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Judgment
The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking the following reliefs :-
That this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue a writ of quo warranto calling upon the respondents to show the authority under which land in question has been taken over by them under the garb of Nationalization. ii) This Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct the respondents to release the land in question back in favour of the petitioner as the same was not taken over under the Nationalization iii) That any other relief that this Hon’ble Court deems fit in the facts and circumstances of the case be also granted.
It is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner is the legal heir of late Shri Rai Bahadur Mathura Prasad, who was recorded as owner of the land in question. The land was initially recorded in the name of Rai Bahadur Mathura Prasad Motilal & Sons Coal Company. After his death, the property devolved upon his daughter Smt. Jugnu Bai, whose name came to be recorded in the revenue records. Thereafter, upon her death, the petitioner’s father inherited the property, and subsequently, upon his demise, the petitioner along with other legal heirs succeeded to the same.
It is the case of the petitioner that no mining activity was ever carried out on the said land and that the land does not fall within the definition of “coal mine” under the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1973 Act'). However, in the year 1979, the name of respondent No.3 Western Coal Fields Ltd. came to be recorded in the revenue records vide Sanshodhan Panji No. 44.
The petitioner challenged the said mutation before the Tahsildar, Junnardeo, which came to be dismissed on 29.12.1997. The appeal preferred before the Sub-Divisional Officer was also dismissed on 20.04.2000. Though review proceedings were initiated, the same ultimately came to be rejected on 02.06.2003 and the order dated 20.4.2000 was maintained. The revision preferred before the Collector was also dismissed on 17.08.2004. Thereafter, the petitioner remained silent for around seven years and had filed the instant petition in the year 2011.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the land in question is neither a coal mine nor included in the Schedule appended to the 1973 Act. Under Section 3 of the 1973 Act, only specified coal mines stood vested in the Central Government. The respondents have illegally mutated their names without following due process of law and the revenue authorities have failed to appreciate the legal position and have acted in an arbitrary manner. To bolster his submission, reliance has been placed upon judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Vidya Devi v. State of H.P., (2020) 2 SCC 569 and Urban Improvement Trust v. Vidhya Devi, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3725.
Per contra, learned counsel for respondent no.1 Union of India submits that the contention of the petitioner that name of Rai Bahadur Mathura Prasad Motilal & Sons Coal Company is not mentioned in the Schedule is misconceived. The statutory scheme of the 1973 Act is mine oriented and not favouring the land owners. Therefore, absence of the owner’s name is immaterial if the subject land forms part of a coal mine situated within a notified coalfield. It is further submitted that as per sub section (3) and (5) of the Coal Mines (Taking Over of Management) Act, 1973, the duty is cast on the person incharge of the mine to intimate the Central Govt. about the name and location of mine. It is further submitted that by operation of law, the coal mines vests in the Central Government and failure on the part of forefathers of the petitioner cannot defeat the purpose of the Act which provides vesting of coal mines to the Central Govt. It is further submitted that the State Government is the competent authority to verify and ascertain whether the land in question falls within the areas of the coal mines specified in the Schedule to the 1973 Act. Thus, it is submitted that the the factor for determination whether land falls under the coal mines or not is the existence of coal mining activity and not omissions of name or land number in the Schedule.
Learned counsel for the respondents No.3 and 4 submits that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches, as the mutation was done in the name of respondents way back in the year 1979 and final order of the Collector was passed in the year 2004. The land vested in the Central Government by virtue of Sections 3 and 4 of the 1973 Act. The petitioner has failed to produce any documentary evidence establishing ownership or non-applicability of the Act. The petition involves disputed questions of fact and is not maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. To bolster his submissions, reliance has been placed upon judgment of Hon'ble Apex court in the case of State of Rajasthan v. D.R. Laxmi, (1996) 6 SCC 445, State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai, 1964 SCC OnLine SC 10 and State of J&K v. R.K. Zalpuri, (2015) 15 SCC 602.
Having considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and upon perusal of the material available on record, this Court finds that the issue involved in the present case is with regard to the nature of the land in question and its alleged vesting under the provisions of the 1973 Act. Section 3 of the 1973 Act, provides that only such coal mines as are specified in the Schedule vest in the Central Government. Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the 1973 Act, which was later omitted by Act 57 of 1986, provided that where the existence of any other coal mine came to the knowledge of the Central Government, the provisions of the Coal Mines (Taking Over of Management) Act, 1973, would apply to such mine until it was nationalised by appropriate notification.
Section 3 of the Coal Mines (Taking Over of Management) Act, 1973, provides as under :-
(1) On and from the appointed day, the management of all coal mines shall vest in the Central Government.
Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of subsection (1), the coal mines specified in the Schedule shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, to be the coal mines the management of which shall vest, under sub-section (1), in the Central Government:
Provided that if, after the appointed day, the existence of any other coal mine comes to the knowledge of the Central Government, whether after an investigation or in pursuance of an intimation given to it under sub-section (5), or otherwise, the Central Government shall, by a notified order, make a declaration about the existence of such mine, and on and from the date of such declaration-
the management of such coal mine shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, to vest in the Central Government; and
such coal mine shall be deemed to be included in the Schedule, and thereupon the provisions of this Act shall become applicable thereto subject to the modification that for the words "appointed day", wherever they occur, the words, brackets and figures "date of the declaration made by the Central Government under sub-section (2) of section 3" shall be substituted.
If any error or omission is noticed in the Schedule in relation to the name or address of the owner of a coal mine, the owner of such mine shall, within thirty days from the date on which this Act receives the assent of the President, bring such error or omission to the notice of Central Government.
If, after the appointed day, the Central Government is satisfied whether from any information received by it or otherwise, that there has been any error, omission or misdescription in relation to the particulars of a coal mine included, or deemed to be included, in the Schedule or the name and address of the owner of any such coalmine, it may by, notified order, correct such error, omission or misdescription, and on the issue of such notified order the relevant entries in the Schedule shall stand corrected accordingly:
Provided that no such correction in relation to the ownership of a coal mine shall be made where such ownership is in dispute.
Every person in charge, immediately before the date on which this Act receives the assent of the President, of the management of any coal mine, being a coal mine not included or deemed to be included on the said date in the Schedule, shall, within thirty days from the said date, intimate to the Central Government the name and location of such mine and the name and address of the owner thereof.
Where there is a dispute with regard to the declaration made by the Coal Board under the Coking Coal Mines (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1971, to the effect that a coal mine contains coking coal, the management of such coal mine shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the said Act, vest in the Central Government.
The main ground of challenge in this petition is that the subject-matter land is within revenue circle Junnardeo, District Chhindwara (M.P.)., and several mines in the Pench Kanhan Valley Coalfields with the location at Post Office Junnardeo have been included in the Schedule at Serial Number 340, 346, 354, 362 and 364, however, the name 'Rai Bahadur Mathura Prasad Motilal & Sons Coal Company’ is not included in the list.
As per sub-section (3) and (5) of Section 3 of the Coal Mines (Taking Over of Management) Act, 1973, it was the duty of the person in charge of |the management of the mine to intimate the Central Government, within 30 days from the date on which this Act received the assent of the President, about the name and location of mine and name and address of the owner or correction of any omission or error or inclusion of any mine in the Schedule. Further, no such intimation to Central Government or notified order issued under Section 3 has been placed on record by the petitioner nor has been mentioned under any of the proceedings carried out before State Government authorities.
As per Section 2(b) of the 1973 Act, “coal mine” means a mine in which there exists one or more seams of coal, and as per Section 2(h), “mine” means any excavation where any operation for the purpose of searching for or obtaining minerals has been or is being carried on. Therefore, a conjoint reading of the both suggests that any mine, wherein, any operation for the purpose of searching for or obtaining minerals has been or is being carried on, will fall within the ambit of the Act, subject to relevant provisions stated therein.
Further, from perusal of record, it is evident that the State Govt. is the competent authority to verify and ascertain whether any excavation or mineral extraction was undertaken at the concerned site as the mining leases, prospecting licences, royalty and other statutory records are maintained by the State Govt.
As per section 3 of the 1973 Act, on the appointed day, the right, title and interest of the owners in relation to the coal mines specified in the schedule shall stand transferred to and shall vest absolutely in the Central Govt. free from all encumbrances. The petitioner in the entire petition has not stated that how the name of Rai Bahadur Mathura Prasad Sons Coal Company has been recorded in the revenue records in Khasra entries, annexure P/1. But, from perusal of the entry, it is clear that it was recorded in the name of Coal Company. Once, it is recorded in the name of coal company, it is presumed that it is for the purpose of coal mining. Therefore, by the application of section 3 of the 1973 Act, the land in question stood transferred and vested with the Central Govt., which has already been recorded in the revenue records vide Sanshodhan panji dated 12.6.1979, annexure P/2. The petitioner had challenged the said entry made in the revenue records on the ground that the said company was owned by his grandfather and he has inherited the land as the natural successor as per the provisions of the Succession Act. However, the said application for correction of entry in the revenue records has been dismissed on the ground that as the land has been recorded in the name of the company, the petitioner could not produce any document to substantiate that it was recorded in the individual name or owned by the maternal grandfather. Therefore, the said application was dismissed and attained finality by the orders passed under appeals filed thereafter.
As per section 8 of the 1973 Act, the payment will be made by the Central Govt. but if there is a discrepancy in regard to the schedule as per taking over of management under the Act, 1973, then it would be informed by the owner to the Govt. and same shall be decided. But, nothing has been brought on record to substantiate that such a dispute has ever been raised by the petitioner. Therefore, by operation of section 4 of the 1973Act as well as sub-section (3) and (5) of the Coal Mines (Taking Over of Management) Act, 1973, the land in question vests with the Central Government.
Now, the only question which arises for consideration is that in absence of any compensation as provided under section 8 of the 1973 Act, whether the land of the petitioner can be declared to be free for vesting according to the provisions of the 1973 Act. As per section 3 of the Coal Mines (Taking Over of Management) Act, 1973, by operation of law, the land owned by the coal company for mining purpose vests with the Central Government. The forefathers of the petitioner have never raised any dispute in regard to such vesting. The petitioner, by initiating proceedings under the MPLRC, has tried to correct the entry made in the revenue record, in which the petitioner did not get any favourable orders and ultimately the proceedings got dismissed by the Revenue authorities in the year 2003. Thereafter, the petitioner remained silent for years together and finally filed this petition in the year 2011, challenging the authority. As stated hereinabove, the Authority is by operation of law and stood vested in the Central Government. Even if name of the Company is not mentioned in the schedule appended to 1973 Act, then also the land has already been vested with the Central Government. The petitioner cannot claim any adverse title and cannot challenge the authority of taking over of the vesting of the land. Therefore, there is no question of release of such land back in favour of the petitioner.
In the instant petition, the petitioner, by way of this petition, is challenging the legality of the vesting, which, in the considered opinion of this Court, in view of the aforesaid analysis of law and facts is not maintainable at such a belated stage.
While dealing with the question of delay, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. v. K. Thangappan reported in (2006) 4 SCC 322 has held as follows :
6.Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports (1969) 1 SCC 185. Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably.
7.What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd (1874) 5 PC 221 (PC at p. 239) was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service [AIR 1969 SC 329]. Sir Barnes had stated:
“Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy.
In the case of Ghulam Rasool Lone vs State of J&K reported in (2009) 15 SCC 321 , it is held as follows:
"19.It is beyond any cavil of doubt that the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is a discretionary one. For sufficient or cogent reasons a court may in a given case refuse to exercise its jurisdiction; delay and laches being one of them. While considering the question of delay and laches on the part of the petitioner, the court must also consider the effect thereof."
As question of compensation was required to be agitated by the forefathers of the petitioner within a stipulated time as mentioned in Section 3 and 5 of the Coal Mines (Taking Over of Management) Act, 1973, for which no document has been submitted by the petitioner to substantiate that it was ever made by the forefathers of the petitioner. Therefore, the petition of the petitioner questioning the authority of the respondent of acquisition is misconceived. Accordingly, the petitioner is also not entitled for any compensation. Thus, the petition sans merit and is hereby dismissed. However, the petitioner is at liberty to seek declaration of his entitlement in the Company, whose name was recorded in the revenue records, by the competent civil court and consequently his right of compensation.