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Judgment
A.C. Arumugaperumal Adityan, J.—The tenants in RCOP. No. 9 of 1995, who have lost their defence before the Courts below are the
revision petitioners herein. RCOP. No. 9 of 1995 was filed before the Rent Controller (District Munsif) Arrakkonam, u/s 10(2)(ii)(a) and 10(3)(a)
(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 1969.
According to the landlord, he is in possession of D. No. 59, Thasildar Street, Arakkonam. The first respondent has taken lease of the said Door
No. 59 for a monthly rent of Rs. 120/- for the purpose of running a tailoring shop in the name and style of New York tailors and has agreed to pay
the monthly rent on or before 12th day of every English calendar month. Without informing the landlord, the first respondent had sub-let the
premises bearing Door No. 59 for a monthly rent of Rs. 300/- to the second respondent. The landlord is running a mess by name Kumari Vilas
Naidu Mess in a rental premises, for a monthly rent of Rs. 1,200/-, under one Govinda Ammal bearing Door No. 93 (old NO. 67), Gandhi Rod,
Stuartpet, Arakkonam, which is 50 feet away from Door NO. 59, wherein the first respondent is running his tailoring shop with the 2nd
respondent. The landlords family is residing on the backyard of Door No. 93, wherein the mess is being conducted by the landlord. The landlady
of Door No. 93 had issued notice dated 24.12.1989 demanding the landlord herein, who is running a mess in Door No. 93, to vacate and hand
over the possession of Door No. 93, since the same is required for her personal occupation, ie., to conduct finance company. In the mediation
took place subsequently the landlord herein (tenant in Door No. 93) undertook to vacate and handover possession within 3 = years ie., on or
before 22.12.1993. He was allowed to conduct mess in Door No. 93 for another 1 = years thereafter. The landlord herein/tenant in Door No. 93,
had agreed to vacate and hand over the possession of Door No. 93 on or before 22.4.1995. Only under such circumstance, the petition schedule
property ie., Door. No. 59 is required for the landlord herein for conducting his mess in the suit building. In January 1992, the first respondent
herein had agreed to vacate and hand over possession of the petition schedule property, but subsequently he retracted and filed O.S. No. 459 of
1992 claiming an order of permanent injunction. The landlord herein is the owner of not only door NO. 59 but also Door No. 60 & 61. In Door
No. 60 one Raji is in occupation as a tenant and in Door No. 71 one Nagarajan is in occupation as a tenant. The landlord herein requires Door
No. 59, 60 & 61 to run Kumari Vilas Naidu Mess after vacating the same from door No. 93. The landlord herein has laso applied for necessary
municipal plan for conducting Kumari Vilas Naidu Mess at Door No. 59, 60 & 61. Apart from Door No. 59, 60 & 61 there is no other building
of his own is available with the landlord herein. A notice dated 20.3.1995 was issued by the landlord to the respondents herein. The first
respondent has refused to receive the said notice. The second respondent even after receipt of the said notice has not come forward to comply
with the request made by the said notice. Hence, the petition.
The first respondent has filed a counter, which was adopted by the second respondent, as follows:
The 1st respondent admits that in the petition schedule property the 1st respondent is running a tailoring shop in the name and style of New York
Tailors as a tenant under the petitioner/landlord for a monthly rent of Rs. 120/-. The 1st respondent has not sub-let the premises to the 2nd
respondent for a monthly rent of Rs. 300/-. The 2nd respondent is the brother of the 1st respondent. The 2nd respondent is assisting the 1st
respondent in tailoring business. From the date of inception of opening of the tailoring shop itself, both the 1st & 2nd respondents are in the petition
schedule building. The 1st respondent had filed O.S. No. 459 of 1992 before the District Munsif, Arakkonam, for an order of injunction
restraining the petitioner/landlord from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the petition schedule building and got a decree as
prayed for. Even at the time of visiting of the Advocate Commissioner on 21.10.1992, the 2nd respondent was working along with the 1st
respondent in the petition schedule building. The allegation that the landlord herein is conducting a mess in the name and style of Kumari Vilas
Naidu Mess in the building belonging to one Govinda Ammal and the same is situated 50 feet away from the petition schedule building and the rent
was originally fixed as Rs. 800 and has subsequently been raised as Rs. 1,200/- pm and that Tmt. Govinda Ammal had asked the tenant/landlord
herein to vacate and hand over possession of the said building are all false. Further allegation that the Door No. 60 & 61 are also required for
running Kumari Vilas Naidu Mess by the landlord herein along with the petition scheduled building No. 59 is also false. The first respondent has
given a suitable reply to the notice received from the petitioner/landlord herein. Since the first respondent has not refused to pay the enhanced
monthly rent of Rs. 200/- the petitioner/landlord has filed this frivolous petition.
Before the learned Rent Controller, the petitioner/landlord has examined himself as P.W. 1 besides examining one Padmanaban as P.W. 2 and
has exhibited Ex.P.1 to Ex.P.12 and both the respondents have examined themselves as R.W.1 and R.W.2 respectively and have exibited Ex.R.1
to Ex.R.15. The caveat petition was marked as Ex.C.1.
After going through the evidence both oral and documentary, the Rent Controller allowed the petition directing the respondents to vacate and
hand over possession to the petitioner/landlord by 28.4.2003. Aggrieved by the findings of the learned Rent Controller, the tenants/respondents 1
& 2 have preferred an appeal in RCA. No. 5 of 2003 before the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority (Subordinate Judge, Ranipet). The
Rent Control Appellate Authority, after giving due consideration to the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the appellants as well as the
respondent and after going through documents filed on either side, has come to the conclusion that there is no material placed in the appeal for
taking a different view from that of the view already taken by the Rent Controller and consequently dismissed the appeal thereby confirmed the
findings of the learned Rent Controller, which necessitated the tenants/respondents 1 and 2 to prefer this revision.
Heard Mr. G. Jeremian learned Counsel appearing for the revision petitioners and Mr. R. Margabandhu learned Counsel appearing for the
respondent and considered their respective submissions.
The learned Counsel appearing for the revision petitioners would contend that both the courts below have failed to consider the subsequent
event that is the landlord''s taking possession of Door No. 61, which fell vacant due to the order of eviction. The learned Counsel in support of his
contention would rely on 1998 LW 25 Variety Emporium v. V.R.M. Mohd. Ibrahim Naina. The facts of the said case is that:
The landlord in that case had filed a batch of 7 eviction petitions against the tenants in 4 shops and on the ground floor and in residential premises
on the first floor. The Rent Controller decreed all the petitions and passed orders for eviction. The tenant of three out of four shops in the ground
floor had two out of three premises in the residential premises on the first floor filed appeals. The Appellate Authority dismissed the appeals of the
tenants in the shops, but allowed the appeals filed by two tenants on the first floor. The tenant of one of the shops on the ground floor filed a
revision in the High Court while the other two tenants on the ground floor accepted the decree of eviction confirmed by the Appellate Authority.
The position which obtained during the pendency of the civil revision petition before the High Court was that the respondent had succeeded finally
and conclusively, in establishing his right to recover or in recovering possession from 3 out of the 4 tenants of the shop premises on the ground
floor and 1 out of the 3 tenants of the residential premises on the first floor. The High Court had dismissed the civil revision petition, which
necessitated the tenant to approach this Apex Court.
The Honourable Apex Court held that the High Court at the time of revision has made an error, failure in taking into consideration the subsequent
event, which had taken place after filing of the petition that falling of 3 portion out of 7 portions let out by the landlord to accommodate himself,
which will inure to the benefit of the tenant and not to the landlord. The exact observation in the above ratio runs as follows:
The main contention of the appellant before the High Court was that so long as the eviction petitions were pending in the trial Court and the first
appellate Court, it could not be predicted with certainty as to in how many cases the respondent would succeed finally. That position had
crystallised after the Appellate Authority had rendered its judgment. As stated by us at the beginning of this judgment, 1 out of the 3 tenants on the
first floor did not challenge the decree for eviction passed by the trial Court. The landlord had, therefore, succeeded finally against him. Out of the
4 tenants of the shop premises on the ground floor, the tenant under the stairway did not challenge the decree for eviction passed against him by
the trial Court. We will, however, leave that gentleman alone, since he was in possession of an area measuring 4'' x 4'' ony. The remaining 3 tenants
on the ground floor, including the appellant, had filed appeals against the decrees of eviction but, all the three appeal were dismissed by the
Appellate Authority. Two out of these 3 tenants did not challenge the decrees passed by the Appellate Authority, with the result that the
respondent succeeded finally and conclusively against those 2 tenants. The position which thus emerged for he first time when the civil revision
petition was being argued before the High Court was that the landlord had succeeded finally in obtaining orders for eviction against 3 out of the 4
tenants on the ground floor and 1 out of the 3 tenants on the first floor. This position had undoubtedly brought about a change to the state of affairs
which existed at the inception of the ejectment proceedings which existed partly during the pendency of the proceedings before the Appellate
Authority. Basing himself on the change in the factual position which had come about after the Appellate Authority gave its decision, the appellant
argued before the High Court that the subsequent events ought to be taken into account for the purpose of findings out whether the landlord still
required the shop premises in possession of the appellant, which it would appear, and measure about 308 square feet. That contention was
brushed aside by the High Court with the short order extracted above.
No authority is needed for the proposition that, in appropriate cases, the Court must have regard to events as they present themselves at the time
when it is hearing the proceeding before it and mould the relief in the light of the events. We may, however, draw attention to a decision of this
Court in Hasmat Rai and Another Vs. Raghunath Prasad, , the ratio of which may be stated thus:
When an action is brought by a landlord for the eviction of a tenant on the ground of personal requirement, the landlord''s need must not only be
shown to exist at the date of the suit, but it must exist on the date of the appellate decree, or the date when a higher Court deals with the matter.
During the progress and passage of proceedings from Court to court, if subsequent events occur which, if noticed, would non-suit the landlord, the
court is to examine and evaluate those events and mould the decree accordingly. The tenant is entitled to show that the need or requirement of the
landlord no more exists by pointing out such subsequent events, to the Court, including the appellate Court. In such a situation, it would be
incorrect to say that as a decree or order for eviction is passed against the tenant, he cannot invite the Court to take into consideration subsequent
events. The tenant can be precluded from so contending only when a decree or order for eviction has become final.
The learned Counsel for the revision petitioners relying on 1994 (1) LW 24 S. Devaji v. K. Sudarshana Rao, would contend that the landlord
being already in occupation of a non-residential building is not entitled to seek eviction on this ground. The facts of the said case is that an
application for eviction was filed u/s 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act on the ground of bone
fide requirement of the demised non-residential building. The learned Rent Controller allowed the petition, but on appeal the Appellate Authority
reversed the findings of the learned Rent Controller. On Revision, the High Court reversed the Appellate Authority''s order and confirmed the
decree of the trial Court. Hence, the SLP was preferred by the tenant before the Honourable Apex Court. The relevant observation in the said
ratio runs as follows:
The landlord is required to prove his bona fide requirement of the non-residential building to carry on or commence a business. At the relevant time
the landlord is not in occupation of another non-resident building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own or to the possession of
which he is entitled whether under the Act or otherwise. The objection of the Act is to enable the landlord to recover possession of his non-
residential building in occupation of a tenant, if his requirement is bona fide for the purpose of the business which he is carrying on or his bona fide
proposes to commence. The landlord should not be in possession of another non-residential building or of which he is entitled to be in possession
in the city, town or village concerned. The intendment of the Legislature thereby is clear that a landlord who is in occupation of a non-residential
building which is his own or to the possession of which he is entitled to under the Act or any other law should not be permitted to recover
possession of another non-residential building belonging to him by evicting the tenants therefor. In Vidya Bai and Another Vs. Shankerlal and
Another, a Full Bench considered this question afresh and held that u/s 10(3)(a)(ii) a landlord in occupation of a non-residential building is not
entitled for carrying on his business or for commencement of business to get back possession of another non-residential building in the occupation
of a tenant. The bar u/s 10 against securing eviction of the tenant.
...
The analysis of the provisions made hereinbefore indicates that the landlord must be in possession of a non-residential building in the city, town or
village and if he requires another non-residential building for expansion of his business or to establish another business or needs additional
accommodation of a non-residential building in the same city, town or village, Section 10(3)(a)(iii) creates an embargo. Suitability or convenience
does not appear to have, from the language found therein, been envisaged by the Legislature. As pointed out in Vijayalakshmi Printing Press''s case
it would be open to the Legislature to clarify the position, but on the explicity language, it is difficult to give countenance to the respondent''s
contention. In Pandu''s case the finding was that the non-residential building which the appellant sought for eviction ceased to be a non-residential
building, by virtue of its conversion in to a residential buildings. Therefore, this question had not arisen in Pandu''s case for decision. The ratio
therein would be confined to those facts and circumstances. The decisions of the Madras High Court relied on by the learned Counsel do not
appear to have laid down the law correctly. The language in the Madras Act in Pari maeria is that same as in Section 10(3)(a)(iii).
So from the above two ratio decidenti of the Honourable Apex Court, it is clear that when the landlord came into possession of a non-residential
building even subsequent to the filing of the petition u/s 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act, the eviction of a tenant from a non-residential building cannot be
ordered. But the facts and circumstances of each and every case are to be taken into consideration while passing an order of eviction u/s 10(3)(a)
(iii) as observed by the Honourable Apex Court in 1998 LW 25 Variety Emporium v. V.R.M. Mohd. Ibrahim Naina (referred to above).
In the case on hand, it is the definite case of the landlord that he is running a mess by name Kumari Vilas Naidu Mess at Door No. 93, Gandhi
Road, Chevapet, Arakkonam, for a monthly rent of Rs. 1,200/- and since Govinda Ammal, the landlady of the land there, has insisted the
petitioner/landlord herein to vacate and hand over possession, he has no other option but to ask the respondent, who are in occupation of the
petition schedule building bearing Door No. 59, Thasildar Road, Arrakkonam, wherein they are conducting a tailoring shop for a monthly rent of
Rs. 120/-/ Ex.P.1 is the rental receipt dated 15.9.2000 to show that the petitioner/landlord herein was conducting his mess at Door No. 93 in a
rental basis. Since Kumari Vilas Naidu Mess was conducted in a larger area, the landlord had also filed petition against the tenants, who were in
occupation of Door Nos. 60 & 61 besides Door No. 59 and got an order of eviction against the tenants in Door Nos. 60 & 61, as seen from
Ex.P.3 and Ex.P.4 copy of the decree in RCOP. Nos. 7 & 8 of 1995. To conduct the Mess, the landlord had obtained license under Ex.P.5. It is
the case of the landlord/petitioner/respondent that after getting possession of Door Nos. 59, 60 & 61, he want to alter the place in a way to
conduct the said Mess in the said building. For the said building he has obtained building plan under Ex.P.7. The fact that subsequent to the filing of
the petition, eviction was ordered in respect of Door NO. 61 cannot be a ground to dismiss the present RCOP. No. 9 of 1995 filed by the
landlord. For this proposition, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents would rely on Bhagwan Chand and Co. Vs. Utham Chand,
Ramesh Kumar and Rajesh Kumar rep. by Estate od Shah Ganmal Nemalji, . The exact observation relevant for the purpose of deciding this case
runs as follows:
The Honourable Apex Court has also set aside the findigns of this Court on an earlier occasion with regard to the issue of comparative hardship.
Hence, now let me discuss the said issue. Section 10(3)(iii) specifically provides that in the case of an Application u/s 10(3)(c) the Controller shall
reject the Application if he is satisfied that the hardship which may be caused tot he tenant by granting it will outweigh the advantage to the
landlord. The landlords have clearly stated in their Application that if eviction is ordered, the advantage to them will not outweigh the disadvantage
that may be caused to the Tenants. It is not the case of the tenants that they could not locate any other place to run the business which they are
now running in the petition premises. It is not even his case that he has searched for a place to shift his business and he could not locate a place for
the same. No doubt the tenant is doing stationery-business for more than 30 years in the premises which has been let out to him. So, even if the
tenant is evicted from the premises which is occupying now, he can very well get a shop portion in the nearby area. If these facts are taken into
consideration there cannot be any hardship to the tenant which will outweigh the advantage to the landlords.
The learned Counsel for the respondent contending that it is no necessary to take note of subsequent events in all cases. For this proposition of
law, the learned Counsel for the respondent would rely on 1983(3) MLJ 203 Narasu''s Coffee Co. v. Muhammed Ibrahim Rowther. The exact
observation in the said ratio runs as follows:
Turning now to the subsequent event in this case, it is not a subsequent event at all because, as I observed above, two simultaneous applications
were filed. It a tenant in his wisdom chooses not to contest after being evicted by the Rent Controller and allows the order to become final by
execution of which the landlord obtained possession, it passes my comprehension to see as to how this could be characterised as a subsequent
event. Only such of those events totally unrelated to the proceedings for eviction if it takes place, which have a bearing on the maintainability of the
petition, then of course it will be a different mater. But, that is not the position here, in view of the landlord coming forward with a claim that he
requires both the portions in occupation of two different tenants. Construed inthis light, there is no difficulty in reconciling the rulling of the Supreme
Court in Hasmat Rai and Another Vs. Raghunath Prasad, .
The same view has been reiterated in 1998(3) LW 661 V.T. Asokan and Anr. v. Bowjiya Begam, as follows:
The next question is whether the recovery of possession of the adjacent property by the respondent from another tenant would militate against her
case of bona fide requirement for own occupation. The learned Counsel for the revision petitioners broguh to by notice the petitioner, counter,
memorandum of compromise and the order passed in RCOP. No. 19/95 between the respondent and one S.M. Syed Mohammed and on the
basis of Hasmat Rai and Another Vs. Raghunath Prasad, contended that the respondent has suppressed her filing a a petition for eviction in respect
of the adjacent premises and pending proceedings against the revision petitioners she had come to possess the property covered by the other
RCOP and in view of this subsequent development it should be held that the respondent''s requirement for own occupation had been satisfied and
the eviction on this ground must be set aside.
...
In the present case, I am satisfied that the very fact that the respondent had filed two separate petitions for eviction of the tenants in respect of
adjacent properties would clearly show that she required both the portions for the business purpose of her husband, who had gained experience in
particular line of trade and who wanted to commence independent business in own premises. It cannot be said that the respondent was lacking in
boda fides in taking simultaneous eviction proceedings in respect of portions of building for own occupation, particularly when the portions were
adjacent. The Appellate Authority has rightly found that the requirement of the respondent for own occupation for commencing a business by her
husband was bona fide and the revision petitioners were liable to be evicted on this ground also.
It has been held in 100 LW 381 K. Ganesan v. K. Padmavathi Ammal, as follows:
It would not be correct to say that, merely because the landlady has secured som accommodation during the pendency of the litigation her claim
which was originally determined with reference to the provisions of Section 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act, must be thrown out at this stage. It is well
established that a Court is entitled to apply the correct provision of law to facts which are established on the record. Provision of law mentioned in
the petition does not determine either the nature of the proceeding or the nature of the relief to be granted to a party. It is the duty of the court to
find out whether on facts established a party is entitled to any relief or not. Therefore, even though originally the petition for eviction was made u/s
10(3)(a)(i) of the Act on the ground that the landlady did not have any accommodation in her own possession and that she was living in the rented
premises, the order of eviction cannot be interfered with merely on the ground that subsequently the landlady has come in possession of some
accommodation even though that accommodation does not fully mee the need of the landlady. There is no doubt that the petition as framed when it
was made was clearly minatinable because at that time the landlady was not in occupation of any premises of her own. The petitioner does not
automatically become non-maintainable because of subsequent events.
Under such circumstances, the fact that the landlord/respondent herein has got possession of one of the buildings and he sought for eviction for
shifting his Mess viz. Kumari Vilas Naidu Mess from Door No. 92, Gandhi Road, Cheva, Arakkonam, to building bearing Door No. 59, 60 & 61
cannot be a ground to reject the claim of the landlord/respondent as rightly held by the appellate authority in RCA. No. 5 of 2003 on the file of the
Sub-Judge, Ranipet (Rent Control Appellate Authority), which is in my considered view does not warrant any interference from this Court.
In fine, this revision fails and the same is hereby dismissed confirming the findings of the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority in RCA. No.
5 of 2003 on the file of the Sub-Judge, Ranipet. Connected Miscellaneous petition is closed. No costs. Time for vacating the premisses one month
from this date.