High CourtsSingle Bench(2013) 02 MAD CK 0048

Management, State Express Transport Corporation T.N. Ltd. vs Joint Commissioner of Labour (Conciliation) and Another

Madras High Court · Decided on 27 February 2013 · Citation: (2013) 3 MLJ 242

HON’BLE JUDGES
P.R. Shivakumar, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Writ Petition No. 30188 of 2007 and M.P. No. 1 of 2007

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Judgment

45 paragraphs · 912 words

P.R. Shivakumar, J.—There is no representation for the respondents. The arguments advanced by Mr. R.P. Prathap Singh, learned counsel

for the petitioner has been heard. P. Rajendiran, the second respondent in the writ petition, who was employed as a driver in the petitioner

Transport Corporation, was dismissed from service by the Management on the ground that charges framed against him in the disciplinary

proceedings, had been proved. Since the dispute regarding payment of performance incentive connected with the second respondent was pending

before the Commissioner of Labour, DMS-Campus, Chennai-6, the particulars of which have not been furnished, the Management submitted an

application for approval of the order dismissing the second respondent from the services of the petitioner Management.

2.

The Joint Commissioner of Labour (Conciliation), after considering the application for approval and also the counter affidavit filed by the second

respondent, who figured as the opposite party in the approval petition, chose to decline approval on the following grounds:

(1) There was no proof of having conducted a proper domestic enquiry in accordance with the rules/standing orders, observing the principles of

natural justice.

(2) The Management had not established even a prima facie case for the dismissal of the second respondent herein based on legal evidence

adduced in the domestic enquiry.

and

(3) There was unreasonable delay in submitting the application for approval.

3.

Citing the above reasons, the first respondent has declined approval for the dismissal of the second respondent from the services of the

petitioner Management. The said order of the first respondent dated 14.12.2006 made in the approval petition in A.P. No. 307 of 2004 is

impugned in the present writ petition.

4.

The first respondent held that the petitioner Management failed to establish that a proper domestic enquiry was conducted in accordance with

the relevant rules/standing orders, observing the principles of natural justice. Since the writ petitioner, who sought approval for the dismissal of the

second respondent, did not produce the file relating to the enquiry into the charges framed against the delinquent (second respondent herein), the

first respondent made it clear that in the absence of the said document, it was impossible to hold that the petitioner Management had conducted the

enquiry into the charges framed against the second respondent in accordance with the rules/standing orders following the principles of natural

justice.

5.

The first respondent cited the very same reason for holding that the writ petitioner Management failed to make out even a prima facie case for

the dismissal based on legal evidence adduced in the domestic enquiry. Both the reasons assigned by the first respondent for declining approval are

valid reasons and the writ petitioner Management has to be found fault with for not producing the enquiry file, so as to enable the first respondent

to consider whether an enquiry was conducted in accordance with the rules/standing orders observing the principles of natural justice and that a

prima facie case for dismissal had been made out on the basis of legal evidence adduced in the domestic enquiry.

6.

The approval was declined by the first respondent also on the ground of delay in seeking the approval. The order of dismissal was made on

9.9.2004, but the same was dispatched to the second petitioner only on 25.9.2004. No application seeking approval was sent to the first

respondent immediately after passing the order of dismissal. It was not done even before or at the time of dispatch of the dismissal order to the

second respondent. Further, a delay of 16 days from the date of dispatch had also been caused in submitting the application for approval.

7.

Section 33(2)(b) proviso of the Industrial Disputes Act contemplates submission of such application without delay. In this case, no reason had

been assigned by the writ petitioner Management for belated submission of the application for approval of the order of dismissal. In addition, the

writ petitioner has not chosen to produce either the copy of the order of the dismissal regarding which approval was sought for or the enquiry file

containing copies of show cause notices, statements of the delinquent given in reply to the show cause notices, charge memo and enquiry report

containing the documentary and oral evidence, if any, recorded by the Enquiry Officer, so as to enable this Court to take a decision to find out

whether a proper enquiry following the procedure has been conducted and whether the finding is not perverse. The writ petitioner Management

seems to have had an idea that an approval could be obtained from the first respondent without furnishing the necessary particulars by simply

seeking approval for the order of dismissal by enclosing a copy of the order of dismissal. The very attitude on the part of the petitioner, which is

again reflected in this writ petition in burking the enquiry file gets the disapproval of this Court also. For all the reasons stated above, this Court

comes to the conclusion that in refusing to approve the dismissal order, the first respondent could not be held to have either exceeded his power or

omitted to exercise his power. The impugned order of the first respondent cannot be termed either illegal or arbitrary warranting interference of this

Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. There is no merit in the writ petition and the same

deserves to be dismissed. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petition is closed.