High CourtsSingle Bench(2026) 09 MAD CK 1589

Mangammal & Anr. vs The State Rep By & Anr.

Madras High Court · Decided on 2 September 2026 · Citation: 2025 INSC 19

HON’BLE JUDGES
G. K. Ilanthiraiyan, J
CASE NUMBER
Crl.OP.Nos.16757 & 18607 of 2026 and Crl.MP.Nos.11105, 12382 & 12383 of 2026

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Judgment

32 paragraphs · 3,427 words

Both the Criminal Original petitions have been filed by A1, A2, A4 & A6 seeking to quash the proceedings in CC.No.243 of 2026 pending on the file of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Perambalur.

2.

The case of the prosecution is that the de facto complainant purchased the subject property from one Balakrishnan under a registered sale deed dated 28.07.2016, registered as Document No.3847 of 2016. Within 28 days of the said purchase, the second respondent sold the subject property in favour of the first accused under a registered sale deed dated 26.08.2016, registered as Document No.4468 of 2016. Thereafter, after a period of two years, the first accused sold the subject property in favour of one Muthuramalingam and the sixth accused under a registered sale deed dated 09.03.2018, registered as Document No.1081 of 2018. Significantly, the second respondent himself stood as a witness to the said sale deed. Further, the second respondent voluntarily vacated the premises and executed a release deed dated 04.09.2018.

3.

Subsequently, the second respondent lodged a complaint on 11.12.2018 before the District Crime Branch, Perambalur, pursuant to which an FIR was registered in Crime No.4 of 2018. After conducting a detailed enquiry, the said complaint was closed on the ground that the allegations were civil in nature. After a lapse of three years, the second respondent once again lodged a complaint before the Inspector of Police, Perambalur Police Station, Perambalur, which was registered in Crime No.1187 of 2021 for the offences punishable under Sections 406 and 506(i) of the IPC read with Section 3 of the Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Charging Exorbitant Interest Act, 2003. After completion of the investigation, the Inspector of Police, Perambalur Police Station closed the FIR in Crime No.1187 of 2021 as “Mistake of Fact”. Aggrieved by the same, the second respondent filed a protest petition in Crl.M.P.No.7828 of 2023 before the learned Judicial Magistrate, Perambalur. The said petition was dismissed by an order dated 10.01.2024. Challenging the said order, the second respondent filed Crl.R.C.No.154 of 2024 before this Court. The said revision was also dismissed as withdrawn by this Court on 03.07.2024.

4.

Suppressing all the aforesaid facts, the second respondent once again filed Crl.O.P.No.23651 of 2024 before this Court, seeking transfer of the investigation in Crime No.1187 of 2021. This Court, by an order dated 21.02.2025 transferred the investigation in Crime No.1187 of 2021 from the file of the Inspector of Police, Perambalur Police Station, to the first respondent/Inspector of Police, CBCID, Perambalur, and the same was re-registered as Crime No.2 of 2025. After completion of the investigation, the first respondent filed a final report and the same was taken cognizance in C.C.No.243 of 2026 on the file of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Perambalur.

5.

The learned Senior Counsels appearing for the petitioners submits that the allegations are purely civil in nature and that there is absolutely no material evidence to attract any of the offences alleged against the petitioners. It is further submitted that the second respondent has suppressed the earlier complaints, the closure reports, and has once again lodged the present complaint in respect of the very same set of allegations. They further submit that the second respondent, by suppressing the aforesaid facts, managed to secure registration of the present FIR and the filing of a final report against the petitioners. The entire dispute arises out of transactions of a civil nature, and no criminal offence is made out against the petitioners. In fact, two investigating agencies had conducted detailed investigations and closed the respective FIRs as “Mistake of Fact”. The said closure reports were also affirmed by this Court. Therefore, the continuation of the impugned proceedings amounts to a clear abuse of the process of law and the same cannot be sustained.

6.

Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the second respondent, by filing a counter on behalf of the second respondent, submits that pursuant to the order of this Court, the investigation in Crime No.1187 of 2021, was transferred to the file of the first respondent and re-registered as Crime No.2 of 2025. After completion of the investigation, a final report was filed and the same was taken cognizance of by the learned Trial Court. It is further submitted that the second respondent has disputed the value of the property which was allegedly sold. L.W.4 has stated that the value of the adjacent property to the disputed property was Rs.59.41 lakhs. L.W.5 has stated that the sale deed was executed in favour of the first accused only as security for the loan transaction and that the same was executed under compulsion and coercion. According to the second respondent, he never intended to sell the property. The same is also corroborated by the statements recorded from L.W.6 and L.W.7. L.W.6 has further stated that the accused had charged exorbitant interest on the loan availed by the second respondent.

7.

It is further submitted that the second respondent, being the owner of the property, submitted a request to the Electricity Department for providing electricity service connection to the property. According to the second respondent, he had never transferred the electricity service connection in favour of accused Nos.1 to 6 under the sale deed. Therefore, it is alleged that the accused forged the relevant records and transferred the electricity service connection in their names. Thus, it is submitted that there is clinching oral and documentary evidence to attract the offences alleged against the accused. The grounds raised by the petitioners involve disputed questions of fact, which can be considered only by the learned Trial Court during the course of trial upon appreciation of the evidence adduced by both sides. Hence, the learned counsel prayed for dismissal of the present petitions.

8.

Heard the learned counsel appearing on either side and perused all the materials placed before this Court.

9.

The petitioners in Crl.O.P.No.16757 of 2026 are arrayed as A1 and A2, while the petitioners in Crl.O.P.No.18607 of 2026 are arrayed as A4 and A6. They are facing charges for the offences punishable under Section 120B r/w. Sections 420, 352, 506(i), 506(ii) and 34 of the IPC and Section 4 of the Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Charging Exorbitant Interest Act, 2003. The second respondent originally lodged a complaint in the year 2018, which was registered as Crime No.4 of 2018 on the file of the District Crime Branch, Perambalur. After conducting a detailed enquiry, the said complaint was closed as “Mistake of Fact”, holding that the allegations were civil in nature. Nearly after a period of three years, the second respondent once again lodged a complaint for the very same set of allegations before the Inspector of Police, Perambalur Police Station, Perambalur, and the same was registered as Crime No.1187 of 2021 for the offences punishable under Sections 406 and 506(i) of the IPC read with Section 3 of the Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Charging Exorbitant Interest Act, 2003. After completion of the investigation, the Inspector of Police, Perambalur Police Station, again closed the FIR in Crime No.1187 of 2021 as “Mistake of Fact”. Aggrieved by the said closure report, the second respondent filed a protest petition in Crl.M.P.No.7828 of 2023 before the learned Judicial Magistrate, Perambalur. The said protest petition was dismissed by an order dated 10.01.2024. Challenging the said order, the second respondent filed Crl.R.C.No.154 of 2024 before this Court, which was also dismissed as withdrawn on 03.07.2024.

10.

Suppressing all those facts, the second respondent once again filed Crl.OP.23651 of 2024 before this Court to transfer the investigation in Crime No.1187 of 2021. This Court also by an order dated 21.02.2025 transferred the investigation in Crime No.1187 of 2021 from the file of Inspector of Police, Perambalur Police Station to the first respondent/Inspector of Police, CBCID, Perambalur, and the same was re-registered in Crime No.2 of 2025. After completion of investigation, the respondent filed final report and the same was taken cognizance in CC.No.243 of 2026 on the file of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Perambalur.

11.

On perusal of the earlier complaints and the present complaint, it is evident that the allegations are substantially identical and arise out of the very same set of facts and circumstances. A perusal of the entire charge sheet does not disclose any legally admissible material or even a prima facie case establishing the involvement of the petitioners in the offences alleged under the aforesaid provisions. Though the first respondent is a different investigating agency, the allegations in the present case admittedly arise out of the same facts and circumstances which had already been enquired into by two investigating agencies, and subsequently both the respective FIRs were closed as “Mistake of Fact”. In the absence of any fresh material or subsequent circumstances justifying a different conclusion, the continuation of the present prosecution cannot be permitted, as the same would amount to an abuse of the process of law. Further, the prosecution has failed to attribute any specific overt act or independent role to the petitioners.

12.

It is not the case of the prosecution that the petitioners advanced any loan, demanded or collected exorbitant interest, participated in the alleged financial transactions, induced the second respondent to execute any document, criminally intimidated him, or otherwise participated in the commission of the alleged offences. There is also no material to establish that the petitioners had prior knowledge of the alleged acts, shared any common intention or conspiracy with the other accused, or actively participated in the commission of the alleged offences. Insofar as the offence under Section 420 of the IPC is concerned, the same is also not made out against the petitioners. The charge sheet does not disclose that either of the petitioners made any false representation, practised deception, or dishonestly induced the de facto complainant to part with any money or property. There is no material whatsoever to establish that the petitioners possessed any fraudulent or dishonest intention at the inception of the transaction, which is the sine qua non for attracting the offence under Section 420 of the IPC. Therefore, in the absence of the essential ingredients of deception and fraudulent or dishonest inducement, the charge under Section 420 of the IPC is wholly unsustainable.

13.

Insofar as the offence under Section 120B of the IPC is concerned, the charge is wholly misconceived and legally unsustainable. The materials on record do not disclose any prima facie evidence establishing the existence of any prior agreement, meeting of minds, or concerted action between the petitioners and the other accused to commit any illegal act. In the absence of the essential ingredients constituting the offence of criminal conspiracy, the charge under Section 120B of the IPC cannot be sustained. Likewise, the charge sheet does not disclose any prima facie material to establish that the petitioners shared a common intention with the other accused or consciously participated in the commission of the alleged offences. Admittedly, the petitioners are only subsequent purchasers of the subject property. Therefore, in the absence of any material showing their participation in the commission of the alleged offences, the offence under Section 34 of the IPC is also not made out against them.

14.

Insofar as the offence under Section 506(i) of the IPC is concerned, the essential ingredients of the offence include the existence of a threat coupled with an intention to cause alarm to the person threatened. Further, such threat must be intended to cause the person so threatened either to do an act which he is not legally bound to do or to omit to do an act which he is legally entitled to do. In the case on hand, even according to the prosecution, the alleged threats said to have been issued by the petitioners were merely empty threats and had no effect whatsoever on the de facto complainant. There is, therefore, no material to establish the essential ingredients of the offence under Section 506(i) of the IPC. In this regard, it is relevant to rely upon the judgment of this Court made in Crl.O.P.(MD)No.11030 of 2014 in the case of Abdul Agis Vs. State through the Inspector of Police, which reads as follows:-

“7.

It is seen from the statements recorded under Section 161(3) of Cr.P.C. of the second respondent/ defacto complainant that it does not contain any obscene words, which were uttered by the petitioner herein and the entire allegations are very simple in nature. It is also seen from the statement of one Uthami, that the petitioner threatened the defacto complainant with dire consequences when he dashed the defacto complainant.

The entire allegations are trivial in nature. Further, to attract the offence under Section 506(i) of I.P.C., there was a threatening only by words. As pointed by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, the threat should be a real one and not just a mere word when the petition uttering does not exactly mean what he says and also when the person to whom threat is launched does not feel threatened actually. Therefore, the offences under Sections 294(b) and 506(i) of I.P.C. are not made out as against the petitioner herein and also the entire criminal proceedings is clear an abuse of process of Court. Therefore, this Court is inclined to quash the entire proceedings.”

15.

Insofar as the offence under Section 506 Part II of I.P.C is concerned, it is relevant to extract the provision of Section 506 Part II of IPC hereunder:

“506. Punishment for criminal intimidation -

Whoever commits, the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both;

If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc -

and if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or [imprisonment for life], or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to impute unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.”

16.

It is also relevant to rely upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Naresh Aneja @ Naresh Kumar Aneja v. State Of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. [2025 INSC 19], wherein it was held as follows:

“13.

Let us now examine the next charge for which the appellant stands accused. For an offence u/s 503 to be established, it must be shown that:- (1) Threatening a person with any injury; (i) to his person, reputation or property; or (ii) to the person, or reputation of anyone in whom that person is interested. (2) Such threat must be intentional; (i) to cause alarm to that person; or (ii) to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat; or (iii) to cause that person to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat. Punishment for this offence is prescribed u/s 506 IPC, which is two years or with a fine or both, as applicable to this case.

13.1

Manik Taneja v. State of Karnataka [(2015) 7 SCC 423] as affirmed by a bench of three judges in Parminder Kaur v. State of Punjab [(2020) 8 SCC 811] , records the principle of application of Section 506, IPC in the following terms: –

“11.…A reading of the definition of “criminal intimidation” would indicate that there must be an act of threatening to another person, of causing an injury to the person, reputation, or property of the person threatened, or to the person in whom the threatened person is interested and the threat must be with the intent to cause alarm to the person threatened or it must be to do any act which he is not legally bound to do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled to do.

13.

…It is the intention of the accused that has to be considered in deciding as to whether what he has stated comes within the meaning of “criminal intimidation”. The threat must be with intention to cause alarm to the complainant to cause that person to do or omit to do any work. Mere expression of any words without any intention to cause alarm would not be sufficient to bring in the application of this section. But material has to be placed on record to show that the intention is to cause alarm to the complainant….”

17.

Further, this Court has, in a catena of judgments, consistently held that a mere empty threat, without any intention to cause alarm or fear in the mind of the person threatened, would not, prima facie, constitute the offence under Section 506 of the IPC. In the case on hand, even according to the prosecution, the alleged threats said to have been issued by the petitioners were merely empty threats and had no effect whatsoever on the second respondent. There is no material to show that the alleged threats caused any fear or alarm in the mind of the second respondent or his family members. Therefore, the essential ingredients of the offence under Section 506(i) of the IPC are not made out against the petitioners.

18.

Insofar as the offence under Section 4 of the Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Charging Exorbitant Interest Act, 2003 is concerned, the charge sheet does not disclose any material to show that the petitioners had advanced any loan, demanded, charged or collected exorbitant interest, or otherwise committed any act attracting the provisions of the said Act. Therefore, the prosecution has failed to place any prima facie material to establish the essential ingredients of the offence under Section 4 of the said Act. Further the conduct and antecedents of the second respondent also assume significance in the present case. On perusal of the materials placed before this Court, it is revealed that the second respondent have been involved in several criminal cases. An FIR was registered against him in Crime No.2 of 2019 on the file of the District Crime Branch, Perambalur. Further, FIRs were also registered against him in Crime Nos.197 of 2019 and 746 of 2019 on the file of the Inspector of Police, Perambalur Police Station, Perambalur, alleging offences of cheating and other cognate offences. It is also revealed that he was classified as a “Goonda” and detained under Act 14 of 1982.

19.

The aforesaid antecedents have a bearing on the credibility and conduct of the second respondent, particularly when he has deliberately suppressed the earlier complaints and FIRs registered in respect of the very same set of allegations. Therefore, the suppression of the earlier proceedings, coupled with the absence of any prima facie material establishing the essential ingredients of the offences alleged against the petitioners, clearly demonstrates that the continuation of the present proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law.

20.

The entire case of the prosecution arises out of documented financial and property transactions. Any dispute with regard to the validity, effect or enforceability of such transactions is essentially civil in nature and falls within the jurisdiction of the competent civil court. Therefore, the present criminal proceedings appear to have been initiated only to give a criminal colour to transactions which are predominantly civil in nature and to exert pressure upon the petitioners. It is also significant that the second respondent has been repeatedly lodging complaints, one after another, in respect of the very same set of allegations, despite the fact that two investigating agencies had already conducted detailed enquiries and closed the respective FIRs.

21.

Such repeated initiation of criminal proceedings on the same set of allegations, without any fresh material, amounts to a clear abuse of the process of law and would result in unnecessary harassment of the petitioners. In order to prevent such abuse of the process of law and to secure the ends of justice, the impugned proceedings are liable to be quashed, as the same have been manifestly instituted with an ulterior motive and amount to a misuse of the criminal law.

22.

In view of the above discussion, the impugned proceedings in CC. No.243 of 2026 on the file of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Perambalur is hereby quashed in respect of the petitioners and both the Criminal Original petitions stands allowed. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.