Manohar Lal Sharma vs Jeevraj Singh and Others

R.S. Chauhan, J.—The petitioner-defendant is aggrieved by the order dated 10.3.2014 passed by the Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate & Addl. Civil Judge (Sr. Div.), Sikar whereby the learned Magistrate has refused to exhibit the partnership dissolution deed.

The brief facts of the case are that Jeevraj Singh, the respondent No. 1-plaintiff, had filed a suit for recovery of arrears of rent and eviction of respondents No. 2 to 5 from the shop which belonged to him. He sought eviction on the ground of default in payment of rent amount, and on the ground of subletting. With regard to subletting, it was pleaded that Dr. Nauratam Dadhich (respondent No. 3) had taken the said shop on rent in the name of his son, Ankit Dadhich (respondent No. 2), who was minor at that time. The business in the shop was carried out in the partnership of Ankit Dadhich, and one Amit Kumar. However, from October, 1990, the defendants No. 1 to 4 (respondents No. 2 to 5 before this court) started a business in the name and style of "Amit X-ray & Laboratories". Since 1994, the defendant No. 5-petitioner is carrying on business alone in the shop. However, the respondents No. 2 to 5 informed the landlord that the petitioner happens to be merely their employee. But since 1995, the landlord became slightly suspicious when the petitioner began asking that the receipt of rental amount be issued in his name. Subsequently, the petitioner also filed a suit for permanent injunction wherein he claimed that he is a tenant in the suit shop. It is upon receiving summons in the said suit that the landlord realized that the petitioner now claims to be a tenant although originally the shop was rented out to Dr. Nauratam Dadhich, respondent No. 3 before this court. It is in these circumstances that the landlord submitted a suit for eviction on the ground of subletting and non-payment of rent.

The petitioner filed a written statement alongwith the counter claim. In his counter claim, he pleaded that he is a tenant in the premises. In his counter claim, he further pleaded that the respondent-plaintiff be restrained from evicting him from the suit premises. While filing his written statement, the petitioner had clearly pleaded that there is a dissolution deed of the partnership which he had submitted as a Photostat copy. Moreover, he informed the court that original of the dissolution deed has been filed by him in the other suit filed by him against the respondent-plaintiff. Subsequently he moved an application under Order 8, Rule 1A CPC for bringing the original partnership dissolution deed on record. The application filed by him was allowed and the document was taken on record. While the petitioner was cross-examining the plaintiff, an objection was raised by the respondent-plaintiff with regard to marking the dissolution deed as an exhibit. Therefore, the petitioner submitted an application wherein he claimed that the document is duly stamped. But in case it is found not to be duly stamped, then he should be given opportunity to pay the deficit stamp duty. He also prayed that he be permitted to mark the document as an exhibit as the document had already been taken on record. However, by order dated 10.3.2014, the learned Magistrate has dismissed the said application. Hence, this petition before this court.

Mr. Ajeet Bhandari, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has contended that the logic given by the learned Magistrate is clearly untenable. For, according to the learned Magistrate, since the plaintiff was not confronted with the said document, the document cannot be marked now as an exhibit.

Secondly, but for this reasoning, no other reasons have been given by the learned Magistrate. Therefore, the impugned order suffers from the virus of being a non-speaking order.

Lastly, according to Section 39 of the Rajasthan Stamp Act, 1998 (''the Act of 1998'', for short, although an instrument not duly stamped is inadmissible in evidence, but such an instrument can be admitted in evidence on payment of duty which is chargeable, after payment of the duty by the party. Thus, according to the learned counsel, the dissolution deed should have been impounded and an opportunity should be given to the petitioner to pay the proper stamp duty. But the learned Magistrate has failed to follow the procedure prescribed by Section 39 of the Act of 1998.

On the other hand, Mr. Ripu Daman Singh Naruka, the learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff, has contended that the petitioner had already filed a suit for permanent injunction and declaration which has already been decided against the petitioner. Even the appeal therefrom has also been dismissed. Therefore, now there is an issue estoppel with regard to his being a tenant. Hence, no fruitful purpose would be served by permitting the petitioner-defendant in exhibiting the dissolution deed.

Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned order.

The reasoning given by the learned Magistrate is as under:-

A bare perusal of the para, quoted above, clearly reveals that while the learned Magistrate has given this conclusion for dismissing the application. But the learned Magistrate has failed to give any cogent reason for his conclusions. It is not only a right under the principles of natural justice, but is also a legal duty imposed upon the courts to pass a reasoned order. Merely mentioning of conclusion does not tantamount to a reasoned order. The court is expected to give reasons for reaching its conclusions. In the para quoted above, the learned Magistrate does not give any reason for concluding that the document cannot be accepted in evidence. Therefore, the impugned order cannot be held as a reasoned order.

Moreover, the learned Magistrate has ignored the duty imposed by Section 39 of the Act of 1998 while rejecting the application filed by the petitioner. In case the learned Magistrate was of the opinion that the dissolution deed is not duly stamped, he was required to impound it and to give a chance to the petitioner to pay the required stamp duty. Therefore, the learned Magistrate has failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in him.

The reasoning given by the learned Magistrate that the respondent-plaintiff was not confronted with these documents is equally untenable. For, it is at the time of cross-examination of the respondent-plaintiff that the said dissolution deed was brought to his notice. But an objection was raised by the counsel for the respondent-plaintiff that since the document was not duly stamped, it could not be marked as an exhibit. In fact, it is this objection which prompted the petitioner to move the necessary application. Therefore, the reasoning is clearly unacceptable.

For the reasons stated above, this court quashes and sets aside the impugned order dated 10.3.2014 and remands the case back to the learned trial court to pass a fresh order on the application filed by the petitioner keeping in mind Section 39 of the Act of 1998.

The appeal stands allowed. The stay application is also disposed of.