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Judgment
Hon'Ble Irshad Ali, J.
Heard Shri Amit Dwivedi, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel for the respondents-State.
Vide order dated 15.9.2026, the notice upon respondent nos.6 and 7 are deemed to be sufficient.
By means of the present writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for the following reliefs:
(i)Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Certiorari quashing the impugned order dated 26.2.2008 passed by the opposite party no.1 passed in Appeal No.36/43/07 as well as impugned order dated 30.11.2004 passed by the opposite party no.2 contained in Annexure Nos.1 and 2 to this writ petition.
(ii)Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Mandamus commanding the opposite parties not to take the possession of the disputed land No.51/10 area 950 of village-Ganjga Nagar Pargana- Khairigarh Tehsil and District Kheri.
(iii)Issue any other writ, order or direction which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper under the circumstances of the case.
(iv)Allow the writ petition with costs."
Factual matrix of the case is that the disputed land no.51/10 area 9.50 acre of Village Gang Nagar, Pargana- Khairigarh Tehsil and District Kheri originally belonged to the father of the opposite party no.4, Prithvi Pal singh who in the year 1961 executed a registered sale deed in favour of Fateh Singh and the said Fateh Singh executed sale deed in favour of Bali Singh and Bali Singh executed sale deed in favour of Mahendra Kaur (petitioner). Since the date of execution of sale deed the petitioner and earlier her predecessor in interest has been in the possession.
On 4.3.1965, the Prescribed Authority declared the surplus land from the holdings of said Prithvi Pal singh ( who has died and his son namely Sarv Pal Singh has been arrayed as a party in all the lower court proceedings as well as in the instant writ petition as opposite party no.4) in view of the provisions of U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960.
In the year 1973, section 12-A introduced vide U.P. Act No.18 of 1973. The petitioner filed objectiojn against the orders dated 4.3.1965 and 29.5.1975 before the Prescribed Authority, Ceiling which was rejected on 30.06.1986.
Against the said order dated 30.6.1986, statutory appeals were filed by the petitioner and other persons which were rejected by a common order dated 13.11.1991 by Appellate Authority/ Additional Commissioner, Lucknow Division. Special finding has been recorded that transfer was irrevocable, in good faith and in lieu of adequate compensation/ consideration.
The petitioner and others person preferred review applications bearing No.108(88-897) U/S 13 Ceiling Act against the aforesaid order dated 13.11.1991 passed by the Appellate Authority/ Additional Commissioner, Lucknow Division which was disposed of remitting the matter before the Prescribed Authority for considering the aspect of declaring the land of original tenure holder not the land of transferee as surplus, it was further provided that till then applications if in possession shall not be dispossessed except in accordance with law.
The petitioner moved an application in pursuant to aforesaid order dated 22.12.1999 which was also rejected by the Prescribed Authority (Ceiling) on the premise that Section 12 A (d) was not there in the Ceiling Act when the original order of surplus was passed. Against the aforesaid order dated 17.8.2001 the petitioner along with other persons preferred statutory appeal before the Appellate Authority/ Additional Commissioner, Lucknow Division which was allowed vide order dated 31.10.2002 directing the Prescribed Authority to follow earlier order dated 22.12.1999.
The Prescribed Authority vide order dated 30.11.2004 in an illegal and arbitrary manner rejected the objection of the petitioner on the premise that Section 12(a)(d) was not there in the Ceiling Act when the original order of surplus was passed. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner filed the statutory appeal against the aforesaid order dated 30.11.2004 which has also been rejected vide order dated 26.2.2008. Hence this writ petition.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the original tenure holder- Prithvi Pal Singh executed a registered sale deed in favour of Fateh Singh and Fateh Singh executed sale deed in favour of Bali singh, Bali Singh executed a sale deed in favour of Mahendra Kaur and since the date of execution of sale the petitioner has been in the possession.
Learned counsel for the petitioner next submitted that without notice to the predecessor in interest of the petitioner, her aforesaid purchased land was included in the holdings of said Prithvi Pal Singh and it was declared surplus vide orders dated 4.3.1965 and 29.5.1971.
Learned counsel for the petitioner next submitted that the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of Section 12A (d) as the land in question was transferred to one Fateh Singh vide sale deed executed in the year 1961 by his original tenure holder for which specific satisfaction in view of Section 5(6) of the Act has been recorded by the Appellate Authority/ Additional Commissioner, Lucknow Dvision vide order dated 13.11.1991 and as such the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of Section 12A.
Learned counsel for the petitioner next submitted that the petitioner by virtue of the sale deed dated 1961 which was executed by the Bali Singh in favour of the petitioner stepped into the shoe of the said Fateh Singh.
Learned counsel for the petitioner next submitted that the aforesaid transfer of land by original tenure holder/ Prithvi Pal Singh vide sale deed executed in the year 1961 in favour of Fateh Singh (predecesor in interest of the petitioner) was irrevocable, in good faith and in lieu of adequate compensation and in this regard specific satisfaction in view of Section 5(6) of the Act has been recorded by the Appellate Authority/ Additional Commissioner, Lucknow Division vide order dated 13.11.1991.
Learned counsel for the petitioner next submitted that a perusal of the aforesaid Section 12-A(d) of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 would reveal that in case the tenure holder is found to have land in excess of the ceiling area including the land which is subject matter of the transfer referred to in sub section 6 of Section 5, the surplus land determined shall, as far as possible, be other than land which is subject of such transfer.
Learned counsel for the petitioner next submitted that the Prescribed Authority as well as the lower Appellate Court by misconstruing the provisions of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 held that the provisions of Section 12-A of the Act are not applicable ignoring that the objections preferred by the petitioner wer pending consideration before the Prescribed Authority Ceiling at the time of insertion of Section 12-A.
Learned counsel for the petitioner next submitted that insertion of Section 12-A in no way affects anything done by a party in the past and provided for new remedies for enforcement of an existing right, will apply to future as well as past causes of action, thus the provision may be prospective in force but will have pass retroractive effect and as such, orders dated 30.11.2004 and 26.02.2008 passed by the opposite party nos.1 and 2 respectively are not sustainable.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the authorities below, while recording the specific satisfaction under Section 5(6) of the Act, failed to consider that operation of Section 12A is retroactive in nature and therefore, its introduction vide Amendment Act No.UP Act No.18 of 1973 will also apply to pending cases. He also submits that at the time of insertion of Sectiojn 129A) the objection preferred by the petitioner was pending and subsequently the order dated 30.06.1986 and 13.11.1991 were nullified and the matter was remitted back.
Learned counsel for the petitioner next submitted that Section 12A was inserted for conferment of benefit to a set of persons without inflicting a corresponding detriment to other persons then the presumption would be that such a legislation giving it a purposive construction would warrant it to be given a restorspective effect.
Learned counsel for the petitioner lastly submitted that in view of Section 5 sub section 6(b) and Section 12(A)(d) of the Act, the petitioner is entitled to retain the land which they have purchased would be ignored only for determining the ceiling area and is liable to be excluded from surplus land.
In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the following judgments:
"(i). Krishna Mohan v. District Judge, Pilibhit and others, 2007(3) AWC 2152:: 2007 (11) RJ 1098.
(ii). Smt. Kamlesh Kumari v. State of U.P. and others, AIR 1982 Supreme Court 1248 :: 1981 ALL.L.J. 1139.
(iii)Smt. Prema Devi v. A.D.J., Hamirpur and another, 2005 (2) AWC 1411.
(iv)Bholanath and Anr. v. State of U.P. and others (Writ Petition No.14566 of 1995)
(v)Ashok Kumar and others v. State of U.P. and others (Writ-C No.3000069 of 2003)
(vi)Mohd. Muste Hassan and others v. The Addl. Commissioner, Meerut and others, 1995 RD 186
(vii)Dilip v. Mohd. Azizul Haq and another, AIR 2000 Supreme Court 1976:: 2000 AIR SCW 1035.
(viii)Commissioner of Income Tax (Central Tax New Delhi) v. Vatika Township Pvt. Ltd., 2015(1) SCC (1)."
Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that proceedings were initiated against the original tenure holder- Prithvi Pal Singh and the land in question has been declared surplus by the Prescribed Authority. In the revenue records the land in question is not registered in the name of the petitioner, hence no notice was required to be given to the petitioner.
Learned counsel for the respondents next submitted that the land in question has already been declared as surplus by orders dated 4.3.1965 and 29.05.1971 and the same is recorded in the revenue record as surplus land and the petitioner moved the application under Section 12-A (d) of the Ceiling Act read with Sectiojn 151 C.P.C. which were not maintainable as the Section 12A (d) as well as Section 5(2) of the Ceiling Act is not applicable in the present case.
Learned counsel for the respondents lastly submitted that the grounds taken by the petitioner are contrary to the facts and law and are not tenable in the eyes of law and therefore, the writ petition being devoid of merits is liable to be dismissed.
Having heard the rival submissions of learned counsel for the parties, I have perused the material available on record as well as law reports cited by learned counsel for the petitioner.
To resolve the controversy involved in the present writ petition, the operative portion of the judgment relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner are extracted hereinbelow:
(i) Krishna Mohan (supra):-
7.Interpreting the aforesaid provisions Supreme Court in Escorts Farms Ltd. v. Commissioner, Kumanon Division, Naini-tal, [(2004) 4 SCC 281 : AIR 2004 SC 2186.] has held that section 12-A (d) was applicable to the sale deeds in between 24.1.1971 and 8.6.1973 and sale deeds after 8.6.1973 were void (section-9(2) was added with effect from 8.6.1973). In the instant case sale deed by Krishna Mohan to Sarla Devi was executed on 12.1.1972 i.e. in between 24.1.1971 and 8.6.1973 hence Sarla Devi was entitled to the benefit of section 12-A (d) of the Act. Even though Sarla Devi sold the land to respondent No. 3 in 1974, however, the sale deed cannot be held to be void for the reason that it was not executed by petitioner. By virtue of the said deed of 1974 respondent. No. 3 stepped into the shoes of Sarla Devi. If the land had been sold by the petitioner after 8.6.1973 then of course it would have been void and petitioner could assert that he was entitled to give the said land in choice. However, this is not the position in the instant case.
8.Petitioner gave the sold land in choice. No notice was issued either to Sarla Devi or to respondent No. 3 whose names had already been mutated. On coming to know that the land purchased by her had been given in choice by the petitioner to be taken as surplus land, respondent No. 3 filed objections on the basis of section 12-A(d) of the Act. The application filed by respondent No. 3 was registered as Ceiling Case No. 60 of 1974. Prescribed Authority; Pooranpur/Sub-Divisional Officer decided the matter in favour of respondent No. 3 on 2.9.1980. Against the said order petitioner filed Ceiling Appeal No. 44 of 1980. District Judge, Pilibhit dismissed the appeal on 6.3.1982 hence this writ petition.
9.Before the controversy in question arose it had conclusively been decided that petitioner held 7.81 acres of surplus land which he was required to surrender. In 1972 petitioner sold the land to Sarla Devi and Sarla Devi on 3.12.1974 sold the same land to respondent No. 3 - Smt. Harbhajan Kaur. Both the Courts below held that by virtue of section 12-A (d) of the Act the land in dispute which was purchased by Sarla Devi and thereafter by respondent No. 3 could not be taken as surplus land. 10. I do not find any error in the impugned orders. Respondent No. 3 was fully entitled to the benefit of section 12-A(d) of the Ceiling Act.
(ii) Smt. Kamlesh Kumari:-
The short point taken by Mr Ashoke Sen in support of the petition is that even assuming that the finding of the prescribed authority that the transfer was not bona fide is correct, the prescribed authority was in error in not excluding the land said to have been transferred from the surplus area. The land which was the subject-matter of transfer was covered by Plot 460. The contention is well-founded and must prevail. In these circumstances, we set aside the judgment of the High Court and that of the prescribed authority and remit the case to the prescribed authority to decide the surplus land in accordance with Section 12-A(d) of the Act by excluding the area which was the subject of transfer as far as possible.
(iii) Smt. Prema Devi (supra):-
9.The broad legislative intent appears to be where a tenure-holder holding land in excess of ceiling area has transferred or partitioned land after the appointed day, the surplus land shall be so carved out that, so far as possible, land subject matter of such transfer or partition, shall not be included in the land to be declared surplus. In other words unless sufficient land is not available with the tenure-holder to be declared surplus or It is not possible to exclude the land covered under transfer or partition for some other cogent reason such land shall not be included in the surplus land.
10.The aforesaid intention of the Legislature becomes further clear from conjoint reading of Section 5(6) and clause (d) of proviso to Section 12-A. Section 5(6) provides that any transfer made after the appointed day is liable to be ignored and not taken into account for the purpose of determining the ceiling area. Under this Section the transfer made by a tenure-holder has not been declared to be void unlike Section 5(8) where any transfer made during continuance of ceiling proceedings are to be treated as void. Thus, though under Section 5(6) of the Act the transfer made after the appointed day is to be ignored for the purpose of computing the ceiling area but the same remains valid and operative so far as transferor and transferee are concerned. However, in view of clause (d) of proviso to Section 12-A the moment any land which is subject matter of transfer or any part thereof is to be included in surplus land such transfer of land or such part thereof shall be deemed to be void. The mere fact that transfer made after appointed day have not been declared to be absolutely void unless the area or part thereof gets included in the surplus land goes to show that Legislature always intended so far it was possible to exclude the land which is subject matter of transfer from being included in surplus land.
11.The rights conferred upon the tenure-holder of making a choice by enacting part of Section 12-A has to be balanced with the right of a transferee to seek exclusion of the plots purchased by him for a valuable consideration from the surplus land in case plots other than those purchased by him are available for being declared surplus. Only such a construction of Section 12-A of the Act will further the object of clause (d) of proviso to the said Section and any other construction will make it redundant.
12.Thus the normal rule is that land forming subject matter of transfer shall not be included in the surplus land unless the tenure-holder is left with no other land or the area available with him falls short of area declared surplus.
13.Reference at this stage may be made to a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Smt Kamlesh Kumari v. State of U.P., 1981 All LJ 1139, wherein it was observed as follows:
“The short point taken by Mr. Ashok Sen in support of the petition is that even assuming that the finding of the prescribed authority that the transfer was not bona fide is correct, the prescribed authority was in error in not excluding the land said to have been transferred from the surplus area. The land which was the subject matter of transfer was covered by plot No. 460. The contention is well founded and must prevail. In these circumstances, we set aside the Judgment of the High Court and that of the prescribed authority and remit the case to the prescribed authority to decide the surplus land in accordance with Section 12A(d) of the Act by excluding the area which was the subject of transfer as far as possible.”
(iv) Bholanath (supra):-
A learned Judge of this Court in Smt. Prema Devi Vs. Additional District Judge, Hamirpur and another, 2005 (98) RD 567 while interpreting the provisions of Section 12-A of the Act observed as follows:-
"The broad legislative intent appears to be where a tenure-holder holding land in excess of ceiling area has transferred or partitioned land after the appointed day, the surplus land shall be so carved out that, so far as possible, land subject-matter of such transfer or partition, shall not be included in the land to be declared surplus. In other words unless sufficient land is not available with the tenure-holder to be declared surplus or it is not possible to exclude the land covered under transfer or partition for some other cogent reason such land shall not be included in the surplus land.
The aforesaid intention of the legislature becomes further clear from conjoint reading of section 5(6) and clause (d) of proviso to section 12-A. Section 5(6) provides that any transfer made after the appointed day is liable to be ignored and not taken into account for the purpose of determining the ceiling area. Under this section, the transfer made by a tenure-holder has not been declared to be void unlike section 5(8) where any transfer made during continuance of ceiling proceedings are to be treated as void. Thus, though under section 5(6) of the Act the transfer made after the appointed day is to be ignored for the purpose of computing the ceiling area but the same remains valid and operative so far as transferor and transferee are concerned. However, in view of clause (d) of proviso to section 12-A the moment any land which is subject-matter of transfer or any part thereof is to be included in surplus land such transfer of land or such part thereof shall be deemed to be void. The mere fact that transfer made after appointed day have not be declared to be absolutely void unless the area or part thereof gets included in the surplus land goes to show that legislature always intended so far it was possible to exclude the land which is subject-matter of transfer from being included in surplus land.
The rights conferred upon the tenure-holder of making a choice by enacting part of section 12-A has to be balanced with the right of a transferee to seek exclusion of the plots purchased by him for a valuable consideration from the surplus land in case plots other than those purchased by him are available for being declared surplus. Only such a construction of section 12-A of the Act will further the object of clause (d) of proviso to the said section and any other construction will make it redundant.
Thus, the normal rule is that land forming subject-matter of transfer shall not be included in the surplus land unless the tenure holder is left with no other land or the area available with him falls short of area declared surplus."
In coming to the aforesaid conclusion, the learned Judge has placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Smt. Kamlesh Kumari Vs. State of U.P. and others, 1981 ALJ, 1139 wherein the Supreme Court observed as follows:-
" The short point taken by Mr. Ashok Sen in support of the petition is that even assuming that the finding of the prescribed authority that the transfer was not bona fide is correct, the prescribed authority was in error in not excluding the land said to have been transferred from the surplus area. The land which was the subject-matter of transfer was covered by plot No. 460. The contention is well founded and must prevail. In these circumstances, we set aside the judgment of the High Court and that of the prescribed authority and remit the case to the prescribed authority to decide the surplus land in accordance with section 12-A (d) of the Act by excluding the area which was the subject of transfer as far as possible."
(v) Ashok Kumar (supra):-
10.Having heard the rival submissions of learned counsel for the parties, I have perused the material on record as well as the provisions contained in Section 12(A)(d) and Section 5 Sub-clause 6(b) of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling On Land Holding Act, 1960.
11.To resolve the controversy involved in the present writ petition, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the provision of Section 5 Sub-clause 6(b) and Section 12(A)(d):
"Section 5 Sub-clause 6(b): a transfer proved to the satisfaction of the Prescribed Authority to be in good faith and for adequate considered and under an irrevocable instrument not being a benami transaction or for immediate or deferred benefit of the tenure-holder or other members of his family.
Section 12(A)(d): where any person holds land in excess of the ceiling area including land which is the subject of any transfer or partition referred to in sub-section (6) or sub-section (7) of Section 5, the surplus land determined shall, as far as possible, be land other than land which is the subject of such transfer or partition, and if the surplus land includes any land which is the subject of such transfer or partition, the transfer or partition shall, insofar as it relates to the land included in the surplus land, be deemed to be and always to have been avoid and
(i)it shall be open to the transferred to claim refund of the proportionate amount of consideratiojn, if any, advanced by him to the transferor, and such amount shall be charged on the amount payable to the transferor under Sectiojn 17 and also on any land retained by the transferor within the ceiling area, which shall be liable to be sold in satisfaction of the charge, nothwithstanding anything contained in Section 153 of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950( Act No.1 of 1951);
(ii)any party to the partition (other than the tenure holder in respect of whom the surplus land has been determined whose land is included in surplus land of the said tenure holder shall be entitled to have the partition re-opened."
12.Perusal of the above-extracted shows that a transfer proved to the satisfaction of the Prescribed Authority to be in good faith and for adequate considered and under an irrevocable instrument not being a benami transaction or for immediate or deferred benefit of the tenure holder or other members of his family.
13.Perusal of the records shows that consolidation proceedings started in the year and the dispute in respect of land of original tenure holder Tahira Begam was finally adjudicated and by the consolidation authorities also final reports have been prepared in the year 1988 to the effect that land of Gata No.163, 164, 177, 191 and 193 has been found to be original tenure holder namely Tahira Begam. The petitioners have purchased the land of area 10 acres out of the land of Gata No.177 vide registered agreement to sale deed dated 17.8.1994 and sale deed was executed on 22.7.1995. Names of the petitioner were also mutated in the revenue record.
14.It is not in dispute that land i.e. Gata No.163, 164, 177, 191 and 193 belongs to Tahira Begam and the petitioners purchased the said plot from Tahira Begam through registered sale deed in the year 1995, therefore the land would not have been included to the surplus land.
15.The petitioner took specific ground that he has purchased the land by bonafide and genuine sale deed in the year 1995 and the land purchased by the petitioner would have been excluded from the zone of consideration land, but neither prescribed authority nor appellate authority has considered this ground and has outrightly passed the orders impugned which are per se illegal.
16.In view of the provision of Section 5 Sub-clause 6(b) and Section 12(A)(d) of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling On Land Holding Act, 1960, the petitioner after depositing of adequate satisfaction purchased the land, therefore same is liable to be ignored while passing the order impugned by the Prescribed Authority as well as by the Appellate Authority. In this view of the matter, the impugned orders passed by the Both the CourtsBelow is not just and valid order and are liable to be quashed.
(vi) Mohd. Muste Hassan (supra):-
I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for petitioners. Admittedly the respondents were not party in the proceedings before the prescribed authority when the order determining the land as surplus was passed and thus the order cannot gain finality against them. Under the scheme of the Act though the transfers made after 24.1.1971 are liable to be ignored, under Section 5 (6) of the Act if the conditions mentioned therein are not satisfied, however, the sale deed is ignored under the aforesaid provision only for determining the ceiling area. The legislature was aware of the situations that if the sale deeds are ignored, the transferees from the tenure holders may suffer irreparable loss and injury and to avoid this hardship they provided provisions under Section 12 of the Act, the relevant clause (d) whereof is very material for consideration which is being reproduced below:
"12-A. In determining the surplus land under Section 11 or Section 12, the prescribed Authority shall, as far as possible, accept the choice indicated by the tenure holder to the plot or plots which he and other members of his family, if any, would like to retain as part of the ceiling area applicable to him or them under the provisions of this Act, whether indicated by him in his statement under Section 9 or in any subsequent proceedings:
Provided that
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)Where any person holds land in excess of the ceiling area including land which is the subject of any transfer or partition referred to in sub-section (6) or sub-section (7) of Section 5, the surplus land determined shall, as far as possible, be land other than land which is the subject of such transfer or partition, and if the surplus land includes any land which is the subject of such transfer or partition, the transfer or partition shall, in so far as it relates to the land included in the surplus land, be deemed to be and always to have been void
(i).........................…
(ii).........................…
A perusal of the aforesaid clause (d) shows that in case the tenure holder is found to have land in excess of the ceiling area including the land which is subject matter of the transfer referred to in sub-section (6) of Section 5, the surplus land determined shall, as far as possible, be other than land which is subject of such transfer. The phrase 'as far as possible' has been interpreted by this Court and also by the Apex court in several decisions and it has been held that it means that unless it is impossible, the direction given by the legislature should be complied with. Thus, the prescribed authority was under obligation to apply its mind before determining the plots in dispute as surplus as to whether it is not possible to have any other plot from the holding of the tenure holder. The order dated 24.4.1976, however, shows that the choice indicated by. the tenure holder Mohd. Ali through his application dated 11:3.1976 was accepted without any scrutiny. Section trans A (d) contains a valuable protection extended to the transferee and he should not have been deprived of the same in the fashion as it had been done by the prescribed authority. In my opinion, when -the choice is indicated in respect of the land which is subject of any transfer referred to in sub-section 5 (6) of the Act ans Sopportunity of hearing ought to have been given to the transferee before accepting the land as surplus. Admittedly, no such opportunity was given in the present case The prescribed authority by its ordur dated 31.3.1992 rejected the claim of the transferee mainly on the ground that as the transfers were made after 24.1.1971 they are liable to be ignored. He failed to consider the provisions of Section 12-A-(d) of the Act. In my opinion, the demand of equity was that the tenure holder should have himself taken care of the interest of ) the transferee from whom he had accepted money in lieu of the land and he should not have indicated the same land for being declared surplus. The action of the tenure holder indicating choice in respect of the plots in dispute cannot be said to be fair. In these circumstances, in my opinion, the appellate authority has rightly allowed the appeal of the transferees and has given them the benefit of Section 9-A (d) of the Act. In the facts and circumstances of the case no interference is called for under Article 226 of the Constitution.
(vii) Dilip (supra):-
7.In theory the appeal is only a continuation of the hearing of the suit. Accordingly, the word “suit” in the Order has to be understood to include an appeal. The result is that if at the time of the institution of the suit for eviction clause 13-A was not in force, but at the time of appeal such a clause is introduced, the tenant in appeal becomes entitled to its protection. We draw support for these propositions from the three decisions of this Court cited by the learned counsel for the appellants. Therefore, we are of the view that the High Court was not justified in holding that there was no appeal filed or pending against the tenant. In this case, although a decree for eviction had been passed in the suit, that decree was under challenge in a proceeding arising out of that suit in appeal and was pending in a court. Thus an appeal being a rehearing of the suit, as stated earlier, the inference drawn by the High Court that no proceedings were filed or pending against the tenant as on the date would not be correct.
8.The High Court further concluded that the amendments have no retrospective effect. The provision came into force when the appeal was pending. Therefore, though the provision is prospective in force, has “retroactive effect”. This provision merely provides for a limitation to be imposed for the future which in no way affects anything done by a party in the past and statutes providing for new remedies for enforcement of an existing right will apply to future as well as past causes of action. The reason being that the said statutes do not affect existing rights and in the present case, the insistence is upon obtaining of permission of the Controller to enforce a decree for eviction and it is, therefore, not retrospective in effect at all, since it has only retroactive force.
(viii) Vatika Township Pvt. Ltd. (supra):-
27.A legislation, be it a statutory Act or a statutory rule or a statutory notification, may physically consists of words printed on papers. However, conceptually it is a great deal more than an ordinary prose. There is a special peculiarity in the mode of verbal communication by a legislation. A legislation is not just a series of statements, such as one finds in a work of fiction/non-fiction or even in a judgment of a court of law. There is a technique required to draft a legislation as well as to understand a legislation. Former technique is known as legislative drafting and latter one is to be found in the various principles of “interpretation of statutes”. Vis-à-vis ordinary prose, a legislation differs in its provenance, layout and features as also in the implication as to its meaning that arise by presumptions as to the intent of the maker thereof.
28.Of the various rules guiding how a legislation has to be interpreted, one established rule is that unless a contrary intention appears, a legislation is presumed not to be intended to have a retrospective operation. The idea behind the rule is that a current law should govern current activities. Law passed today cannot apply to the events of the past. If we do something today, we do it keeping in view the law of today and in force and not tomorrow's backward adjustment of it. Our belief in the nature of the law is founded on the bedrock that every human being is entitled to arrange his affairs by relying on the existing law and should not find that his plans have been retrospectively upset. This principle of law is known as lex prospicit non respicit : law looks forward not backward. As was observed in Phillips v. Eyre [(1870) LR 6 QB 1] , a retrospective legislation is contrary to the general principle that legislation by which the conduct of mankind is to be regulated when introduced for the first time to deal with future acts ought not to change the character of past transactions carried on upon the faith of the then existing law.
29.The obvious basis of the principle against retrospectivity is the principle of “fairness”, which must be the basis of every legal rule as was observed in L'Office Cherifien des Phosphates v. Yamashita-Shinnihon Steamship Co. Ltd. [(1994) 1 AC 486 : (1994) 2 WLR 39 : (1994) 1 All ER 20 (HL)] Thus, legislations which modified accrued rights or which impose obligations or impose new duties or attach a new disability have to be treated as prospective unless the legislative intent is clearly to give the enactment a retrospective effect; unless the legislation is for purpose of supplying an obvious omission in a former legislation or to explain a former legislation. We need not note the cornucopia of case law available on the subject because aforesaid legal position clearly emerges from the various decisions and this legal position was conceded by the counsel for the parties. In any case, we shall refer to few judgments containing this dicta, a little later.
30.We would also like to point out, for the sake of completeness, that where a benefit is conferred by a legislation, the rule against a retrospective construction is different. If a legislation confers a benefit on some persons but without inflicting a corresponding detriment on some other person or on the public generally, and where to confer such benefit appears to have been the legislators' object, then the presumption would be that such a legislation, giving it a purposive construction, would warrant it to be given a retrospective effect. This exactly is the justification to treat procedural provisions as retrospective. In Govt. of India v. Indian Tobacco Assn. [(2005) 7 SCC 396] , the doctrine of fairness was held to be relevant factor to construe a statute conferring a benefit, in the context of it to be given a retrospective operation. The same doctrine of fairness, to hold that a statute was retrospective in nature, was applied in Vijay v. State of Maharashtra [(2006) 6 SCC 289] . It was held that where a law is enacted for the benefit of community as a whole, even in the absence of a provision the statute may be held to be retrospective in nature. However, we are (sic not) confronted with any such situation here.
31.In such cases, retrospectivity is attached to benefit the persons in contradistinction to the provision imposing some burden or liability where the presumption attaches towards prospectivity. In the instant case, the proviso added to Section 113 of the Act is not beneficial to the assessee. On the contrary, it is a provision which is onerous to the assessee. Therefore, in a case like this, we have to proceed with the normal rule of presumption against retrospective operation. Thus, the rule against retrospective operation is a fundamental rule of law that no statute shall be construed to have a retrospective operation unless such a construction appears very clearly in the terms of the Act, or arises by necessary and distinct implication. Dogmatically framed, the rule is no more than a presumption, and thus could be displaced by outweighing factors.
32.Let us sharpen the discussion a little more. We may note that under certain circumstances, a particular amendment can be treated as clarificatory or declaratory in nature. Such statutory provisions are labelled as “declaratory statutes”. The circumstances under which provisions can be termed as “declaratory statutes” are explained by Justice G.P. Singh [Principles of Statutory Interpretation, (13th Edn., LexisNexis Butterworths Wadhwa, Nagpur, 2012)] in the following manner:
“Declaratory statutes
The presumption against retrospective operation is not applicable to declaratory statutes. As stated in Craies [ W.F. Craies, Craies on Statute Law (7th Edn., Sweet and Maxwell Ltd., 1971)] and approved by the Supreme Court [Ed. : The reference is to Central Bank of India v. Workmen, AIR 1960 SC 12, para 29] :‘For modern purposes a declaratory Act may be defined as an Act to remove doubts existing as to the common law, or the meaning or effect of any statute. Such Acts are usually held to be retrospective. The usual reason for passing a declaratory Act is to set aside what Parliament deems to have been a judicial error, whether in the statement of the common law or in the interpretation of statutes. Usually, if not invariably, such an Act contains a Preamble, and also the word “declared” as well as the word “enacted”.’ But the use of the words ‘it is declared’ is not conclusive that the Act is declaratory for these words may, at times, be used to introduced new rules of law and the Act in the latter case will only be amending the law and will not necessarily be retrospective. In determining, therefore, the nature of the Act, regard must be had to the substance rather than to the form. If a new Act is ‘to explain’ an earlier Act, it would be without object unless construed retrospective. An explanatory Act is generally passed to supply an obvious omission or to clear up doubts as to the meaning of the previous Act. It is well settled that if a statute is curative or merely declaratory of the previous law retrospective operation is generally intended. The language ‘shall be deemed always to have meant’ is declaratory, and is in plain terms retrospective. In the absence of clear words indicating that the amending Act is declaratory, it would not be so construed when the pre-amended provision was clear and unambiguous. An amending Act may be purely clarificatory to clear a meaning of a provision of the principal Act which was already implicit. A clarificatory amendment of this nature will have retrospective effect and, therefore, if the principal Act was existing law which the Constitution came into force, the amending Act also will be part of the existing law.”
The above summing up is factually based on the judgments of this Court as well as English decisions.
A Constitution Bench of this Court in Keshavlal Jethalal Shah v. Mohanlal Bhagwandas [AIR 1968 SC 1336 : (1968) 3 SCR 623] , while considering the nature of amendment to Section 29(2) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act as amended by Gujarat Act 18 of 1965, observed as follows : (AIR p. 1339, para 8)
“8.… The amending clause does not seek to explain any pre-existing legislation which was ambiguous or defective. The power of the High Court to entertain a petition for exercising revisional jurisdiction was before the amendment derived from Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the legislature has by the amending Act not attempted to explain the meaning of that provision. An explanatory Act is generally passed to supply an obvious omission or to clear up doubts as to the meaning of the previous Act.”
Perusal of the above-extracted judgments reveals that the rights conferred upon the tenure-holder of making a choice by enacting part of Section 12-A has to be balanced with the right of a transferee to seek exclusion of the plots purchased by him for a valuable consideration from the surplus land in case plots other than those purchased by him are available for being declared surplus. Only such a construction of Section 12-A of the Act will further the object of clause (d) of proviso to the said section and any other construction will make it redundant.
Perusal of the material available on record shows that one Prithvi Pal Singh against whom the proceedings under Ceiling Act were initiated who executed a registered sale deed in favour of Fateh Singh and Fateh Singh executed sale deed in favour of Bali Singh and Bali Singh executed a sale deed in favour of Mahendra Kaur (petitioner), in pursuant to agreement to sale dated 15.4.1959 on 1961 and since the date of execution of sale deed, the petitioner has been in the possession.
I have examined the material available on record in the light of the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner.
On examination, it is found that without notice to the predecessor in interest of the petitioner, her aforesaid purchased land was included in the holdings of said Prithvi Pal Singh and it was declared surplus vide orders dated 4.3.1965 and 29.5.1971. In this view of the matter, this Court is of the view that the petitioner is entitled to the benefits of Section 12A (d) as the land in question was transferred to one Fateh Singh vide sale dated 1961 by his original tenure holder (which is much prior to 24.01.1971, limitation set out by Section 5(6) of the Act) and as such, Mahendra Kaur was entitled to the benefit of Section 12A.
Perusal of Section 12-A (d) of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 reveals that in case the tenure holder is found to have land in excess of ceiling area including the land which is subject matter of the transfer referred to in sub section (6) of Section 5, the surplus land determined shall, as far as possible, be other than the land which is subject of such transfer.
It is also found that the Prescribed Authority as well as the Lower Appellate Court by misconstruing the provisions of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 held that the provisions of Section 12-A of the Act are not applicable ignoring that the objections preferred by the petitioner were pending consideration before Prescribed Authority Ceiling at the time of insertion of Section 12-A and on insertion of Section 12-A in no way affects anything done by a party in the past and provided for new remedies for enforcement of existing right, will apply to future as well as past causes of action, thus the provision may be prospective in force, but will have has retroactive effect and as such impugned orders passed by the opposite party nos.1 and 2 are not sustainable.
In the aforesaid view of the matter, the respondents have failed to consider that Section 12-A is retroactive in nature and therefore, its introduction vide Amendment Act No./U.P. Act 18 of 1973 will also apply to the pending cases.
Here it is relevant to submit that at that time the objection preferred by the petitioner was pending and therefore, the orders impugned dated 30.06.1986 and 13.11.1991 passed by the respondents are nullified.
Section 12-A was inserted for conferment of benefit to a set of persons without inflicting a corresponding detriment to other persons then the presumption would be that such a legislation giving it a purposive construction would warrant it to be given a retrospective effect.
The right conferred upon the tenure-holder of making a choice by enacting part of Section 12-A has to be balanced with the right of a transferee to seek exclusion of the plots purchased by him for a valuable consideration from the surplus land in case plots other than those purchased by him are available for being declared surplus. Only such a construction of Section 12-A of the Act will further the object of clause (d) of proviso to the said section and any other construction will make it redundant.
The normal rule is very much clear that land forming subject matter of transfer shall not be included in the surplus land unless the tenure holder is left with no other land or the area available with him falls short of area declared surplus. In view of the aforesaid, the objection filed by the petitioner before the Prescribed Authority under Section 12-A of the Act should have been considered. In the circumstance, the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner are fully applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case.
At this juncture, it is important to note that while passing the orders impugned, the respondents must take into account the various factors viz. (i) outcome of consolidation proceeding wherein the dispute in respect of original tenure holders has been adjudicated by the consolidation authorities (ii) while passing the impugned orders, finding on the specific objection of the petitioner that once the petitioner purchased the land before the appointed date, the land purchased by the petitioner would have been declared surplus, must be return. (iii) the orders impugned would have been passed by following the provisions of Section 5 Sub-clause 6(b) and Section 12(A)(d) of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling On Land Holding Act, 1960.
Considering in totalities of facts and circumstances of the case, this writ petition succeeds and is hereby allowed. Impugned order dated 26.2.2008 passed by the opposite party no.1 passed in Appeal No.36/43/07 as well as impugned order dated 30.11.2004 passed by the opposite party no.2 contained in Annexure Nos.1 and 2 to this writ petition is quashed.
No order as to costs.
