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Judgment
F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla, J.—The appellant is aggrieved against the order of the learned single Judge in setting aside the order of the appellant
dated February 18, 1999, in and by which, the appellant informed the respondent herein that his term of employment expired and therefore, he
would be relieved on and from March 31, 1999.
The brief facts which are required to be stated are that the respondent joined as a ''security supervisor'' in 1983 in the appellant-Corporation as
contract labourer. The contractor was stated to be one Thai Security. Subsequently, in the year 1987, the contractor got changed and another
establishment, called Priyadharshini Indira Gandhi Security Services came into picture and the respondent continued to serve in the same capacity
as a ''contract labourer''. Subsequently, by an order dated January 21, 1988, the respondent was directly employed by the appellant- Corporation
as ''security supervisor'' with effect from January 13, 1988 for a fixed period. Similar such orders were issued fixing specific period of employment
of the-respondent and last of such order was dated September 28, 1989, in and by which, the appointment of the respondent as ''security
supervisor'' was continued till October 30, 1989. It is common ground that after the issuance of the order dated September 28, 1989 and after the
expiry of the term fixed therein dated October 31, 1989, though no orders were issued, the respondent''s services as ''security supervisor'' was
continued. It is also not in dispute that such employment of the respondent was continuous till the impugned order dated February 18, 1999 which
directed to relieve the respondent from service from March 31, 1999 came to be made. Therefore, the uncontroverted fact remains that after the
initial engagement of the respondent as a ''contract labourer'' in the year 1983 which status was prevailing till the end of 1987, from January, 1988,
the respondent came to be directly employed by the appellant as ''security supervisor'' and that the said employment continued till the end of
March, 1999.
According to the respondent, after the issuance of the order dated February 18, 1999, when he enquired in the office of the appellant as to why
he was being relieved from duty with effect from March 31, 1999, while other security supervisors were being retained, he was informed that since
he has reached the age of 58 years, he was being relieved from service. The respondent, therefore, preferred the above said W.P. No. 4710 of
1999 challenging the Order ""dated February 18, 1999, inter alia contending that in the appellant-Corporation, the age of retirement of the
employees below Board level is 60 years and therefore, the relieving of the respondent at the age of 58 years was illegal. It was also contended
that since after 1989, his employment was not for any fixed period and since the employment continued without any break, the respondent cannot
be treated differently than that of other employees. It was further contended that the order dated February 18, 1999 was also invalid for non-
compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. It was lastly contended that since by notification dated December 9, 1976, the Central
Government abolished engagement of ''contract labourer'' in the public sector corporation, the respondent should be deemed to be the employee
of the appellant-Corporation in every respect and therefore, he was governed by the conditions of service applicable to regular employees and
therefore, all benefits that are available to a regular employee ought to have been extended to him as well.
The challenge made by the respondent was resisted by the appellant-Corporation, by contending that the engagement of the service of the
respondent was on the basis of a fixed term on daily rate basis and therefore, the engagement of the services of the respondent cannot be
construed as that of a regular employee of the appellant. According to the appellant, such term based employees were not engaged after the age of
58 years. It was therefore, contended that the age of superannuation, namely, 60 years, which is applicable to the employees of the appellant-
Corporation would not apply to the respondent.
Before the learned single Judge, significantly, no records were produced at the instance of the appellant to show that any specific orders for
fixed term of engagement was issued to the respondent for the period subsequent to October, 1989. Even before us, no such records were
produced. Even along with the written submissions what was produced was the memorandum dated January 21, 1988 which confirmed the
engagement of the services of the respondent on ''term basis'' with effect from January 31, 1988 which came to an end by February 29, 1988.
The learned Judge held that the respondent was entitled for the benefits under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 that in
view of the abolition of contract labour for engagement of any workman for watching of the buildings, owned and occupied by the respondent-
Corporation, by necessary implication, the absorption of the respondent as a ''security supervisor'' became imperative and therefore, it should be
construed that the respondent became the ''regular employee'' of the appellant-Corporation. The learned Judge, further held that Clause (6) of the
Memorandum of the respondent-Corporation dated January 21, 1988 in excluding the application of the provisions of the Standing Orders was
violative of Article 14 and therefore, the same cannot be approved and consequently, the learned Judge took the view that the claim of the
respondent to continue in the service of the appellant-Corporation till the age of 60 years was justified as per Rule 26 of the Service Rules of the
appellant- Corporation and accordingly, set aside the order dated February 18, 1999 by directing the appellant-Corporation to continue to engage
the respondent till he attains the age of 60 years though on consolidated pay, to which condition, the respondent originally agreed.
Mr. Rathinadurai, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant- Corporation reiterated his contentions which were raised before the learned
single Judge. According to the appellant, having regard to the nature of engagement of the respondent as per memorandum dated January 21,
1988 which was for a fixed period, the respondent cannot be equated to that of a regular employee of the appellant-Corporation. It is further
contended that in view of the said position, the direction of the learned single Judge to continue the services of the respondent till he attained the
age of 60 years was not justified. As regards violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, hereagain, according to the learned Counsel,
since the engagement of the service of the respondent was for a fixed period, he would fall within the ''excepted category'' as provided u/s 2(oo)
(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act and consequently, the non-engagement of the respondent after the expiry of the period of his term, would not
amount to ''retrenchment'' in order to attract compliance of Section 25-F of the Act.
As against the above submissions, Mr. Hariparanthaman, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent would contend that after October 31,
1989 since the service of the respondent was continued till he was relieved on March 31, 1999, the respondent should be held to have acquired
the status of a regular employee of the appellant-Corporation and therefore, he was bound to have been retained in service till he attained the age
of 60 years. According to the learned Counsel since the respondent satisfied the definition of ''workman'' within the meaning of Section 2(i) of the
Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, the exclusion of the applicability of Standing Orders Act in the Memorandum dated January
21, 1988 will have no force. It was, therefore, contended that the respondent was entitled to the benefit of ONGC Service Rules providing for
retirement only at the age of 60 years as applicable to all other employees. According to the learned Counsel, the illegality committed by the
appellant in not granting the regular scale of pay to the respondent cannot be a ground to deprive the valuable right to the respondent to remain in
service till the age of 60 years.
Having considered the respective submissions of the learned Counsel on either side, in the forefront, we wish to consider the issue involved in
this writ appeal in the anvil of Section 2(oo)(bb) vis-a-vis Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act inasmuch as in our considered opinion, the
whole of the right of the respondent as against the appellant Corporation centres around the said legal question. We could have straightaway held
that the issue relating to the applicability of Section 2(oo)(bb) or non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, can be left to be
agitated by the respondent by raising an 5 Industrial Dispute under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. But having regard to the fact that
the respondent is 64 years old and also taking note of the unconverted facts placed before us, we feel that driving the respondent to resort to such
a course would be travesty of justice and therefore we do not wish to dispose of this appeal on that ground.
Having steered clear of the above hurdle, when we consider the facts involved, we find that the respondent who was initially engaged as a
''contract labour'' under two different contractors, between 1983 and at the end of 1987, came to be employed by the appellant from January 31,
1988 by a specific order dated January 21, 1988. It is no doubt true that the said order among the other things, mentions that, his monthly wages
would be Rs. 445, that, his engagement was temporary for the period between January 13, 1988 (F.N.) and February 29, 1988 (A.N.), that, such
engagement would stand terminated on February 29, 1988 (A.N.) without further notice, unless otherwise extended by the Commission in writing
and that, such engagement being on the basis of that memorandum, the Standing Order of ONGC was not applicable to him.
At the risk of repetition, we wish to state that though such engagement for fixed period was stated to have been periodically made by the
appellant-Corporation till March 31, 1989, the services of the respondent as ''security supervisor'' continued beyond April 1, 1989 in the
appellant-Corporation till he was relieved on March 31, 1999. Therefore, we are bound to take note of the uncontroverted fact of the
uninterrupted continuous employment of the respondent in the appellant-Corporation between January 13, 1988 and March 31,1999, namely, for
11 long years. The abovesaid period is de hors the earlier period of engagement of the respondent as a ''contract labour'' between 1983 and 1987.
We feel that the above uncontroverted factual details relating to the period of employment of the respondent in the appellant-Corporation,
undoubtedly created a very valuable right in his favour when it came to the question of his non-employment on and after March 31,1999. Even
though such an engagement of the respondent continuously lasted for nearly 11 long years atleast from 1988, we wonder whether there could be
an un-ceremonial termination as resorted to at the instance of the appellant in total violation of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. In other
words, we are obliged to state that the stand of the appellant that the engagement of the services of the respondent was for a fixed period, which
commenced on January 13, 1988 and therefore, disengagement from March 31, 1999 should be merely taken as a disengagement in terms of the
original order of engagement dated January 21, 1988 and therefore, it should be held that the respondent was not entitled for any relief would be in
total derogation of and on a misreading of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. We are afraid that such blind folded approach cannot
be made when the facts involved disclose that the respondent would atleast be entitled for certain consequential benefits in pursuance of such
termination. In our considered view, in the case on hand, the termination of the service of the respondent by the order dated February 18, 1999
relieving the respondent from March 31, 1999 would squarely fall within the definition of ''retrenchment'' u/s 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act
and consequently, non-compliance of the situations contained u/s 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act would render the very order dated February
18, 1999 invalid.
As far as the contention that the respondent would fall within the excepted category as provided u/s 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act,
we are of the considered view that such a stand of the appellant cannot be accepted. To appreciate the above legal position, extraction of Sections
2(oo) and 2(oo)(bb) is required, which reads as under: ""Section 2(oo): ""retrenchment"" means the termination by the employer of the service of a
workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action but does not: include -
(a)...
(b)...
(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the
workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation on that behalf contained therein;
The definition of ''retrenchment'' u/s 2(oo) and exception provided u/s 2(oo)(bb) came up for consideration before the Hon''ble Supreme
Court in the judgment reported in M. Venugopal Vs. The Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India, Machilipatnam, Andhra
Pradesh and another, and the Hon''ble Supreme Court has stated the legal position, thus in para 9, which reads as under at p. 600 of LLJ:
... This Court from time to time held, that the definition of ""retrenchment"" being very wide and comprehensive in nature shall cover, within its
ambit, termination of service in any manner and for any reason, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by -way of disciplinary action. The result
was that even discharge simpliciter was held to fall within the purview of the definition of ""retrenchment"". The State Bank of India Vs. Shri N.
Sundara Money, ; Santosh Gupta Vs. State Bank of Patiala, . Now with introduction of one more exception to Section 2(oo), under Clause (bb)
the Legislature has excluded from the purview of ""retrenchment""; (i) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the
contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry; (ii) such contract being terminated under a stipulation in
that behalf contained in contract of employment. It need not be impressed that if in the contract of employment no such stipulation is provided or
prescribed, then such contract shall not be covered by Clause (bb) of Section 2(oo)....
A Division Bench of Allahabad High Court, in its judgment reported in Shailendra Nath Shukla and Ors. v. Vice-Chancellor, Allahabad
University and Ors., 1987 L.I.C. 1607 examined the position as to in what cases, Section 2(oo)(bb) can be applied and stated the legal position
as under in para. 5:
... Terminations which are included in it are those which are brought about either because of non-renewal of contract or because of expiry of
time stipulated in agreement. The meaning is plain and simple. But in a society with so wide gap where bargaining power of employee is nil who is
exposed to exploitation, the nature of employment cannot be judged on the letter issued by the employer but on the nature of duties performed.
For instance workers employed for doing a particular job which may be for more than 240 days can be said to be covered by this clause as their
engagement comes to an end because of completion of work. Similarly a workman employed for a stipulated period or completion of work
whichever may be earlier may be covered in this clause. But if contractual employment is resorted to as mechanism to frustrate the claim of
employee to become regular or permanent against a job which continues or the nature of duties is such that the colour of contractual engagement is
given to take it out from the principal clause then such agreements shall have to be tested on anvil of fairness and bona fide. An agreement for arm
twisting or to perpetuate the policy of hire and fire cannot be deemed to be included in Clause (bb). Because if it is left to employer not to renew
contract whenever he likes irrespective of any circumstance then the protection afforded to a workman by treating every termination of service as
retrenchment shall be rendered nugatory. It has to be confined to those limited cases where either the work or post ceases to exist or job comes to
an end or the agreement for a specific period was bona fide. It cannot be extended to such cases where the job continues and the employee''s
work is also satisfactory but periodical renewals are made to avoid regular status to the employees. That would be unfair labour practice. (See:
H.D. Singh Vs. Reserve Bank of India and Others, . (Italics added)
In another Division Bench judgment of Orissa High Court, reported in Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Orissa Road Transport Co. Ltd.
Vs. Ramesh Chandra Gouda and Another, , whereagain, while interpreting Section 2(oo), the Division Bench has stated as under in para 3 at p.
1129:
3.... It is hence the general intention of the Legislature that all types of termination of services are to be covered by ''retrenchment'' except the
events excepted in Sub- clauses (a) to (c). It is well known that exceptions to a general provision are to receive a rigorous interpretation and only
govern specifically the situations covered by them and no further. An exception cannot be permitted to frustrate the general provisions of the Act in
this case to treat any termination of services are retrenchment except what is strictly excepted....
In another Division Bench judgment of Punjab and Haryana High Court reported in Bhikku Ram v. Presiding Officer Industrial-cum-Labour
Court, Rohtak, 1996 III LLJ (Suppl) 1126, the Division Bench has explained the legal position as under at p. 1143:
... If the employer resists the claim of the workman and invokes Section 2(oo)(bb), burden lies on the employer to show that though the
employee has worked for 240 days in twelve months prior to termination of his service, such termination of service cannot be treated as
retrenchment because it is in accordance with the terms of the contract of employment or on account of non-renewal of the contract of
employment... only a bona fide exercise of right by an employer to terminate the service in terms of the contract of employment or for non- renewal
of the contract will be covered by Clause (bb). If the Court finds that the exercise of rights by the employer is not bona fide or the employer has
adopted the methodology of fixed term employment as a conduct or mechanism to frustrate the rights of the workman, the termination of the
service will not be covered by the exception contained in Clause (bb). Instead the action of the employer will have to be treated as an act of unfair
labour practice, as specified in the Fifth Schedule of the Act.
...In all other cases, termination of service will be treated as retrenchment unless they are covered by other exceptions I set out hereinabove.
(Italics supplied)
In yet another Division Bench judgment of Orissa High Court, reported in Chakradhar Tripathy v. State of Orissa and Ors., 1992 L.I.C. 1813
in a concurring judgment, the Hon''ble Chief Justice B.L. HANSARIA as he then was, has stated the position as under in paras. 19 and 20:
It has been stated in the leading judgment that by taking resort to ''colourable'' contracts, the protection of Section 25-F cannot be allowed to
be frustrated. I think this statement of law takes care of the apprehension of Shri Nanda....
There may be other cases also, these cannot be categories as observed by my learned Sister. All that I would like to emphasise is that the
Courts would remove the veil in such cases and see the reality of the matter....
A learned single Judge of Madhya Pradesh, in his judgment reported in Madhya Pradesh Bank Karmachari Sangh (M.P.) v. Syndicate Bank
and Anr., 1997 III LLJ (Suppl) 536 after considering the various judgments of the Hon''ble Supreme Court as well as other High Courts, has
concluded as under in para. 18 at p. 543:
From the decisions noted above, it becomes apparent:
(i) that the provisions of Section 2(oo)(bb) are to be construed benevolently in favour of the workman;
(ii) that if the workman is allowed to continue in service by making periodic appointments from time to time, then it can be said that the case would
not fall u/s 2(oo)(bb);
(iii) that the provisions of Section 2(oo)(bb) are not to be interpreted in the manner which may stifle the main provision;
(iv) that if the workman continues in service, the non renewal of the contract can be deemed as mala fide and it may amount to be a fraud on
statute;
(v) that there would be wrong presumption of non-applicability of Section 2(oo)(bb) where the work is of continuous nature and there is nothing
on record that the work for which a workman has been appointed had come to an end."" (Italics supplied)
His Lordship Mr. Justice sriKRISHNA, as he then was, has interpreted Clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) in the following words, in the judgment
reported in Alexandar Yesudas Maikel Vs. Perfect Oil Seals and Irp and Others, at p. 535:
.... In any event, one cannot lose sight of the fact that Clause (bb) has itself been restrictively interpreted and judicial consensus appears to be
that, if the post 4 continues and the work continues, Clause (bb) cannot be said to operate as a charter for unscrupulous employers to jettison their
workmen. ...
In another judgment reported in Deputy Director of Health Services, Nashik v. Lalabai Rajdhar Paturkar 1996 III LLJ (Suppl) 602 Bom the
very same learned Judge has explained the position as under in para. 8, at p. 606:
...It will at once be seen that, just as there are no words of limitation in the main body of the definition, equally, there are no words of limitation
in the exception Clause (bb). As long as either of the two contingencies contemplated by the clause is fulfilled, the situation would not amount to
''retrenchment'' within the main body of the definition in Section 2(oo). However, by a series of judgments of our High Court and of other High
Courts import of the words used and the amplitude of this have been whittled down and the judicial consensus on the construction of this clause
appears to be that the sweep of Clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) cannot be extended to such cases where the job continues and the employee work is
also satisfactory, and yet periodical renewals are made to avoid regular status to the employee, where the circumstances indicate that the letter of
appointment is a camouflage to circumvent the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act or the benefit of permanency on workers who have
worked continuously for a period of more than 240 days.
(Italics supplied)
In a recent judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court reported in S.M. Nilajkar and Others Vs. Telecom, District Manager, Karnataka, has set
out the necessary ingredients to be satisfied for the application of Section 2(oo)(bb) in the following words in para 13 at p. 364 of LLJ:
The termination of service of a workman engaged in a scheme or project may not amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Sub-clause
(bb) subject to the following conditions being satisfied:
(i) that the workman was employed in a project or scheme of temporary duration;
(ii) the employment was on a contract, and not as a daily- wager simpliciter which provided inter alia that the employment shall come to an end on
the expiry of the scheme or project;
(iii) the employment came to an end simultaneously with the termination of the scheme or project and consistently with the terms of the contract;
and
(iv) the workman ought to have been apprised or made aware of the abovesaid terms by the employer at the commencement of employment.
Further in para. 14, the Hon''ble Supreme 1 Court made it clear that at p. 364 of LLJ:
14.... To exclude the termination of a scheme or project employee from the definition of retrenchment it is for the employer to prove the
abovesaid ingredients so as to attract the applicability of Sub-clause (bb) abovesaid....
The above referred to decisions on interpretation of Section 2(oo)(bb) explain the legal position to the effect that a claim of an employer on a
term based employee providing for automatic termination whether within the terms fixed or on expiry of the said term, cannot be taken for granted
to sustain the order 2 of termination. On a plain reading of Section 2(oo)(bb), it is quite clear that such term based employment would fall outside
the scope of ''retrenchment'' so long as the requirement of such fixed period of employment was bona flde required by the employer. It was
therefore, repeatedly pointed out that such excepted categories required a rigorous test rather than accepting the plea of employer on its face value
or otherwise it would cause serious prejudice 3 to an employee, who can be taken for a ride by unscrupulous employers by contending that the
term of employment was for specific period though as a matter of fact such period of employment lasted quite for a long spell. In other words even
though the requirement of employment was perennial by adopting the methodology of employing a person for a specific period as many a times, an
unscrupulous employer can always resort to abusing the provision contained in Section 2(oo)(bb) to thwart the other statutory protection available
to an employee u/s 2(oo), namely, in the case of a ''retrenchment'' vis-a-vis the consequential"" benefits contained u/s 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act. Therefore, when such extraordinary circumstances are brought out in the matter of employment and termination is resorted to by
taking umbrage u/s 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, in the interest of justice, we are of the view that a close scrutiny of the real position
will have to be necessarily made to rule out the possibility of any injustice being caused to an employee. It cannot be lost sight of that Section 2(oo)
(bb) is specifically meant to cover only such employment which would be needed for an employer for a specific period alone and beyond which
the requirement will not be there and even on such occasions, the employer should not be put into an unnecessary predicament of facing the other
consequences that would normally occur while resorting to retrenchment. The benefit of the said exception will have to be strictly restricted to such
specific situations alone and the same cannot be allowed to be misused or abused by the employers even in regard to cases where the nature and
requirement of employment is perennial.
In the above said legal background, when the case on hand is examined, we find that even excluding the earlier period of engagement of the
respondent as ''security supervisor'' in his capacity as a contract labour between 1983 and 1987, from January 13, 1988 his employment with the
appellant was a direct one. While it is stated that between January 13, 1988 and March 31, 1989 such employment as security supervisor with the
appellant was pursuant to specific orders for fixed period, the said position was given a go-by by the appellant after April 1, 1989 till the
respondent came to be relieved of his duties on and after March 31, 1999. To put it more clearly, on and after April 1, 1989 upto March 31,
1999 for a period of 10 long years, the service of the respondent was availed of by the appellant in the post of ''security supervisor'' continuously
without any break and the said period of employment was not covered by any specific written orders of contract employment providing for either
automatic termination on the expiry of the period ending with March 31,1999 or was such termination dependent upon any other contingencies. It
is not the case of the appellant that the cessation of the employment of the respondent on and after April 1, 1999 was either due to the post not
being available nor any other contingencies depriving the appellant to continue the services of respondent in the said post.
On a perusal of the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition as well as the counter affidavit, it transpires that the appellant took the stand that
since the respondent was not a regular employee of the appellant, the age of retirement of 60 years applicable to other employees would not apply
to the respondent, and therefore, he had to be relieved on completing the age of 58 years as on March 31, 1999. Even such a stand of the
appellant further strengthens the claim of the respondent that his employment with the appellant did not fall within the exception provided u/s 2(oo)
(bb) and thereby the termination on and after March 31,1999 amounted to a clear case of ''retrenchment'' falling u/s 2(oo) of the Industrial
Disputes Act and when such ''retrenchment'' was in violation of 25- F of the Industrial Disputes Act that would render the order of termination void
ab initio. Admittedly, while relieving the respondent by issuing the impugned order dated February 18, 1999, the appellant did not comply with the
legal requirement of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. While according to the respondent, he was entitled to be continued in service till
he reached the age of 60 years according to the appellant, the said condition of service was not applicable to him. As we have found from the
factual matrix involved in the case on hand that the claim of the appellant as regards the employment of the respondent does not fall within Section
2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, it will have to be held that the services of the respondent could not have been terminated atleast without
following the statutory requirements as stipulated u/s 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as the termination resorted to by the appellant squarely
falls within the definition of ''retrenchment'' as defined u/s 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Consequently, we are obliged to state that the
impugned order of termination dated February 18, 1999 issued in violation of Section 25-F of the Act was wholly ab initio void. In such
circumstances, it will have to be held that the respondent was entitled to be continued in service atleast upto the age of 60 years. When once we
reach the conclusion that the appellant though initially employed the respondent for a fixed period between January 13, 1998 and March 31, 1989
after April 1, 1989, the employment of the respondent was on a regular basis and such employment continued for 10 long years till March 31,
1999. When that be so, it will have to be held that such sustained employment provided by the appellant in an uninterrupted manner by itself
conferred every legal right on the respondent to claim that he was employed on a regular basis. In such circumstances, the consequential benefit of
continuation in employment till 60 years should automatically follow, to which the respondent was legally entitled to. Therefore, we are of the
confirmed view that the impugned order of termination dated February 18, 1999 relieving the respondent on and after March 31, 1999 was
colourable exercise of power and consequently, the respondent should be deemed to have been in service till he attained the age of 60 years, i.e.
ending with March 31, 2001.
Having regard to the said position, the appellant is bound to pay the wages that were payable to the respondent. Since the respondent has
crossed the age of 60 years, the appellant is directed to pay the wages payable to the respondent between April 1, 1999 and March 31, 2001
apart from other consequential benefits payable to him pursuant to his employment with the appellant-Corporation as a security supervisor. The
appellant shall comply with the above direction within one month from the date of receipt of this order.
In the result, the writ appeal fails and the same is dismissed with the above direction. No costs.