AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi, J.
These three connected Writ Petitions concern the redevelopment of the Baba Akhandalamani Temple Complex at Aradi, Bhadrak. The petitioners are Sevayats of the temple who occupied residential structures close to the temple: Manoranjan Parhi in W.P.(C) No.15391 of 2026 occupied Ac.0.01 under Plot No.1470, Khata No.464/179; Bansidhar Padhi in W.P.(C) No.15389 of 2026 occupied Ac.0.01 under Plot No.1469, Khata No.464/179; and Kedarnath Padhi in W.P.(C) No.15394 of 2026 occupied Ac.0.02 under Plot No.1366, Khata No.464/7. The first two holdings are described as Trust Board land and the third as deity land, although the petitioners claim the residential structures as their ancestral dwellings.
I. FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE:
Succinctly put, the facts of the case are as follows:
The State introduced the redevelopment project in 2023 and subsequently approved a Revised Rehabilitation and Resettlement Scheme under the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 and the Odisha R&R Policy, 2006. Government land measuring Ac.2.10 under Plot No.2036, Khata No.589, Mouza-Aradi, situated near the temple, was identified as the rehabilitation site; Ac.1.275 was intended for individual homestead plots, while Ac.0.825 was reserved for roads, drainage, electricity, water supply and other civic amenities. The Scheme contemplated acquisition through direct purchase, payment of compensation and resettlement of affected families in a properly planned and serviced area.
The petitioners admit receiving the monetary R&R components prescribed under the Scheme, namely ₹3,12,465 as house-building assistance, maintenance allowance of ₹4,166 per month for twelve months, ₹20,831 for a temporary shed and ₹4,166 as transportation allowance, aggregating to ₹3,87,454 per eligible unit. Monetary payment is therefore not the principal controversy; the dispute concerns whether the obligation to allot a usable alternative plot with the promised infrastructure remained incomplete.
On 16 December 2025, the Superintending Engineer, Bhadrak (R&B) Division issued separate notices requiring the petitioners to vacate the affected premises within seven days, failing which their structures would be demolished. The notices related to the respective structures required for the temple redevelopment project and were issued after the authorities had disbursed monetary compensation and rehabilitation assistance.
The petitioners first approached this Court through W.P.(C) Nos.37119, 37122 and 37120 of 2025 respectively. By orders dated 23 December 2025, this Court disposed of those petitions without examining the merits and permitted the petitioners to approach the Collector, Bhadrak. The Collector was directed to consider their grievances and make arrangements for rehabilitation under the Revised R&R Scheme before undertaking eviction pursuant to the notices dated 16 December 2025.
The petitioners’ representations were registered as Misc. Case No.46 of 2025 for Manoranjan Parhi, Misc. Case No.48 of 2025 for Bansidhar Padhi and Misc. Case No.47 of 2025 for Kedarnath Padhi. On 2 January 2026, the Collector directed the Sub-Collector to allot alternative land through lottery within one week, the Superintending Engineer to commence development of the allotted land, including road connectivity, electricity and drainage, within one week, and the Tahasildar to commence eviction only after completion of both the allotment and land-development processes.
A lottery was eventually conducted on 17 April 2026 for 44 eligible affected families connected with 98 affected plots. Twenty-one beneficiaries participated; the three petitioners did not participate. The recorded lottery procedure provided that plots for absent beneficiaries would be allotted serially, and the State consequently records alternative allotments of Ac.0.01 each to Manoranjan and Bansidhar and Ac.0.02 to Kedarnath out of Plot No.2036, Khata No.589. The petitioners, however, dispute that this paper or serial allotment resulted in actual delivery of a developed and habitable plot.
The State’s own correspondence records that the rehabilitation site was low-lying and required substantial development before becoming suitable for residential occupation. An estimate of ₹2.497 crore was prepared for land filling, boundary and retaining walls, internal roads and drainage; requests for administrative and financial sanction were forwarded to the Works Department on 12 May 2026 and again on 28 July 2026. Thus, when the counter-affidavits were filed, the record showed preparation of estimates and pursuit of sanction rather than completion of the infrastructure directed by the Collector.
The present petitions were filed in May 2026 when eviction was allegedly being revived. On 18 May 2026, this Court issued notice and temporarily restrained eviction until 27 July 2026, after which Opposite Party Nos.3 and 4 filed applications seeking vacation of the interim protection. The State papers contain some drafting inconsistencies: Manoranjan’s voucher and counter mention ₹80,28,958, whereas a later Collector’s instruction mentions ₹93,33,862; several common pleadings also cross-reference the wrong miscellaneous case number. The petitioner-specific mapping stated above follows the original writ petitions and the orders dated 2 January 2026.
II. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS:
Learned counsel for the petitioners earnestly made the following submissions in support of his contentions.
The petitioners contend that direct purchase under the Scheme involved a composite obligation comprising monetary compensation, rehabilitation assistance, allotment of alternative homestead land and development of that land with essential amenities. Mere payment of money did not complete the purchase or extinguish their possessory rights when the promised resettlement component remained unperformed. Until a developed alternative plot was actually allotted and made available, the authorities could not lawfully take possession or demolish their existing dwellings.
The petitioners rely principally upon the Collector’s orders dated 2 January 2026, which expressly placed allotment and land development before eviction in the sequence of implementation. Eviction was authorised only “immediately after completion” of both processes. Since roads, electricity, drainage, drinking water and land development had admittedly not been completed, revival of the notices dated 16 December 2025 was premature and directly contrary to the Collector’s binding directions and the earlier orders of this Court.
The petitioners maintain that identifying Plot No.2036 generally for rehabilitation, drawing a layout or making a serial entry during a lottery does not amount to effective allotment and resettlement. According to them, no individually demarcated, accessible and habitable plot was delivered to them, nor were they placed in possession of land on which a house or even the temporary shed contemplated by the Scheme could be constructed. The State’s subsequent reliance on their absence from the lottery cannot substitute actual delivery of a usable rehabilitation plot.
The petitioners emphasise that the State’s own documents describe the site as low-lying and unsuitable for residential occupation without substantial filling, retaining structures, roads and drainage. The fact that a DPR and estimate were merely forwarded for sanction demonstrates, according to them, that the Collector’s development direction remained unimplemented. A future assurance that development “shall be carried out” cannot satisfy an order requiring completion before eviction.
The petitioners contend that the maintenance allowance was limited to one year and the temporary-shed assistance was meaningless without land on which the shed could be erected. If evicted before resettlement, they would have to incur continuing rent and maintenance expenses after the limited assistance was exhausted. They deny that the monetary grant by itself provides a durable substitute for the dwelling and livelihood security promised under the Scheme.
As senior-citizen Sevayats, the petitioners claim that their dwellings near the temple enable regular performance of Seva Puja. Eviction without proximate rehabilitation would allegedly render them homeless or landless, obstruct their religious duties and violate Article 21, particularly the right to shelter and to live with dignity. They also invoke natural justice, humanitarian considerations and the prevailing flood conditions in Bhadrak as reasons against immediate displacement.
The petitioners further contend that the old seven-day notices could not be acted upon several months later without completion of the intervening rehabilitation directions and without issuing a fresh notice. They seek quashing of the notices dated 16 December 2025, enforcement of the Collector’s orders, completion of allotment and infrastructure, restraint against eviction until such completion, action regarding Opposite Party No.6’s alleged non-compliance and at least fifteen days’ fresh notice before any future eviction.
III. SUBMISSIONS OF THE OPPOSITE PARTIES:
Per contra, the learned counsel for the Opposite Parties earnestly made the following submissions:
The Opposite Parties contend that redevelopment of the Baba Akhandalamani Temple Complex is a flagship public project intended to preserve the heritage temple, improve infrastructure, promote religious tourism and advance the socio-economic development of Bhadrak. The acquisition and rehabilitation processes were undertaken after administrative approval and in accordance with the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 and the approved Revised R&R Scheme. Continued obstruction by a few beneficiaries should not be permitted to frustrate this substantial public purpose.
The State asserts that the petitioners accepted substantial structure compensation and the complete R&R grants before eviction was initiated. It relies upon payment figures of ₹80,28,958 for Manoranjan, ₹45,66,660 for Bansidhar and ₹72,16,802 for Kedarnath, together with the standard R&R assistance of ₹3,87,454 per unit. On that basis, it argues that the petitioners agreed to surrender the affected holdings after receiving their statutory entitlements and cannot continue indefinitely in possession while retaining the monetary benefits.
The Opposite Parties maintain that the alternative-land allotment was completed through a fair and transparent lottery on 17 April 2026 under the supervision of the Sub-Collector and in the presence of the Land Acquisition Officer, Tahasildar, temple authorities and beneficiaries. Prior notice and opportunity were allegedly given to all beneficiaries, but the petitioners voluntarily remained absent. Under the pre-announced procedure, plots for absent beneficiaries were serially allotted; their absence therefore did not invalidate or prevent their respective allotments.
The State treats the serial earmarking of alternative plots, coupled with preparation of the DPR and submission of the ₹2.497 crore infrastructure proposal, as substantial compliance with the rehabilitation directions. It states that roads, electricity, drainage, water supply and other civic facilities will be developed after governmental sanction and that the administration remains committed to executing those works. According to the State, the Scheme does not justify indefinite suspension of the redevelopment project merely because every infrastructure component has not yet been physically completed.
The Opposite Parties deny that the petitioners will become landless or houseless. The Collector’s instructions state that Manoranjan possesses approximately Ac.0.04 of other land and a residential house under Khata No.164; Bansidhar possesses approximately Ac.0.18 and a residential house under Khata No.371; and Kedarnath possesses approximately Ac.0.20 and a residential house under Khata No.464/170, all in Mouza-Aradi. The State consequently argues that their residence, livelihood and ability to perform Seva Puja will not be materially impaired.
The State contends that the original eviction notices remain operative because compensation was paid, alternative plots were made available and the rehabilitation procedure contemplated by the Scheme was completed. It denies any requirement to issue another notice merely because implementation was delayed by litigation and administrative processes. The petitioners’ request for a fresh fifteen-day notice is therefore said to have no statutory or factual foundation.
According to the Opposite Parties, 41 of the 44 eligible affected families have already vacated without objection, leaving only these three petitioners in possession. Continued interim protection for three compensated beneficiaries would stall the entire project and produce administrative, logistical and financial repercussions, including delay and cost escalation. The State therefore places the balance of convenience and larger public interest in favour of permitting eviction and continuing the redevelopment work.
Opposite Party Nos.3 and 4 accordingly contend that the petitioners have no prima facie case, that monetary and rehabilitation benefits have already removed any irreparable prejudice, and that the public authorities will suffer greater prejudice if the interim restraint continues. They seek vacation of the order dated 18 May 2026 and dismissal of all three writ petitions.
IV. COURT’S ANALYSIS AND REASONING:
Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials placed on record.
The primary question which arises for consideration in these Writ Petitions is whether the Opposite Parties can proceed with the eviction of the Petitioners pursuant to the notices dated 16.12.2025 when the alternative plots allotted in their favour have neither been physically delivered nor developed in terms of the Revised Rehabilitation and Resettlement Scheme and the subsequent orders passed by the Collector, Bhadrak.
At the outset, it is pertinent to make it clear that the Petitioners have not questioned the public purpose underlying the redevelopment of the Baba Akhandalamani Temple Complex. The redevelopment of the temple and its surrounding area is undoubtedly a project conceived in public interest. Therefore, the limited controversy before this Court relates to the manner and stage at which the Petitioners can lawfully be displaced.
It is not disputed that the Petitioners have received the monetary components of rehabilitation, including house-building assistance, subsistence allowance, assistance for construction of temporary sheds and transportation allowance. It is also not disputed that alternative plots measuring Ac.0.01 each have been recorded in favour of two Petitioners and Ac.0.02 in favour of the third Petitioner out of Plot No.2036 under Khata No.589 of Mouza-Aradi.
However, the receipt of monetary assistance and the recording of alternative plots in favour of the Petitioners do not conclude the matter. The principal grievance of the Petitioners is that the land identified for their rehabilitation is low-lying and has not been developed by providing the infrastructure promised under the Revised Scheme. The State’s own correspondence reveals that filling of the land, construction of retaining and boundary walls, internal roads, drainage and other civic amenities are yet to be completed.
This Court also takes notes of the orders passed by the Collector, Bhadrak, in January 2026 upon the representations submitted by the Petitioners pursuant to the earlier orders of this Court. By the said orders, the Sub-Collector was directed to complete the allotment of alternative land by providing road connectivity, electricity and drainage, and the Tahasildar was directed to initiate eviction immediately after completion of the allotment and development processes.
A plain reading of the Collector’s orders makes it evident that allotment and development of the alternative sites were intended to precede eviction. The direction to commence eviction “immediately after completion” of those processes cannot be construed to mean that eviction may first be undertaken and development completed subsequently. Such an interpretation would be contrary to the express language of the orders as well as the object of the rehabilitation scheme.
The aforesaid orders have neither been withdrawn nor modified by any competent authority. Therefore, the authorities subordinate to the Collector are bound to act in conformity with the same. It is not permissible for one authority of the State to assure an affected family that eviction would follow rehabilitation and for another authority to proceed with eviction while rehabilitation remains incomplete.
Section 31(1) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 requires the Collector to pass a Rehabilitation and Resettlement Award for every affected family in terms of the entitlements contained in the Second Schedule. Section 31(2)(c) and (d) further provide that such award shall include particulars of the house site and house to be allotted in the case of displaced families and particulars of the land allotted to such families.
Section 32 of the Act casts a duty upon the Collector to ensure provision of infrastructural facilities and basic minimum amenities specified in the Third Schedule in every resettlement area. Section 38(2) further provides that the Collector shall be responsible for ensuring that the rehabilitation and resettlement process is completed in all its aspects before the affected families are displaced.
A conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions indicates that rehabilitation and resettlement cannot be confined to payment of monetary benefits alone where the applicable scheme also provides for allotment of a house site or land with basic infrastructure. The different benefits contemplated under the Scheme constitute distinct components of rehabilitation. Performance of the monetary component cannot, in the absence of any provision to that effect, extinguish the obligation to provide the non-monetary component.
Whether each of the Petitioners can independently claim all the benefits under the Act of 2013 on the basis of ownership over the lands occupied by them need not be finally determined in these proceedings. The State has itself treated the Petitioners as eligible affected families under the Revised Scheme, disbursed rehabilitation assistance to them and recorded alternative plots in their favour. The present case is, therefore, not one where the Court is being called upon to create an entitlement dehors the Scheme. The Petitioners seek enforcement of an entitlement already recognised by the State.
The contention that the Petitioners did not participate in the lottery conducted on 17.04.2026 also does not materially advance the case of the Opposite Parties. The lottery proceedings themselves contemplated serial allotment of plots to beneficiaries who remained absent. Acting upon the said procedure, the State claims to have allotted specific areas to the Petitioners. Therefore, their non-participation was not treated by the State as relinquishment of their entitlement.
Moreover, there is no document on record indicating that the Petitioners waived the requirement of physical delivery and development of the alternative plots. Waiver of a benefit under a rehabilitation scheme cannot be readily inferred merely from absence at a lottery, particularly when the State subsequently proceeded to make allotments in favour of the absent beneficiaries.
The Supreme Court in Union of India v. Lt. Col. P.K. Choudhary1, has explained that the doctrine of legitimate expectation is founded upon fairness and non-arbitrariness in State action and constitutes a facet of Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court held as follows:
“This Court went on to hold that if denial of legitimate
expectation in a given case amounts to denial of a right that is guaranteed or is arbitrary, discriminatory, unfair or biased, gross abuse of power or in violation of principles of natural justice, the same can be questioned on the well-known grounds attracting Article 14 of the Constitution but a claim based on mere legitimate expectation without anything more cannot ipso facto give a right to invoke these principles.”
In the present case, the Petitioners’ expectation rests on concrete official acts that is the Revised Scheme, their identification as eligible beneficiaries, allotment of specific areas, and the Collector’s express directions that the allotted land be developed before eviction.
It is well settled that alternative land is not an automatic constitutional entitlement in every case of acquisition. In Amarjit Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors.2, the Supreme Court held that provision of an alternative site cannot be made a condition precedent to every acquisition. The relevant excerpts are produced below:
“The decisions of this Court in New Reviera Coop Housing Society and Anr. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer and Ors. 1996 (1) SCC 731 and Chameli Singh and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Anr. 1996 (2) SCC 549 have repelled the contention that rehabilitation of the property owners is a part of the right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution so as to render any compulsory acquisition for public purpose bad for want of any such measures. In New Reviera's case (supra) this Court held that if the State comes forward with a proposal to provide alternative sites to the owners, the Court can give effect to any such proposal by issuing appropriate directions in that behalf. But a provision for alternative sites cannot be made a condition precedent for every acquisition of land.”
Similarly, in State of M.P. v. Narmada Bachao Andolan3, the Supreme Court further observed that the entitlement to land in lieu of acquired land must be determined with reference to the applicable rehabilitation policy.
The aforesaid decisions, however, do not assist the Opposite Parties. There is a distinction between claiming alternative land in the absence of any statutory provision or policy and seeking implementation of a specific rehabilitation benefit already sanctioned by the State. Once the State has framed a scheme and granted a particular benefit under it, implementation of such benefit cannot be left to administrative uncertainty.
The administrative uncertainty exhibited in the present case is not without consequence. Sanction of the development estimate, allocation of funds, entrustment of the work and coordination between the Revenue and Works Departments are matters lying entirely within the control of the State. The Petitioners possess neither the authority nor the practical means to complete any of these processes. Consequently, the burden arising from delay within the governmental machinery cannot be transferred to them by requiring them to vacate before the State completes the obligations which it has undertaken.
The Supreme Court, in IFGL Refractories Ltd. v. Orissa State Financial Corporation4, recently deprecated prolonged non-implementation of a sanctioned policy benefit as an instance of “bureaucratic lethargy” and observed that:
“This litigation is a fine specimen of the bureaucratic lethargy. It is this bureaucratic lethargy which gave rise to this long drawn litigation. This Court in many of its decisions has reminded various State Governments that if the object of formulating the industrial policy is to encourage investment, employment and growth, the bureaucratic lethargy of the State apparatus is clearly a factor which will discourage entrepreneurship.”
The Court further reiterated that policies formulated and representations made by the State generate a legitimate expectation that the State will act in accordance with what it has proclaimed. This principle applies with greater force where the consequence of non-implementation is not merely financial deprivation but displacement from an existing home. Once the entitlement of the Petitioners was recognised and specific alternative plots were allotted, the State’s role ceased to be one of dispensing largesse and became one of performing an obligation already assumed.
The Supreme Court in Lloyd Electric and Engineering Ltd. v. State of Himachal Pradesh5 has further held that the Government cannot speak in two voices and that its departments are required to implement the policy of the Government rather than adopt inconsistent positions of their own. The principle bears direct application to the present case. The Collector’s orders constitute a single and composite administrative decision like the concerned authorities were directed to allot the plots, develop the site and thereafter undertake eviction. A delay in obtaining sanction or executing the work through one department cannot authorise another department to disregard the sequence prescribed by the Collector.
Therefore, the pendency of administrative or financial sanction may explain why the development work has not yet been completed; it cannot amount to completion of that work. An explanation for non-performance is not performance. Nor can the State convert its own unfinished obligation into a default on the part of the Petitioners.
In fact, Section 38(2) of the Act of 2013 removes any uncertainty concerning the legal sequence. It mandates completion of the rehabilitation and resettlement process “in all its aspects” before displacement of the affected families. The Collector’s orders faithfully reproduce that statutory sequence. While the precise date on which the development work may be completed could depend upon administrative execution, the order in which the two events must occur is not administratively negotiable that is rehabilitation must precede displacement.
This brings the Court to the next question, namely, what constitutes completion of rehabilitation “in all its aspects” in the facts of the present case. An allotment or revenue entry only identifies the beneficiary and the land allotted. It does not amount to delivery of possession of a demarcated and usable plot. Where the Scheme provides for a developed homestead site, rehabilitation can be treated as complete only when the allotted land is made accessible and fit for residential use with the promised basic infrastructure.
In Narmada Bachao Andolan (supra), the Supreme Court explained that while compensation relates to the property acquired, rehabilitation concerns restoration of what displacement takes away and the securing of a dignified mode of life. Applying that distinction here, the monetary assistance already received by the Petitioners constitutes one component of the rehabilitation package. The developed alternative plots constitute another. Payment of the former cannot be treated as a substitute for performance of the latter when both have been expressly recognised under the Revised Scheme.
The same understanding informs the decision in N.D. Jayal v. Union of India6, wherein the Supreme Court held as follows:
“Rehabilitation is not only about providing just food, clothes or shelter. It is also about extending support to rebuild livelihood by ensuring necessary amenities of life.
Rehabilitation of the oustees is a logical corollary of Article
21.The oustees should be in a better position to lead a decent life and earn livelihood in the rehabilitated locations.”
In the present case, the requirement of filling the low-lying land and providing road connectivity, drainage, electricity and water supply is, therefore, not collateral to rehabilitation. It forms part of rehabilitation itself. A residential plot which remains waterlogged, inaccessible or devoid of basic civic amenities cannot fulfil the purpose for which the alternative site was sanctioned.
The estimate amounting to approximately ₹2.497 crore prepared by the State for development of the rehabilitation site is itself a material acknowledgment that substantial work remains to be executed. Filling and levelling of the land, construction of retaining and boundary walls, internal roads, drainage and other civic facilities are not minor finishing works. They are the very works which would transform the identified parcel of land into a functional resettlement site.
Rehabilitation must, therefore, travel from the file to the field. A plot on paper is not a home on the ground. Until the allotted plots are demarcated, physically offered and made reasonably fit for residential occupation, the rehabilitation contemplated under the Revised Scheme and the Collector’s orders cannot be regarded as complete.
This Court is crestfallen to find a blinkered vision of development reflected in the present case, where the urgency attached to the project has not been matched by equal urgency in fulfilling the rehabilitation promised to those who must make way for it.
It must also be observed that the Opposite Parties have not yet complied with the conditions stipulated in the Collector’s orders. Enforcement of the notices dated 16.12.2025 at this stage would invert the prescribed sequence and compel the Petitioners to bear the consequences of administrative delay for which they are not responsible. Such action would be unfair and arbitrary.
At the same time, completion of rehabilitation would correspondingly cast an obligation upon the Petitioners to vacate the existing structures and cooperate with the redevelopment project. The protection granted by this Court is thus neither indefinite nor an impediment to the public project. It operates only until the State performs the antecedent obligations which the Scheme, the statute and the Collector’s orders place upon it.
V. CONCLUSION:
In view of the foregoing analysis, the notices dated 16.12.2025, insofar as they contemplate eviction of the Petitioners before completion of their rehabilitation, are unsustainable in law and are accordingly quashed. The Writ Petitions are allowed in part.
The Writ Petitions are disposed of with the following directions:
The Collector, Bhadrak, shall be the nodal authority for implementing these directions and shall coordinate with the Works Department and all other authorities concerned.
ii) The Collector, Bhadrak, shall ensure that the requisite administrative and financial sanctions are obtained and that the development work is entrusted to the competent executing agency, within six weeks from the date of communication of this judgment.
iii) Within an outer limit of six months from the date of communication of this judgment, the Opposite Parties shall develop the rehabilitation site, certify its completion, demarcate the individual plots and formally offer possession of those plots to the Petitioners.
iv) For the purposes of these directions, the rehabilitation site shall not be treated as developed unless:
the land has been filled and levelled so as to render it fit for residential use, and
the site has been provided with all-weather road access, functional drainage, electricity, potable water supply and the other basic amenities contemplated under the Revised Scheme.
Upon completion of the development work, the Collector, Bhadrak, and the Superintending Engineer concerned shall jointly inspect the site and draw up an item-wise completion certificate recording the facilities provided. The Collector shall thereafter cause the plot allotted to each Petitioner to be demarcated on the spot and shall formally offer possession of it through an individual possession certificate accompanied by a site plan showing the location, area and boundaries of that plot. The Collector shall furnish each Petitioner with a copy of the completion certificate, the possession certificate and the site plan.
vi) No coercive action for eviction or demolition shall be taken against any of the Petitioners until the requirements contained in clauses (iii) to (v) above have been fulfilled. Mere expiry of the period of six months shall not, by itself, authorise eviction where such requirements remain unfulfilled.
vii) Only after the developed plots have been duly offered for physical possession may the competent authority issue fresh written notices granting the Petitioners fifteen clear days from the date of service thereof to vacate the existing structures. Upon expiry of such period, the authority shall be at liberty to proceed in accordance with law.
viii) Should the Opposite Parties, for reasons beyond their control, be unable to complete the entire exercise within the period stipulated above, the Collector, Bhadrak, may, before expiry of that period, seek an extension from this Court by filing an application supported by an affidavit disclosing the work completed, the work remaining, the reasons for the delay and the definite additional period required. No extension shall be presumed merely from the filing or pendency of such an application.
ix) In the meantime, if the Opposite Parties are so compelled to complete the project at the earliest, they may arrange some temporary housing facilities with all basic amenities for the displaced people till the rehabilitation exercise is complete.
Interim order, if any, passed earlier stands vacated.