Manish vs National Investigation Agency

The present D.B. Criminal Appeal has been preferred by the appellant under Section 21 of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 (hereinafter referred to as “the NIA Act”), assailing the order dated 15.10.2025 passed by the learned Special Court of NIA Cases, Jaipur in Bail Application No. 63/2025, arising out of FIR No. R.C. 01/2024/NIA, Jaipur, registered for the offences punishable under Sections 308(4) and 111(3) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (for short, “the BNS”) and Sections 25, 25(1AA) and 3 of the Arms Act, with the foundational FIR being FIR No. 420/2024 registered at Police Station Neemrana, District Alwar. By the impugned order, the learned Special Court has declined to enlarge the appellant on bail.

The prosecution case, as emerging from the record placed before us, is that FIR No. 420/2024 came to be registered at Police Station Neemrana, District Alwar, on 08.09.2024 for offences punishable under Sections 308 and 111(3) of the BNS read with Section 3/25 of the Arms Act. The allegation in the FIR is that two unidentified persons, armed with firearms, fired approximately 35 rounds at Hotel Highway King and thereafter threatened the concerned person with dire consequences, demanding an amount of Rs.5 crore as extortion money and extending a threat to kill in the event the demanded amount was not paid. During the course of investigation into the aforesaid FIR, allegations relating to organised crime and extortion pursuant to an alleged conspiracy came to be levelled against the appellant. The appellant was arrested on 12.11.2024 and has continued to remain in custody thereafter.

Learned counsel appearing for the appellant assailed the implication and arrest of the appellant primarily on the ground that his name surfaced during investigation in an interrogation note/statements of a co-accused and that, merely on the basis of such material, the appellant could not have been arrayed as an accused without there being independent and tangible material connecting him with the alleged occurrence. It was contended that the implication of the appellant is founded substantially upon the statement of a co-accused and that a person cannot be subjected to continued incarceration merely on the basis of an allegation made by a co-accused, particularly when such allegation is not supported by independent corroborative material.

Learned counsel for the appellant has also referred to the alleged person, namely, Manisha, and submitted that, as per the information obtained under the Right to Information Act, she had never named the appellant. It was also submitted that the appellant had already been arrested in another matter and was lodged in Bhondasi Jail, Haryana, prior to the occurrence in question and that, in the present case, his arrest was effected on 12.11.2024 from Bhondasi Jail, Haryana. It was further urged that the appellant has been implicated principally because he happens to be the brother of Kaushal, who is stated to be a recognised gangster of Haryana, and that such familial relationship, by itself, cannot constitute a legally sustainable basis for attributing criminal liability to the appellant.

Learned counsel further submitted that several criminal cases have been registered against the appellant in the past and that, out of a total of 21 cases referred to by the prosecution, the appellant has already been acquitted in a majority of the cases and the criminal proceedings therein have come to an end. Therefore, mere registration of criminal cases cannot be treated as proof of criminal conduct or guilt in the present case.

Learned counsel for the appellant had lastly submitted that the appellant has remained in custody for a period of more than 22 months; that the charge-sheet has already been filed; that three supplementary charge-sheets have also been filed; that the provisions of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (for short, “the UAPA”) have not been invoked against the appellant; and that the statutory embargo contained in Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA is, therefore, not attracted to the appellant. It was further contended that despite the passage of approximately one year, the trial has not progressed substantially and, thus, continued incarceration of the appellant would serve no useful purpose.

Learned counsel whilst placing reliance upon the settled principle that “bail is the rule and jail is the exception”, submitted that prolonged incarceration, filing of the charge-sheet and lack of meaningful progress in the trial constitute circumstances warranting enlargement of the appellant on bail.

Per contra, learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent-National Investigation Agency vehemently opposed the prayer for bail, and submitted that the appellant has extensive criminal antecedents and that as many as 21 criminal cases stand reflected against him; and that the acquittals relied upon by the appellant cannot, at the stage of consideration of bail, be viewed in isolation, particularly when, according to the prosecution, such acquittals in several cases were occasioned by witnesses turning hostile.

Learned Special Public Prosecutor has further submitted that the appellant is the real brother of Kaushal Chaudhary, stated to be associated with the Kaushal Chaudhary gang/Bambiah Group, and that the said gang is alleged to have connections with foreign-based gangsters as well as the Khalistan Tiger Force. It was submitted that investigation with regard to these aspects is still continuing and that the possibility of applicability of the provisions of the UAPA to the appellant is under investigation. It was further contended that the allegations against the appellant relate to organised criminal activity having alleged international ramifications and that, in the event of his release on bail, there exists a possibility of the appellant absconding, particularly having regard to the alleged conduct of his brother and the co-accused.

Learned Special Public Prosecutor also emphasised upon the gravity and seriousness of the offences alleged against the appellant and submitted that release of the appellant at this stage may have an adverse impact upon the investigation, the witnesses and the larger societal interest, besides raising concerns relating to national security. For the perusal of the Court, learned counsel appearing for the NIA placed before us, in sealed cover, the statements of PW-80 and PW-96 dated 13.08.2025. It was submitted that the said material discloses prima facie evidence connecting the appellant with the alleged criminal activity. Therefore, the discretionary relief of bail ought not to be extended to him at this stage.

We have given our anxious and thoughtful consideration to the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and have carefully perused the material placed before us, including the material submitted by the respondent-NIA in sealed cover.

At the outset, it is necessary to reiterate that consideration of a prayer for bail does not require the Court to conduct a meticulous examination of the evidence or to undertake a detailed appreciation of the prosecution case as would be undertaken at the stage of trial. The Court is required to undertake a prima facie assessment of the material placed before it, while simultaneously bearing in mind the nature and gravity of the accusation, the role attributed to the accused, the antecedents of the accused, the possibility of the accused fleeing from justice, the likelihood of influencing witnesses or otherwise obstructing the course of justice, and the larger societal implications of the alleged offence. In the ratio encapsulated in State of U.P. through CBI v. Amarmani Tripathi : (2005) 8 SCC 21, the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that the question of grant of bail requires consideration of, inter alia, whether there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed the offence, the nature and gravity of the accusation, the severity of punishment in the event of conviction, the danger of the accused absconding or fleeing from justice, his character and standing, likelihood of repetition of the offence, reasonable apprehension of witnesses being tampered with, and the larger interests of the public or the State.

Similarly, in the dictum enunciated in Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi) : (2018) 12 SCC 129, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while there can be no exhaustive enumeration of the factors governing the exercise of bail jurisdiction, the seriousness and nature of the offence, the character of the evidence, the likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice, the possible impact of his release upon witnesses and society, and the possibility of tampering with evidence are relevant considerations. The Court emphasised that the discretion has to be exercised judiciously. The aforesaid principles assume particular significance in the present matter because the prosecution allegations are not confined to an isolated or individual act.

The allegations, as placed before us, concern firing of approximately 35 rounds at a hotel, a demand of Rs.5 crore as extortion money accompanied by a threat to kill, and an alleged organised criminal conspiracy. At the stage of bail, the Court is not required to finally determine whether these allegations stand proved; nevertheless, the seriousness and nature of the allegations constitute relevant circumstances while exercising discretionary jurisdiction. It is equally well settled that criminal antecedents cannot be mechanically disregarded while considering an application for bail. In Neeru Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2016) 15 SCC 422, the Hon'ble Supreme Court deprecated an approach whereby relevant criminal antecedents of the accused were ignored while exercising bail jurisdiction. The Court emphasised that the discretion to grant bail must be exercised judiciously and on a consideration of all relevant circumstances. The principle has subsequently been reiterated by the Supreme Court in several decisions.

At the same time, we are conscious of the submission advanced on behalf of the appellant that registration of criminal cases cannot, by itself, be treated as proof of guilt and that the appellant has been acquitted in a number of cases. We do not propose to examine the merits or demerits of those previous proceedings in the present appeal. However, the fact that the prosecution has placed before the Court a history of 21 criminal cases is a circumstance which cannot be completely excluded from consideration at the stage of bail, particularly when the present allegations themselves concern organised criminal activity. As regards the contention that the appellant has been implicated merely on the basis of the statement/interrogation note of a co-accused, we are of the view that the Court, at the stage of bail, cannot isolate one piece of material from the entire prosecution record and undertake a mini-trial for the purpose of determining its ultimate evidentiary worth. The relevance, admissibility, corroborative value and ultimate reliability of the statements relied upon by the prosecution are matters which would fall for consideration at the appropriate stage of trial.

We are also mindful of the submission that the provisions of the UAPA and, consequently, the embargo under Section 43-D(5) thereof are not presently applicable to the appellant. We accept that, on the facts placed before us, the appellant cannot be denied bail merely by mechanically invoking a statutory embargo under Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA when the said provision has not been invoked against him. However, the absence of the statutory embargo under Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA does not mean that the Court is precluded from considering the nature and gravity of the allegations, the material collected during investigation, the antecedents of the accused, the apprehension of absconding, and the potential impact of release upon the investigation and the trial. These are independent and well-recognised considerations governing ordinary bail jurisdiction.

The decisions rendered under the UAPA nevertheless illustrate the distinction between a statutory restriction upon bail and the broader constitutional and judicial principles governing pre-trial detention. In Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb : (2021) 3 SCC 713, the Supreme Court recognised that prolonged incarceration and unreasonable delay in trial can, in appropriate circumstances, engage the guarantee of personal liberty under Article 21 even in cases governed by stringent statutory provisions. At the same time, the said principle does not establish that mere passage of time automatically entitles every accused to bail irrespective of the facts and circumstances of the case.

Likewise, in Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation : (2022) 10 SCC 51, the Apex Court emphasised the importance of speedy adjudication and recognised that prolonged incarceration is a relevant consideration in determining entitlement to bail. The Court, however, also recognised that the rigour of special statutes and the particular facts of each case must be duly considered. In the present case, the appellant has specifically relied upon the period of incarceration, filing of the charge-sheet and supplementary charge-sheets, and the alleged lack of substantial progress in the trial. These circumstances have indeed been considered by us. However, the period of custody cannot be examined in isolation from the nature of the allegations, the material placed by the investigating agency, the antecedents attributed to the appellant and the apprehensions expressed by the prosecution regarding his release. It is also relevant that the present case concerns allegations of organised criminal activity involving an alleged extortion demand of Rs.5 crore and the use of firearms, including the allegation that approximately 35 rounds were fired at the hotel. The prosecution has further placed before us the statements of PW-80 and PW-96 dated 13.08.2025, which, according to the prosecution, constitute prima facie material against the appellant.

Having regard to the material placed before us, we are not persuaded to hold that the prosecution case against the appellant is so inherently improbable that the discretionary jurisdiction of bail ought to be exercised in his favour at this stage. The apprehension expressed by the prosecution regarding the possibility of the appellant absconding is also a relevant consideration. The Supreme Court in Amarmani Tripathi (supra) and Anil Kumar Yadav (supra) has recognised the likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice and the possibility of interference with the administration of justice as material factors in the exercise of bail jurisdiction. The prosecution has also relied upon the alleged connection of the appellant's brother with the Kaushal Chaudhary gang/Bambiah Group and the alleged links of the said network with foreign-based gangsters and the Khalistan Tiger Force. We make it abundantly clear that we do not record any finding of guilt against the appellant on the basis of his familial relationship or upon the allegations which are still subject to investigation. Nevertheless, the existence of such allegations, coupled with the other material placed before us, constitutes a circumstance which cannot be completely ignored while assessing the prosecution's apprehension regarding the release of the appellant.

It is a settled proposition that the Court, while considering bail, is not required to record findings which may prejudice either the prosecution or the defence at the stage of trial. The exercise is necessarily tentative and confined to determining whether the circumstances justify enlargement of the accused on bail. Further, in the context of appeals arising under Section 21 of the NIA Act, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has recognised the importance of examining whether the order under challenge is founded upon a proper prima facie assessment of the material on record and whether the discretion exercised by the Special Court calls for appellate interference. The statutory appellate jurisdiction does not require the appellate Court to undertake a full-fledged trial-like assessment of the prosecution evidence at the stage of bail.

Having regard to the totality of the circumstances, namely, the nature and gravity of the allegations; the allegation of firing of approximately 35 rounds at the hotel; the alleged demand of Rs.5 crore as extortion money accompanied by threats to kill; the allegation of organised criminal activity pursuant to a conspiracy; the criminal antecedents attributed to the appellant; the prima facie material relied upon by the prosecution, including the statements of PW-80 and PW-96 dated 13.08.2025; the apprehension expressed by the prosecution regarding the possibility of absconding; and the overall circumstances emerging from the investigation, we are not persuaded to exercise our discretionary jurisdiction in favour of the appellant at this stage. We have also considered the submission regarding prolonged incarceration and the alleged delay in commencement/progress of the trial. While such factors are undoubtedly relevant considerations in an application for bail, they cannot, in the facts of the present case, be viewed in isolation from the other circumstances referred to hereinabove. The right to personal liberty is undoubtedly fundamental; however, the exercise of bail jurisdiction requires a balancing of the liberty of the accused with the legitimate interests of a fair, effective and unhindered criminal process.

We accordingly refrain from expressing any opinion on the ultimate merits of the prosecution case, the admissibility or evidentiary value of the statements relied upon by the prosecution, the correctness of the allegations concerning the appellant's alleged association with organised criminal networks, or the eventual applicability of any provision of the UAPA. All such questions are expressly left open for determination by the competent Court at the appropriate stage. On an overall consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, and without expressing any final opinion on the merits or demerits of the prosecution case, we are of the considered view that the appellant has not made out a case warranting his release on bail at this stage.

Consequently, the present D.B. Criminal Appeal, preferred under Section 21 of the NIA Act, fails and is accordingly dismissed. The sealed envelopes/documents handed over by learned counsel appearing for the respondent-NIA for perusal of the Court are directed to be returned to learned counsel appearing for the respondent-NIA in accordance with law. However, it is clarified that the observations contained in the present order are confined solely to the adjudication of the prayer for bail and shall not be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case. The learned Trial Court shall proceed with the trial uninfluenced by any observation contained herein.