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Judgment
Heard.
By these two Writ Petitions, there is a common challenge to the judgment and order passed by the Industrial Court, Nagpur in Revision (ULPN) No.75 of 2008.
The Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation (MSRTC) has filed Writ Petition No.4252 of 2012 to quash and set aside the order passed by the Industrial Court, Nagpur, whereas the employee, namely Jagjivan Shende, has filed the petition for modification of order to the extent that he is entitled to full back wages which are denied by the Industrial Court while allowing the revision.
In the present matter, to consider the controversy involved in the petition, certain facts are required to be recorded. The employee, namely Jagjivan Shende, has joined the service as a Conductor on 18.12.2003 with MSRTC Nagpur Division, Nagpur. At the time of joining the services, he has filled in Schedule-C form of attestation. In the said form, there was a specific clause wherein the employee has to give the specific answer as to whether any criminal case is pending against him or not, or whether he has been convicted by any Court or not. The employee has given the answer to that clause as “No”. Accordingly, he has been continued in service with effect from 18.12.2003.
It is the submission of the MSRTC after his appointment, in a regular course, the Vigilance Department of the respondent on 23.03.2005 while collecting general information, in case they came across the fact that the offence is registered under Sections 496 and 498-A of Indian Penal Code in Sakkardara Police Station, Nagpur vide Crime No.102 of 2003 against Jagjivan Shende. In pursuance of said registration of the offence, criminal case bearing No.320 of 2003 was also pending before learned Judicial Magistrate, Nagpur.
After receipt of information to the MSRTC, they have discharged the services of the petitioner w.e.f. 26.08.2005 by recording the reason that the employee has committed serious error by furnishing wrong information under Column 11 of Annexure ‘C’.
The employee being aggrieved by the order of discharge has filed the complaint (ULPA) No.24 of 2006 before the Labour Court, Nagpur. The MSRTC has strongly opposed the complaint. Accordingly, the issues were framed and parties have led their evidence before the Labour Court. Before the Labour Court, the employee has admitted the fact that he is educated up to 12th Standard and he can read and write the Marathi language. It is also admitted by him that he can fill up the form, if he asked to fill the same in a Marathi language. He admitted that the form ‘C’ he has been filled by him in his own handwriting. He further admitted that he has written ‘No’ against the information as to whether any criminal case pending against him or not.
In view of this admission of the employee before the Labour Court and the fact that there was a complaint registered against him under Sections 496 and 498-A of the Indian Penal Code pending before the Competent Court of law, the learned Labour Court by its order dated 04.02.2008 dismissed the complaint by holding that at the time of submitting the information, employee has furnished wrong information and, therefore, the MSRTC has rightly discharged his services in the matter.
The employee has challenged the said order in Revision (ULP) No.75 of 2008 before the Industrial Court, Nagpur. The learned Industrial Court, by the impugned judgment and order, has allowed the revision by holding that the employee has completed more than 180 days including his weekly off and other holidays and by giving the benefit of Clause 49 of the Settlement of 1956, which was the settlement arrived in between MSRTC and Union, and thereby hold that the employee has acquired the status of a permanent employee, and therefore, before taking any action against him, the departmental inquiry was required to be conducted as per Clause 26 of the Employees’ Discipline and Appeal Procedure of MSRTC.
The learned Industrial Court further recorded the finding that the employee namely Jagjivan Shende was employed as a bus conductor by the MSRTC. At the time of submitting the information, he was not convicted in any criminal case and admittedly after the submission of the form, he has been acquitted in criminal case. Hence, the information which is alleged to be suppressed by him is not of a vital importance and serious in nature to deprive him the opportunity of being employed as a conductor, especially when there is no material on record that the pending criminal case or arrest in criminal matter would disqualify the candidate from being selected or holding the post of conductor.
Learned Industrial Court further held that the discharge of the employee from the service is a penal action and same cannot be permitted without following the principles of natural justice. Hence, not holding of domestic inquiry as per the rules made entitled the employee for reinstatement on the post. Recording all these findings, the revision was allowed and the MSRTC was directed to reinstate the employee namely Jagjivan Shende on the post of conductor with continuity of service from the date of his discharge till he is taken on duty, but without back wages.
The MSRTC has filed Writ Petition 4252/2012 before this Court against the judgment and order of Industrial Court. In this petition, this Court has granted “Rule” by order dated 21.02.2013 by recording the finding that as the appointment was fraudulently obtained by making a false statement in the application in regard to the pendency of the criminal case is void or voidable is pending before the Larger Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in reference, and hence, the impugned order passed by the Industrial Court was stayed during the pendency of the present petition.
After filing of the petition by the MSRTC before this Court, employee namely Jagjivan Shende has also preferred Writ Petition No.623 of 2013 seeking thereby modification to the order of Industrial Court to the extent that he is entitled for full back wages from the date of discharge from service till reinstatement. The said petition is, therefore, tagged with the present petition and accordingly, both the petitions are taken up for final disposal.
In the present matter, before considering the controversy, it would be relevant to refer the certain rules and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India.
The MSRTC has relied upon the Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation (Recruitment, Promotion, Seniority and Recategorisation) Procedure. As per the said rules, particularly Clause 26 therein, it is specifically stated “a candidate who is found to have knowingly furnished any particulars which are false, or to have suppressed material information of a character, which, if known, would ordinarilly have debarred him from obtaining employment in Government service, is liable to be disqualified and, if appointed, to be discharged from service”.
The Discipline and Appeal Procedure Rules of MSRTC has provided that if any disciplinary action is to be taken against the employee for any misconduct, then procedure as contemplated in the said rules requires to be followed. According to the employee, as per the said rules, if any employee himself or any other person has done any criminal act or any information in respect of MSRTC is not disclosed intentionally or by giving false information to keep continue the service amount to misconduct, and for that purpose, the departmental inquiry is necessary. In this regard, the employee has pointed out Clause 29 of Annexure A of the said rules.
In this regard, it would be first necessary to consider the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Avtar Singh v. Union of India and others, reported in 2016 (8) SCC 471, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has, by considering the various decisions, explained their view and summarized their conclusion in Paragraph No.30, which reads as under:
“30.We have noticed various decisions and tried to explain and reconcile them as far as possible. In view of aforesaid discussion, we summarize our conclusion thus:
(1)Information given to the employer by a candidate as to conviction, acquittal or arrest, or pendency of a criminal case, whether before or after entering into service must be true and there should be no suppression or false mention of required information.
(2)While passing order of termination of services or cancellation of candidature for giving false information, the employer may take notice of special circumstances of the case, if any, while giving such information.
(3)The employer shall take into consideration the Government orders/instructions/rules, applicable to the employee, at the time of taking the decision.
(4)In case there is suppression or false information of involvement in a criminal case where conviction or acquittal had already been recorded before filling of the application/verification form and such fact later comes to knowledge of employer, any of the following recourse appropriate to the case may be adopted : -
(a)In a case trivial in nature in which conviction had been recorded, such as shouting slogans at young age or for a petty offence which if disclosed would not have rendered an incumbent unfit for post in question, the employer may, in its discretion, ignore such suppression of fact or false information by condoning the lapse.
(b)Where conviction has been recorded in case which is not trivial in nature, employer may cancel candidature or terminate services of the employee.
(c)If acquittal had already been recorded in a case involving moral turpitude or offence of heinous/serious nature, on technical ground and it is not a case of clean acquittal, or benefit of reasonable doubt has been given, the employer may consider all relevant facts available as to antecedents, and may take appropriate decision as to the continuance of the employee.
(5)In a case where the employee has made declaration truthfully of a concluded criminal case, the employer still has the right to consider antecedents, and cannot be compelled to appoint the candidate.
(6)In case when fact has been truthfully declared in character verification form regarding pendency of a criminal case of trivial nature, employer, in facts and circumstances of the case, in its discretion may appoint the candidate subject to decision of such case.
(7)In a case of deliberate suppression of fact with respect to multiple pending cases such false information by itself will assume significance and an employer may pass appropriate order cancelling candidature or terminating services as appointment of a person against whom multiple criminal cases were pending may not be proper.
(8)If criminal case was pending but not known to the candidate at the time of filling the form, still it may have adverse impact and the appointing authority would take decision after considering the seriousness of the crime.
(9)In case the employee is confirmed in service, holding Departmental enquiry would be necessary before passing order of termination/removal or dismissal on the ground of suppression or submitting false information in verification form.
(10)For determining suppression or false information attestation/verification form has to be specific, not vague. Only such information which was required to be specifically mentioned has to be disclosed. If information not asked for but is relevant comes to knowledge of the employer the same can be considered in an objective manner while addressing the question of fitness. However, in such cases action cannot be taken on basis of suppression or submitting false information as to a fact which was not even asked for.
(11)Before a person is held guilty of suppressio veri or suggestio falsi, knowledge of the fact must be attributable to him.”
The judgment of Avtar Singh (supra) is recently followed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Bappa Barai v. Union of India and others, reported in 2026 DGLS (SC) 912. As such, principles culled out in Avtar Singh (supra) are till date holding the field. Hence, same needs consideration while deciding the petition.
In the light of this factual as well as legal position, I have heard the arguments advanced by both the parties before this Court and various case laws which they have pointed out in the matter.
The petitioner has made first submission before this that, once the Labour Court, by appreciating the evidence, has decided the complaint, then in revision, the Industrial Court, which is having the jurisdiction of superintendence and supervision only, cannot re-appreciate the material on record. In revision, the Industrial Court cannot overturn the findings of fact recorded by the Labour Court, and therefore, the Industrial Court, by exceeding its jurisdiction, passed the impugned order.
In respect of submission that Industrial Court is having a limited jurisdiction under Section 44 of the Industrial Disputes Act, has relied upon the judgment of this Court reported in Vithal Gatlu Marathe Vs. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation and others reported in 1995 (1) C.L.R. 854, particularly paragraph Nos.1 and 2, which reads as under:
“1.Heard learned Counsel for the appellant as well as the learned Counsel for the respondents. Perused the judgments of the Industrial Court and also the Labour Court. The Industrial Court was moved against the judgment of the Labour Court under Section 44 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971. The provisions of Section 44 are almost in pari materia with the provisions of Article 227 of the Constitution of India. This is not so much a revisional jurisdiction, but jurisdiction of superintendence. It has been settled for about four decades that in exercise of this jurisdiction of superintendence and supervision, the Court cannot go to appreciate to re-appreciate the materials on record. It may be that in a given case or cases, we have, in our anxiety to do justice, have done so on occasions. But that is a different matter.
2.After hearing the strenuous arguments of Mr. Sawant for respondent Nos. 1 and 2, we have not been able to persuade ourselves to agree that in exercise of limited jurisdiction under Section 44 of the said Act, the Industrial Court can re-appreciate evidence and overturn findings of fact however erroneous those findings may be.”
The MSRTC has further raised a ground of limitation in the present petition. According to the petitioner, the services of the employee have been discharged by order dated 26.08.2005, but the complaint was filed by him on 13.03.2006; as such, same was barred by limitation. Therefore, the complaint itself was not tenable and ought to have been rejected on the ground of limitation.
The respondent has further stated that once it is established on record that the employee has furnished the incorrect information in the form which is required to be submitted after joining in the service, the action of discharge taken by MSRTC is justified in the matter. In support of his submission, he has relied upon the judgment of Avtar Singh (supra) and the judgment delivered by this Court in the case of Supriya Vinayak Gawande vs. State of Maharashtra and others, reported in (2023) 1 Mah.L.J. 567.
Per contra, the employee has relied upon the judgment of the Industrial Court and findings recorded therein. According to him, he has obtained the status of a confirmed employee in the establishment of MSRTC as he has completed more than 180 days after his appointment, and therefore, without conducting inquiry, his services cannot be discharged. Therefore, the action taken by the MSRTC is in violation of the Discipline and Appeal Rules. Therefore, the Industrial Court has rightly considered the controversy, and hence, interference of this Court is not necessary in the matter.
He has also relied upon the judgment of Avtar Singh (supra) and stated that while considering the case of giving false information, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that while deciding this issue, the yardstick is to be applied considering the nature of post and the criteria for services. According to him, if the higher post is involved, then more rigorous criteria can be applied, and then the MSRTC may be right in saying so that due to non-supplying the information, his services can be discharged. But if there is a lower post where the nature of duties and impact of suppression is required to be considered, and power has to be exercised by taking consideration of various aspects. However, in the present case, from the impugned order of discharge, there is no such consideration in the matter, and therefore, applying the principles laid down in the case of Avtar Singh (supra), the impugned order of discharge is liable to be quashed and set aside.
In support of his submission, the employee has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Regional Manager, Bank of Baroda vs. Presiding Officer, Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and another, reported in AIR 1999 SC 912. In the said case, the employer, before taking the decision, has awaited for the decision of the Court in which the proceedings are pending against the employee, and as the employee has been acquitted from the proceeding, he has been continued in service. According to the petitioner in this case, the impact of crime was considered and then the decision was taken in the matter. However, in the present case, no such procedure has been applied, and therefore, the learned Industrial Court has rightly considered this aspect and therefore, indulgence of this Court is not necessary in the present matter.
The employee has further relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shtrughana Yadav vs. Fertilizers and Chemical Travancore Ltd and ors. reported in 2026 DGLS (SC) 884. In the said case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in paragraph No.24 as under:
“24.To summarise, the enquiry to be undertaken by the employer, before proceeding to terminate the services of an employee on the ground of suppression of information regarding criminal antecedents, is essentially two-pronged. The first is one of fact: whether there has, in truth, been any suppression or furnishing of false information by the candidate, having regard to the extent of his knowledge at the relevant time and the circumstances in which the declaration came to be made. The second prong of enquiry requires the authorities to apply their mind to the specific facts and circumstances of the case including the type of the suppression, the nature of allegations, role and gravity of the offence, the nature of the post and the duties attached to it and wherever relevant the effect thereof, and the eventual outcome of the criminal proceedings, if concluded, in order to arrive at a considered conclusion as to whether the continuation of the employee in service would not be feasible and the only option available is termination from service. It is only where both these stages of enquiries are undertaken and not otherwise, that an order of termination on this ground can be said to be sustainable in law.”
In the present case, after going through the rival submission and the case laws which are referred above, it will be necessary to record the fact that the petitioner was appointed on a compassionate ground by virtue of the order passed by this Court on 18.12.2003. At that time, he was given the Form 'C', wherein the employee has to submit the correct factual position, which is become a part of record of the Corporation. The perusal of the said Form at its inception states that if any information which is suppressed or found to be false, then the employee would be disqualified and would be held not eligible for the appointment in MSRTC. So also, Clause 11(c) is very specific, and for the perusal, the same is reproduced as under:
“क) तुमच्यावर कधी खटला भरण्यात आला होता काय ? तुम्हाला अटक स्थानबद्ध किंवा बंदीस्त केले होते काय? किंवा कोणत्याही अपराधाबद्दल न्यायालयाने तुम्हाला दोषी करवून दंड केला होता काय? किंवा कोणत्याही आरोपाने आपल्याला परिक्षेत बसावयासाठी निवडीसाठी अपात्र ठरविले होते काय? किंवा कोणत्या विद्यापिठाने/संस्थेने काढून टाकले होते काय ?”
In the present case, the employee has categorically admitted in his evidence before the Labour Court that he is a 12th Standard pass and understood the Marathi language. Therefore, considering the fact that the offence under Sections 496 and 498-A of the Indian Penal Code was pending against him before the competent Court of law, and the charge sheet was also served on him on 28.08.2003, while submitting the details in the Form ‘C’ on 11.12.2003, it was expected from the applicant that he should submit the correct factual position to the authority. But here, it is clear that petitioner has admittedly given the incorrect information about the pendency of criminal proceeding against him.
The recruitment rules of the MSRTC, particularly Recruitment, Promotion, Seniority, and Recategorization Procedure, specifically contemplate under its Clause 26 that a candidate who is found to have knowingly furnished any particulars which are false or have suppressed material information of a character shall be debarred from obtaining employment and liable to be disqualified. Therefore, this aspect is required consideration in the present matter.
The learned Industrial Court reached to the conclusion that as he has completed 180 days in the establishment, therefore, he has obtained the status of permanent employee, and therefore inquiry was necessary in the matter. In this regard, it would be relevant to refer the judgment delivered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Gangadhar Pillai vs. Siemens Limited reported in 2007 (8) MH.L.J. 883, wherein in paragraph No.29, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has specifically observed that concept of 240 days of continuous service in a year is applicable only in a cases where the issue of retrenchment under Section 25-F of Industrial Disputes Act is involved. For other purpose, the said 240 days cannot be made applicable. The observation recorded by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph No.29 is reproduced as under:
“29.It is not the law that on completion of 240 days of continuous service in a year, the concerned employee becomes entitled to for regularization of his services and/or permanent status. The concept of 240 days in a year was introduced in the industrial law for a definite purpose. Under the Industrial Disputes Act, the concept of 240 days was introduced so as to fasten a statutory liabilities upon the employer to pay compensation to be computed in the manner specified in Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 before he is retrenched from services and not for any other purpose. In the event a violation of the said provision takes place, termination of services of the employee may be found to be illegal, but only on that account, his services cannot be directed to be regularized. Direction to reinstate the workman would mean that he gets back the same status.”
In view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, the criteria which is adopted by the Industrial Court to hold that the employee has become the permanent employee is contrary to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. Consequently, holding the employee as a permanent employee and thereby, observing that inquiry ought to have been conducted before discharging his services found to be incorrect as per the settled principles of law.
It is further pertinent to note that in the present case, the employee has submitted the wrong information. It came to the knowledge of the department in a regular vigilance inquiry, and immediately thereafter, the decision is taken in the matter. By that time, employee has completed only one year and eight months service. This fact is clear from the impugned order dated 26.08.2005. Therefore, the employee who has obtained the employment by rendering false information cannot have a right over the post, and hence the Industrial Court committed an error by holding that the inquiry was necessary in the matter.
It is further pertinent to note that the judgment of a Constitutional Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Avtar Singh (surpa) has specifically held that “the information given to the employer by a candidate as to conviction, acquittal or arrest, or pendency of a criminal case, whether before or after entering into service, must be true and there should be no suppression or false mention of required information.” In the present case, it is seen that there is a suppression of information at the instance of employee without any justification. Hence, applying the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Avtar Singh (surpa), the discharge order dated 26.08.2005 issued by the MSRTC cannot be faulted in the matter.
The case laws which employee has relied upon in the present matter are not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case. The judgment in the case of Regional Manager, Bank of Baroda (supra) and Shatrughna Yadav (supra), if perused minutely, it would be clear that in both cases, the information which was suppressed was within the knowledge of the employer, and therefore, in those cases, considering the factors as enumerated in the case of Avtar Singh (supra), the respective Court has granted benefit in favour of the employee. However, in the present case, there is a clear-cut suppression of fact and therefore, those judgments are not applicable in the matter.
It is further pertinent to note that in the present case, the employee has rendered only one year and eight months service. He is out of employment since 26.08.2005. It is clear from the record that he has not been confirmed in the service by any order of the appointment. Therefore, such employee who was not confirmed in the service, and the information against him about the pendency of the criminal case was came to the knowledge within a short period, such employee cannot claim a right over the post. Hence, in such cases, the indulgence is required of this Court on factual as well as legal grounds as stated above.
In the circumstances, the Industrial Court, who has exceeded its jurisdiction by substituting the view expressed by the Labour Court, and further, the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India is very clear that person who has suppressed the pendency of a criminal offence registered against him is not entitled for any relief, in my considered opinion, the impugned order passed by the Industrial Court dated 18.01.2012 is liable to be quashed and set aside. Accordingly, following order is passed:
ORDER
Writ Petition No.4252 of 2012 is allowed.
ii) Writ Petition No.623 of 2013 is dismissed.
iii) The judgment and order passed by the Labour Court dated 04.02.2008 in Complaint ULP No.24 of 2006 is restored.
Both Writ Petitions stand disposed of in above terms. No order as to costs.
