Maharani Janki Kuer vs Kukur Dusadh and Others

These five cases arise from a decision of the Special Judge of Champaran upon appeals from the Assistant Settlement Officer decreeing in a modified form suits for enhancement of rent upon holdings held under the Bettia Raj. The applicant before us is the Court of Wards Acting for the Bettia Raj. The grounds taken in revision are that the limitations put by the Special Judge upon the enhancement applied for were based upon an unlawful exercise of the discretion vested in him by Section 35 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. The learned Judge in dealing with these cases considered, firstly, the disparity between the prices of staple food crops for the ten years immediately prior to the application for settlement of vent and the prices of those crops during the ten years immediately prior to that period. He ascertained that if the disparity alone be considered, the Raj was, entitled to an enhancement of 4 1/2 annas in the rupee; but in view of the fact that the disparity was an abnormal disparity, considered that it would be unfair to give an enhancement of 4 1/2 annas, and, therefore, gave an enhancement of three annas only. Objection is taken to this line of reasoning on two grounds, firstly, that u/s 32 it must be taken that the Legislature had considered, before settling periods of ten years as the periods to be compared, all possibility of abnormal rises and falls in specific years. It is argued that the ten years'' rule was inserted after full consideration by the Legislative Council and that the discretion vested in the Judge u/s 35 was not meant to extend ''to a modification of the provisions of Section 32. It is pointed out in this connection that Section 32 itself makes provision for any abnormal rise or fall by giving the Court power to select any period of ten years it chooses as the period to be compared with the period immediately prior to the suit. The second ground taken upon which the proceedings of the Judge should be set aside is, that the whole basis of the argument that the latter years were abnormal years is based, firstly, upon evidence not legally admissible, and secondly, upon a complete misunderstanding of that evidence. With regard to both these points we are of opinion that Section 115 of the CPC does not apply. It may be that the law enunciated by the learned Judge was wrong with regard to the discretion vested in him. It may be that the evidence adduced was inadmissible. It may be that it was misunderstood. But these are all errors affecting merely the result of the cogitation of the learned Judge upon the ''facts submitted to him. They are not errors involving any question of jurisdiction. This seems to us to have been the view taken in Madhavrav Ganeshpant Oze v. Gulabbhai Lallubhai 23 B. 177 : 12 Ind. Dec.116 and the date of that decision indicates that the interferences with the decisions of the Courts below quoted in ILR 1800 Bom had not the approval of the Divisional Bench responsible for the latter decision. The latest case upon the point is Balakrishna Udayar v. Vasudeva Aiyar 40 Ind. Cas. 650 : 22 C.W.N. 50 : 15 A.L.J. 645 : 2 P.L.W. 101 : 33 M.L.J. 69 : 26 C.L.J. 143 : 19 Bom. L.R. 715 : (1917) M.W.N. 628 : 40 M. 793 : 6 L.W. 501 : 11 Bur. L.T. 48 (P.C.), in which at page 58 their Lordships of the Judicial Committee held that the section is not directed against conclusions of law or fact in which a question of jurisdiction is not involved. It is to be noted further that in Sajivan Mahto v. Gulab Chand Lal 35 Ind. Cas. 678 the Hon''ble the Chief Justice was of opinion that the decision of the District Court upon a point of law was manifestly erroneous. He declined to interfere on the ground that no appeal lay, and contented himself with pointing out the error of the District Court in order that a similar error might not be, committed in future. In the case before us we are not prepared to discuss the question whether there was any error of law in the decision of the Special Judge, but must draw attention to the danger of an implied promise to the tenants of the estate contained in the judgment before us. The learned Judge says: "I may state here that I propose to follow this decision, in all future appeals from the Bettiah Sub Division, whether or not the Assistant Settlement Officer may have stated the case as he has done in the present judgment, unless special reasons for departing from it are made out. The reasons given for the present decision are of general application, and it would not be fair that decisions should vary because one Assistant Settlement Officer states the same case differently from another. If Second Appeal No. 13 of 1916 were now before me I should decide it differently on this point." The Court of Wards naturally anticipates that the '' special reasons referred to in this passage must be reasons not hitherto advanced. We have no doubt that this is not the true meaning of the passage. Inasmuch as no appeal lies front the judgment of the Special Judge, we are confident that all further appeals will be heard upon their merits, and the arguments on the points urged again considered. The learned Judge has been moved to change his opinion already in one directory. It may be that on further consideration he may be moved to change it in another. We may note for instance that there is said to be authority for the proposition that Government publications are not admissible in evidence. This is a point which should be considered before quotations are allowed from Administration reports. Further it is said that the Court of Wards will be able to put before the Court at the next bearing figures which will show that it is possible to divide the thirty years for which price lists have been kept in this province, into not less than twenty successive decennial periods. If it is shown as the result of the comparison of twenty successive decennial periods that the tendency in any given direction has been steady, it can no longer be said that there is in the conditions of any one period anything abnormal. These points no doubt will be regarded as special reasons for reconsideration of the judgment now before us. For the reasons stated the applications fail and. are rejected with costs, two gold mohurs in each case.