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Judgment
The Zamindar of Mandasa is the plaintiff and the defendants are his tenants of the Pidi Mandasa Village. In 1923 the zamindar filed suits against
his tenants in the civil and revenue Courts for rent in respect of Faslis 1329 to 1331. During the pendency of these suits the agreement, Ex. A, was
executed and in pursuance of it the plaintiff withdrew those suits and they were dismissed. Generally stated Ex. A provided, amongst other things,
that the zamindar should withdraw his suits, that accounts of arrears from Fasli 1325 should be looked into, within 15 days from the date of the
agreement and within a further period of 15 days the ryots should pay the balances that may be found due according to the D.C.B. and other
accounts and duplicate receipts. It also provided that if the ryots failed to make the payments according to the terms of the agreement and the
accounts of the zamindar he may file suits for arrears found due from Fasli 1325 and for costs. The agreement ended with the statement that the
withdrawal of the suits now pending in the Court constitutes verily the consideration for this agreement.
As the tenants failed to make the payments according to Ex. A the zamindar filed various suits against them and recovered the arrears from them
together with interest. These Civil Revision Petitions have been filed by the tenants against the decrees in those suits.
In support of these Civil Revision Petitions Mr. Jagannadha Doss urged mainly three grounds : (1) that the lower Court, i.e., the District
Munsif''s Court, of Sompeta, had no jurisdiction to try these suits, they being essentially suits for rent which are cognizable only by the revenue
Courts under the Estates Land Act, (2) that the agreement, Ex. A, is unenforceable as its effect is to defeat the provisions of the Estates Land Act,
such as Sections 189, 199, and 211, and (3) that interest on the amounts due should not have been awarded by the lower Courts. We will deal
with these points in order.
Point No. 1:-It is argued that though suits are nominally for amounts due under Ex. A, those amounts really represent the rents due from the
tenants for the various faslis and that therefore the suits in question should have been filed only in the revenue Courts under the provisions of the
Estates Land Act : see Sections 77 and 189 read with the Schedule of the Act. This argument is met with the reply that the present suits are in no
sense suits to recover rents but are in substance, as in form,, suits to enforce the plaintiff''s rights under Ex. A which constitutes altogether a new
cause of action. The terms of the document which we have set forth above show that the intention of the parties was to supersede the old liability
and substitute in its place a new cause of action. The parties are conscious that a new contract is substituted because they specially state at the end
of the document what the consideration for the new contract is. If the tenants by this document were only agreeing to pay what they were bound to
pay before, they would not point out the new consideration for the agreement. Further they contemplate the filing of fresh suits and also provide for
costs of such suits. That Ex. A embodies a new cause of action is also clear from the fact that the zamindar under it is entitled to get from the
tenants the rents for faslis which were admittedly barred at the time when Ex. A was executed. Not only was the barred liability kept alive but it
was also plainly sought to be enforced. A careful perusal of its terms makes it difficult to accept the suggestion that it does no more than make the
old obligation a matter of record. In this connexion attention maybe drawn to the decisions in Ibrahim Mallick Vs. Lalit Mohan Roy, and
Royazuddi Sheik v. Kali Nath Mookerjee [1906] 33 Cal. 985 referred to by the lower Court. In the former case a suit was instituted in a Small
Cause Court on the strength of a verbal promise to pay a rent decree amount in consideration of not enforcing the said decree. It was held that
the suit was on a contract no doubt with reference to the amount found due by the judgment but it is a suit on a simple contract and no exception
can be taken to the frame of it.
In the latter case, a bond was taken for
arrears of rent, for amount of a rent decree and for cesses etc.
It was held that
the suit to enforce the bond was in no sense a suit to enforce the original rent charge.
In our opinion in the present case the old obligation to pay rent was superseded by the new agreement under Ex. A which created a new
liability. For these reasons we hold that the lower Court had jurisdiction to try these suits.
Point No. 2 :-We are not satisfied that Ex. A is unenforceable because it is opposed to the public policy as laid down in the Estates Land Act. It
is conceded that the terms of Ex. A do not specifically contravene any of the provisions of Sections 189, 199, and 211, Estates Land Act. What is
argued is that these are opposed to the general policy of the law underlying those sections. This argument cannot be accepted. Ex. A does not
purport to oust the jurisdiction of the revenue Courts in trying cases arising under it and does not therefore offend against Section 189. This
contention only raises in another form the considerations we have dealt with under Point No. 1. As regards Section 199 we do not think that Ex. A
evidences a compromise of the prior suits between the zamindar and the tenants. As a matter of fact the prior suits were withdrawn and dismissed
and it is not open to the petitioners now in civil revision petition to argue that Ex. A. is inequitable and should not on that account be enforced.
Then it is said that the effect of enforcing Ex. A is to enforce the payment of a barred debt, i.e., in this case, rents of Faslis 1325, 1326 etc., and
thus violate the spirit of Section 211. Assuming that this policy underlies Section 211, we cannot accept the plea that Ex. A contemplates the
payment of a barred debt as such. It evidences only an adjustment of the respective claims of the parties'' during the years referred to in it. In giving
effect to its terms we are not concerned with any question relating to the payment of a barred debt. We must therefore hold that Ex. A is not
objectionable as opposed to public policy, as laid down in the Estates Land Act.
Point No. 3:-This has reference to the interest that has been awarded by the decree against each of the tenants. We cannot satisfactorily deal
with this question as it was raised for the first time'' before us in the course of the arguments. It is not clear from the amounts decreed whether the
interest has been calculated on the amounts of the faslis from the due dates to the suit dates or whether it is included in the arrear of each fasli. The
question should have been raised in the lower Court for a proper decision. In our opinion the plaintiff is entitled to interest up to Ex. A and since
the suit is based on the breach of the agreement contained in it, he is entitled to interest subsequent to it also in the form of damages.
In the result, these Civil Revision Petitions are dismissed with costs We fix Rs. 500 as the advocate''s fee in all the cases together.