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Judgment
K. Raviraja Pandian, J.—The above writ petition is filed challenging the order of the Appellate Authority under the provisions of Tamil Nadu
Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), dated March 22, 1996, whereby the Appellate Authority
accepted the case of the third respondent herein and held that the petitioner is liable to pay subsistence allowance to the third respondent by setting
aside the order of the controlling authority dated July 26, 1995. The correctness of the said order is now put in issue in the present writ petition.
Sri S. Ravindran, learned counsel appearing for petitioner-management has assailed the order on the ground that the Appellate Authority has
misdirected itself in coming to the conclusion that the stand taken by the petitioner was one of abandonment of the work by the third respondent.
But in fact it was not so. According to him, the other reason given by the Appellate Authority that the period from January 3, 1994, for which
subsistence allowance was directed to be paid by the petitioner cannot be considered as a period under which the third respondent was put in
suspension in view of the specific language employed in the provisions of Section 2(g) of the Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act.
On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the third respondent has submitted that taking into consideration the materials which were
made available before the authorities, the appellate authority has come to the conclusion that the third respondent was denied employment from
January 3, 1994 onwards by the petitioner by stating that unless the third respondent gets a letter from the Bombay office, he would not be
permitted to do his work. Thereafter, the third respondent was immediately issued with a charge-sheet, which acts would prove that the third
respondent was debarred from performing his duty which would come within the purview of Section 2(g) of the Act. Hence the order cannot at all
by any stretch of imagination be considered to be one passed without consideration of any material on record and the finding recorded by the
Appellate Authority could not be considered as perverse in nature.
I heard the arguments of either side and also perused the materials on record.
Section 2(g) of the Act defines ""suspension"" and it reads as follows:
In accordance with Section 2(i) of the Tamil Nadu Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act of 1981, ''suspension'' means
An interim decision of an employer as a result of which an employee is debarred temporarily from attending to his office and performing his
functions in the establishment on the ground that:
(1) on enquiry into grave charges against him is contemplated or is pending or no final order after the completion of the enquiry has been passed ;
or
(2) a complaint against him of any criminal offence is under investigation or trial or the complaint has not been finally disposed of.
From a mere reading of the above provisions, it would indicate that debarring an employee temporarily from attending to his office and
performing his function in the establishment on the ground that an enquiry into grave charges against him is contemplated or is pending or no final
order after completion of the enquiry has been passed would amount to suspension. Clause 2 is not relevant for the purpose of this case. From the
above provision it is clear that the order of suspension need not necessarily be a written order. That can very well be oral. In such circumstances,
in order to find out that such debarring of the employee from attending to his office and performing his functions can be considered to be the
suspension as defined under the Act, the relevant materials would be gathered from the attendant and surrounding circumstances in which the case
has been put up against the employee.
Admittedly, in this case for certain enquiry the third respondent was directed to go to Bombay office of the petitioner for which the third
respondent has also drawn advance and T.A. However, for the reasons best known to the third respondent, he immediately applied leave from
November 29, 1993 onwards and after the expiry of the leave period, he reported for duty on January 3, 1994. It is an undisputed fact that on
that day the third respondent reported for duty and he was not allowed to attend his functions or perform his duties in the petitioner establishment
by stating that unless the third respondent goes onwards and after the expiry of the leave period he reported to Bombay and gets a letter from
Bombay office, he would not be allowed to attend the office. In addition to the above, there is also subsequent incident of serving the third
respondent with the charge-sheet for certain other charges. If these two incidents are taken together, they Would constitute that the third
respondent was debarred from attending to his office and performing his functions in the establishment on the ground of contemplated enquiry.
The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the appellate authority misdirected itself by concluding that the stand of the petitioner
was one of abandonment of duty by the third respondent would not militate the issue any further. The letter, dated January 17, 1995 of the
petitioner filed pursuant to the claim made by the third respondent for subsistence allowance, particularly the two sentences in the second
paragraph would manifestly make it clear that the stand of the petitioner was that the third respondent was absent from reporting duty. It would
otherwise amount to abandonment. In order to have clarity, the two sentences in the letter, dated January 17, 1995, is extracted below:
He has been remaining absent inspite of our asking him to report for duty. We reserve our right to take appropriate action in this regard.
The above sentence has been interpreted by the Appellate Authority as if the petitioner has taken a stand that the third respondent has abandoned
his service, which cannot be said to be incorrect. Rather it would not by itself conclude the issue in its entirety.
In the absence of any written order of suspension, the conclusion arrived at by the appellate authority based on materials to the effect that the
debarment of the third respondent temporarily from attending to his duty or performing his functions in the petitioner establishment coupled with the
charge-memo issued apart from the charges of not reporting at Bombay in addition to other charges would amount to suspension, cannot be said
to be perverse or without any material, which requires interference from this Court. Hence this writ petition fails and is dismissed. Consequently,
connected W.M.Ps. are also dismissed. No costs.