Manager, Pace Motors vs Subair

8

C. Viswanath, J

The present Revision Petition is filed by the Petitioner under Section 21(b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 against Order passed by the Kerala State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Thiruvananthapuram (hereinafter referred to as the "State Commission") in Appeal No. 206/2016 dated 25.04.2018.

In the Complaint Case, it was stated by the Respondent/Complainant that he purchased a black coloured Honda Motor Cycle bearing No. KL-14 L-4095 from the Petitioner/Opposite Party on 24.02.2012 for Rs.74500/-. After 7 months of purchase, the color of the vehicle started fading and the same was informed to the Petitioner. The Respondent alleged that the Petitioner had coated black color on a red vehicle. The Petitioner assured the Respondent to take necessary steps, but in vain. On 12.12.2012, the Respondent sent a notice which was refused by the Petitioner. Hence, the Complaint was filed.

The Complaint was contested by the Petitioner whereby he denied all the contentions of the Respondent. It was denied that the color of the vehicle started to fade out or red colour was seen beneath the paint. The Petitioner delivered black colored vehicle only and not red color. The vehicle was delivered by the manufacturer direct to the dealer. There was no manufacturing defect in the vehicle and hence the Petitioner was not liable to pay any compensation or replacement of the vehicle as claimed in the Complaint.

District Forum, vide order dated 23.02.2015, allowed the Complaint directing Petitioner to pay Rs.74500/- i.e. the cost of the vehicle with a compensation of Rs.10,000/- and Rs.5,000/- as cost to the Respondent and on receipt of the amount the Respondent was directed to return the vehicle to the Petitioner. Time for compliance of the order was 30 days from the date of receipt of copy of this order.

Being aggrieved of the order passed by the District Forum, the Petitioner filed an Appeal before the State Commission. The State Commission, vide order 25.04.2018, modified the order. It restricted the claim to Rs.60,000/-. Furthermore, it was made clear that when refund of the price of the vehicle would be given, then the Respondent had to surrender the vehicle to the Petitioner. The directions given by the District Forum in relation to compensation and cost was not modified.

Being aggrieved by the order passed by the State Commission, the Petitioner filed the present Revision Petition before this Commission.

Heard the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner. I have also carefully gone through the evidence placed on record.

Along with the present Revision Petition, an application has been filed for condonation of delay of 198 days in filing the present Revision Petition. The grounds for condonation of delay has been enumerated in the application which are re-produced as under:-

The impugned judgement was passed on 25.04.2018 but the certified copy of the impugned judgement was issued to the Petitioner on 27.06.2018. Immediately after receipt of the certified copy of the impugned judgement, the Petitioner contacted the counsel who conducted the matter before the State Commission. In fact, after the conclusion of the case, the Petitioner collected the case papers from the counsel. The Petitioner was directed to send the case papers to the said lawyer and accordingly the Petitioner sent the same to the lawyer for his comments and possibility of approaching Hon'ble Commission. As per the advice of the lawyer, who conducted the matter before the State Commission, during the first week of September, 2018, the Petitioner contacted his lawyer in Delhi and sent the available case files. Since there was no complete set of pleadings, the counsel for the petitioner requested the Petitioner to provide the same and accordingly the Petitioner provided the copy of the version during the second week of November, 2018. Thereafter the counsel for the Petitioner drafted the Revision Petition and sent the same to the Petitioner during the last week of November 2018.

It was submitted that since the evidence by way of affidavit and Argument note filed by the Respondent were not provided to the Counsel for the Petitioner, he requested the Petitioner to provide the said documents. Thereafter the Petitioner contacted the lawyer who conducted the matter before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal, Forum Kasargod and requested to apply for the certified copy of the evidence by way of affidavit and Argument note. This process consumed some time which caused in the delay in filing the Revision Petition.

The Petitioner could arrange the above said documents only during the second week of March 2019. After receiving the above mentioned documents, the counsel for the Petitioner sought some clarifications from the Petitioner and the present Revision Petition was filed immediately after receiving the clarifications from the Revision Petitioner.

It is settled proposition of law that condonation of delay is not a matter of right and the applicant has to set out the case showing sufficient reasons for not being able to come to the Court/ Commissions within the stipulated period of limitation. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Ram Lal and Ors. Vs. Rewa Coalfields Limited, AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361 has held as under:

"It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant."

The burden is put upon the applicant to show sufficient causes for the delay. The expression 'sufficient cause' has been discussed and defined by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Basawaraj & Anr. Vs. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, 2013 AIR SCW 6510, as under:

"Sufficient cause is the cause for which defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever he court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See: Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. V. Bhootnath Banerjee & Ors, AIR 1964 SC 1336; Lala Matadin V. A.Narayanan, AIR 1970 SC 1953; Parimal V. Veena alias Bharti AIR 2011 SC 1150 L2011 AIR SEW 1233); and Maniben Devraj Shah V. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, AIR 2012 SC 1629: (2012 AIR SCW 2412).

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It is a settle legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim "dura lex sed lex" which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.

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The law on the issue can be summarized to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature".

The Hon'ble Supreme Court has clearly held that party who has not acted diligently or remained inactive is not entitled for condonation of delay. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "R. B. Ramlingam vs. R. B. Bhavaneshwari, I (2009) CLT 188 (SC) has also described the test for determining whether the petitioner has acted with due diligence or not. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:

"We hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the special appeal leave petitions stands properly explained. This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal/petition."

Also in the case of "Anshul Aggarwal Vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (2011) 14 SCC 578, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has warned the Commissions to keep in mind while dealing with such applications the special nature of the Consumer Protection Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:

"It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the consumer Foras."

The contentions in the application seeking condonation of delay are not sufficient as it is nowhere states that this delay had occurred due to reasons which were beyond the control of the petitioner or that the petitioner had acted bonafidely or with due diligence. According to the Petitioner the copy of the Impugned order was received on 27.06.2018 and the case was filed on 11 April, 2018 i.e. after a delay of more than 9 months. Only some vague and routine reasons have been enumerated in the application and no valid, and sufficient reason has been given explaining such a long delay.

I find no ground to condone the inordinate delay in filing this Revision Petition. The application for condonation of delay is accordingly dismissed. As a consequence, Revision Petition is dismissed in limine being barred by limitation.