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Judgment
M.M. Punchhi, J.—The Petitioner, Manjit Singh Dhingra, is in this Court challenging the order of detention dated 15th June, 1985 (Annexure P-4) passed by the State of Maharashtra under the provisions of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974. He prays for an interim relief in the nature of stay of arrest or operation of the impugned order.
A similar relief was claimed by the Petitioner in Criminal Writ No. 978 of 1985 which came up for hearing before me on 11th December, 1985. I had dismissed the petition in limine, for the Petitioner, then was not categorical as to whether any order had been passed by the State of Maharashtra. It is in those circumstances that I had taken the view that since the Petitioner had not produced a copy of the detention order and even had not been detained within the jurisdiction of this Court, no cause of action arose and thus that petition merited dismissal. Now the Petitioner has filed a copy of the detention order and apprehensive of his arrest on its being carried out within the jurisdiction of this Court, he has laid challenge thereto.
Notice of motion was issued. The Respondents have filed replies and raised plea of jurisdiction.
The Learned Counsel for the Petitioner has relied on a Division Bench judgment of the Bombay High Court in N.K. Nayar and Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra and Ors. 1985 (2) Cri. 304, as also two Single Bench decisions of the Delhi and Karnataka High Courts reported as Delhi Development Authority v. Ganga Singh and Anr. 1980 Cr.L.J. 1175, and Dr. L.R. Naidu v. State of Karnataka 1984 Cr.L.J. 757, respectively. All these cases relate to the power of the Court u/s 438, Code of Criminal Procedure. The Bombay High Court in N.K. Nayar''s case (supra) has taken the view that its powers are wide enough to include the power to grant interim anticipatory bail to a person situated within its jurisdiction for an offence allegedly committed outside the State of Maharashtra. The Delhi High Court in Delhi Development Authority''s case (supra) has gone even further by saying that not only can it grant interim bail but can also confirm it. The Karnataka High Court is, however, in line with the Bombay view. Grant of a limited anticipatory bail was spelled out as within the power of the Court u/s 438, Code of Criminal Procedure. On the other hand, there is a Full Bench judgment of the Patna High Court in Syed Zafr-ul Hassan and Anr. v. State 1985 Cri. L. J. 605, where the expressions "the High Court" or "the Court of Session" in Section 438, Code of Criminal Procedure, have been held to mean those Courts within whose territorial jurisdiction the accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence arises or is made. The Patna High Court took the view that the apprehension of arrest by such accused is with regard to that particular offence having a particular locale and not generically. In other words, physical presence of the accused in a particular jurisdiction did not confer jurisdiction on that Court to grant him anticipatory bail u/s 438, Code of Criminal Procedure, when the offence was committed in another jurisdiction and accusation lay against him in that jurisdiction. On the strength of these decisions, Mr. Cuccria, Learned Counsel for the Petitioner, says that there is a conflict of opinion and the matter deserves to be heard by a larger Bench.
I am afraid the conflict suggested is not germane to the case in hand. The Petitioner has not approached this Court u/s 438, Code of Criminal Procedure. He is in a petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India challenging a detention order. In determining the question of jurisdiction in Sardar Ujagar Singh Sekhwan and Ors. v. The State of Punjab and Ors. Cr. W. 426 of 1986 decided on 12th August, 1986, I had expressed the following view:
...Furthermore, this Court would be slow to assume jurisdiction over a matter on which a sister Court can, with more efficacy, promptitude and exactitude, hold an inquiry and grant relief. In making this observation, this Court has in mind the availability of the Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur which can grant prompt and adequate relief to the Petitioners....
It was further observed:
...Let us assume that this Court has the jurisdiction (not by any means now holding so) but it cannot be denied that the Rajasthan High Court too has jurisdiction. The Petitioners thus must be relegated to seek their remedies in that Court. Though the power under Article 226 of the Constitution is wide and extraordinary, it yet remains discretionary with this Court to exercise it or not in a given set of circumstances.
I am still of the same view. It is the Bombay High Court which can grant adequate relief to the Petitioner and the Petitioner is relegated to seek his remedy there. That Court has the necessary equipment to grant prompt and adequate relief to the Petitioner. That Court has all the means to expand and enquire into the subject and have its orders obeyed in a better way.
For the foregoing reasons, this petition is dismissed in limine.