Manmeet Singh Sahni & Ors. vs Rupinder Singh Sahni & Ors.

S. Particulars Para Nos. Page

No. No.

The Application 1 – 3 2

Factual Matrix 4 – 10 3

Computation of Delay

Submissions on behalf of the Appellants / 11 6 Applicants

Submissions on behalf of Respondent Nos. 12 9 1 and 2

S. Particulars Para Nos. Page

No. No.

Analysis and Findings 13 – 34 13

Conclusion 35 – 38 24

The present Application, being CM APPL. 12562/2026, has been preferred by the Appellants under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963^{11.The Limitation Act} read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908^22.CPC, seeking condonation of delay in filing the captioned Appeal, FAO(OS) 25/2026.

By way of the captioned Appeal, preferred under Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966 read with Order XLIII Rule 1 and Sections 104 and 151 of the CPC, the Appellants assail (i) the judgment dated 19.09.2025^{33.Impugned Judgement}passed by the learned Single Judge in I.A. No. 37405/2024^{44.Status Quo Application} , I.A. No. 16373/2025 ^{55.Rent Deposit Application} and I.A. No. 20694/2025 ^{66.Recall Application} in CS(OS) 675/2024 titled “Rupinder Singh Sahni &Anr. v. Manmeet Singh Sahni & Ors.”^{77.the Suit}; and (ii) the order dated 06.08.2025^{88.Impugned Order} passed by the learned Single Judge in the Suit.

The Application, as filed, prays for condonation of a delay of 124 days in assailing the Impugned Order dated 06.08.2025 and 94 days in assailing the Impugned Judgment dated 19.09.2025.

Succinctly stated, the dispute is a family dispute concerning the estate of late Sh. Surjit Singh Sahni, who passed away on 27.01.2024, and his interest in two companies, namely, M/s Prestolite of India Limited and M/s Razika Finlease Private Limited, as well as in the property bearing No. W-134, Greater Kailash, New Delhi-110048.

Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 instituted the Suit against, inter alia, their brother, Appellant No. 1 (Defendant No. 1), and Appellant Nos. 2 and 3 (Defendant Nos. 6 and 7), seeking, inter alia, partition of the estate of their late father, Sh. Surjit Singh Sahni, declarations in respect of the gift deeds and share transfers made by him in favour of Appellant No. 1, and rendition of accounts. During the pendency of the Suit, the learned Single Judge, by the Impugned Order dated 06.08.2025, directed Defendant Nos. 1 to 4, 6 and 7 to place on record specific affidavit(s) with respect to the movable assets mentioned in paragraph 35 of the plaint, along with the contemporaneous record. The Appellants sought recall of the said order by way of the Recall Application.

By the Impugned Judgment dated 19.09.2025, the learned Single Judge disposed of the Status Quo Application and the Rent Deposit Application, made the interim order dated 04.10.2024 absolute, and directed Appellant No. 2 (Defendant No. 6) to deposit a percentage of the rent accruing from its immovable properties commensurate to the share of Respondent Nos. 1 and 2, to be calculated on the basis of the purported shareholding disclosed in paragraph 23 of the plaint. By the same judgment, the Recall Application was dismissed, and the matter was directed to be listed before the learned Joint Registrar on 08.12.2025. The period of 30 days for preferring an appeal against the Impugned Judgment expired on 19.09.2025.

In the meantime, Appellant No. 1 is stated to have consulted a doctor on 18.10.2025, 16.11.2025, 23.11.2025 and 01.01.2026 for cardiac, hypertension and other ailments. On 08.12.2025, the learned Joint Registrar, noting that no deposit had been made in terms of the Impugned Judgment, issued a warrant of attachment against Appellant No. 2 and attached five of its bank accounts. Thereafter, on 21.01.2026, Court notice was issued to the concerned Bank Managers to furnish details of the movable assets of Appellant No. 2 and of late Sh. Surjit Singh Sahni.

According to the Appellants, an appeal against the Impugned Judgment was filed by their erstwhile counsel on 22.01.2026 vide Diary No. E-41775/2026, which was, however, never registered or listed. The certified copy of the Impugned Judgment was applied for on 22.01.2026 and was received on 28.01.2026, on which date the present counsel was engaged. The index of the present appeal and the supporting affidavits bear the date 12.02.2026; the appeal was filed on 17.02.2026 vide Diary No. E-81171/2026; advance service was effected upon Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 on 23.02.2026; and the appeal was listed before this Court for the first time on 24.02.2026.

Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 filed their reply opposing the present application. By order dated 28.04.2026, this Court directed the Appellants to file an affidavit with regard to the delay in filing the appeal and the appeal stated to have been filed by the erstwhile counsel. Pursuant thereto, Appellant No. 1 filed his affidavit dated 06.07.2026, along with Board Resolutions, medical documents and copies of the applications dated 18.04.2026 and 01.06.2026 filed by the Respondents before the learned NCLT, in response to which Respondent No. 1 filed a counter affidavit dated 25.08.2026. In the meanwhile, in the Suit, by orders dated 12.08.2026 and 19.08.2026, the learned Single Judge recorded the undertaking of the defendants that the affidavit of assets directed on 06.08.2025 shall be filed, and granted four weeks for compliance.

The period of limitation for an intra-court appeal under Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966 is 30 days in terms of Article 117 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act. The respective computations of the parties are as under:-

It is the further case of Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 that, since the certified copy was applied for only on 22.01.2026, i.e., after the expiry of limitation, the Appellants are not entitled to exclusion of time under Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act; and that even if the time taken for obtaining the certified copy (22.01.2026 to 28.01.2026) were excluded, the delay qua the Impugned Judgment would still be about 120 days if reckoned till 23.02.2026. No separate application seeking condonation of delay in re-filing has been moved, and none has been pressed by either side; the appeal, after removal of defects, was listed for the first time on 24.02.2026.

Learned counsel for the Appellants, relying upon the application and the affidavit of Appellant No. 1 dated 06.07.2026, made the following submissions:

Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent Nos. 1 and 2, relying upon the reply, vehemently opposed the application and made the following submissions:

We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and have carefully perused the application, the affidavit of Appellant No. 1 dated 06.07.2026, the reply and the counter affidavit of Respondent No. 1, and the documents placed on record.

Section 5 of the Limitation Act empowers the Court to admit an appeal after the prescribed period if the appellant satisfies the Court that he had “sufficient cause” for not preferring it within such period. The expression “sufficient cause” has consistently been construed liberally so as to advance substantial justice, particularly where no negligence, inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to the party. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji^{99.(1987) 2 SCC 107}, the Supreme Court laid down the following guiding principles:

In N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy^{1010.(1998) 7 SCC 123}, the Supreme Court held that the length of delay is no matter and that the acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. The Court observed that rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties, but are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek their remedy promptly. The Court further cautioned that, while condoning delay, the Court should not forget the opposite party altogether, and that the opposite party may be compensated for the loss occasioned to it.

In Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy^{1111.(2013) 12 SCC 649}, the Supreme Court, while reiterating the liberal, pragmatic and justice-oriented approach, culled out further principles, including that no presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay, though gross negligence on the part of counsel or litigant is to be taken note of; that lack of bona fides imputable to the party seeking condonation is a significant and relevant fact; that there is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration, the former warranting a strict approach and the latter a liberal delineation; and that the conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant, the Court being required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties.

In Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India^{1212., (2023) 10 SCC 531 : 2023 INSC 885}, the Supreme Court reiterated that the exercise of discretion under Section 5 must depend upon the sufficiency of the cause shown, the length of delay by itself not being decisive, and drew a distinction between an “explanation” and an “excuse”, holding that it is a genuine explanation, and not a mere excuse, which must inform the exercise of discretion. The Supreme Court there upheld the condonation of a delay of about 479 days.

The test, therefore, is not whether each individual circumstance pleaded would, in isolation, constitute sufficient cause, but whether the circumstances, viewed cumulatively and realistically, disclose a bona fide explanation free from deliberate inaction or mala fides. It is on this anvil that the present application must be examined.

At the outset, we note that the computation of delay furnished by the Appellants (124 days and 94 days) appears to have been reckoned only till 22.01.2026, the date of the alleged earlier filing, and even on that footing is understated qua the Impugned Order. The Respondents are right in pointing this out. However, to obviate any controversy, and without determining whether the Appellants are entitled to the benefit of Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act or to reckon delay from the earlier diary number, we proceed on the footing most favourable to the Respondents, namely, a delay of 127 days qua the Impugned Judgment and 171 days qua the Impugned Order, reckoned till 23.02.2026.

An understatement of the delay in the application, without more, does not by itself establish mala fides, particularly when the dates of the Impugned Judgment, the Impugned Order, the filing and the service are all matters of record before the Court and nothing was concealed. A delay of about four months in filing an intra-court appeal against an interlocutory judgment, though not insignificant, cannot be characterised as inordinate in the sense of being a delay of years that would unsettle vested rights.

The higher delay of 171 days qua the Impugned Order is largely explained by the record itself. The Appellants did not sit idle after 06.08.2025; they filed the Recall Application (I.A. 20694/2025) seeking recall of that very order, which remained pending until it was dismissed by the Impugned Judgment on 19.09.2025. A party that is bona fide pursuing a remedy before the same Court for setting aside an order cannot be said to have acquiesced in it or to have been negligent during that period. Upon the dismissal of the Recall Application, the challenge to the Impugned Order merged with the challenge to the Impugned Judgment, and the Appellants have sought to assail both together. We are, however, conscious that the period of limitation for assailing the Impugned Order commenced from 06.08.2025, the date of its pronouncement, and expired on 05.09.2025, and that the period of limitation for assailing the Impugned Judgment commenced from 19.09.2025, the date of its pronouncement. The pendency of the Recall Application did not, by itself, arrest the running of time; it is only a circumstance to be weighed while examining whether “sufficient cause” has been shown under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Supreme Court, in Jharkhand Urja Utpadan Nigam Ltd. & Anr. v. M/s Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd^{1313.2025 INSC 533}., has reiterated that limitation commences from the date of pronouncement of the judgment and not from the date of its communication, and that the law of limitation enjoins diligence upon the parties. The relevant observations read as under:

The period of limitation falls into three broad phases, which is examined as under:-

First phase (19.09.2025 to 08.12.2025): ill-health of Appellant No.1-It is not in dispute that Appellant No. 1 is a senior citizen, aged about 65 years, and that he underwent cardiac bypass surgery in 2018. The prescriptions placed on record show that on 18.10.2025, a day before limitation expired, he presented with chest pain, sweating and a blood pressure of 170/100, was administered emergency medication and oxygen, and was advised complete bed rest; on 16.11.2025 he was catheterised for acute urinary retention; on 23.11.2025 he again presented with chest pain, ECG changes and a blood pressure of 190/110, and was advised urgent coronary angiography and bed rest; and on 01.01.2026 he was administered intravenous fluids for weakness and vomiting.

The Respondents have assailed these documents on the ground that they are unaccompanied by purchase slips or test reports, and that Appellant No. 1 was seen attending a Board Meeting on 19.11.2025, driving on 24.11.2025 and visiting the Gurudwara. We have considered these objections carefully. The genuineness of the prescriptions, which bear the name, qualifications and registration number of the treating doctor, has not been shown to be false by any material beyond bare assertion. That a 65-year-old cardiac patient with a history of bypass surgery was able, on some days, to attend a Board Meeting (which, the record shows, was convened pursuant to proceedings before the learned NCLT), visit a place of worship or drive a car, does not falsify the existence of his ailments; the law does not require a litigant to be bed-ridden every single day of the period of delay. The Court is required to take a realistic and humane view, and not to sit in judgment on whether a senior citizen followed every medical advice to the letter. The fact that the cardiac surgery took place in 2018 does not detract from the case of the Appellants; on the contrary, it is the underlying cardiac condition, coupled with the acute episodes in October and November 2025, that renders the explanation credible. We, however, clarify that we do not rest our conclusion on the medical documents alone, but consider them as one of the cumulative circumstances.

Second phase (08.12.2025 to 28.01.2026): attachment of accounts and change of counsel- On 08.12.2025, the bank accounts of Appellant No. 2 were attached. It is no answer to say that the Impugned Judgment directs deposit of only a percentage of the rent; the attachment of five operational bank accounts of a company, on any reckoning, has an immediate effect on its ability to meet salary and statutory obligations, and it is natural that the person principally conducting its affairs and litigation would have to attend to the same. The Respondents’ contention that the attachment of the accounts of Appellant No. 2 and the direction of 21.01.2026 alone prompted the appeal, far from demonstrating mala fides, demonstrates that the coercive consequences of the Impugned Judgment crystallised only thereafter, and that the Appellants thereupon took steps to engage new counsel and assail it. A litigant who chooses to challenge an order once its consequences become real cannot be said to have forfeited his statutory right of appeal by reason of acquiescence, absent an express waiver, which is not the Respondents’ case.

As regards the alleged earlier filing by the erstwhile counsel vide Diary No. E-41775/2026, we find merit in the Respondents’ submission that no copy of the same has been placed on record and that it was admittedly never registered or listed. We, accordingly, do not grant the Appellants any benefit on account of that filing, and have computed the delay ignoring it altogether. At the same time, the fact that the certified copy of the Impugned Judgment was undisputedly applied for on 22.01.2026, the very date of the said diary number, lends a degree of corroboration to the Appellants’ version that steps towards filing an appeal were being taken around that date. The variance between the application and the affidavit as to who applied for the certified copy is, in our view, a drafting inconsistency which has been clarified on affidavit, and not a deliberate misstatement calculated to gain any advantage.

Third phase (28.01.2026 to 23.02.2026): preparation and filing by new counsel- The present counsel was engaged on 28.01.2026, the certified copy was received on the same day, and the appeal was filed on 17.02.2026, with service on 23.02.2026. The present paper book runs into more than 1,650 pages and comprises 68 annexures, including the plaint, the written statement, the counter-claim, the NCLT proceedings and numerous orders. A period of about three weeks for new counsel to study such a record, draft a comprehensive appeal with accompanying applications and file it, cannot be termed lack of diligence. Upon engagement of the new counsel, the Appellants acted with reasonable promptitude.

Wife and company could have filed the appeal- It is true that Appellant No. 1 and his wife are both Directors of Appellant No. 2 and that the Board Resolution dated 19.11.2025 authorised both to engage counsel and conduct litigation. However, the authorisation is enabling, not mandatory, and its existence does not mean that the wife was in a position to instruct counsel on a complex family and commercial dispute in which Appellant No. 1, the son of late Sh. Surjit Singh Sahni and the donee under the impugned gift deeds, is the principal contesting party with personal knowledge of the facts. Notably, the Impugned Order dated 06.08.2025 is directed against Appellant No. 1 personally, among others, in respect of disclosure of movable assets, and Appellant No. 1 is himself an appellant in his individual capacity. The question under Section 5 is whether the explanation offered by the appellant before the Court is bona fide, not whether some other person could theoretically have acted differently. We also cannot overlook the incongruity in the Respondents’ stand: on the one hand they assert that the appeal is not maintainable for want of a Board Resolution authorising Appellant No. 1, and on the other they rely on a Board Resolution to contend that the company was adequately authorised to act through others. The Board Resolutions dated 27.09.2024, 19.11.2025 and 16.04.2026 placed on record, in any event, answer the objection regarding authorisation of Appellant No. 1.

Application lacks factual averments- The original application is no doubt brief. However, this Court, by its order dated 28.04.2026, called upon the Appellants to file an affidavit explaining the delay, and the Appellants have done so on 06.07.2026, supported by medical documents, Board Resolutions and other material. Both the application and the affidavit have to be read together, and, so read, they furnish a specific and date-wise explanation that has been tested by the Respondents through a detailed counter affidavit.

Non-compliance and default- The Respondents have strenuously urged that the Appellants have not complied with the order dated 06.08.2025 and the deposit directions, and have remained in default for more than a year, as is evident from the order dated 12.08.2026 passed in the Suit. We do not, in any manner, condone non-compliance with orders of the Court. However, the question before us is confined to whether sufficient cause has been shown for the delay in filing the appeal. Compliance with the orders of the learned Single Judge is a matter being supervised by the learned Single Judge, who, by the orders dated 12.08.2026 and 19.08.2026, has recorded the undertaking of the Appellants and granted time for compliance; the Respondents’ remedies for any non-compliance remain fully available in those proceedings. Non-compliance with the very order which is the subject matter of challenge cannot be a ground to non-suit a party at the threshold on limitation, more so when the attachment and coercive directions continue to operate in favour of the Respondents and no stay has been granted in the appeal. That the amounts deposited are not presently withdrawable by the Respondents, as urged, in fact demonstrates that the Respondents’ interests are secured and that no prejudice would be caused to them by the appeal being heard on merits.

Collection of rent and alleged concealment- The submissions regarding non-collection of rent from RBL Bank Ltd., receipt of Rs. 90,00,000/- and the conduct of the Appellants before the learned Single Judge pertain to the merits of the dispute and to compliance in the Suit. They do not bear upon the question whether the delay in filing the appeal was deliberate, and are left open.

Merits and the balance of justice- Both sides have addressed submissions touching upon the merits, the Appellants relying upon the Respondents’ statements before the learned NCLT regarding their shareholding, and the Respondents contending that the Impugned Judgment is well reasoned. In view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by LRs v. Special Deputy Collector (LA)^{1414.2024 SCC OnLine SC 513}, the merits of the appeal are not required to be considered while deciding an application for condonation of delay, and we have not done so. Our conclusion rests solely on the sufficiency of the cause shown. We only note, as the Supreme Court did in Katiji (supra), that when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that the cause is decided on merits after hearing the parties, and, as held in Esha Bhattacharjee (supra), that the Court must weigh the balance of justice in respect of both parties.

Prejudice- Lastly, we find that no irreparable prejudice would be caused to the Respondents by condoning the delay. The Impugned Judgment and the Impugned Order are interlocutory in nature; the Suit continues; the interim protections and coercive directions in favour of the Respondents remain operative; and no third-party rights are shown to have arisen on account of the lapse of time. On the other hand, refusing to condone the delay would permanently deprive the Appellants of their statutory right of an intra-court appeal against directions having significant financial and corporate consequences. Any inconvenience caused to the Respondents by the delay can adequately be compensated by costs.

In the considered opinion of this Court, the cumulative circumstances, namely, the advanced age and documented cardiac condition of Appellant No. 1 and the acute medical episodes during the relevant period; the pendency of the Recall Application against the Impugned Order until 19.09.2025; the coercive attachment of the accounts of Appellant No. 2 and its effect on the conduct of the company; the change of counsel; and the voluminous record that had to be studied by the new counsel, constitute “sufficient cause” within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The delay is not shown to be the result of a deliberate design or culpable negligence, and the Appellants stood to gain nothing by approaching this Court late, particularly when coercive directions were operating against them.

In view of the foregoing, the application is allowed, and the delay in filing the appeal against the Impugned Judgment dated 19.09.2025 and in filing the appeal against the Impugned Order dated 06.08.2025 are condoned. Bearing in mind the observation in N. Balakrishnan (supra) that the opposite party ought not to be forgotten, and not as a condition forming the basis of condonation, the Appellants shall pay costs of ₹25,000/- (Rupees twenty five thousand only) each to Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 within four weeks from today.

It is clarified that:

The application stands disposed of in the above terms.

List the appeal for hearing on 08.02.2027.