Mamta Devi vs State Of Haryana & Ors.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

CONTENTIONS

● On behalf of the petitioner(s)

● On behalf of the respondents

OBSERVATIONS AND ANALYSIS

I. The Role and Mandate of the National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE).

“List I-Union List

66.

Co-ordination and determination of standards in institutions for higher education or research and scientific and technical institutions.

List III-Concurrent List

25.

Education, including technical education, medical education and universities, subject to the provisions of entries 63, 64, 65 and 66 of List I; vocational and technical training of labour.”

National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993

“1. Short title, extent and commencement.—

(1)

This Act may be called the National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993.

(2)

It extends to the whole of India.

(3)

It shall come into force on such date as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint.

(4)

Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the provisions of this Act shall apply to—

(a)

institutions;

(b)

students and teachers of the institutions;

(c)schools imparting pre-primary, primary, upper primary, secondary or senior secondary education and colleges providing senior secondary or intermediate education irrespective of the fact, by whatever names they may be called; and

(d)

teachers for schools and colleges referred to in clause (c).

2. Definitions.—

In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,— xxx xxx xxx

(ka)

“school” means any recognised school imparting pre-primary, primary, upper primary, secondary or senior secondary education, or a college imparting senior secondary education, and includes—

(i)

a school established, owned and controlled by the Central Government, or the State Government or a local authority;

(ii)

a school receiving aid or grants to meet whole or part of its expenses from the Central Government, the State Government or a local authority;

(iii)

a school not receiving any aid or grants to meet whole or part of its expenses from the Central Government, the State Government or a local authority; xxx xxx xxx

(m)

“teacher education qualification” means a degree, diploma or certificate in teacher education awarded by a University or examining body in accordance with the provisions of this Act;

12. Functions of the Council.—

It shall be the duty of the Council to take all such steps as it may think fit for ensuring planned and co-ordinated development of teacher education and for the determination and maintenance of standards for teacher education and for the purposes of performing its functions under this Act, the Council may— xxx xxx xxx

(d)

lay down guidelines in respect of minimum qualifications for a person to be employed as a teacher in recognised institutions; xxx xxx xxx

(g)

lay down standards in respect of examinations leading to teacher education qualifications, criteria for admission to such examinations and schemes of courses or training; xxx xxx xxx

12A. Power of Council to determine minimum standards of education of school teachers.—

For the purpose of maintaining standards of education in schools, the Council may, by regulations, determine the qualifications of persons for being recruited as teachers in any pre-primary, primary, upper primary, secondary, senior secondary or intermediate school or college, by whatever name called, established, run, aided or recognised by the Central Government or a State Government or a local or other authority:

Provided that nothing in this section shall adversely affect the continuance of any person recruited in any pre-primary, primary, upper primary, secondary, senior secondary or intermediate schools or colleges, under any rule, regulation or order made by the Central Government, a State Government, a local or other authority, immediately before the commencement of the National Council for Teacher Education(Amendment)Act, 2011 (18 of 2011) solelyon the ground of non-fulfilment of such qualifications as may be specified by the Council:

Provided further that the minimum qualifications of a teacher referred to in the first proviso shall be acquired within the period specified in this Act or under the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (35 of 2009).”

Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009

“2. Definitions.—

In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,—

(a)

“appropriate Government” means—

(i)

in relation to a school established, owned or controlled by the Central Government, or the administrator of the Union territory, having no legislature, the Central Government;

(ii)

in relation to a school, other than the school referred to in sub-clause (i), established within the territory of—

(A)

a State, the State Government;

(B)

a Union territory having legislature, the Government of that Union territory;

ka) “school” means any recognised school imparting pre-primary, primary, upper primary, secondary or senior secondary education, or a college imparting senior secondary education, and includes—

(i)

a school established, owned and controlled by the Central Government, or the State Government or a local authority;

(ii)

a school receiving aid or grants to meet whole or part of its expenses from the Central Government, the State Government or a local authority;

(iii)

a school not receiving any aid or grants to meet whole or part of its expenses from the Central Government, the State Government or a local authority;

23. Qualifications for appointment and terms and conditions of service of teachers.—

(1)

Any person possessing such minimum qualifications, as laid down by an academic authority, authorised by the Central Government, by notification, shall be eligible for appointment as a teacher. xxx xxx xxx

“NOTIFICATION

New Delhi, the 31st March, 2010

S.O. 750(E).-In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 23 of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009, the Central Government hereby authorises the National Council for Teacher Education as the academic authority to lay down the minimum qualifications for a person to be eligible for appointment as a teacher.”

“Frequency of conduct of TET and validity period of TET certificate

11.

The appropriate Government should conduct a TET at least once every year. The Validity Period of TET qualifying certificate for appointment will be decided by the appropriate Government subject to a maximum of seven years for all categories. But there will be no restriction on the number of attempts a person can take for acquiring a TET Certificate. A person who has qualified TET may also appear again for improving his/her score.” (emphasis added)

“Subject- Extension of validity period of Teacher Eligibility Test (TET) Certificate-regarding.

Madam/Sir.

In accordance with the decision of the National Council for Teacher Education in its 50th General Body Meeting and the approval of the MoE vide letter No. 21-3/2021-IS.1 dated 7th June, 2021, the second sentence of para 11 of the Guidelines for conducting Teacher Eligibility Test (TET), issued by NCTE vide letter no. 76-4/2010/NCTE/Acad. dated 11/02/2011 which is “The Validity Period of ТЕТ qualifying certificate for appointment will be decided by the appropriate Government subject to a maximum of seven years for all categories.” shall be substituted by, “The Validity Period of TET qualifying certificate for appointment, unless otherwise notified by the appropriate Government, would remain valid for life.”

2.

The other sentences of para 11 remain the same.

3.

Since this provision will have retrospective effect from the date of enforcement of TET Guidelines i.e. 11.02.2011, the concerned Body/State Govt./UT is to take necessary action to revalidate/issue fresh TET certificate to those candidates whose period of 7 (seven) years has elapsed.” (emphasis added)

II. Contradictory Executive Instructions dated 06.08.2024 (Annexure P-18) issued by the State Government.

“Haryana Government School Education Department, Chandigarh

The 06^th August, 2024

ORDER

No.15/6-2017 Co.(1)- The State Government has decided to extend the validity period of certificates pertaining to passing of State Teacher Eligibility Test/Haryana Test Eligibility Test for life time.

Further, it is also decided that the State Teacher Eligibility Test/Haryana Test Eligibility Test certificates expired on the date of this notification will be treated as valid for the advertisements issued for recruitments of teachers after issuance of this notification.” (emphasis added)

III. Constitutional Limitations on Executive Action of the State.

“Article 162. Extent of executive power of State.

Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the executive power of a State shall extend to the matters with respect to which the Legislature of the State has power to make laws: Provided that in any matter with respect to which the Legislature of a State and Parliament have power to make laws, the executive power of the State shall be subject to, and limited by, the executive power expressly conferred by this Constitution or by any law made by Parliament upon the Union or authorities thereof.

Article 254. Inconsistency between laws made by Parliament and laws made by the Legislatures of States.

(1)

If any provision of a law made by the Legislature of a State is repugnant to any provision of a law made by Parliament which Parliament is competent to enact, or to any provision of an existing law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List, then, subject to the provisions of clause (2), the law made by Parliament, whether passed before or after the law made by the Legislature of such State, or, as the case may be, the existing law, shall prevail and the law made by the Legislature of the State shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void.

(2)

Where a law made by the Legislature of a State with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List contains any provision repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law made by Parliament or an existing law with respect to that matter, then, the law so made by the Legislature of such State shall, if it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent, prevail in that State:

Provided that nothing in this clause shall prevent Parliament from enacting at any time any law with respect to the same matter including a law adding to, amending, varying or repealing the law so made by the Legislature of the State.

Article 256. Obligation of States and the Union.

The executive power of every State shall be so exercised as to ensure compliance with the laws made by Parliament and any existing laws which apply in that State, and the executive power of the Union shall extend to the giving of such directions to a State as may appear to the Government of India to be necessary for that purpose.

Article 257. Control of the Union over States in certain cases.

(1)

The executive power of every State shall be so exercised as not to impede or prejudice the exercise of the executive power of the Union, and the executive power of the Union shall extend to the giving of such directions to a State as may appear to the Government of India to be necessary for that purpose.”

“8.

It would be seen that so far as clause (1) of Article 254 is concerned it clearly lays down that where there is a direct collision between a provision of a law made by the State and that made by Parliament with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List, then, subject to the provisions of clause (2), the State law would be void to the extent of the repugnancy. This naturally means that where both the State and Parliament occupy the field contemplated by the Concurrent List then the Act passed by Parliament being prior in point of time will prevail and consequently the State Act will have to yield to the Central Act. In fact, the scheme of the Constitution is a scientific and equitable distribution of legislative powers between Parliament and the State Legislatures. First, regarding the matters contained in List I, i.e. the Union List to the Seventh Schedule, Parliament alone is empowered to legislate and the State Legislatures have no authority to make any law in respect of the Entries contained in List I, Secondly, so far as the Concurrent List is concerted, both Parliament and the State Legislatures are entitled to legislate in regard to any of the Entries appearing therein, but that is subject to the condition laid down by Article 254 (1) discussed above. Thirdly, so far as the matters in List II, i.e. the State List are concerned, the State Legislatures alone are competent to legislate on them and only under certain conditions Parliament can do so. It is, therefore, obvious that in such matters repugnancy may result from the following circumstances:-

1.

Where the provisions of a Central Act and a State Act in the Concurrent List are fully inconsistent and are absolutely irreconcilable, the Central Act will prevail and the State Act will become void in view of the repugnancy.

2.

Where however, a law passed by the State comes into collision with a law passed by Parliament on an Entry in the Concurrent List, the State Act shall prevail to the extent of the repugnancy and the provisions of the Central Act would become void provided the State Act has been passed in accordance with clause (2) of Article 254.

3.

Where a law passed by the State Legislature while being substantially within the scope of the entries in the State List entrenches upon any of the Entries in the Central List the constitutionality of the law may be upheld by invoking the doctrine of pith and substance if on an analysis of the provisions of the Act it appears that by and large the law falls within the four corners of the State List and entrenchment, if any, is purely incidental or inconsequential.

4.

Where, however, a law made by the state Legislature on a subject covered by the Concurrent List is inconsistent with and repugnant to a previous law made by Parliament, then such a law can be protected by obtaining the assent of the President under Article 254 (2) of the Constitution. The result of obtaining the assent of the president would be that so far as the State Act is concerned, it will prevail in the State and overrule the provisions of the Central Act in their applicability to the State only. Such a state of affairs will exist only until Parliament may at any time make a law adding to, or amending, varying or repealing the law made by the State Legislature under the proviso to Article 254.”

xxx xxx xxx

35.

On a careful consideration, therefore, of the authorities referred to above, the following propositions emerge:-

1.

That in order to decide the question of repugnancy it must be shown that the two enactments contain inconsistent and irreconcilable provisions, so that they cannot stand together or operate in the same field.

2.

That there can be no repeal by implication unless the inconsistency appears on the face of the two statutes.

3.

That where the two statutes occupy a particular field, but there is room or possibility of both the statutes operating in the same field without coming into collision with each other, no repugnancy results.

4.

That where there is no inconsistency but a statute occupying the same field seeks to create distinct and separate offences, no question of repugnancy arises and both the statutes continue to operate in the same field.”

“43.

What emerges from the above discussion is as follows:

[i] The expression "coordination" used in Entry 66 of the Union List of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution does not merely mean evaluation. It means harmonisation with a view to forge a uniform pattern for a concerted action according to a certain design, scheme or plan of development. It, therefore, includes action not only for removal of disparities in standards but also for preventing the occurrence of such disparities. It would, therefore, also include power to do all things which are necessary to prevent what would make "coordination" either impossible or difficult. This power is absolute and unconditional and in the absence of any valid compelling reasons, it must be given its full effect according to its plain and express intention.

[ii] To the extent that the State legislation is in conflict with the Central legislation though the former is purported to have been made under Entry 25 of the Concurrent List but in effect encroaches upon legislation including subordinate legislation made by the Centre under Entry 25 of the Concurrent List or to give effect to Entry 66 of the Union List, it would be void and inoperative.

[iii] If there is a conflict between the two legislations, unless the State legislation is saved by the provisions of the main part of clause [2] of Article 254, the State legislation being repugnant to the Central legislation, the same would be inoperative.

[iv] Whether the State law encroaches upon Entry 66 of the Union List or is repugnant to the law made by the Centre under Entry 25 of the Concurrent List, will have to be determined by the examination of the two laws and will depend upon the facts of each case.

[v] When there are more applicants than the available situations/seats, the State authority is not prevented from laying down higher standards or qualifications than those laid down by the Centre or the Central authority to short-list the applicants. When the State authority does so, it does not encroach upon Entry 66 of the Union List or make a law which is repugnant to the Central law.

[vil However, when the situations/seats are available and the State authorities deny an applicant the same on the ground that the applicant is not qualified according to its standards or qualifications, as the case may be, although the applicant satisfies the standards or qualifications laid down by the Central law, they act unconstitutionally. So also when the State authorities derecognise or disaffiliate an institution for not satisfying the standards or requirement laid down by them, although it satisfied the norms and requirements laid down by the central authority, the State authorities act illegally.”

“16.

There is no manner of doubt that the NCTE, acting as an 'academic authority' under Section 23 of the RTE Act, under the Notification dated 31st March, 2010 issued by the Central Government as well as under Sections 12 and 12A of the NCTE Act, was competent to issue Notifications dated 23rd August, 2010 and 11th February, 2011. The State Government was under obligation to act as per the said notifications and not to give effect to any contrary rule. However, since NCTE itself has taken the stand that notification dated 11th February, 2011 with regard to the weightage to be given to the marks obtained in TET is not mandatory which is also a possible interpretation, the view of the High Court in quashing the 15th Amendment to the 1981 Rules has to be interfered with. Accordingly, while we uphold the view that qualifications prescribed by the NCTE are binding, requirement of weightage to TET marks is not a mandatory requirement.”

“39.

This is the scheme of grant and/or refusal of the recognition to an institution dealing with various courses of teacher training programme.

40.

Under the scheme of the NCTE Act, there are three principal bodies involved in processing the applications for grant or refusal of recognition for running of teacher training courses by various institutions. They are the NCTE, the State Government, the affiliating body or the University, as the case may be. Each of these stakeholders has been assigned a definite role under the provisions of the NCTE Act and even the stage at which such role is required to be performed. The provisions of the NCTE Act even identify the scope and extent of power which each of these bodies is expected to exercise. As already noticed, the NCTE Act has been enacted with the object of constituting a National Council with a view to achieve planned and coordinated development of teacher education system throughout the country and also to ensure maintenance of proper norms and standards in teacher education system. The NCTE is a specialised body and is expected to perform varied functions including grant of recognition, ensuring maintenance of proper norms and standards in relation to teacher education, inspection of the colleges through experts and to ensure strict adherence to the time schedule specified under the NCTE Act and rules and regulations framed therein.

41.

The NCTE Act is a special act enacted to cover a particular field, i.e. teacher training education and, thus, has to receive precedence over other laws in relation to that field. No institution or body is empowered to grant recognition to any institution under the NCTE Act or any other law for the time being in force, except the NCTE itself. Grant of recognition by the Council is a condition precedent to grant of affiliation by the examining body to an institute.

xxx xxx xxx

48.

The NCTE Act has been enacted by the Parliament with reference to Entry 66 of List I of Schedule VII of the Constitution. There is no such specific power vested in the State Legislature under List II of the Seventh Schedule. Entry 25 of List III of the Seventh Schedule is the other Entry that provides the field for legislation both to the State and the Centre, in relation to education, including technical education, medical education and Universities; vocational and technical training and labour. The field is primarily covered by the Union List and thus, the State can exercise any legislative power under Entry 25, List III but such law cannot be repugnant to the Central law. Wherever the State law is irreconcilable with the Central law, the State Law must give way in favour of the Central law to the extent of repugnance. This will show the supremacy of the Central law in relation to professional education, including the teacher training programmes…”

“Questions before the Court :

14.

Thus, questions which need to be gone into are:

i)

Whether under the scheme of appointment of Shiksha Mitras, they could be treated as teachers appointed as per applicable qualifications?

ii) If Shiksha Mitras were not duly appointed teachers, could they be regularised as teachers?

iii) Whether qualification laid down under Section 23(1) of the RTE Act was applicable or stood relaxed in the case of Shiksha Mitras?

iv) Whether statutory qualifications in a Central Statute on a concurrent list subject could be relaxed by a State legislative/administrative action?

xxx xxx xxx

Our consideration and reasons:

xxx xxx xxx

18.

In the impugned judgment the Full Bench of the High Court highlighted the importance of the prescribed TET qualification as follows:

"93.

The object and purpose of introducing the TET is to ensure that a teacher who embarks upon instructing students of primary and upper primary classes is duly equipped to fulfil the needs of the students, understands the relevance of education for a child at that stage and can contribute to the well rounded development of the child. Teaching a child is not merely a matter of providing information. Deeply embedded in the process of imparting education is sensitivity towards the psyche of the child, the ability to understand the concerns of a young student of that age, the motivations which encourage learning and the pitfalls which have to be avoided. The emphasis on clearing the TET is to ensure the maintenance of quality in imparting primary education. These requirements which have been laid down by NCTE fulfil an important public purpose by ensuring a complement of trained teachers who contribute to the learning process of children and enhance their growth and development. These requirements should not be viewed merely as norms governing the relationship of a teacher with the contract of employment. These norms are intended to fulfil and protect the needs of those who are taught, namely, young children. India can ignore the concerns of its children only at the cost of a grave peril to the future of our society. The effort of the State Government to by-pass well considered norms which are laid down by NCTE must be disapproved by the Court. We have done so on the ground that the State Government lacks the legislative power and competence to do so. Equally, fundamental is the concern that a relaxation of the norms prescribed by an expert body will result in grave detriment to the development and growth of our young children and the provision of quality education to them. Providing quality education is crucial for students belonging to every strata of society. Education which is provided in schools conducted by the Basic Education Board should not be allowed to degenerate into education of poor quality which it will, if the norms which are prescribed by an expert body under legislation enacted by Parliament in the national interest are allowed to be ignored by the State Government on the basis of parochial or populist perceptions. Such an attempt is ultra vires the statutory powers of the State and is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution."

“45.

It is thus clear that the Central Government has considered the subject of Secondary Education and Higher Education at the national level. The Act of 1993 also requires Parliament to consider Teacher Education System 'throughout the country'. NCTE, therefore, in our opinion, is expected to deal with applications for establishing new B.Ed. colleges or allowing increase in intake capacity, keeping in view 1993 Act and planned and co-ordinated development of teacher-education system in the country. It is neither open to the State Government nor to a University to consider the local conditions or apply 'State policy' to refuse such permission. In fact, as held by this Court in cases referred to hereinabove, State Government has no power to reject the prayer of an institution or to overrule the decision of NCTE. The action of the State Government, therefore, was contrary to law and has rightly been set aside by the High Court.

46.

The decision relied on by Mr. T.R. Andhyarujina in Vidharbha Sikshan Vyawasthapak Mahasangh v. State of Maharashtra & Others, (1986)4 SCC 361, has no application to the facts of the case. In that case, the power was with the State Government to grant or refuse permission to open B.Ed. college. Considering the fact that if permission would be granted, there would be a large scale unemployment, it was decided by the State Government not to allow new D.Ed. colleges to be opened. It was held by this Court that such policy decision could not be said to be arbitrary or otherwise unreasonable. The Court in that case was not concerned with the power or authority of State Government vis-a-vis Central Government and Act of Parliament. In the present case, as the field was fully occupied by Entry 66 of List I of Schedule 7 to the Constitution and Parliament has enacted 1993 Act, it was not open to the State Legislature to exercise power by making an enactment. Such enactment, as per decisions of this Court, would be void and inoperative. It would be unthinkable that if State Legislature could not have encroached upon a field occupied by Parliament, it could still exercise power by executive fiat by refusing permission under the 'policy consideration'. The contention of the State Government, therefore, has to be negatived. We may state at this stage that the contesting respondents have placed heavy reliance on Section 12 of the Act which relates to functions of the Council and submitted that it is incumbent on the Council to lay down norms and guidelines for ensuring planned and co-ordinated development of the teacher education and it is not open to the Council to delegate those 'essential functions' to the State Government. According to them, such delegation would be excessive and impermissible and abdication of power by the Council in favour of the State Government which is inconsistent with the provisions of the parent Act and must be held ultra vires. In reply, Mr. Andhyarujuna submitted that the constitutional validity of the Regulations or Guidelines had not been challenged before the High Court and the respondents now cannot be permitted to raise such point in this Court in the absence of the challenge. The respondents, however, urged that since they succeeded before the High Court on other points, it was not necessary for them to challenge the vires of Regulations. But when the State had approached this Court, they can support the judgment on any ground available to them including unconstitutionality of Regulations and Guidelines. In our opinion, it is not necessary to enter into larger question since we are satisfied that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court was justified in allowing the petitions filed by the colleges and setting aside the order dated December 28, 2004 passed by the State Government and also in dismissing the petition filed by the State holding that the order of the State was not legal. We may, however, observe that the learned counsel for NCTE, Mr. Raju Ramachandran is right in submitting that the Guidelines permitted the State Government to collect necessary data and materials and make them available to NCTE so as to enable NCTE to take an appropriate decision. In accordance with the provisions of 1993 Act, final decision can be taken only by NCTE and once a decision is taken by NCTE, it has to be implemented by all authorities in the light of the provisions of the Act and the law declared by this Court. It has been so held in St. John Teachers training Institute.”

IV. Arbitrary Nature of Impugned Order dated 06.08.2024 (Annexure P- 18).

“14)

It is a cardinal principle of law that government has to abide by rule of law and uphold the values and principles of the Constitution. Respondents herein alleged that creating an artificial distinction between the persons in the same cadre would amount to violation of Article 14 i.e. equality before law and hence, such an act cannot be sustained. The doctrine of equality is a dynamic and evolving concept having many dimensions. Articles 14-18 of the Constitution, besides assuring equality before the law and equal protection of the laws, also disallow discrimination which lacks the object of achieving equality, in matters of employment. It is well settled that though Article 14 forbids class legislation but it does not forbid reasonable classification. When any rule of statutory provision providing classification is assailed on the ground that it is contrary to Article 14, its validity can be sustained if it satisfies two tests, namely, that the classification was to be based on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things grouped together from the others left out of the group, and the differentia in question must have a reasonable nexus to object sought to be achieved by the rule or statutory provision in question. In other words, there must be some rational nexus between the basis of classification and the object intended to be achieved by the Statute or the Rule.”

“82.

The last two grounds of challenge may be taken up together for consideration. Though we have formulated the third ground of challenge as a distinct and separate ground, it is really in substance and effect merely an aspect of the second ground based on violation of Articles 14 and 16. Article 16 embodies the fundamental guarantee that Article 14 as there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. Though enacted as a distinct and independent fundamental right because of its great importance as a principle ensuring equality of opportunity in public employment which is so vital to the building up of the new classless egalitarian society envisaged in the Constitution, Article 16 is only an instance of the application of the concept of equality enshrined in Article 14. In other words, Article 14 is the genus while Article 16 is aspects. Article 16 gives effect to the doctrine of equality in all matters relating to public employment. The basic principle which, therefore, informs both Articles 14 and 16 is equality and inhibition against discrimination. Now, what is the content and reach of this great equalising principle ? It is a founding faith, to use the words of Bose J., "a way of fife", and it must not be subjected to a narrow pedantic or lexicographic approach. We cannot countenance any attempt to truncate its all-embracing scope and meaning, for to do so would be to violate its activist magnitude. Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be "cribbed cabined and confined" within traditional and doctrinaire limits. From a positivistic point of view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of Article 14, and if it affects any matter relating to public employment, it is also violative of Article 16. Articles 14 and 16 strike at arbitrariness in State action an( ensure fairness and equality of treatment. They require that State action must be based on valid relevant principles applicable alike to all similarly situate and it must not be guided by any extraneous or irrelevant considerations because that would be denial of equality. Where the operative reason for State action, as distinguished from motive inducing from the antechamber of the mind, is not legitimate and relevant but is extraneous and outside the area of permissible considerations, it would amount to mala fide exercise of power and that is hit by Articles 14 and 16. Mala fide exercise of power and arbitrariness are different lethal radiations emanating from the same vice in fact the matter comprehends the former. Both are inhibited by Articles 14 and 16.”

CONCLUSION