Maltibai vs Bhimdeo Rao

T.C. Shrivastava, J.—This appeal has been preferred by the Appellant (opponent) Smt. Maltibai against the order of the District Judge, Indore, passed on 24-12-1957, granting to the deceased Respondent Col. Martandrao Bhagwat a succession certificate to the estate of the Princess Sitabai Sahab.

The Appellant is the daughter''s daughter and the deceased Respondent Col. Martandrao Bhagwat (now represented by Bhim-deorao and others) was the son of the said Princess Sitabai Sahab. The village of Barlai in Indore was granted to her at the time of her marriage by her father, His Highness the Ruler of Holker State, by the Sanad, dated 7-10-1886. On 6-5-1946, Princess Sitabai Sahab executed a will bequeathing her properties, including the jagir village partly in favour of the parties ''and'' partly in favour of others. She died on 1-2-1956. The village was acquired by the State in 1952 under the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act, Sam-vat 2008 (hereinafter called the Jagir Abolition Act) and compensation was made payable in instalments. On the date of the application for succession certificate, four instalments of the compensation amounting to Rs. 17, 226-7-4 were due. The deceased Respondent Col. Martandrao applied for a succession certificate to enable him to receive the amount.

The claim of the Respondent was that as the son he was the proper heir of the deceased Princess Sitabai Sahab in respect of the compensation amount both under the personal law of the deceased and under the law of inheritance governing jagir properties. He also claimed that under the will the village was given to him. The Appellant opposed the application pleading that the will was a bar to the grant of a succession certificate under the Jagir Abolition Act and further that the jagir being the stridhan property of the deceased Princess Sitabai Sahab, she was a nearer heir than the deceased Respondent Col. Martand-rao.

The learned District Judge held that the Respondent was entitled to a succession certificate and granted the same.

The first point that has been urged on behalf of the Appellant is that the application is barred by Section 370 of the Indian Succession Act, as admittedly there was a will in existence. On behalf of the Respondent, it was stated in reply that the will itself was ineffective to dispose of jagir properties and therefore it does not affect the right of the Respondent to obtain a succession certificate, as Princess Sitabai Sahab should be deemed to have died intestate in respect of the jagir properties.

According to the special law in Section 5 and 49 of the Jagir Manual, jagir property is impartible and indivisible. It is governed by the law of primogeniture. Accordingly, the jagirdar has no power to dispose of jagir villages by a will. The Respondents, therefore, rightly contended that the will, dated 6-5-1946, is ineffective so far as the jagir properties are intended to be disposed of under it. We agree with the learned District Judge that the will does not operate as a bar to the grant of a succession certificate.

It was next urged by the Respondents that the jagir villages would be inherited according to the Provisions of the Sahad, dated 7-10-1886, and the law contained in the jagir Manual. It was submitted that the fact that the jagir was acquired and had been replaced by the amount of compensation made no difference. Reliance was placed on Sri Ravu Janardhana Krishna Ranga Rao Bahadur Vs. The State of Madras and Others, and Gopalkrishna v. Krishna ( AIR 1955 And 264 ). It is true that in these two decisions it has been held that the replacement of an impartible jagir by the amount of compensation leaves the compensation money im-pressed with the character of the impartible estate and it is payable only to those persons who had interest in the impartible estate.

Those decision do not, however, help the Respondents. The matter is governed by Section 18 of the Jagir Abolition Act, which is as follows:

If any Jagirdar to whom compensation money is payable under this Act dies before the full payment of such compensation money to him, such compensation money as may remain payable to him under this Act, shall be payable to such of his heirs or successors as may be declared by a competent Court entitled to receive the same, according to the personal law by which the Jagirdar is governed.

The expression "according to the personal law by which the Jagirdar is governed" is clear enough to indicate that after the abolition of the jagir the compensation money can be disposed of only in accordance with the personal law of the deceased jagirdar and there is no scope for applying the special law governing the inheritance of jagir properties. Shri S. R. Joshi for the Respondent No. 1 argued that the expression "personal law" as used in section 18 has reference to the law contained in the Sanad and the Jagir Manual, and he sought support for his contention in the fact that the word "Jagirdar" has been used in the expression which we are interpret-ing. The contention is without any substance, as "personal law", can mean only Hindu law or Mohemadan law or such other laws as have been made applicable in matters of marriage, succession etc. The personal law applicable to the jagirdar has no relation to the special law governing the inheritance of jagirs.

In view of the unambiguous language of Section 18 of the Jagir Abolition Act, it must be held that the compensation money becomes ordinary moveable property of the deceased and passes according to the personal law to which the jagirdar Was subject In the instant case, therefore, the compensation money will pass by inheritance to the heirs of Princess Sitabai Sahab according to Hindu law.

As the jagir village was given to the Princess Sitabai Saheb at the time of her marriage by her father, it is her stridhan property. It is not disputed by the learned Counsel for the Respondent that as the daughter''s daughter the Appellant is a preferential heir to the Respondent. Accordingly, she is entitled to withdraw the compensation amount.

At the time of the arguments Shri Joshi for the Respondent produced the original documents as per list. These are orders passed by the Holkar Government interpreting the Sanad. These documents should have been filed earlier before the trial Court. We do not consider them necessary to enable us to pronounce judgment under Order 41, Rule 27 of the CPC Code. They are, therefore, rejected.

In view of our findings, the succession certificate was wrongly granted to the deceased Respondent Col. Martandrao Bhag-wat. The appeal is allowed. The order of the District Court granting the certificate is set aside. The costs of the Appellant shall be paid by the Respondents throughtout.