Managing Committee of Victoria Girls'' High School andOthers vs Board of Secondary Education, West Bengal and Another

Bijeyesh Mukherji, J.—This is an appeal by the plaintiff, the Managing Committee of the Victoria Girls'' High School, at 26 Russa Road (now Shyamaprosad Mukherji Road), police-station Tollygunge, with the district of 24-Farganass, from an appellate judgment and decree of revesal. The seed of this unfortunate litigation lies in the dismissal on April 15 1958, as averred in paragraph 2 of the plaint, of the then Headmistress of the school, Sm. Sova Roy, by the Managing Committee. Sm. Roy appealed on June 2, 1958: vide exhibits G-1 and H-1. The Appeal Committee of the Board of Secondary Education, West Bengal, (shortened hereafter into "the Board"), allowed the appeal and ordered Sm. Roy to be reinstated to her post as Headmistress and also to be given "all her arrear dues during the interim period". A communication to that end was sent by the Secretary to the Board to the Secretary of the school: vide letter No. 1447-G-Appeal 83 dated Jan. 29, 1960, exhibit A-1 (23), also exhibit 4 (z8). A letter as this not only embodies the decision of the Appeal Committee, but also point''s out the reason of such decision: that dismissal of Sm. Roy by the old committee superseded by the Board, and, therefore, "turned defunct", cannot "stand at all".

It is now necessary to go back a couple of years or thereabouts. The supersession, referred to in Appeal Committee''s decision, was ordered by the Board on February 11, 1958, with immediate effect, as the result of investigation and report by the District Inspectress of Schools to the Director of Public Instructions, who forwarded a copy thereof to the Board: vide his letter dated December 24, 1957, exhibit A-1 (4), the Board''s order of supersession dated February 11, 1958, being exhibit A-2(8). The burden of the report was no legal existence of the managing committee of the school. Indeed, no election was held before or after 1956, and whatever was shown as the duly constituted managing committee was a sham, having been a paper transaction only, as is the written admission of Shri Jamini Kanta Roy, Secretary of the school, exhibits 4(c), A/1 and B/1, before the investigating inspectress. Exhibit B/1 is the original written and signed by Jamini Kanta Roy on December 12, 1957. The other two are copies. Be that as it may, simultaneously with the supersession, Secretary Jamini Kanta Roy was directed to make over charge to Shri Nirod Kumar Bhattacharyya, the Administrator appointed by the Board. Secretary Roy, however, did not comply with this directive. He challenged it instead in the writ jurisdiction of this court and obtained, on February 27, 1958, a rule: Civil Rule No. 556 of 1958, exhibit H/2, which was disposed of, mostly by consent, on May 21, 1958, in the manner following, exhibits 6(a) and G/2, to note only its gist.:

Administrator Bhattacharyya, appointed by the Board, goes, with his reputation unsullied.

Comes in his place a new administrator to be appointed by the Board within three days.

The Managing Committee do hand over charge of the school to such administrator ad hoc within two days of intimation being received of the new appointment.

The Administraor ad hoc do expedite the holding of election of a new managing committee, the present members whereof being eligible to stand for such election, if otherwise fit.

Election over, the Administrator ad hoc do make over charge and possession of the school to the newly elected managing committee.

Any permanent appointment for the school, the Administrator ad hoc shall not make. The new managing committee when it comes, will.

On June 3, 1968, the Administrator ad hoc, Shri S. K. Chatterjee, appointed by the Board, did take over charge from the managing committee, in terms of the order of this court, as is evident from the declaration dated June 3, 1958, over his signature, exhibit 4-1 (35), in token of his having formally taken over charge. Thereafter, election was held, the result of which was announced by ad hoc Administrator, S. K. Chatterjee on August 17, 1958, exhibit D/1, a managing committee was constituted, and its office-bearers were elected on August 27, 1958, exhibit E/1, though the Board accorded its approval to the committee, so reconstituted, by its letter dated March 14, 1960: exhibits 4(y) and 4(z2), one being a copy of the other. But Administrator, S. K. Chatterjee could not be relieved of his charge by the reconstituted managing committee earlier than February 2, 1959, as Jamini Roy, Secretary again of the school, wrote to say to the Secretary of the Board, reminding him of the Board''s lack of approval yet of the reconstitution of the committee (on August 17, 1958) and stating that ad hoc Administrator, S. K. Chatterjee had "handed over the charge" to him on February 2, 1959: vide Jamini Roy''s letter dated February 5,1960, exhibit A1 (22). Apparently, there was some hitch somewhere in Chatterjee being relieved and the reconstituted committee relieving him. Because the matter had to be brought to the notice of the writ court which directed on January 12, 1959, that this business of handing over, and taking over, charge was to be done within a fortnight from that date, failing which the petitioner in the writ court (Jamini Roy) was given the liberty to take out an application for contempt: vide this court''s order dated January 12, 1959, exhibit 6(d).

Now, back to the Board''s letter No. 1447/G/Appeal/83 dated January 29, 1960, exhibits A1(23) and 4(z8), by which the Appeal Committee''s decision was communicated to Secretary Jamini Roy, as noticed in paragraph 2 ante. But he or his committee, if that, would neither reinstate Sm. Roy to her post as Headmistress nor pay back dues due to her for the interim period. Then began exchange of letters to and fro, and on March 21, 1960, the Board desired that there would be no further correspondence on the subject: vide the Board''s letter of that date, exhibit A1(24). After some more fruitless correspondence, the Board, by its letter No. 9369/G/Appeal/83 dated April 24, 1961, exhibit A1(29), communicated to Secretary Roy of the school its final decision, which, in so far as it is material here, may be put thus:

A. You have not complied with in spite of several reminders, the Board''s order communicated to the school by letter No. 1447G/Appeal/83 dated January 29, 1960, directing you to reinstate Sm. Roy to her post as Headmistress and to give her all back dues during the interim period.

B. The Board, therefore, directs that the recognition of the school cannot be extended beyond December 31, 1961.

C. Inform the pupils, as also their guardians, and grant transfer certificates to pupils reading in Class IX and such others as want to leave the school for getting themselves admitted in a recognized institution.

D. A notification is being released to the Press "for information of the public concerned."

This was on April 24, 1961. The session was to end on December 31, 1961, when the recognition of the school by the Board would end too, as ordered. And a little more than a month ahead of that, that is to say, on November 25, 1961, the appellant instituted its suit in the first court of the munsiff at Alipore, impleading the Board and Sm. Roy as the two defendants. The reliefs it prayed the court for are listed below :

A. Declare that the school in controversy here is lawfully affiliated under the defendant Board.

B. Declare that the decision of the Appeal Committee communicated through the two letters - one of January 29, 1960, and another of April 24, 1961, (just noticed, save that there is a venial error in the plaint about their numbers) is invalid, inoperative, and of no effect.

C. Restrain, by a permanent injunction, the defendant Board from disaffiliating the school.

A suit as this succeeds in the court of first instance, but fails in the court of appeal below. Hence, this second appeal by the plaintiff.

Since the judgment under appeal is a judgment of reversal, it assists one''s convenience to have the findings of the two courts alongside one another in a tabular form. Here it is :

Trial Court

Lower Appellate Court

The report of the District Inspectress of schools is perfunctory and should not have formed the basis of the school''s supersession.

I. A finding as this is uncalled for, closed as it has been by the decision of this court in its writ jurisdiction. Worse, the matter has not even been raised in the suit.

Secretary Jamini Roy was coerced into making a written admission before the investigating inspectress that, with no election before or after 1956, the existence of the managing committee was a sham, having been a paper transaction only.

No coercion was exercised ever. A question as this is beyond the scope of the suit. More, the committee which was functioning at the relevant time had no legal existence. Therefore, suspension and dismissal by such committee of Sm. Roy, the Headmistress, is without jurisdiction.

The Appeal Committee was not properly constituted. Its decision is, therefore, of no effect.

Quite properly constituted. That apart, the plaintiff does not raise this point in his plaint.

The decision of the Appeal Committee violates the principle of natural justice.

No; it does not.

s 8. The first point raised upon this appeal is that the appellate judgment is not a proper judgment of reversal. It is well to remember first what the law is on the subject. The law is. An appeal court''s judgment need not be as elaborate as the trial court''s. Some of the reasons of the trial court may not be reversed even. Still the. High Court is not justified in reversing the findings of fact by the appeal court: the last court of facts. Not that the appeal court "must come to close quarters" and must meet each and every reasoning of the trial court. This is but a summary of what has been laid clown by Gajendragadkar, C.J. (then Gajendragadkar, J.) in (1) R. Ramachandran Ayyar Vs. Ramalingam Chettiar, .

Now, whether Secretary Jamini Roy was coerced or not in making the written admission he did about non-existence of a legally constituted managing committee before or after 1956, and whether the Appeal Committee was properly constituted or not, are certainly questions of fact, concluded by the findings of the last court of facts, and, therefore, a prohibited area for me, even if I see error or defect in the appreciation of evidence - which, sure enough, is not an error or defect in procedure within the meaning of section 100 of the Procedure Code. Not that I see such error or defect. I do not, save a minor misstatement of fact to be noticed presently. More of which in paragraph 12 injra. The evidence does not disclose the investigating inspectress to be a virago or an amazon, nor does it disclose any other circumstance, from which a prudent man can find in favour of a male secretary having been coerced by her to write in his own hand and sign the admission, exhibit B/1, he did. Secretary Jamini Roy admits on cross-examination :

In the course of her inquiry I gave a written letter to Mrs. Haider-

Mrs. Haider being the investigating inspectress and a witness too for the defendants at the trial. More, Jamini Roy''s evidence on cross-examination runs:

Perhaps this is the copy of that letter (ext. A/1).

To this be added Mrs. Haider''s evidence in chief, proving the written admission in original by Jamini Roy, exhibit B/1, and denying that she had forcibly taken it from him. Her cross-examination reveals:

I told Jamini Babu to write this (the admission ext. B/1) if he liked; if the did not, he might not write it.-

When the male complainants, not the female ones, were insisting on Jamini Roy putting down in writing what the had admitted orally: absence of any proper election of the managing committee. And Sm. Sova Roy had not asked him ever to put such oral admission in writing. If after such illuminating evidence the last court of facts finds no coercion, disagreeing with the first court, it is not for me to interfere, in second appeal, with the finding. Equally impossible it is for me to see in such judgment of the lower appellate court an improper judgment of reversal.

The constitution of the earlier Appeal Committee is testified to by the sanctity of the writings here and there, initials, and signature of the then Administrator of the Board, Late Mr. G. N. Das, a quondam judge of name and fame of this court - a consideration which the trial court ignores so wrongly, and which the appeal court reckons so rightly. A big flaw is said to be that the date put in by Mr. Das in the relevant paper, exhibit J.1, recording the constitution of the Appeal Committee, reads: 16/7: July 16. But of which year? That is not unfortunately stated. For this and other considerations, such as the paper used being an ordinary type, words scored through here and there, absence of official seal and emblem, the trial judge feels overborne and finds "suspicion". The appellate judge sees in such paper a sheet of the office file with endorsements of no less a person than Mr. G. N. Das, and, therefore, finds little to condemn it. To this be added the following considerations:

One, exhibit J/1, gets into evidence, on formal proof thereof having been waived by the plaintiff: vide the endorsement over the signature of the trial judge in column No. 4 of the list of documents admitted in evidence.

Two, exhibit J/1 contains much more than endorsements of Mr. G. N. Das: it contains his signature and initials against the places in the typescript corrected or added to in his own hand. So, what does it matter that words are scored out here and there, or that the official seal is not there. Much more than that is there. The solemnity or genuineness of a document as this depends not on the seal nor on the paper used being fashionable, but on the authenticity of the writings, initials and signature of one, whose honesty and integrity is beyond question, so much so that his signature, initials and writings the plaintiff admits at the trial for the purpose of doing away with formal proof.

Three, the way in which the litigation has been conducted on behalf of the Board reflects on the efficiency and earnestness of those who were entrusted with its carriage. A little effort on their part, supplemented by a little evidence too, would have shown at once the year when Mr. Das had signed, putting the date as "16/7". What they did not do I have done by ransacking the pages of the old Calcutta Gazettes. That has yielded result. Here is the notification, recording the appointment of Mr. Das as administrator:

No. 3610 Edn. - 12th May, 1954- Whereas a Super session Order has been made u/s 3 of the West Bengal Secondary Education (Temporary Provisions) Ordinance, 1954, (West Bengal Ordinance, III of 1954);

Now therefore, in exercise of the power conferred by clause (b) of section 4 of the said Ordinance, the Governor is pleased to appoint Shri Gopendranath Das, M.A., B.L., as the person (called the Administrator in that clause) by whom the powers, duties and functions referred to in that clause shall, so long as the said Supersession Order continues to be in force, be exercised and performed.

By order of the Governor, D.M. Sen, Secy, to the Govt, of West Bengal.

Now, take into reckoning the constitution of another Appeal Committee by another administrator, Mr. J. N. Mukherjee, persumably Mr. Das''s successor. It also gets into evidence and is marked exhibit J/1(1), on admission, for the purpose of doing away with formal proof. Fortunately, it bears the full date: April 3, 1956. So "16/7" as put in by Mr. Das on exhibit J/1 must be either July 16 of 1954 or 1955. Be it one or the other, it is of the least materiality for the purpose of this litigation. Because Sm. Sova Roy''s appeal is dated June 2, 1958, and could not, therefore, have been heard by the Appeal Committee appointed by Administrator G. N. Das either on July 16, 1954, or on July 16, 1955, when a fresh Appeal Committee was there from April 3, 1956.

For nothing, therefore, the Board led this exhbiit J/1, in evidence at the trial. For nothing, therefore, the two judges below and I have laboured over it. Let this be left alone. But exhibit J/1(1) evincing the constitution of the Appeal Committee on April 3, 1956, by Administrator J. N. Mukherjee, remains. It is the usual office noting followed by the order of approval by Administrator J. N. Mukherjee as under :

"As above. Sd. J.N. Mukherjee 3-4-56"

in a note-sheet marked for "Admr." - an abbreviation for "Administrator." The appellate judge makes a misstatement of fact when he observes that it also contains endorsements of Mr. G. N. Das. It does not. Indeed, it cannot. Because Mr. Das was not then the Administrator. Mr. J. N. Mukherjee was. Still his finding on the constitution of the Appeal Committee is plainly right. So considered, the judgment under appeal cannot go down as not a proper judgment of reversal on this point, even though the appellate judge lays himself open to the criticism of having made a misstatement of fact, just pointed out.

There is yet another matter in which the appellate judge does not appear to be right as a matter of law. He makes a point of the fact that the constitution of the Appeal Committee the plaintiff does not raise in its plaint. That indeed is true. But the lawful authority of the Appeal Committee has been made the subject-matter of an issue - issue No. 5. The parites go to trial with the sure knowledge that that is very much in issue. The Board, in answer to such an issue, does produce exhibit J/1 (a wholly unnecessary document), as also exhibit J/1(1), a relevant document. So, the rule laid down by Viscount Dunedin in (2) AIR 1930 57 (Privy Council) : that no amount of evidence can be looked into upon a plea which was never put forward in the pleadings, is not attracted here. The rule to go by instead is that, laid down by Venkatarama Ayyar, J. in (3) Nagubai Ammal and Others Vs. B. Shama Rao and Others, , by Lord Atkinson in (4) Rani Chandra Kunwar v. Narpat Singh, (1907) 34 LA 27, and by Gajendragadkar, C.J. in (5) Bhagwati Prasad Vs. Shri Chandramaul, - the last-mentioned case having been referred to on behalf of the appellants. And a feature of these cases is that there was no issue on the point, but that the parties went to trial with fair knowledge of the point having been at issue in fact. So viewed, the case on hand appears to be so much the stronger, a fortiori. May I refer to my own decisions in (6) J. K. and Sons v. Metal Press Works Limited, (1965) 70 CWN 324, where I dealt with the matter at length, and (7) Binani Properties Private Limited v. M. Gulamali Abdul Hossain, a summary of which has come into the reports: Binani Properties Private Ltd. Vs. M. Gulamali Abdul Hossain and Co. and Others, . So, the constitution of the Appeal Committee having not been in the plaint appears to be neither here nor there, in view of what has happened at the trial: the framing of issue No. 5 and the leading of the evidence with no element of surprise anywhere. But here also, the wealth of facts, discussed in the foregoing lines, being there, on this consideration, the judgment under appeal cannot earn the stigma of an improper judgment of reversal.

Apart from the contention about the appellate judgment having not been a proper judgment of reversal, the further argument on behalf of the appellant is absence of delegation by the Administrator of his powers to the Appeal Committee. Section 4, clause (b), of the West Bengal Secondary Education (Temporary Provisions) Act, 22 of 1954, in the wake of the relative prior Ordinance, is the answer. It lays down the consequences of supersession of the Board. One such consequence is: the Administrator is the Board, and the Board is the Administrator. Section 30 of the West Bengal Secondary Education Act, 37 of 1950, provides for the Appeal Committee, entrusted with the duty of hearing and determining appeals from decisions in disputes between teachers and managing committees of high schools. By virtue of the proviso to section 4, clause (b), of the 1954 Act, Administrator J. N. Mukherjee did no more than delegate his powers to the Appeal Committee by his order dated April 3, 1956, exhibit J/1 (1). Therefore, the finding of the appellate judge, in disagreement with that of the trial judge, that there was an Appeal Committee, does not appear to suffer from any error of law.

The report of the Inspectress of Schools forms the next ground of attack on behalf of the appellant. But supersession of the old managing committee ("on paper") of the school, resting on such report, was made the subject-matter of the writ petition, which culminated in a consent order against Jamini Roy and many, and in an order of the court against the rest. See the concluding portion of the judgment of the writ court, exhibit 6/A. So, everything apart, a matter as this is concluded by the principle of res judicata - a principle which is attracted even when the earlier lis is on a writ under article 226 of the Constitution and the latter one a suit (as here): (8) Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh Vs. State of Bombay (Now Gujarat), . And so far as the consent order is concerned, it raises an estoppel in the same way as a judgment entered, after a lis is fought out to the bitter end, does: (9) In re South American and Mexican Company: Ex parte Bank of England, (1895) 1 Ch. 37, and (10) Margaret Gomes v. Kanupada Bhowmik. (1966) 70 CWN 949, to which I was a party. So, here also, there is nothing which can be said to have vitiated the judgment under appeal on an error of law.

Now comes the most important question debated in this appeal, as also in the courts below: Does the decision of the Board, the appellant is up against, violate the principles of natural justice? It is said that no notice of the appeal has been given to the managing committee. But where is the managing committee at the relevant time ? It exists neither in fact nor at law. What exists instead is an ad hoc authority in Administrator S. K. Chatterjee, and that too on the basis of the consent order by the writ court, as noticed: paragraphs 3 and 4 ante. Naturally, the notice went out to him: the administrator ad hoc, on June 20, 1958, inviting his observations to Sm. Sova Roy''s appeal, a copy of which was forwarded: exhibit A/1 (15). On July 22, 1958, Administrator S. K. Chatterjee replied that he had no comments to make and that the minute book had only to be sent for, if needed: exhibit A/1(14). So, notice was given to one who was at the helm of affairs then and, therefore, entitled to receive it. To send a notice to the so called managing committee, a body non-existent in fact and at law, and that too on Jamini Roy''s admission, cannot make for natural justice, it being neither just nor natural. Who has ever head of a tribunal, judicial or quasi-judicial, making a point to issue a notice on a non-existent person? It appears therefore to be futile to make a point of such a pointless point. Worse still, to make such useless notice a condition precedent to the hearing of the appeal is to make for the most unnatural justice, degenerating itself into gross injustice,

It is however contended that Administrator ad hoc S. K. Chatterjee was there only for the purpose of holding the election of the managing committee, in terms of the order of the writ court, and that notice to such a one, therefore, is no notice. To read the order of the writ court so is to misread it. What the order is like has been noticed: paragraph 3 ante. The only fetters the administrator ad hoc had upon him imposed by the Order were the fetters disabling him to make any permanent appointment in the school. Save that, he was placed in charge of the school with powers unfettered. That the scope of the writ court''s order dated May 21, 1958, exhibit 6/a, is so, is clear from the order itself, made clearer still by the subsequent order dated June 2, 1958, exhibit 6/b, where it is reiterated that the only restriction upon the ad hoc administrator is the restriction of making a permanent appointment. Necessarily, the notice of the appeal to such a one appears to be too good.

Again, the contention is that the managing committee, duly elected on August 17, 1958, reiterated the dismissal of Headmistress Sova Roy. There is a true copy of the relevant portion of the resolution of the managing committee meeting held on October 6, 1958, exhibit 5, - a resolution which bears:

All the Resolutions of the previous Managing Committee Meeting are read and confirmed.

A ''liquid'' resolution as this cannot go far. And certainly it cannot render valid which is ab initio void. The managing committee was superseded on February 11, 1958. The superession order was challneged by a writ petition. A rule was obtained on February 27, 1958, but the prayer for interim order was refused; exhibit H/2. Headmistress Sova Roy was dismissed on April 15, 1958, going by the plaint''s averment in paragraph 2, or on April 16, 1958, going by the resolutions in the minute book. It does not matter which. What matters is that such order of dismissal was made in April 1958 by a managing committee superseded on February 11, previous, and, therefore, destitute of the power to do what it had done. Jamini Roy admits it on cross-examination :

Q. Is it a fact that, during the pendency of the writ petition, the defendant No. 2 (Sova Roy) was suspended and ultimately dismissed ?

Answer : I admit it,

And still so much noise is being made over so little, the nullity of the order of dismissal being patent enough. A man in the street could have then dismissed the headmistress.

Why reinstate Headmistress Sova Roy, and with back salary too ? Why does not the Appeal Committee make her leave the school with 12 months'' salary as gratuity? Such has been the contention too, on behalf of the appellant. The answer is: it is a matter for the Appeal Committee, and not for this court. The statutory regulation 7 (2) (a), made u/s 36 (2) (g), read with section 30 (3), of the parent Act, the 1950 Act, enables the Appeal Committee" "to allow the appeal and order" either reinstatement or gratuity. Reinstatement necessarily means the act of being reinstated, effective from the date of dismissal, with back pay from that date. Otherwise a queer reinstatement it will be. The Appeal Committee has not therefore exceeded the limits of its jurisdiction prescribed by the regulation concerned.

Headmistress Sudha Roy bypassed the Appeal Committee and sued the managing committee of her school for reinstatement, after the committee had dismissed her: (11) Baidyanath Bose v. Sm. Sudha Roy, (1965) 70 CWN 571. Upon such facts, P. B. Mukharji, J. observes :

If the plaintiff respondent wants reinstatement, then she has got to adopt the procedure laid down by the statue and ask for reinstatement from the statutory body which the statute has created and which the statute has expressly clothed with the. power of reinstatement. It is not for this court to be the substitute for the Appeal Committee in the facts of this case.

Headmistress Sova Roy has done what Headmistress Sudha Roy did not do. The Appeal Committee has allowed Sova Roy''s appeal. I see nothing in the facts of the case upon which I can substitute my judgment for that of the Appeal Committee.

True it is that the Board did not furnish copies of proceedings before the Appeal Committee to the secretary of the school, as appears from the Board''s letter dated January 12, 1961, exhibit 4(z9). The Board did not, because such proceedings are "strictly confidential", and, therefore, "cannot be sent to either of parties". This has been made a point of, on behalf of the appellant. Again, I see a pointless point. The so-called previous managing committee did not exist in fact and at law, as pointed out more than once. The nullity of the order of dismissal by a committee, superseded and having no legal existence, is writ large upon the whole of the evidence. The Board does communicate the decision of the Appeal Committee, and the reason for such decision, to the secretary of the school: paragraph 2 ante. - reason which has no answer, but is admitted instead, the attempt to flee such admission having failed, as is the finding of fact come to by the last court of facts. So, what more can be needed, and that too by the duly elected and reconstituted committee, whose order has not been under appeal ? The order of a previous committee, nonexistent ever, save "on paper", and defunct on top of that by supersession, is. I therefore see no merit in an approach as this.

The power of the Board to withdraw recognition of the school is challenged too. Here is a school, the human agency of which defies and defies the lawful order of the Board. Will the Board remain an idle spectator to such contumacy? If the law is so, it is time that the Board be wound up. Fortunately, the law is not so. u/s 36, sub-section (1), of the parent Act, the 1950 Act, the Board, amongst other things, shall have the power to control secondary education; more, it shall have the power to do all such acts as it may consider necessary for the purposes of such control. The Board has done no more, and that too having been driven to do so by the persistent recalcitrance of the human elements, running the school, to a lawful order by a lawful statutory committee. Such wide powers having been vested in the Board by statute, it matters not that there are no regulations made by the Board u/s 36, sub-section (2), clause (a), prescribing the procedure for withdrawing recognition of a school. Regulations or no regulations, the Board''s power is there under sub-section (1), nothing to say of the general law that a statutory authority which can grant recognition can withdraw it too.

The last appeal made to me is ''Save the school as an institution. Upon all I see in the evidence, oral and documentary, it is no good having maudlin sympathy for an institution as this. The human elements, running the school, have made their bed, and they must lie on it.

In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. The cross-objection, a wholly unnecessary one, because of Order 41, rule 22, read with Order 42, rule 1, of the Procedure Code, on which I have not even been addressed, do stand dismissed too, but without costs. Leave to appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent has been asked for. It is refused.