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Judgment
This revision petition has been filed under Section 21 (b) of the Act 1986 in challenge to the Order dated 10.08.2018 in Appeal No. 1135 of 2017 of the State Commission West Bengal arising out of Order dated 30.06.2017 of the District Commission in Complaint no. 652 of 2014.
State Commission vide its impugned Order dismissed the appeal of the petitioner on limitation as the appeal before the State Commission was filed with a delay of 86 days. For better facilitation the relevant portion of the impugned Order is quoted hereinbelow:
In respect of the delay in filing this Appeal, it is stated by the Appellant that it obtained the certified copy of impugned order on 07-07-2017. Thereafter, the same was sent to the H.O. at Pune for their opinion, which was received on 10-08-2017. Subsequently, the Ld. Advocate gave his opinion on 15-08-2017. On 16-08-2017, the concerned Advocate was appointed, who submitted the draft Memo of Appeal on 03-09-2017. The H.O. approved the said draft on 22-09-2017 and thereafter, the Appeal was filed on 26-10-2017.
Heard both sides and gone through the documents on record.
The concerted effort of the Appellant notwithstanding to justify the delay of so says in filing this Appeal (excluding the statutory period of limitation), it is very much apparent that there was definite laches on its part to move this Appeal. A simple example is suffice to discern the reality. Although the original claim file was sent to the Pune H.O. of the Appellant, it made no sincere effort to obtain their opinion expeditiously. It appears, the H.O. took nearly a month to give its nod to move the Appeal.
Again, although the concerned Advocate was asked to pare draft Memo of Appeal on 16-08-2017, the Appellant did not deem any such compelling reason to follow up the matter with him in a proper manner resulting which, the concerned Advocate took 18 days to prepare a simple draft.
Next, although the H.O, approved the draft Memo of Appeal on 22-09-2017, the Appellant took 34 days to file this Appeal.
The intensity of urgency with which this Appeal has been filed does not inspire any confidence in our mind about the sincerity of purpose of the Appellant. The 1986 Act clearly stipulates that 'sufficient cause' must be shown to justify the delay, which is clearly missing here.
Although the Ld. Advocate for the Appellant harped on the need for showing liberal approach in the matter, we afraid, in the process, injustice cannot be done to the other side. There is no ambiguity in the position of law that sufficient cause must be shown in order to justify filing of a delayed Appeal. Since a Court of Law is not expected to re-write the legislation, in absence of any such stipulation in the Act that such petitions must elicit extra- liberal consideration, we do not think it prudent to take unto ourselves the onus of rewriting the legislation afresh. Thus, in utter disregard to the position of law and going against the spirit of this beneficial legislation, we are not inclined to allow this petition.
As a result, the complaint case stands dismissed being barred by limitation.
Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and respondent no. 1
The learned counsel for the petitioner has not added anything to the arguments that were raised before the State Commission and which have already been discussed therein. Submission is that the Order of the District Commission was passed on 30.06.2017 and a copy of the Order was received on 07.07.2017 within a week but thereafter the same was sent to the head office which was received on 10.08.2017. The subsequent time which got consumed was because of internal departmental administrative reasons. Submission is that in the internal working of the department the files move from desk to desk and that takes a lot of time and, therefore, such delay is ought to be ignored and this may be considered a good cause to explain the delay. Contention is that the delay deserved to be condoned by the State Commission but it did not do so wrongly and, therefore, the impugned Order may be set aside.
Learned counsel appearing for the respondents has vehemently opposed. He submitted that the circumstances as have been shown and get reflected in the impugned Order relating to the aspect of delay also speak of nothing except the indifferent attitude of the petitioner and its casual approach towards the law of limitation which cannot be recognized as a good ground to condone the delay. It has also been submitted that the impugned order does not suffer from jurisdictional error and it is not any Order which may be castigated on the ground that it has been passed without application of judicial mind or that there is any element of perversity or material irregularity in the impugned Order which may go to vitiate the same.
Perused the impugned Order and the record in the light of the rival submissions made at bar
Normally, the Bench leans favourably towards the defaulting petitioner who fails to file the petition within the limitation period. It is ordinarily preferred to decide the case on merits rather than to thwart the cause at the very threshold on the ground of limitation. But while saying so it does not imply that the law of limitation wherever it is provided can either be blissfully ignored or soft paddled at will. Such kind of approach will entirety frustrate and defeat the very purpose which inspires the enactment on law of limitation. The statutory law regarding limitation, wherever it is provided has a salutary purpose to serve, and has to be respected and complied with. In no case can any forum judicial or quasi-judicial can ride roughshod on the solemn provisions regarding the law which provides limitation period. It goes without saying that when a particular order attains finality it simultaneously gives rise to a right to the other side and unless there is sufficient cause, which may justify the condonation of delay and satisfy the Bench that there were justifiable reasons which explain as to why the petition was not filed within the stipulated period of time, the Bench cannot act either whimsically or capriciously. The judicial discretion which this Bench exercises in the matters of condonation of delay is not an exercise of some kind of privilege or prerogative, it is a judicial discretion and has to be exercised judiciously. The availability of sufficient cause has to be seen in perspective of the conspicuous facts and circumstances of each case and the onus of showing such factual basis from which may emanate the convincing grounds to vindicate the delayed filing has to be discharged by the petitioner who seek judicial indulgence in this regard.
When this Bench goes through the impugned Order it finds that it is a well-reasoned order and the explanation for the delay in filing the appeal before the State Commission as proffered on behalf of petitioner has been duly considered by it. In the opinion of the State Commission there were definite latches on the part of the petitioner for not filing the appeal in time. It took note of the fact that no efforts showing due diligence were made to obtain the opinion from the head office within stipulated period. The State Commission did not countenance with the undue time of around one month taken to give green signal to file the appeal. The subsequent time gaps which cumulatively resulted in the delayed filing of appeal by 86 days did not go down well with the State Commission and the forum below ascribed its reasons for disapproving the delayed filing of appeal. There is no use reproducing the impugned Order all over again as the same is part of record. Suffice it to observe that this Bench does not see any good reason to take a different view of the matter. Obviously enough, the impugned Order does not suffer from any material irregularity, not to speak any jurisdictional error which may be said to have vitiated the Order. Certainly, there is no element of perversity involved in it. The grounds as have been resorted to for seeking condonation of delay fall far short of being called sufficient cause or good reason to vindicate the delayed filing of appeal after so much of gap which is neither insignificant nor small.
The petition is sans merits and the same stands dismissed.
The Registry is requested to send a copy each of this Order to all parties in the petition and to their learned counsel. The stenographer is requested to upload this Order on the website of this Commission immediately.