Mankunwarbai vs Kusumlatabai and Another

V.D. Gyani, J.—These three miscellaneous appeals u/s 30 of the Workmen''s Compensation Act (hereinafter referred to as ''the Act'') arise out of the same order dated 18-1-1980, awarding compensation of Rs. 18,000/- to claimants Mankunwarbai and Kusumlatabai, respectively mother and wife of the deceased workman, Komal Singh.

So far as appeal No. 91 of 1980 is concerned, it relates to the dispute between Mankunwarbai and her daughter-in-law Kusumlatabaj, whose entitlement to compensation has been challenged in this appeal. Two other appeals have been preferred by Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corpn. challenging the compensation made in favour of Mankunwarbai and Kusumlatabaj.

Taking up the appeal preferred by Mankunwarbar denying the claim of Kusumlatabai, Mr. Samvatsar, learned Counsel for the appellant, submitted two points, firstly, Kusumlatabai having remarried, is not entitled to compensation and secondly, it was declared by Kusumlatabai''s counsel before the Commissioner that she had given up her claim. Mr. Kemkar who appears for respondent No. 2 in this appeal also joins Mr. Samvatsar in his arguments as regards Kusumlatabai''s disentitlement to claim compensation on both the grounds, waiver as well as remarriage.

Mr. Garg, learned Counsel, who appears for the respondent Kusumlatabai, submitted that remarriage as such by itself is no bar to claim and award to compensation. He placed reliance on the following decisions in support of his contention. R.B. Moondra and Co. v. Bhanwari 1971 ACJ 438 (Rajasthan), which goes to hold the definition of dependent as given in Section 2(1)(d) of the Act, should not be given a restricted meaning and widow of workman will not be disentitled to claim compensation under the Act merely on the ground of her remarriage.

Mr. Garg, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent, submitted that it would be offending the object of the Act itself, in restricting the meaning and scope of the definition of dependent as given u/s 2(1)(d) of the Act, as reading something which was not provided under law. If it was the intent of the legislature to disqualify and disentitle a widow from claiming compensation on the ground of remarriage, such disqualification should have been clearly provided under the Act, and in absence of any such provision, such a disqualification cannot be read in the definition of ''dependent'' as given in Section 2(1)(d) of the Act. A similar view has been expressed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Ravuri Kotayya v. Dasari Nagavaradhanamma 1958 65 ACJ 193 , which holds that widow of the deceased workman does not cease to be his dependent after her remarriage and is not disentitled to receive compensation as there is no provision in the Act to this effect. The Act is benevolent statute intended to give benefit to the workman or his dependents. The construction of the statute should, therefore, be such as to extent that benefit and not to restrict or arrest the beneficial provisions of the Act.

The other point raised by Mr. Samvatsar, learned Counselappear-ing for the appellant in this appeal, is about waiver. It is true that counsel for the respondent, who appeared before the Commissioner, had made a statement on 7-91979 to the effect that as she (Kusumlatabai) had remarried, she did not desire to prosecute her claim any longer. It was contended on this basis that she had waived her claim. A question of a similar nature as regards waiver of excess quantum of compensation arose before the Orissa High Court in Balabhadra Patra v. Chief Engineer Orissa 1987 ACJ 693 (Orissa). It was found that the claimants were entitled to Rs. 13,500/- as compensation but as they had claimed only Rs. 7000/-, the excess amount to which the claimants were otherwise entitled was not awarded. The High Court in this context held that the principle of waiver or acquiescence has no application to such cases. What is further to be noted in this case is that the counsel, who made a declaration on behalf of respondent, Kusumlatabai, just on the next date of hearing i.e., 8-11-1979 appeared for her mother-in-law, Mankunwarbai on authority from her counsel. In this apparent conflict and clash of interest between mother-in-law and the daughter-in-law, the statement made by an advocate concerned, as made on 7-9-1979 carries no substance or sanctity and cannot be used for disentitling her claim.

Thus, so far as appeal No. 91 of 1980 is concerned, it is liable to be dismissed for the reasons set forth above. It is accordingly dismissed without any order as to costs.

Coming to the other appeals preferred by the Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as ''the Corporation'') Mr. Kemkar, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant, has raised basic question whether the deceased Komal Singh was a workman within the meaning of Section 2(1)(n) of the Act. It was contended that Komal Singh, the deceased workman, was undergoing training as conductor at the relevant time, when the accident occurred, he was not in the employment of the Corporation. He also raised the question that Mankunwarbai not being a widowed mother of the deceased workman Komal Singh, was not entitled to compensation as she did not fall within the definition of the ''dependent'' as defined by Section 2(1)(d) of the Act. Similarly, the entitlement of Kusumlatabai was also challenged on the ground of her remarriage, which has already been discussed and decided above.

Mr. Kemkar, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant, strenuously urged that howsoever liberally construed, Section 2(1)(d) of the Act does not bring the deceased Komal Singh within the ambit and scope of workman. He referred to Exh. P/6 and submitted that the deceased was called upon to submit all the papers as mentioned in Exh. P/6 within three days from the date of this letter, i.e. 19-6-1976. He also submitted that the deceased never submitted all the required papers. He was never appointed as conductor by the appellant Corporation, as such he did not comply with the condition of furnishing security as required by Exh. P/6. Exh. P/5, the collection sheet of conductor, Tulsinandan, who was on duty in the bus at the material time was also referred to and it was submitted by learned Counsel that the deceased was undergoing training, which did not clothe him with the rights of workman so long as he did not complete his training for four days from 24-6-1976 to 27-6-1976, as stated in Exh. P/3.

Mr. Garg, on the other hand, submitted that the question whether the deceased was a workman is a pure question of fact and the Commissioner having found the deceased to be a workman, this question of fact can and should not be allowed to be raised and reagitated in this appeal. Same is the argument of Mr. Samvatsar, who appears for Mankunwarbai in this appeal.

In order to appreciate the rival contentions advanced by the learned Counsel, it may be noted that the deceased Komal Singh was a ''trainee'' on 25-6-1976, on Morwan Jawad route and at Butiya Khal the door slipped open and the deceased fell down. He was immediately shifted to Jawad Hospital, where he was declared dead. Respondent Kusumlatabai, wife of the deceased, made an application under Workmen''s Compensation Act before the Commissioner, Workmen''s Compensation at Ratlam for the award and the same was numbered as 39 of 1977. Mankunwarbai also made an application for the grant of amount under the said Act and it was numbered as 26 of 1977.

Mr. Kemkar, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant Corporation, again referring to the documents Exh. P/3 to Exh. P/6 and the evidence on record very strongly contended that it cannot be said that the accident arose out of and in the course of employment of the deceased Komal Singh by the appellant.

Mr. Garg, learned Counsel for the respondent, submitted that a finding of fact arrived at by the Commissioner cannot be challenged under appeal and the question whether accident arose out of and during the course of employment is a pure question of fact, which cannot be assailed in an appeal u/s 30 of the Act. Mr. Garg referred to the Wordings of Section 30(1) and submitted that an appeal is only on a substantial question of law and it is here that the appellant is up against a serious hurdle. Reliance was placed by Bansidhar Munnalal Vs. Ramchandra Bardichand, , Central India Paper and Board Mills Ltd. v. Omprakash 1983 JLJ SN 59 and United India Fire and General Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Krishna MPWN 1985 N147. In view of these authorities, the question of facts as raised by the appellant cannot be entertained in an appeal u/s 30(1) of the Act.

One more point raised by Mr. Kemkar, learned Counsel for the appellant, still remains to he considered. According to Mr. Kemkar. respondent Mankunwarbai is not legally entitled to claim compensation, as it is only a widowed mother, who can claim and indisputably Mankunwarbai was not a widowed mother of the deceased workman.

Mr. Samvatsar, however, referred to Section 2(1)(d)(iii)(b) of the Act and submitted that mother is included in the word ''parent''. He also referred to decision of this Court in Sundarbai v. M.P. Electricity Board 1981 JLJ 646. As a matter of fact the wordings of the section itself are very clear. The Submission made by Mr. Kemkar cannot, therefore, be accepted.

For the foregoing reasons, the appeals preferred by the Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation fail, they are accordingly dismissed with costs. Counsel''s fee as per schedule, if certified. As noted above, the appeal preferred by Mankunwarbai is also dismissed but there shall be no order as to costs in this appeal.