Mahomed Abdul Bari vs The Empress

The Magistrate, on the 13th September last, required the Petitioner to furnish security to keep the peace for one year. That order has already been brought before this Court in revision, and the Court has declined to interfere with it. On the 5th October following, the Magistrate required further security from the same person for one year, and he declared that that order should commence to take effect on expiry of the term of the security already taken by the order of the 13th September previous. Now, there is no authority for such an order. It should take effect at once and it is only for special reasons, as is now provided by sec. 120, sub-sec. 2, that the operation can be deferred. It is, however, not the object of this sub-section to enable a postponement of the operation of such, an order as in the case now before us. The object is to allow a Magistrate in this manner to give time to a person bound over to obtain security instead of at once proceeding to order imprisonment as if in default. This is shown by sec. 123. Under sec. 123 the security must be given on or before the date on which the period for such security commences. Consequently in this case the security need not have been given for nearly one year, that is, not until after the term for which the former security had been given. Such a postponement is'' not contemplated by law, the object of which is to prevent breaches of the peace likely to take place in consequence of some present dispute and who can say that at the end of one year such a dispute will still exist. If it should so happen that it does then exist, a further security can be demanded on fresh proceedings properly taken. The dispute which is stated to be the cause of the present proceedings is on account of the cultivation of certain lands and this should be settled within that time either amicably or by recourse to the Civil Courts. The order of the 5th October is, therefore, set aside.

The Deputy Magistrate''s explanation seems to show that he thinks that orders for security to keep the peace can be cumulative in the same manner as sentences for distinct and separate offences. There is nothing similar in the two cases. Separate punishments are appropriate for separate breaches of the law. A security to keep the peace once given is sufficient for that purpose so long as it is in force in respect of every act of the person bound over breaking any of its conditions.