High CourtsDivision Bench(2002) 11 DEL CK 0063

Mahavir Singh vs Union of India (UOI) and Others

Delhi High Court · Decided on 12 November 2002

HON’BLE JUDGES
B.N. Chaturvedi, J · B.A. Khan, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Civil Writ Petition No. 2382 of 2000

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Judgment

7 paragraphs · 651 words

Khan, J.—Petitioner, an ASI and BSF, was accused of outraging the modesty of a constable''s wife and charged u/s 40 of the BSF Act for an act prejudicial to good order and discipline of the Force. He was tried by the Summary Security Force Court (SSFC). He allegedly entered plea of guilty and was dismissed from service on 15.5.1998. He filed a statutory complaint against this which was rejected. he has now filed this petition in which notice was issued limited to the issue of the disproportionally of punishment awarded to him in the facts and circumstances of the case.

2.

This disproportionally of the quantum of punishment is, Therefore, the only issue to be dealt with. It is no more rest integra that judicial review was exercisable even in cases of sentence awarded by the court martial where it was found that it was shocking to judicial conscience in the facts and circumstances of the case or afflicted by perversity and irrationality. Dealing with the doctrine of proportionality the Supreme Court held in Ranjit Thakur Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, :-

"The question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the court-martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect which, otherwise, within the exclusive province of outrageous defiance of logic, then the sentence would not be immune from correction. Irrationality and perversity are recognised grounds of judicial review. In the present case the punishment is so strikingly disproportionate as to call for and justify interference."

3.

The test laid down by the Supreme Court in the judgment (supra) still occupies the field though it has been repeatedly emphasised in the later judgments that the courts should refrain from interfering in the sentence punishment on compassionate grounds or for harshness except for ex-facie perversity or irrationality. In Union of India and Others Vs. R.K. Sharma, , the Supreme Court said:-

"While exercising power under Article 226/227 of Article 32, the High Court or the Supreme Court should not interfere with the punishment merely because it considers the punishment to be disproportionate. It is only in extreme cases, which on their face show perversity or irrationality that there can be judicial review. Merely on compassionate grounds, a court should not interfere."

4.

From all this, it is clear that the sentence awarded by the court martial can''t be upset, modified or reduced on compassion or for its harshness. It is only in extreme cases where perversity or irrationality is writ large on the sentence or where it is so disproportionate as to shock the judicial conscience where interference would be called for and warranted. This would, Therefore, depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. Where facts disclosed that the accused was awarded maximum punishment on a ridiculous charge as in Ranjit Thakur''s case, the court would interfere to balance the scales of justice.

5.

In the present case, petitioner was charged of outraging the modesty of a constable''s wife and in the absence of her husband and in a drunken state which was treated as prejudicial to good order and discipline of the Force. He was ordered to be removed from service for this after trial. Given regard to the nature of the charge and the requirements of discipline of an armed Force, it does not appear to us that the punishment awarded to petitioner was attended by any irrationality or perversity or that it was so strikingly disproportionate as to shock the judicial conscience. We, accordingly, find no scope to interfere and, Therefore, dismiss this petition.