son or adopted daughter would be included only in respect of communities in whose case adoption is permissible under law. The applicant also Central Administrative Tribunal^{challenges communication No. PHE/Estt/11033-34 dated} 24.07.2017, whereby his claim for compassionate appointment under SRO-43 of 1994 was rejected on the ground that he was an adopted son and adoption was not recognized under Muslim Personal Law. The applicant consequently seeks a direction to the respondents to appoint him on compassionate grounds under SRO-43 of 1994 and to extend to him the same treatment as allegedly extended to similarly situated persons.

The case of the applicant, in brief, is that he was adopted by Bashir Ahmad Teeli of Khiram when he was an infant and was brought up by him as his son. Bashir Ahmad Teeli was serving as an Assistant Lineman in the Public Health Engineering Department and died in harness on 13.07.2010. The applicant relies upon a Will deed stated to have been executed by the deceased on 29.07.2003, in which the applicant was described as his adopted son and was declared entitled to inherit his movable and immovable properties. The applicant further relies upon Central Administrative Tribunal^{the various revenue and official records in which he has} been described as the adopted son of Bashir Ahmad Teeli.

Following the death of the deceased employee, the applicant sought compassionate appointment under SRO-43 of 1994. The concerned Executive Engineer requested issuance of a legal heir/dependency certificate for processing his case. The Deputy Commissioner, Anantnag thereafter issued an income/dependency certificate dated 12.01.2011 showing Mst. Haseena, wife of the deceased, and the applicant, described as the adopted son, as the dependents of the deceased. The age of the applicant was subsequently corrected by corrigendum dated 08.12.2011. The applicant has also placed on record a succession certificate issued by the District Judge, Anantnag, under which the widow of the deceased was held entitled to one-eighth share and the remaining amount in respect of the debts/securities mentioned therein was shown in favor of the applicant.

The record further shows that the applicant’s case was Central Administrative Tribunal^{processed at the departmental level. The Superintending} Engineer, Hydraulic Circle, Anantnag forwarded the case to the Chief Engineer along with the relevant documents, including the dependent certificate, application, affidavit, adoption deed and other documents, for further necessary action. The case, however, was ultimately returned by the Chief Engineer vide communication No. PHE/Estt/11033-34 dated 24.07.2017, stating that the Administrative Department had intimated that an adopted son was not recognized under Muslim Personal Law and that the applicant, being an adopted son of the deceased, was not covered under the rules governing compassionate appointment.

The applicant assails the aforesaid rejection primarily on the ground that his adoptive father died in 2010 and his claim was made within the prescribed period when the un-amended SRO-43 of 1994 was in force. According to the applicant, the definition of “family member” under the original SRO-43 expressly included an adopted son and Central Administrative Tribunal^{adopted daughter and, therefore, he acquired a vested right} to compassionate appointment which could not subsequently be taken away by SRO-177 dated 20.06.2014. It is further contended that the explanation appended to SRO-177, directing that pending cases be decided in accordance with the amended notification, cannot operate retrospectively to the prejudice of a right which had already accrued to the applicant.

Learned counsel for the applicant has also relied upon the Will deed, the dependency certificate, the succession certificate and other official documents to contend that the applicant was throughout recognized by the authorities as the adopted son and dependent of the deceased employee. It is submitted that the respondents themselves processed his case under SRO-43 of 1994 and forwarded the same for consideration. It is argued that the applicant cannot now be denied the benefit merely by relying upon the subsequent amendment.

Another limb of the applicant’s argument is founded upon Central Administrative Tribunal^{Article 14 of the Constitution. It is contended that several} adopted sons and daughters have allegedly been granted compassionate appointment under SRO-43 of 1994 and that denial of similar treatment to the applicant amounts to hostile discrimination. According to learned counsel, the distinction introduced by SRO-177 between communities in which adoption is permissible and those in which it is not permissible has no rational nexus with the object of compassionate appointment, which is to provide succour to the family of a deceased Government employee.

Learned counsel has also submitted that the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Service Regulations contain a broader concept of “family” and that SRO-43 of 1994, being a special scheme, should prevail over the general provisions of the service regulations. It is further contended that the Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 2007 cannot be invoked to defeat the applicant’s claim, particularly when the adoption and the Will relied upon by him predate the said enactment. In Central Administrative Tribunal^{support of his contentions, learned counsel for the} applicant has relied upon the decision rendered by a sister Bench of this Tribunalin T.A. No. 8596 of 2020, Ubaid Latif v. Director, Civil Secretariat, J&K & Ors., decided on 13.11.2024. Learned counsel has prayed that the present case be decided in the light of observations made in the aforesaid judgement.

Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents has opposed the Transfer Application. It is submitted that compassionate appointment is an exception to the normal rule of recruitment and cannot be claimed as a matter of right or inheritance. According to the respondents, eligibility must be determined strictly in accordance with the governing scheme.

The respondents submit that the applicant belongs to the Muslim community and that adoption, in the legal sense in which it creates a relationship equivalent to that of a natural-born child, is not recognized under the applicable Muslim Personal Law. It is contended that after the Central Administrative Tribunal^{coming into force of the Jammu and Kashmir Muslim} Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 2007, matters relating to succession, inheritance and other matters governed by Muslim Personal Law are to be decided in accordance with Shariat. The respondents accordingly contend that the applicant cannot claim the status of a legally recognized adopted son merely on the basis of a private adoption arrangement or a Will.

The respondents have further relied upon SRO-177 dated 20.06.2014 and, in particular, the amended definition of “family member”, which expressly restricts recognition of an adopted son or adopted daughter to communities in whose case adoption is permissible under law. It is submitted that the amendment itself contains an Explanation making the amended provisions applicable to pending cases, subject to the condition that the candidate had applied within one year from the date of death of the deceased employee. Since the applicant admittedly applied within one year of the death of Bashir Ahmad Central Administrative Tribunal^{Teeli, the respondents contend that his pending claim was} necessarily required to be examined under the amended provision.

The respondents have also relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court in Mohammad Rafiq Wagay v. State of J&K & Ors., SWP No. 1673/2018, decided on 26.07.2018, wherein the claim of an adopted son belonging to the Muslim community under SRO-43 of 1994 was declined after taking note of the amendment introduced by SRO-177 of 2014. The Hon’ble High Court held that the benefit in respect of an adopted son or daughter would be available only where the personal law governing the concerned community permits adoption.

Reliance has also been placed upon the judgment of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Jammu Bench, in Mohammad Yousuf Khanday v. D/o Power Development, UT of J&K, T.A. No. 5478/2020, decided on 05.05.2021. In that case, arising from the claim of an adopted son of a Muslim employee who had died in Central Administrative Tribunal^{harness in 2011, the Tribunal rejected the claim for} compassionate appointment, holding that adoption was not recognized under Muslim Personal Law and that the claim could not be sustained under SRO-43 of 1994.

The respondents have further relied upon the judgment of this Tribunal in Abdul Wahid Sheikh v. State of J&K & Ors., T.A. No. 5206/2021, arising out of SWP No. 1587/2017, decided on 04.12.2024, as well as other decisions cited in their written submissions. It has been contended that the decision relied upon by the applicant has subsequently been stayed by the Hon’ble High Court, therefor has nor precedential value.

We have heard learned counsel for the parties and carefully perused the pleadings, the documents placed on record, the impugned communication, the reply filed by the respondents and the judgments relied upon by both sides.

From the respective contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, the following questions arise for Central Administrative Tribunal^{consideration before this Tribunal:}

The case of the applicantis founded on his claim that he is the adopted son of the deceased employee and, therefore, eligible to be treated as a "family member" of the deceased employee for the purposes of consideration under SRO-43 of 1994 for compassionate appointment as it stood prior to the amendment introduced by SRO-177 of 2014.

The applicant contends that the amendment introduced by SRO-177 of 2014 restricts recognition of adopted son oradopted daughter to those communities in which adoption is legally recognized under the applicable personal law. It is urged that such restriction creates an impermissible distinction between otherwise similarly situated dependents and results in denial of consideration for compassionate appointment solely on the basis of religion.

It is, therefore, contended that classification introduced by the amendment, whereby adopted sons and daughters belonging to communities in which adoption is recognized under the applicable personal laws, while those belonging to communities where such recognition is unavailable are excluded has no reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the Scheme of providing succour to the family of a deceased employee facing financial hardship on account of loss of its breadwinner. According to the applicant, the amendment introduced through SRO-177 of 2014 defeats the very object underlying the parent Central Administrative Tribunal^Scheme.

As per the applicant, the earlier version of SRO-43 of 1994 expressly defined "family member" in Rule 2(d) to include "adopted son" and "adopted daughter". The Scheme did not make any distinction on the basis of religion and recognized an adopted son or adopted daughter as a member of the family of the deceased employee. According to the applicant, rejection of his claim solely on the ground that he is a Muslim and that adoption is not recognized under Muslim Personal Law is arbitrary, discriminatory and unsustainable in law. It is further contended that amendment has no application to his case and that his claim is required to be considered strictly under the special provisions of SRO-43 of 1994.

The controversy essentially turns upon whether the applicant can claim the status of a legally recognized “adopted son” for the purposes of compassionate appointment under SRO-43 of 1994 and, further, whether the amendment introduced by SRO-177 dated 20.06.2014 Central Administrative Tribunal^{can validly be applied to his pending claim.}

There is no dispute that the applicant was brought up by Bashir Ahmad Teeli and that several official documents describe him as his adopted son. The dependency certificate issued by the Deputy Commissioner, Anantnag also records the applicant as the adopted son and dependent of the deceased. The departmental record further demonstrates that the applicant’s claim was processed and forwarded along with documents including an adoption deed. These circumstances establish that the applicant was treated by the concerned authorities as a dependent for various administrative purposes.

That, however, does not conclude the issue before this Tribunal. The question is not merely whether the applicant was brought up by the deceased or whether he was described as an adopted son in official or private documents.The question is whethera person in whose personal law adoption is not recognized in the manner understood under certain other personal law systems, can Central Administrative Tribunal^{claim the status of an "adopted son" and whether such} relationship constitutes a legally recognized relationship falling within the definition of “family member” under the statutory scheme governing compassionate appointment under SRO-43 of 1994 read with SRO -177dated 20.06.2014.

Compassionate appointment is an exception to the normal rule governing public employment. It is intended to provide immediate assistance to a family which suffers financial distress on account of the death of a Government employee in harness. Such appointment does not constitute a mode of succession to the post held by the deceased employee and cannot be claimed as an inheritable or vested right. The claimant must establish eligibility strictly within the parameters of the scheme governing compassionate appointment.

The original SRO-43 of 1994 included an “adopted son” and “adopted daughter” within the definition of “family member”. The subsequent amendment introduced by Central Administrative Tribunal^{SRO-177 dated 20.06.2014 did not altogether delete these} expressions; rather, it qualified their inclusion by providing that an adopted son or adopted daughter would be covered in respect of communities in whose case adoption is permissible under law.

The relevant amended provision, therefore, makes the inclusion of an adopted son or adopted daughter dependent upon the legal permissibility of adoption under the law applicable to the concerned community. The question, consequently, is not merely whether the applicant was described or treated as an adopted son, but whether the relationship relied upon by him is one recognized in law for the purpose of the Scheme.

It is an admitted position that the applicant is Muslim by religion. Under the Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 2007, adoption, in the sense in which it is recognized under certain other personal law systems, is not acknowledged as conferring upon a child the legal status of a natural-born offspring. Central Administrative Tribunal^{Islamic law recognizes the concept of guardianship and} care of a child; however, such guardianship does not ordinarily create legal filiation or inheritance rights equivalent to those of a biological child. In the absence of any statutory provision expressly overriding the personal law applicable to the parties, an adopted child cannot automatically be presumed to acquire the status of a legally recognized adopted son within the Muslim community.

The amendment is also accompanied by an express Explanation providing that all cases pending on the date of issuance of SRO-177 dated 20.06.2014 shall be decided in accordance with the said notification, provided that the candidate had applied within one year from the date of death of the deceased person. The applicant admittedly submitted his claim within one year of the death of Bashir Ahmad Teeli on 13.07.2010. Therefore, his case squarely falls within the class of pending cases to which the amended provision was expressly made applicable.

Central Administrative Tribunal^{29.The contention that SRO-177 is being given retrospective} effect, and is therefore, inapplicable to the case of the applicant,cannot be accepted in the manner urged. The amendment itself contains a specific provision governing applications which were pending on the date of its enforcement. The present case, therefore, is not one where a subsequently amendmentis sought to be applied retrospectively in the absence of any statutory authority. Rather, the rule-making authority has expressly provided the manner in which pending claims are to be dealt with.

It is relevant to note that, while the earlier version of SRO-43 of 1994 referred to "adopted son" and "adopted daughter" amongst the eligible categories, it did not expressly clarify its applicability to communities in which adoption is not legally recognized. By virtue of SRO-177 dated 20.06.2014, the position was clarified to the effect that adoption must be legally valid under the applicable law governing the parties. Thus the amendment does not create a separate category of beneficiaries but regulates Central Administrative Tribunal^{the manner in which the existing category of adopted son} or adopted daughter is to be recognized for the purposes of the Scheme.

For instance, in the case of a Hindu employee, where adoption is recognized under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, a child lawfully adopted acquires the same legal status as a natural-born child and would fall within the ambit of "family member" under SRO-43 of 1994. Conversely, where a person belongs to a community in which adoption is not recognized under the applicable personal law and no statutory mechanism, such as adoption under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, has been invoked, a mere deed, declaration or private arrangement of adoption would not, by itself, confer the legal status necessary for claiming service benefits under the Scheme.

The applicant’s further contention that a vested right had accrued in his favour merely because the original SRO-43 contained the expression “adopted son” is equally Central Administrative Tribunal^{untenable. Compassionate appointment is not a matter of} inheritance or succession. At the highest, the applicant acquired a right to have his claim considered in accordance with the Scheme applicable to his case. No indefeasible right to appointment accrued merely upon the death of the employee or upon submission of the application, unless the competent authority found him eligible under the governing rules and an appointment was made.

The applicant has placed considerable reliance upon the Will dated 29.07.2003 executed by Bashir Ahmad Teeli and upon the succession certificate issued by the District Judge, Anantnag. These documents may have evidentiary relevance concerning the intention of the deceased and the succession to his property or debts; however, they cannot, by themselves, create a legal relationship of adoption where such relationship is not recognized under the law applicable to the parties. The issue before this Tribunal is not one of inheritance or succession to property, but of Central Administrative Tribunal^{eligibility for compassionate appointment under SRO-43} of 1994. Administrative or testamentary recognition of the applicant as a son cannot override the eligibility conditions prescribed by the governing Scheme.

Further, the applicant has sought to draw support from the definition of “family” contained in Rules 15 of the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Service Rules( CSR). However, the said provision, being a general provision contained in the Service Rules, would not by itself, enlarge or modify the scope of expression “family” as contemplated under these special provisions of SRO-43 of 1994. The applicant, therefore, cannot claim inclusion merely by relying upon the general definition contained in the CSR unless such entitlement is otherwise traceable to the provisions of SRO 40 Of 94 or other applicable laws.

In the present case, the applicant has neither pleaded nor established that adoption is recognized under his personal law, nor has he demonstrated that any statutory mechanism creating a legally valid adoption was resorted Central Administrative Tribunal^{to. There is also no case set up by the applicant that} adoption is recognized as a binding custom having the force of law within his family or community. In the absence of a legally cognizable adoption, the applicant cannot be treated as a "family member" within the meaning of the Scheme. Rather, the case projected by the applicant proceeds on the admitted premise that adoption, as understood in other personal law systems, is not recognized under the personal law applicable to him.

The judgment in Mohammad Rafiq Wagay is directly relevant in this regard. The Hon’ble High Court considered the very amendment introduced by SRO-177 and held that where the personal law governing the beneficiary does not permit adoption, an adopted son cannot claim the benefit of SRO-43 of 1994 merely on the basis of the asserted adoption.

The applicant's case has one factual feature which requires specific notice. The deceased employee died on 13.07.2010, whereas the Will relied upon by the applicant Central Administrative Tribunal^{is stated to have been executed in 2003. The applicant,} therefore, seeks to derive significance from the fact that the Will and the alleged adoption preceded the Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 2007 as well as SRO-177 of 2014. This distinction, however, does not advance his case.

By the time the deceased employee died on 13.07.2010, the Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 2007 was already in force. More importantly, irrespective of the date on which the Will was executed or the alleged adoption was effected, the applicant's claim remained pending when SRO-177 dated 20.06.2014 came into force, and the Explanation appended thereto expressly required pending cases satisfying the stipulated condition to be dealt with in accordance with the amended provision. The applicant’s case was pending when SRO-177 came into force and, consequently, was required to be considered in terms of the amended provision.

Central Administrative Tribunal^{39.Thus, the mere fact that the Will relied upon by the} applicant predates the Act of 2007 or SRO-177 of 2014 does not confer upon him an independent or overriding right to compassionate appointment. The Will may have relevance in relation to property or testamentary disposition, but it cannot confer eligibility under a service scheme contrary to the governing legal framework.

The argument based upon Article 14 of the Constitution also cannot be accepted. The classification introduced by SRO-177 is not founded simply upon the religion of the claimant. The amended provision does not prohibit compassionate appointment to a person merely because he belongs to a particular community; rather, it makes the inclusion of an adopted son or adopted daughter dependent upon whether adoption is permissible under the law applicable to that community. The relevant distinction is, therefore, founded upon the legal status of the claimed relationship.

Article 14 prohibits arbitrary discrimination, but does not Central Administrative Tribunal^{require the State to disregard legally relevant distinctions.} While framing a scheme for compassionate appointment, the State is entitled to prescribe ascertainable categories of eligible family members and to require the claimed relationship to have legal recognition. Such a requirement provides an objective basis for determining eligibility and ensures certainty and uniformity in the administration of an exceptional mode of appointment. The applicant has not demonstrated that the classification lacks an intelligible differentia or that the differentia has no rational nexus with the object of the Scheme.

The applicant has also alleged that several similarly situated adopted sons and daughters were granted compassionate appointment and that denial of similar treatment amounts to hostile discrimination. However, no specific appointment order or other cogent material has been placed on record establishing that persons identically situated to the applicant, governed by the same legal framework and the same applicable provisions of the Central Administrative Tribunal^{Scheme, were granted appointment despite being similarly} placed. In any event, an appointment allegedly made contrary to the governing rules cannot furnish a legal basis for claiming repetition of such illegality. The principle of negative equality has no application in such circumstances.

There is also no merit in the contention that the respondents were bound by their earlier processing of the applicant’s case. The fact that the departmental authorities initially forwarded the applicant’s case along with the relevant documents merely shows that the claim was processed administratively. It does not amount to a final determination that the applicant was legally eligible for appointment. Eligibility was ultimately required to be examined by the competent authority in accordance with the Scheme.

In view of the foregoing discussion, the applicant has failed to establish that he falls within the expression “family member” under SRO-43 of 1994 as amended by Central Administrative Tribunal^{SRO-177 dated 20.06.2014. The fact that he was brought} up by the deceased, described as his adopted son in various documents, and treated as a dependent for certain administrative or property-related purposes cannot substitute the requirement of a legally recognized relationship of adoption under the applicable law. The Will, dependency certificate and succession certificate, therefore, do not confer or adjudicate upon the applicant eligibility for compassionate appointment under the Scheme. The competent authority has rightly exercised the discretion against the applicant as he failed to satisfy the threshold statutory requirement of eligibility.

It is settled that compassionate appointment is not a hereditary right that accrues automatically upon the death of an employee. It is an exception to the general rule governing public employment and must therefore be strictly regulated by the Scheme in force. In State Bank of India v. Raj Kumar, (2010) 11 SCC 661, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that no aspirant can claim Central Administrative Tribunal^{compassionate appointment dehors the governing} Scheme. Similar principles were reiterated in Canara Bank v. Mahesh Kumar, (2015) 7 SCC 412. Therefore, the contention that the amended provisions cannot be applied is without merit.The exclusion of an adopted child from the ambit of compassionate appointment in the case of a Muslim employee cannot be said to be unconstitutional merely because Muslim personal law does not recognize adoption.The validity of scheme must be examined within the limited scope of compassionate appointment jurisprudence and not on generalized notion of equality or perceived hardship.

It is equally well settled that Article 14 forbids class legislation but permits reasonable classification founded upon an intelligible differentia having a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved. Distinct personal law systems recognized by law constitute legally cognizable distinctions unless declared unconstitutional by a competent court. Consequently, legal consequences Central Administrative Tribunal^{flowing from such personal law systems cannot} automatically be characterized as arbitrary merely because they operate differently in relation to different communities.

While framing a compassionate appointment policy, the State is entitled to identify the category of eligible dependents on the basis of legally recognized familial relationships. Where the personal law governing a particular community does not confer upon an adopted child the legal status of a natural-born child, the State cannot be compelled to ignore such legal position while determining eligibility under a service scheme. The classification, therefore, is founded not upon religion per se but upon the existence or absence of a legally recognized filial relationship under the applicable legal framework.

The distinction also bears rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved. Compassionate appointment requires certainty, administrative uniformity, and Central Administrative Tribunal^{objective determination of entitlement. Reliance upon} legally recognized family relations ensures administratively manageable standards, prevents uncertainty and disputed dependency claims, and avoids potential misuse of an exceptional concession carved out in deviation from ordinary public employment norms. The State is, therefore, justified in restricting eligibility to persons whose status is recognized by applicable law.It may further be contended that Scheme itself does not create the distinction; rather, the distinction already exists within the applicable legal system. The scheme merely recognizes pre-existing legal status for the limited purpose of determining entitlement under a welfare oriented service policy. Such recognition of different legal consequences flowing from the distinct personal law systems does not by itself offend Article 14 so long as classification rest upon intelligible differentia and bears reasonable nexus with the object of the scheme.

Moreover, compassionate appointment being a matter of Central Administrative Tribunal^{policy, the scope of judicial review remains limited.} Courts have consistently held that compassionate appointment cannot be claimed dehors governing rules nor granted merely on sympathetic considerations. A claimant must strictly satisfy the eligibility conditions prescribed under the scheme. Mere hardship and emotional considerations cannot furnish a ground for judicially expanding the categories of beneficiaries contrary to the express policy framework.

In the absence of any challenge to the validity of the personal law itself, its legal consequences cannot indirectly be nullified through a collateral challenge to a service scheme. So long as the underlying legal framework remains valid and operative, the State cannot be faulted for recognizing distinctions flowing therefrom while determining legally recognized family relationships for administrative purposes.

Further, there also exists a strong presumption of constitutionality in favour of statutory provisions and Central Administrative Tribunal^{executive policies. The burden lies upon the person} challenging such provisions to establish manifest arbitrariness, hostile discrimination or absence of any rational basis. Merely because another personal law system recognizes adoption differently does not render the impugned classification unconstitutional. Equality under Article 14 does not mandate uniformity of personal laws nor obliteration of distinctions legally arising there from.

Accordingly, where the governing personal law does not recognize adoption in the manner contemplated by the Scheme, exclusion of such adopted child from the ambit of compassionate appointment cannot, by itself, be held unconstitutional, arbitrary or lacking in reasonable classification. SRO-177 of 2014, which recognizes adoption only where it is legally recognized under the applicable law, is founded upon an intelligible differentia having a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved. Consequently, the impugned provisions of SRO-177 of 2014 cannot be held to be arbitrary or Central Administrative Tribunal^{unconstitutional.}

Consequently, impugned communication No. PHE/Estt/11033-34 dated 24.07.2017, whereby the applicant's claim was rejected on the ground that he was not covered by the applicable Scheme, also does not warrant interference. The reliance placed upon judgment passed in T.A. No. 8596 of 2020, Ubaid Latif v. Director, Civil Secretariat, J&K & Ors since has been stayed is of no precedential value in the present context.

Accordingly, the points of determination stand answered in terms of the findings recorded hereinabove.In view of the findings returned, the present Transfer Application is dismissed. Consequently, all connected Miscellaneous Applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.

The Registry shall consign the record to the Record Room after due compliance.