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Judgment
The claim arises out of an incident of 1995. Victim Osman Khan was apparently working at a roadside tyre-repairing shop when an oil tanker suffered an accident and the victim apparently sustained serious burn injuries. The appellant, as a relative of the victim, claimed under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and now challenges the dismissal of the claim by an award of January 6, 1999.
According to the appellant, the victim was admitted to the Midnapore District Hospital immediately after the accident from where he was discharged on May 10, 1995, apparently since such hospital did not have the facilities to treat a patient with the severity of 90 per cent burn injuries that the victim in this case suffered. The appellant claims that the victim was taken home but upon his condition deteriorating within the next fortnight or so, he was admitted to a private medical facility from where he was discharged the following day, again apparently on the ground that there was little that the private nursing home could do to treat the patient. According to the appellant, the victim was brought home in such circumstances and he expired within a week or so thereafter.
The appellant narrated her version in course of her oral testimony before the tribunal. The appellant produced the death certificate issued on June 7, 1995, citing the cause of death to be "due to septic all over the body by acid burn."
The doctor, who issued the death certificate, was called as a witness. Such doctor said in his examination-in-chief that he did not treat the victim. In his cross-examination, the relevant doctor admitted as follows: "I do not know the actual cause of death of the victim but he died due to septic all over the body by acid burn."
A doctor from the Midnapore District Hospital was called as a witness. Such doctor recalled that the victim had been admitted in the hospital "with acid burn injury and was subsequently discharged from hospital on 10.05.1995." The circumstances in which the victim was discharged from the hospital were not indicated, nor did the witness furnish any particulars as to the condition of the victim or the extent of the burn injuries suffered by the victim.
It is inconceivable that a government hospital would discharge a critical patient on the ground of lack of facilities. It is possible that a government hospital may not have the facilities to undertake the treatment in a critical case, but the hospital would invariably refer the patient to a larger, referral hospital. A government hospital would scarcely discharge a patient for lack of facilities to treat the patient without a bond being executed by the person responsible for the patient to obtain the discharge. No such material was adduced in evidence, not even the bed-head ticket pertaining to the victim during the victim's stay at the Midnapore District Hospital.
If the appellant's case is to be believed, the victim was discharged from the hospital on the ground that the hospital did not have the infrastructure or the facilities to provide adequate treatment; yet the victim was taken home from the hospital. It is possible that the financial condition of the family was such that the victim could not be provided adequate treatment; but it is unlikely that a family in such position would obtain the discharge of the patient from a government hospital only for the patient to be taken back home. Further, the subsequent admission of the victim to the private hospital was on or about May 29, 1995. The victim was released the following day. If the victim had been released from a private medical facility purely on the ground that such private institution did not have the requisite facilities to provide adequate treatment, a certificate or some writing would invariably have been issued. In any event, in the interregnum between the victim being discharged from the Midnapore District Hospital and the victim's condition deteriorating on or about May 29, 1995, there does not appear to have been any doctor who treated the patient or who was called as a witness to indicate the condition of the patient at such stage.
On the basis of the evidence that was carried to the tribunal, there were far too many gaps and the tribunal could never have reasonably linked the death of the victim on June 7, 1995 to the accident of the tanker on May 7, 1995. It is possible that everything happened exactly how the appellant claims, particularly in the light of the doctor who issued the death certificate maintaining that the victim died as a result of the burn injuries; but it was for the claimant to establish the case by cogent evidence, which the claimant hopelessly failed in doing.
Upon re-apprising the entire evidence before the tribunal, such tribunal cannot be faulted for having found no case made out on behalf of the appellant to obtain compensation under Section 166 of the said Act. In any event, it also does not appear that a case of rash and negligent driving against the offending vehicle or its driver was made out, though there was no doubt that the accident took place.
For the reasons aforesaid, FMA 2268 of 2000 is dismissed.
There will be no order as to costs.
