Manish Shukla vs Procter and Gamble Home

K.K. Trivedi, J.—This Miscellaneous Appeal under Order 43 Rule 1(r) of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as CPC for brevity), is directed against the order dated 4.7.2014, passed in regular Civil Suit No.4-A/2014, by the II Additional District Judge, Raisen, by which the application made by the appellant/plaintiff under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 read with Section 151 CPC, has been rejected, on the ground inter alia that the learned trial Court completely failed to consider that a prima facie case was made out in favour of the appellant/ plaintiff for grant of temporary injunction inasmuch as the resignation submitted by the appellant was already withdrawn and that the same could not be accepted by an authority lower in rank than the appellant, yet such a plea of the appellant has not been properly appreciated. It is contended that the Court below has completely failed to appreciate the grounds raised by the appellant to show that the balance of convenience was also tilted in favour of the appellant. It is contended that the Court below has not examined the law well settled in the circumstances where irreparable loss was going to be caused to the appellant and interim injunction was required to be granted to the appellant.

The appellant was working on the post of Manager Government Relations & Legal with the respondent No.1 Company. The initial appointment of the appellant was made on selection by the orders of the Human Resource Manager of the Company at Mandideep, District Raisen. However, on account of meritorious services of the appellant, he was promoted upto the rank of Manager and in terms of the duty assigned to him in fact he was treated to be senior most officer. According to respondents themselves, the appellant was working in a managerial capacity and as a supervisory role over the most of other employees/executive and others working in the plant at Mandideep. That being so, the appointing authority of the appellant after his promotion was only the company.

It is contended that there was some dispute on account of some action taken by the appellant of which some sort of enquiry was got conducted and a pressure was put to dispense with the services of the appellant. He was so much harassed that ultimately he tendered his resignation on 16.2.2014. However, as was explained by officers of the Company, the resignation of the appellant was to be withdrawn. Despite this, since the respondents were not allowing him to work, he ultimately was required to approach the Court of law by filing a suit seeking the reliefs of declaration and permanent injunction. The specific relief claimed in the suit was for declaration that the resignation dated 26.2.2014 obtained from the appellant by coercion was null and void. A decree of permanent injunction was claimed against the respondents/defendants to allow the appellant to continue on the post.

Along with the plaint, an application under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 read with Section 151 of CPC was filed by the appellant seeking a temporary injunction stating that in terms of the e-mail letter sent to the appellant by the respondent No.1-Company he was to be relieved by 30.4.2014 and in case temporary injunction is not granted and the appellant is relieved from the post, the claim made in the suit would be frustrated. The trial Court considering the said prayer of the appellant, vide order dated 28.4.2014 directed that the appellant be not relieved from the post upto 15.5.2014 till a reply of the application is filed. However, it was said that the appellant would not claim the remuneration for the aforesaid period as of right and that would be subject to the decision of the respondents to pay the said amount.

The respondents were served with the notice of the application and they filed their reply contending inter alia that in terms of the condition prescribed in the service contract, the appellant/plaintiff has already submitted his resignation on 26.2.2014, which was duly received and accepted on the same day and this fact was well within the knowledge of the appellant. Since the appellant has requested to allow him to work till 30.4.2014, such a prayer was accepted and he was to be relieved from the post on 30.4.2014. It was further averred that in fact suit as filed by the appellant was not maintainable in terms of the provisions of Section 14(b) of the Specific Relief Act as the contract of service was not enforceable by the Courts of law. In terms of the condition of employment if resignation was submitted by the appellant and if the same was accepted, no injunction could be granted in favour of the appellant.

On due consideration of the rival submissions since by the order impugned, the application under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 read with Section 151 of CPC, filed by the appellant, has been rejected, this appeal has been filed.

Learned Senior counsel for the appellant has drawn attention of this Court to various documents annexed with the memo of appeal. It is contended by learned Senior counsel that in terms of the contract of service so executed at the initial stage when the appellant was appointed, it was necessary to give a notice of one month if the appellant has preferred to relinquish the job. No notice of one month was given by the appellant nor the salary for the period of one month was paid in lieu of notice and, therefore, the resignation was not to be treated as valid one. Secondly, such a resignation was submitted only because of the illegalities committed by the respondents and the pressure which was being put on the appellant. Since by coercion, the resignation was obtained, the same was not to be acted upon. Thirdly, the resignation was not submitted before the competent authority as the same was made before the Human Resource Manager of the Unit at Mandideep, District Raisen, whereas the resignation was to be made before the Company. That being so, the same was not to be treated as accepted on the very same day. All such actions were taken only to throw out the appellant from the employment with malafide intention. Lastly, it is contended that the Human Resource Manager was not competent authority to accept the resignation of the appellant and in fact the resignation was taken back vide e-mail letter dated 14.3.2014, by the appellant, but this fact was also not looked into and since the resignation of the appellant was said to be accepted after its withdrawal on 21.7.2014, it was necessary for the trial Court to hold that there was a strong prima facie case made out in favour of the appellant. Since the appellant was allowed to continue in the employment upto 30.4.2014 on their own by the respondents, the balance of convenience was also tilted in favour of the appellant and since after the end of employment, the appellant would be put to great financial inconvenience as he is required to maintain a family of five members including his children, wife and mother, the irreparable injury would be cast to the appellant.

It is contended by learned Senior counsel for the appellant that in terms of the provisions of Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, the suit filed by the appellant is not barred and the Court has power to enforce such a contract as the declaration that the resignation submitted by the appellant was a result of coercive action on the part of the respondents/defendants, a permanent injunction could be granted against the respondents/defendants not to act on the said resignation of the appellant. That being so, the order impugned is liable to be set aside and the appellant is entitled to grant of temporary injunction.

Learned counsel appearing for the respondents has contended that firstly the suit as filed was not maintainable in terms of the provisions of Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act. Secondly, the resignation submitted by the appellant was accepted and there is no documentary evidence available to show that the resignation was withdrawn much before its acceptance. Thirdly, the appellant on his own made a request to allow him to remain in the employment upto 30.4.2014, which was accepted by the respondents and they by letter dated 8.7.2014 informed to the appellant that his resignation was already accepted and his dues are to be settled and he is not to remain in the employment of the Company after 30.4.2014. It is contended that from the documentary evidence available on record, it is clear that the appellant on his own in terms of the clause of contract of service tendered his resignation and the same was accepted immediately. Therefore, there was no prima facie case available in favour the appellant.

Learned counsel has submitted that the balance of convenience was also not in favour of the appellant, inasmuch as, it was found that after tendering the resignation, the appellant has remained absent from the duties and that itself is enough to demonstrate that the appellant was no longer interested in the employment with the respondent Company. The balance of convenience therefore was not in favour of the appellant. In any case, if the appellant succeeds in the suit, his reinstatement may be directed and for that the continuance of services, and therefore, the appellant can be compensated in terms of money, therefore, there was no irreparable loss caused to the appellant. Drawing support from the law settled by the Apex Court in the case of Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar, West Bengal Vs. Dunlop India Ltd. and Others, , it is contended that the trial Court after due consideration has reached to the conclusion that in the given circumstances, no case was made out to grant temporary injunction in favour of the appellant. It is contended that in terms of the aforesaid law pronounced by the Apex Court tendency to grant interim order on mere asking was not proper and, therefore, the temporary injunction application was rightly rejected.

By putting reliance in the case of Pearlite Liners Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Manorama Sirsi, , it is contended that the Apex Court has categorically held that in the service matter specially in private employment if a declaration is sought and a permanent injunction is sought restraining employer from taking any action in respect of the employee, if the relief is granted, the same would amount to enforcing contract of personal service, which is barred under law. It is contended that the very same provisions have been looked into by this Court in the case of Birla Jute Industries Ltd., Chanderia and Another Vs. Ramesh Chandra Gattani, , and it has been held that if an injunction is granted relating to the service in private employment, it would amount to enforcing the contract of personal service which is barred under the law. In case the appellant succeeds in the suit, he would be entitled to monetary benefit of service and, therefore, if after due consideration of these pleas, the application made by the appellant for grant of temporary injunction has been rejected by the trial Court, no error of law is committed. It is contended that the appeal is thus liable to be dismissed.

Heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record.

Undisputedly, if the relief of temporary injunction is granted to the appellant, it would mean nothing but to grant the main relief claimed in the suit to the appellant. The main relief claimed by the appellant as described herein above is that it be declared that the resignation dated 26.2.2014 was obtained by coercion which is void and illegal. The second relief is for permanent injunction to allow the appellant to continue in the employment. If the interim relief as claimed in the application is seen, that would mean nothing but granting an injunction to allow the appellant to continue in the services. Though it is contended by learned Senior counsel for the appellant that the law well settled is that in given circumstances even the temporary relief as claimed though amounting to granting of the main relief, may be granted in the given circumstances, as has been held by the Apex Court in the case of Deoraj Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, , but it has to be seen that in ordinary course such an interim relief is not to be granted. The Apex Court while considering the aspect as to how such relief could be granted, has very categorically held in paragraph 12 of the report which reads thus :-

�12. Situations emerge where the granting of an interim relief would tantamount to granting the final relief itself. And then there may be converse cases where withholding of an interim relief would tantamount to dismissal of the main petition itself; for, by the time the main matter comes up for hearing there would be nothing left to be allowed as relief to the petitioner though all the findings may be in his favour. In such cases the availability of a very strong prima facie case � of a standard much higher than just prima facie case, the considerations of balance of convenience and irreparable injury forcefully tilting the balance of the case totally in favour of the applicant may persuade the court to grant an interim relief though it amounts to granting the final relief itself. Of course, such would be rare and exceptional cases. The court would grant such an interim relief only if satisfied that withholding of it would prick the conscience of the court and do violence to the sense of justice, resulting in injustice being perpetuated throughout the hearing, and at the end the court would not be able to vindicate the cause of justice. Obviously such would be rare cases accompanied by compelling circumstances, where injury complained of is immediate and pressing and would cause extreme hardship. The conduct of the parties shall also have to be seen and the court may put the parties on such terms as may be prudent.�

In view of the aforesaid, it has to be examined whether the appellant had a fool proof case for grant of temporary injunction which may amount to grant of final relief claimed in the suit. The contentions raised by the appellant are that in terms of some policy of the respondent-Company for obtaining the business, gifts were to be given to the official concerned for which when he was asked by his superior, he contacted the officer concerned and after obtaining his consent informed the concerning authority. Such an incident had taken place on 2.10.2013, which was not relating to the work of the appellant. However, after four months of the said incident, some sort of enquiry was got conducted against the appellant and thereafter the higher officials of the respondent- Company put pressure on the appellant threatening him for the criminal prosecution, his dismissal from the services and putting his name in the website of dismissed employees so that in future the appellant may not get employment elsewhere. That was the threat given to the appellant on account of which he gave his resignation on 26.2.2014. On 14.3.2014, the appellant sent an e-mail to his superior authorities intimating these facts. However, instead of allowing the appellant to continue in the employment, or treating the resignation as withdrawn, he was sought to be removed from the employment.

For proving the said claim, the appellant has placed on record certain documents, but there is none available to indicate that the appellant has withdrawn his resignation. The letter of 14.3.2014 sent by the appellant nowhere recites that he was intending to withdraw his resignation and that there was no communication that his resignation has been accepted till that time. Similarly, the letter dated 21.3.2014 nowhere indicates that the appellant was willing to withdraw his resignation. In response to this letter, the fact was already communicated to the appellant informing that his resignation was acted upon and that is why after accepting the request of the appellant he was allowed to remain in the employment upto 30.4.2014. From these documents, it is clear that the resignation of the appellant was forwarded to the competent authority and the same was already accepted. Till that time, there was no request for withdrawal of the resignation. Therefore, without recording the evidence it is not possible to say that the resignation was withdrawn by the appellant before its acceptance by the competent authority of the respondent Company. That being so, prima facie case was not in favour of the appellant.

Apart from the aforesaid, as has been held in the case of Deoraj (supra) and Birla Jute Industries Ltd., Chanderia (supra) a contract of service in private employment is not enforceable by the Courts of law and, therefore, it will not be possible for any Court to grant temporary injunction to continue an employment which has already been put at end by the appellant himself by making resignation. This being the specific features which are to be kept in mind, the case in hand cannot be termed to be a case rare in rarest in the given circumstances in which an interim injunction, though may be allowing the main relief in the suit, could be granted.

Now balance of convenience is always based on the circumstances in which an action is taken. Had it been a case that the moment the resignation was tendered, the same was withdrawn immediately, it could be said that there was some balance of convenience tilted in favour of the appellant. Though it is averred in the plaint that the resignation was withdrawn by the appellant, but not a single document withdrawing the resignation has been placed on record by the appellant. On the other hand, in the application for grant of temporary injunction filed by the appellant, it is contended that the resignation submitted on 26.2.2014 was said to be accepted and this fact came to the notice of the appellant on 21.3.2014. Such an averment is made on affidavit by the appellant himself, therefore, in these circumstances, it cannot be said that balance of convenience was also available in favour of the appellant.

Lastly, it has to be seen that there is no stigma cast on the appellant since only his resignation is accepted and in case he has put to end to his own employment by tendering the resignation, the payment of emolument does not arise. If the appellant succeeds in the suit ultimately, and a decree of declaration is granted that such a resignation was not made on freewill by of the appellant or was a result of coercion on the part of the respondents, natural corollary would be as if the appellant was in the employment and in that case, he may be compensated in terms of money for payment of emolument of the period during which he remained out of employment. However, on any of these counts, it is not possible to hold that the case of the appellant is one as described by the Apex Court in the case of Deoraj (supra) in the category of rare and rarest and, therefore, the appellant would not be entitled to grant of temporary injunction.

In view of the aforesaid discussions, no error of law is found in the order passed by the Court below rejecting the application of the appellant for grant of temporary injunction. The appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.