Manju Devi vs State Of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.

“(1)

That the respondent may kindly be directed to regularize the services of the petitioner from January, 2020, wherein the petitioner completed 5 years Daily Waged services as per policy (Vide Annexure P-5) and for releasing all the consequential benefits including seniority and the entire arrears along with interest w.e.f. January, 2020 in the interest of justice and fair play.

(II)

That the letters/ Communication dated 13.04.2021 & 30.05.2023 passed by the respondent No.3 may kindly be quashed and set-aside in the interest of justice and fair play.”

“Heard for some time. Learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to the Policies of Regularization dated 21.02.2019, 30.03.2021 and 28.12.2021. A perusal of the Policy of State dated 30.03.2021 demonstrates that there is a reference in the said Policy to a Communication dated 22.04.2020, of the Department of Personnel. Learned Additional Advocate General is called upon to place on record the said Communication dated 20.04.2020, on the next date of hearing. List on 06.05.2026.” In compliance to the said order, learned Additional Advocate General has produced today the Regularization Policy circulated by the Department of Personnel, Government of Himachal Pradesh, dated 22.04.2020, in terms whereof, it was intimated that the Government had decided that services of daily wage/ contingent paid workers in all the Departments, who have completed five years of continuous service with a minimum of 240 days in a Calendar year as on 31.03.2020, may be regularized only against vacant posts in respective Departments.

“………...10. Having given careful consideration to the submissions advanced and the material on record, we find that the appellants’ long and uninterrupted service, for periods extending well beyond ten years, cannot be brushed aside merely by labelling their initial appointments as part-time or contractual. The essence of their employment must be considered in the light of their sustained contribution, the integral nature of their work, and the fact that no evidence suggests their entry was through any illegal or surreptitious route.

11.

The appellants, throughout their tenure, were engaged in performing essential duties that were indispensable to the day-to-day functioning of the offices of the Central Water Commission (CWC). Applicant Nos. 1, 2, and 3, as Safaiwalis, were responsible for maintaining hygiene, cleanliness, and a conducive working environment within the office premises. Their duties involved sweeping, dusting, and cleaning of floors, workstations, and common areas—a set of responsibilities that directly contributed to the basic operational functionality of the CWC. Applicant No. 5, in the role of a Khallasi (with additional functions akin to those of a Mali), was entrusted with critical maintenance tasks, including gardening, upkeep of outdoor premises, and ensuring orderly surroundings.

12.

Despite being labelled as “part-time workers,” the appellants performed these essential tasks on a daily and continuous basis over extensive periods, ranging from over a decade to nearly two decades. Their engagement was not sporadic or temporary in nature; instead, it was recurrent, regular, and akin to the responsibilities typically associated with sanctioned posts. Moreover, the respondents did not engage any other personnel for these tasks during the appellants’ tenure, underscoring the indispensable nature of their work.

13.

The claim by the respondents that these were not regular posts lacks merit, as the nature of the work performed by the appellants was perennial and fundamental to the functioning of the offices. The recurring nature of these duties necessitates their classification as regular posts, irrespective of how their initial engagements were labelled. It is also noteworthy that subsequent outsourcing of these same tasks to private agencies after the appellants’ termination demonstrates the inherent need for these services. This act of outsourcing, which effectively replaced one set of workers with another, further underscores that the work in question was neither temporary nor occasional.

17.

As for the argument relating to educational qualifications, we find it untenable in the present context. The nature of duties the appellants performed—cleaning, sweeping, dusting, and gardening—does not inherently mandate formal educational prerequisites. It would be unjust to rely on educational criteria that were never central to their engagement or the performance of their duties for decades. Moreover, the respondents themselves have, by their conduct, shown that such criteria were not strictly enforced in other cases of regularization. The appellants’ long-standing satisfactory performance itself attests to their capability to discharge these functions, making rigid insistence on formal educational requirements an unreasonable hurdle.”

“……...17. Before concluding, we think it necessary to recall that the State (here referring to both the Union and the State governments) is not a mere market participant but a constitutional employer. It cannot balance budgets on the backs of those who perform the most basic and recurring public functions. Where work recurs day after day and year after year, establishment must reflect that reality in its sanctioned strength and engagement practices. The long-term extraction of regular labour under temporary labels corrodes confidence in public administration and offends the promise of equal protection. Financial stringency certainly has a place in public policy, but it is not a talisman that overrides fairness, reason and the duty to organise work on lawful lines.

18.

Moreover, it must necessarily be noted that "ad-hocism" thrives where administration is opaque. The State Departments must keep and produce accurate establishment registers, muster rolls and outsourcing arrangements, and they must explain, with evidence, why they prefer precarious engagement over sanctioned posts where the work is perennial. If "constraint" is invoked, the record should show what alternatives were considered, why similarly placed workers were treated differently, and how the chosen course aligns with Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Sensitivity to the human consequences of prolonged insecurity is not sentimentality. It is a constitutional discipline that should inform every decision affecting those who keep public offices running.”

“13.

Another facet requiring consideration in the case of contractual employees, such as the present appellants, is the doctrine of legitimate expectation. Where employees have continued to discharge their duties on contractual posts for a considerable length of time, as in the present case, it is but natural that a legitimate expectation arises that the State would, at some stage, recognize their long and continuous service. It is in this belief, bolstered by repeated extensions granted by the Executive, that such employees continue in service and refrain from seeking alternative employment, notwithstanding the contractual nature of their engagement. At this juncture, it is thus apposite to advert to the principles governing the doctrine of legitimate expectation as enunciated by this Court in Army Welfare Education Society v. Sunil Kumar Sharma, (2024) 16 SCC 598 wherein it was held as follows: -

"63.

A reading of the aforesaid decisions brings forth the following features regarding the doctrine of legitimate expectation:

63.1.

First, legitimate expectation must be based on a right as opposed to a mere hope, wish or anticipation:

63.2.

Secondly, legitimate expectation must arise either from an express or implied promise; or a consistent past practice or custom followed by an authority in its dealings; …

63.5.

Fifthly, legitimate expectation operates in the realm of public law, that is. a plea of legitimate action can be taken only when a public authority breaches a promise or deviates from a consistent past practice, without any reasonable basis.

64.

The aforesaid features, although not exhaustive in nature, are sufficient to help us in deciding the applicability of the doctrine of legitimate expectation to the facts of the case at hand. It is clear that legitimate expectation. jurisprudentially, was a device created in order to maintain a check on arbitrariness in State action. It does not extend to and cannot govern the operation of contracts between private parties, wherein the doctrine of promissory estoppel holds the field."

It is, therefore, not difficult to comprehend the expectation with which such contractual employees continue in the service of the State. The repeated conduct of the employer-State in expressing confidence in their performance and consistently granting monetary upgrades & tenure extensions reasonably nurtures an expectation that their long and continuous service would receive further recognition.

13.1.

Another Constitution Bench in State of Karnataka v. Umadevi, (2006) 4 SCC 1 cautioned that the doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot ordinarily be extended to persons whose appointments are temporary, casual or contractual in nature. The relevant extract of the judgment reads as follows: -

"47.

When a person enters a temporary employment or gets engagement as a contractual or casual worker and the engagement is not based on a proper selection as recognised by the reievant rules or procedure, he is aware of the consequences of the appointment being temporary, casual or contractual in nature. Such a person cannot invoke the theory of legitimate expectation for being confirmed in the post when an appointment to the post could be made only by following a proper procedure for selection and in cases concerned, in consultation with the Public Service Commission. Therefore, the theory of legitimate expectation cannot be successfully advanced by temporary. contractual or casual employees. It cannot also be held that the State has held out any promise while engaging these persons either to continue them where they are or to make them permanent. The State cannot constitutionally make such a promise. It is also obvious that the theory cannot be invoked to seek a positive relief of being made permanent in the post."

However, this Court in Umadevi (supra) clarified that the bar against invocation of the doctrine of legitimate expectation applies only to those temporary, contractual or casual employees whose engagement was not preceded by a proper selection process in accordance with the extant rules. Consequently, where such engagement is made after following a due and lawful selection procedure, there is no absolute bar in law preventing such employees from invoking the doctrine of legitimate expectation.

Limits on Perpetual Contractual Engagements:

13.2.

In the present case, the respondent-State had engaged the services of the appellants on sanctioned posts since the year 2012. It was only towards the end of the year 2022 that the respondents communicated that no further extension of the appellants' engagement was likely to be granted.

13.3.

In our considered opinion, the aforesaid action is not only vitiated by arbitrariness but is also in clear derogation of the equality principles enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. The respondent-State initially engaged the appellants in their youth to discharge public duties and functions. Having rendered long and dedicated service, the appellants cannot now be left to fend for themselves, particularly when the employment opportunities that may have been available to them a decade ago are no longer accessible owing to age constraints.

13.4.

We are unable to discern any rational basis for the respondent-State's decision to discontinue the appellants after nearly ten years of continuous service. We are conscious that the symbiotic-relationship between the appellants and the respondent-State was mutually beneficial, the State derived the advantage of the appellants' experience and institutional familiarity, while the appellants remained in public service. In such circumstances, any departure from a long-standing practice of renewal, particularly one that frustrates the legitimate expectation of the employees, ought to be supported by cogent reasons recorded in a speaking order.

13.5.

Such a decision must necessarily be a conscious and reasoned one. An employee who has satisfactorily discharged his duties over several years and has been granted repeated extensions cannot, overnight, be treated as surplus or undesirable. We are unable to accept the justification advanced by the respondents as the obligation of the State, as a model employer, extends to fair treatment of its employees irrespective of whether their engagement is contractual or regular.

13.6.

This Court has, on several occasions, deprecated the practice adopted by States of engaging employees under the nominal labels of "part-time", "contractual" or "temporary" in perpetuity and thereby exploiting them by not regularizing their positions. In Jaggo v. Union of India, 2024 SCC Online SC 3826 this Court underscored that government departments must lead by example in ensuring fair and stable employment, and evolved the test of examining whether the duties performed by such temporary employees are integral to the day-to-day functioning of the organization.

13.7.

In Shripal v. Nagar Nigam, 2025 SCC Online SC 221 and Vinod Kumar v. Union of India, (2024) 9 SCC 327 this Court cautioned against a mechanical and blind reliance on Umadevi (supra) to deny regularization to temporary employees in the absence of statutory rules. It was held that Umadevi (supra) cannot be employed as a for years without undertaking regular recruitment. The Court further clarified that Umadevi itself draws a distinction between appointments that are "illegal" and those that are merely "irregular", the latter being amenable to regularization upon fulfilment of the prescribed conditions.

13.8.

In Dharam Singh v. State of U.P. 2025 SCC Online SC 1735, this Court strongly deprecated the culture of "ad-hocism" adopted by States in their capacity as employers. The Court criticised the practice of outsourcing or informalizing recruitment as a means to evade regular employment obligations, observing that such measures perpetuate precarious working conditions while circumventing fair and lawful engagement practices.

13.9.

The State must remain conscious that part-time employees, such as the appellants, constitute an integral part of the edifice upon which the machinery of the State continues to function. They are not merely ancillary to the system, but form essential components thereof. The equality mandate of our Constitution, therefore, requires that their service be reciprocated in a manner free from arbitrariness, ensuring that decisions of the State affecting the careers and livelihood of such part-time and contractual employees are guided by fairness and reason.

13.10.

In the aforesaid backdrop, we are unable to persuade ourselves to accept the respondent-State's contention that the mere contractual nomenclature of the appellants' engagement denudes them of constitutional protection. The State, having availed of the appellants' services on sanctioned posts for over a decade pursuant to a due process of selection and having consistently acknowledged their satisfactory performance, cannot, in the absence of cogent reasons or a speaking decision, bruptly discontinue such engagement by taking refuge behind formal contractual lauses. Such action is manifestly arbitrary, inconsistent with the obligation of the ate to act as a model employer, and fails to withstand scrutiny under Article 14 of me Constitution.