Manjit Singh vs The State

R.S. Sarkaria, J.—This revision petition is directed against an order, dated 27th June, 1967, of the learned Sessions Judge, Patiala, by which be maintained the conviction of the Petitioner, u/s 338, Indian Penal Code, but reduced the sentence to 6 months'' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 500/- .

It arises out of the following facts:

On 25th August, 1966, the Petitioner, an employee of the Pepsu Roadways, was driving bus No. PNT-5975 on Patiala-Rajpura road. When it reached near Punjabi University at about 4.15 P.M., another Bus No. PNU-1938 of the Punjab Roadways, driven by Karam Singh, D.W. 2, was going about 25 yards ahead of the bus driven by the Petitioner. A third bus No. PNT-5946, that had come from the opposite side, had halted or was halting on the other side of the road near the campus of the Punjabi university to unload passengers. Just at the juncture, a cyclist came in front of bus No. PNU-1938. Karam Singh, the driver of that bus, applied the brakes, in order to avoid a collision, the Petitioner swerved his vehicle towards the right, and, in the process, rammed into Bus No. PNT-5946. As a result of the impact, Gurjeet Singh, Bakshish Singh, and Mohinder Partap Singh, passengers of Bus No. PNT-5946, sustained injuries. The injured were removed to the Rajendra Hospital, Patiala. A case was registered with the Police against the Petitioner under Sections 279, 337 and 338 Indian Penal Code. On these charges, the Police sent him up before the Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Patiala, who convicted him on all the 3 counts, and sentenced him to various terms of imprisonment and fine. On appeal by the convict, the Sessions Judge acquitted him of the charge, under Sections 279 and 337, Indian Penal Code but maintained his conviction on the charge u/s 338, Indian Penal Code, as aforesaid.

The main contention of the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner is that it was an undisputed fact that the bus driven by the Petitioner was following another bus, driven by Karam Singh, D.W. 2. Karam Singh had to apply emergency brakes to his bus to avoid running over a cyclist. The Petitioner was suddenly faced with a situation which he could not foresee with any amount of care. In order to avoid a headlong crash into the rear of the bus driven by Karam Singh, the Petitioner swerved his bus towards the right in the hope that he could thereby avoid the accident. But to his misfortune, it dashed into another bus. He was, says the counsel, suddenly confronted with a choice between two evils. He only and rightly chose the course which caused much less harm than the one he had avoided. The law, says the counsel, does not require the drivers of vehicles to exercise extraordinary superhuman care. All that it wants is that they should take such care as is required of a prudent man. It is stressed that the act of the Petitioner, in the circumstances, did not indicate any rashness or gross negligence on his part.

I find a good deal of force in this contention. Indeed, the story vouchsafed by Karam Singh, DW, in the witness box, viz., that he had to bring his bus to an emergency stop to avoid running over a cyclist who suddenly appeared in front of his vehicle, has not been discounted by the Learned Counsel for the State. His only argument is that there was no evidence on record to show that the Petitioner applied brakes to his vehicle. According to him, circumstances suggest that he was negligent in closely following another bus driven by Karam Singh. It is argued that as a prudent driver, the Petitioner ought to have kept his vehicle at a safe distance from the vehicle running in front of him.

The evidence with regard to the speed of the bus was variously stated. The prosecution witnesses said that the Petitioner was driving at a speed of not less than 50 miles per hour. But Karam Singh, DW, who was admittedly driving the vehicle in front of the bus driven by the Petitioner, has put the speed of his vehicle at the time of accident at 27 or 28 miles per hour. The conclusion is inescapable that at the material time, the speed of the vehicle, driven by the Petitioner, was not more than 27 or 28 miles per hour. The mere fact that the bus driven by the Petitioner struck the bus in which the injured persons were travelling, does not justify the presumption that the accident was caused by the carelessness or negligence of the Petitioner, when it was not established that he was driving at an excessive speed.

The circumstances brought in evidence as a whole lead only to one reasonable conclusion, that this accident occurred because the vehicle No. PNU-1938, driven by Karam Singh, DW, was brought to an emergency halt. The Petitioner, therefore, found himself suddenly heading for a collision into the rear of that bus. That would have been a disaster of the first magnitude. He, therefore, swerved his vehicle to avoid that disaster towards the right but unfortunately struck against the other bus No. PNT-5946. He could not foresee even with any amount of care that the bus in front of him would come to a sudden stop. He has stated that the distance between his bus and the bus in front of him was about 25 yards. Even if it is assumed that the distance was less, then also in the circumstances of this case, he could reasonably assume that the vehicle in front of him would not come to a sudden halt.

It is in evidence that the brakes of the vehicle driven by the Petitioner did not work by pressing the paddle once, but only if the paddle was pressed twice As there was hardly a split second available to the Petitioner for avoiding the collision and bringing the vehicle to halt, he could reasonably assume that the double paddle brakes would not work to avoid the accident. The mere fact, therefore, that there was no evidence other than the bald statement of the Petitioner to show that he attempted to apply brakes and bring the vehicle to 3 halt, does not raise an inference of negligence or rashness on his part. In my opinion, the Petitioner had explained the circumstances under which his vehicle dashed into the other vehicle.

Since no culpable negligence and rashness on the part of the Petitioner has been cogently proved, I would allow this petition, quash his conviction and sentence, and acquit him Fine, if paid shall be refunded.