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Judgment
These two writ petitions are filed by Management of Madras Gymkhana Club against similar orders passed by first respondent - Labour Court
in claim petitions filed under S. 33-C(2) of Industrial Disputes Act, on a preliminary point taken, as to whether Mr. Sanjay Mohan, a legal
practitioner and who is a member of the said club, on an authority given by the vice-President of the club, could appear on behalf of management
in the Labour Court, and whether it would not be against the provisions of S. 36(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
Mr. Ramasubramaniam, learned counsel for the petitioners, would first submit that there was a total misconception regarding nature of
membership in the petitioner - Club which was registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and now governed by the provisions of Tamil
Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975.
The first claim put forth is that, in the case of a membership club like that of the petitioner, every member of the club is an employer under S.
2(g) of the Industrial Disputes Act, and therefore, he can appear for himself and on behalf of other members, as long as no other member objects
to his appearance. In essence when he is a member of a membership club he is an employer and as such he has the right to appear under S. 36(2)
and that merely because he happens to be an active legal parctitioner, he cannot be prevented from praticipating in the claim petitions. He refers to
Banglore Water Supply v. A. Rajappa [1978]-I L.L.J. 349 wherein it was held that in a membership club, everything belongs only to the
members. The Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic and Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs. The State of Delhi and Another, is referred to for showing that
when registration takes place under Societies Registration Act, it is an unincorporated Corporation and an essential element of the legal conception
of a corporation is that its identity continues in that it belongs to the original member or members and their successors. In law, the individual
Corporators or members of which it is composed, are something wholly different from the corporation itself, for, a corporation is a legal person
just as much as an individual. In para 37 therein it is held that a registered society, however, cannot hold property and to that extent it must be
treated as a voluntary association made up of its constituents, and therefore, it can be regarded as a quasi-corporation, and being a legal entity at
least for some purposes is not a mere society made up of its constituents.
On this point taken, it has to be seen whether Mr. Sanjay Mohan could be treated as an employer, within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes
At. In S. 2(g) no attempt having been made to give a general definition of the term ''employer,'' it has been repeatedly held that the expression
''employer'' must be given its ordinary meaning. Would this mean that, in the case of a membership club like that of the petitioner, each resident
member is an employer, for all the workmen employed therein ? This is a preposterous claim, and if so held, then each member would be held
liable for all the consequences in the claim petitions and could be proceeded against personally. But S. 21, Societies Registration Act (hereinafter)
called the Societies Act), is to the effect that a judgment passed under S. 10(1) shall not be enforced against the property movable or immovable
or against the body of such Officer, but against the property of the registered society. Under S. 23 a member could be such under certain
circumstances, and if the plea that each member is an owner-employer, is accepted, than, it would result in proceedings taken by him against
himself. When the workmen involved herein are paid, they are all paid in the name of the club, treating it as the employer. Hence, when the
constitution of a membership club has to be understood with reference to the provisions of the Societies Act, each member cannot be an employer
for the purpose of Industrial Disputes Act. Under S. 20 a committee or any officer of the registered society authorised in that behalf by its by-laws
may alone sue or be sued on behalf of the society. Under S. 18, all properties belong to the Society and they could be referred to in the legal
proceedings as the property of the committee. Hence, it is only the committee of a registered society, which could be treated as the employer, for
the purposes of Industrial Disputes Act.
The other contention put forth is, if Mr. Sanjay Mohan cannot be treated as an employer, then the Vice-President having authorised him to
appear on behalf of the Committee, he has the right to represent the employer. Though S. 21 of the Societies Act had come into force on 25th
August, 1975, till date the petitioner-Club is oblivious of what it has to necessarily incorporate in its by-laws. Under S. 6 of the Societies
Registration Act, 1860, it was provided that a society may sue or be sued in the name of the president, Chairman, or Principal Secretary or
Trustee, as shall be determined by the rules and regulations of the Society, and in default of such determination, then in the name of such person as
shall be appointed by the Governing body for the occasion. This Act having been repealed, and under S. 20 as now obtaining, it is only the
Committee or any Officer authorised in this behalf by its by-laws can sue or be sued, By-laws as framed are totally silent on the aspect of legal
proceedings, by or against itself. Therefore, to get over this omission, Mr. Ramasubramaniam, its learned counsel, would state that under R. 1 of
the Rules, the management of the club is vested in a committee called general committee consisting of President, Vice-President, Honorary
Secretary, Honorary Treasurer and nine other resident members. He states that, the Vice-President being a member of the General Committee,
has authorised Mr. Sanjay Mohan to represent its interests. Officer is defined under Societies Act, as to include a member of the Committee or
any person authorised in this behalf by the by-laws of the society to bring or defend or cause to be brought or defended or other legal proceedings
touching or concerning the registered society. Mr. Sanjay Mohan is not a member of the Committee. Already it is pointed out that the by-laws do
not provide for any person as having been authorised to appear, under S. 21, on behalf of the society. Hence, reliance is placed only on R. 1 of the
Rules, to contend that the affairs of the Club are managed only by the general committee, and therefore, it being the employer can depute any one
to represent it, in the Labour Court. First of all, it is not the Committee which had deputed him, but it is only the Vice-President. What powers he
had been conferred with to act on behalf of the general committee, is not spelt out. Assuming for the sake of arguments that it is the general
committee which had authorised him to appear on its behalf, even then, he is not an Officer of the club. He is only a resident member who is
subject to the control of the general committee. He cannot be anything superior to general committee, by putting forth the claim that in a
membership club, he is in the capacity of an employer. Already, it is pointed out that he would not be an ''Officer'' under S. 2(g) of the Societies
Act, so that he can represent the club in proceedings arising under Industrial Disputes Act on the basis of the authority given by the Vice-President.
Under S. 36(2) of Industrial Disputes Act, only an officer of an association of employers of which he is a member could represent the employer,
who is a party to the dispute. As Mr. Sanjay Mohan would not be an ''Officer'' nor claims to be so in the affidavit, the order of the Labour Court
does not call for any interference. This is only a device adopted to protract the proceedings and deprive the workmen of their legitimate dues.
Taking not of the fact that but for this point taken, the quantification could have been completed by now, the first respondent-Labour Court is
hereby directed to take up the petitions and dispose of them within six weeks of the receipt of the copy of this order.
Hence, these writ petitions are dismissed with costs. Counsel''s fee Rs. 400/- in each writ petition.