AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
The appellant has preferred this appeal against the award dated 30.05.2017 passed in Title Motor Vehicle No.62/12 by learned District Judge-1st
cum-Motor Accident Claim Tribunal, Bokaro whereby the claimants have been awarded compensation to the tune of Rs.6,09,000/- along with interest
@8% per annum from the date of filing of the claim suit to be paid within two months of the passing of the order, failing which the claimants may
realize the compensation amount by way of process of law.
Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that there is a delay of 55 days in preferring the instant appeal and for condonation of the same
I.A. No.8403 of 2017 has been preferred. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that earlier a co-ordinate Bench of this Court has issued
notice upon the respondents vide order dated 02.08.2018, thereafter the claimants and the owner of the offending vehicle have put their appearance
but the driver has not put his appearance. As such, this Court may take this matter for disposal.
Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the Tribunal has failed to give right of recovery against the insured as the offending vehicle
bearing registration no.BR 18/8700 has no valid route permit. Learned counsel for the appellant has further submitted that the Tribunal has wrongly
decided issue no.5 with regard to the valid driving licence of the driver of the offending vehicle at the time of accident which is fit to be set aside by
this Court. To buttress his argument, learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that route permit was issued for South Chhotanagpur only,
whereas the accident took place in North Chhotanagpur, as such, the route permit was not valid, as such, the learned Tribunal ought to have awarded
right of recovery of compensation amount to the Insurance Company against owner of the vehicle. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted
that reason for delay in preferring the appeal, has been given in paragraphs-4 to 7 of the I.A., as the Insurance Company is a public sector unit and
has taken time in processing the file.
Learned counsel for the Owner of the Vehicle has submitted that the offending vehicle has a route permit. There is no violation of section 149 (2)
of the Motor Vehicles Act to give such right of recovery in favour of the Insurance Company. The Tribunal has rightly passed the award without
giving any right to recovery to the Insurance Company. Learned counsel has further relied upon judgment of Amrit Paul Singh and Anr. vs. TATA
AIG General Insurance Company Limited and Ors.; (2018) 7 SCC 558 and placed para-11 which is profitably quoted hereunder:
“11. A distinction has to be made between “route permit†and permit†in the context of Section 149 of the Act. Section 149 (2)
provides the grounds that can be taken as defence by the insurer. It enables the insurer to defend on the ground that there has been breach
of a specific condition of the policy, namely, (I) a condition that excludes the use of the vehicle, - (a) for hire or reward, where the vehicle
is, on the date of the contract of insurance, a vehicle not covered by a permit to ply for hire or reward, or (b) for organised racing and
speed testing, or (c) for a purpose not allowed by the permit under which the vehicle is used, where the vehicle is a transport vehicle, or (d)
without side-car being attached where the vehicle is a motorcycle. That apart, it also entitles the insurer to raise the issue pertaining to a
condition that excludes driving by a named person or persons or by any person who is not duly licensed or by any person who has been
disqualified for holding or obtaining a driving licence during the period of disqualification or that excludes liability for injury caused or
contributed to by conditions of war, civil war, riot or civil commotion. A further defence that can be availed of by the insurer is that the
policy is void on the ground that it has been obtained by non-disclosure of the material fact or by representation of act which is false in the
material particular.â€
Learned counsel for the respondent-owner has further relied upon section 149 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act which is quoted hereunder to submit that
there is no violation of any of the terms and conditions of section 149 (2) so as to give right of recovery in favour of the Insurance Company:
“149(2) No sum shall be payable by an insurer under sub-section (1) in respect of any judgment or award unless, before the
commencement of the proceedings in which the judgment or award is given the insurer had notice through the Court or, as the case may be,
the Claims Tribunal of the bringing of the proceedings, or in respect of such judgment or award so long as execution is stayed thereon
pending an appeal, and an insurer to whom notice of the bringing of any such proceedings is so given shall be entitled to be made a party
thereto and to defend the action on any of the following grounds, namely-
(a) that there has been a breach of a specified condition of the policy, being one of the following conditions, namely-
(i) a condition excluding the use of the vehicle-
(a) for hire or reward, where the vehicle is on the date of the contract of insurance a vehicle not covered by a permit to ply for hire or
reward, or
(b) for organised racing and speed testing, or
(c) for a purpose not allowed by the permit under which the vehicle is used, where the vehicle is a transport vehicle, or
(d) without side-car being attached where the vehicle is a motor cycle; or
(ii) a condition excluding driving by a named person or by any person who is not duly licensed, or by any person who has been disqualified
for holding or obtaining a driving license during the period of disqualification; or
(iii) a condition excluding liability for injury caused or contributed to by conditions of war, civil war, riot or civil commotion; or
(b) that the policy is void on the ground that it was obtained by the non-disclosure of a material fact or by a representation of fact which
was false in some material particular.â€
Learned counsel for the respondent has thus submitted that this case is fit to be dismissed as there is huge delay.
After hearing learned counsel for the appellant and the respondents and after perusal of the impugned award, it appears that the Tribunal has
considered the validity of licence of the driver of the offending vehicle while discussing the issue no.5 at page-12 of the impugned award holding that
D.T.O., Bokaro has informed the Court directly that the driver has a valid driving license issued from the office of the D.T.O., Bokaro. The Insurance
Company has failed to prove that initially the driving license was issued from Kamroop, Guwahati, Assam. In absence of material brought on record,
there is no reason for this Court to interfere with the findings recorded by the learned Tribunal regarding the validity of the driving license of the driver
of the offending vehicle.
So far the permit is concerned, the vehicle had a permit of South Chhotanagpur and as per section 149 (2) of the M.V. Act, there is no such
violation which entitles the Insurance Company to bring the case in the ambit of the clause for right to recover against the insured.
Under the aforesaid circumstances, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the impugned award. As such, the same is hereby dismissed being
devoid of merit.
I.A. No.8403/17 filed for condonation of delay is closed.
The Registrar General of this Court is directed to refund/reimburse the statutory amount of Rs. 25,000/- deposited at the time of filing of the appeal
within a period of four weeks from the date of filing of the requisition by learned counsel for the appellant.