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Judgment
K. Vinod Chandran, J—The petitioner-management, is aggrieved by Ext.P1 order, passed under section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The brief facts required for the adjudication of the above dispute is that the petitioner was allegedly an Assistant Printer, from 1989-1995, in which latter year he was terminated from service. The termination is the subject of the industrial adjudication and this Court is not concerned with that at present. In the Section 33C(2) application, filed before the Labour Court, the petitioner had sought for arrears of wages between 1989 and 1995.
The claim raised was specifically that the petitioner was a Printer and that he is entitled to the wages paid to a Printer as provided in the Bechawath award with respect to non-journalists-factory employees of the newspaper establishment. The petitioner primarily relied on a writ petition filed by the management, where he was described as a Printer and also on some other documents.
The primary contention raised by the management is that, the claim is raised after 12 years of the termination and has to be rejected as a stale one. The learned counsel for the workman however, would contend that stale claims and prescription of limitation are essentially to protect the other side from being prejudiced insofar as being not able to establish a defence, which could have been established properly, if the claim had been raised at the proper time. In the present case, all documents were produced and adjudication was properly conducted; is the contention.
This Court would only first consider the issue as to whether there is any delay and that whether the same would stand against the application under Section 33C(2).
The Labour Courts are special Courts constituted under the I.D Act and would not be bound by the principles of limitation, as laid down in the Limitation Act of 1963. Nityananda, M. Joshi and Others Vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India and Others, AIR 1970 SC 209 : (1970) 20 FLR 153 : (1970) LabIC 269 : (1969) 2 LLJ 711 : (1969) 2 SCC 199 : (1970) 1 SCR 396 ]. However, in considering the relief the Court can definitely look into the aspect of delay and mould the relief as has been held by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Ajaib Singh Vs. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum-Processing Service Society Limited and Another, AIR 1999 SC 1351 : (1999) 82 FLR 137 : (1999) 3 JT 38 : (1999) 1 LLJ 1260 : (1999) 2 SCALE 508 : (1999) 6 SCC 82 : (1999) SCC(L&S) 1054 : (1999) 2 SCR 505 : (1999) AIRSCW 1051 : (1999) 4 Supreme 51 and Kuldeep Singh Vs. G.M., Instrument Design Development and Facilities Centre and Another, AIR 2011 SC 455 : (2011) 111 CLT 802 : (2011) 128 FLR 121 : (2011) 1 LLJ 615 : (2010) AIRSCW 7233 . Hence the accepted proposition is that, though there is no delay as such, prescribed under the ID Act, definitely, the Court could look into the delay caused and decide on the relief, giving due consideration on the question of delay.
True, as has been stated by the workman, there was an adjudication effected before the Labour Court on documents produced by either side. However, when considering the stale application, one has also to consider the fact that the two parties who are in a legal relationship, herein employer-employee, would expect some certainty regarding their affairs on sheer passage of time. Herein, the petitioner admittedly was appointed in the year 1989 and had been continuing till 1995, in the management company drawing certain amount of wages. As has been emphasised in various Supreme Court judgments, the conscious omission of the legislature to provide limitation under the I.D Act, is considering the fact that the employer and the employee does not stand on the same footing and the employee always is at a disadvantageous position. The employee often times, would not be able to initiate a proper adjudication, as provided under the various enactments, for reason only of fear of termination. However, it is to be noticed that the I.D Act quite aptly takes into consideration such instances also. A discussion of the same may not be relevant in the present circumstances.
Suffice it to notice, that such an apprehension or fear did not hamper the workman herein; since in 1995 he had already been terminated. An industrial adjudication was pending consideration with respect to the termination, before the appropriate forum. Nothing prevented the workman from raising a claim under Section 33C(2) before the Labour Court for the wages between 1989 and 1995. The workman sought to raise such a claim after 12 years from his termination, i.e. in 2007. The delay with respect to the claim made from 1989 to 1995 ranges between 18 to 12 years. This Court cannot commend a claim being considered by the Labour Court at this distance of time. In such circumstance, Ext.P1 order would be set aside, for the unexplained long delay.
Writ petition is allowed setting aside Ext.P1 order of the Labour Court.